Rethinking feminist solidarity between Turkey and Syria

Article

If built on shared political principles, sustained collaboration, and equal representation, a joint feminist front between Turkey and Syria can generate the kind of transformative power that today’s anti-gender climate seeks to constrain.  

8 mart 2018 feminist gece yuruyusu
Teaser Image Caption
8 Mart 2018 tarihli feminist gece yürüyüşünden bir kare. Fotoğraf: Evrensel

Over the past decade, feminist work has been forced to operate in a rapidly deteriorating global environment in which rights once considered fundamental have become subject to political contestation. This is not a series of isolated developments, but a structural transformation shaped by a coordinated anti-gender backlash around the world.[1] The consequences of this shift extend far beyond local policies or funding cycles, reshaping the terms under which feminist advocacy can operate as legitimate political actors, and the political opportunities available to women seeking to protect and expend their rights. These dynamics, visible across a wide set of political contexts, also shape what feminist advocacy in Turkey can realistically offer to Syrian women and, more importantly, how a genuinely transnational feminist strategy might be imagined at a time when both feminist and pro-migrant/refugee movements confront similar political pressures.

To understand this landscape, it is necessary to situate feminist advocacy within the broader global climate. Over the last several years, gender equality, sexual and reproductive rights and LGBTIQ+ rights have increasingly been recast as so-called “gender ideology” or as threats to the traditional family values and national sovereignty[2]. This reframing has direct operational consequences. The controversy surrounding USAID resulted in cutting of the funds was triggered by a false narrative that the United States was supposedly shipping millions of condoms to Gaza[3]. It was not simply a media moment but signaled a broader willingness to politicize reproductive health, undermine established funding structures, and legitimize the idea that gender-focused programming is dispensable. The EU’s subsequent reallocation of resources following US cuts further consolidated this shift: gender equality, gender-based violence prevention, and gender-sensitive protection mechanisms were quietly pushed down the hierarchy of humanitarian and development priorities.

These shifts matter for humanitarian and development sectors because gender-specific funding is consistently the first to be reduced and the slowest to be restored.[4] As funding shrinks, institutional incentives change; resources flow to actors whose commitments to women’s rights are ambiguous or, in some cases, openly oppositional. Global humanitarian spaces increasingly avoid the word “gender,”[5] opting instead for depoliticized language such as “social norms” or “equality between women and men.” While seemingly harmless, these discursive shifts have profound implications. They narrow the conceptual tools available to identify structural inequalities, diminish the visibility of LGBTQI+ communities, and weaken frameworks that previously enabled gender-sensitive protection in emergency settings. The pressure also leaves feminist and queer rights advocates isolated, as their work becomes politically framed as risky or even harmful. 

Overall deterioration of rights-based frameworks 

These global dynamics intersect with national local politics in context-specific ways. In Turkey, gender equality has become increasingly reframed through a conservative, pro-family agenda. The withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention[6], discussions for a new anti-LGBTIQ+ law[7], and the designation of 2025 as the “Family Year”[8] collectively illustrate the state’s reframing of women’s rights as secondary to family-oriented and demographic concerns. While some legal protections technically remain, the political will to implement them is extremely weak, and the civic space in which feminist organizations operate continues to shrink. These changes have direct implications for any form of solidarity with Syrian women living in Turkey, whose legal vulnerabilities and experiences of discrimination are compounded by the overall deterioration of rights-based frameworks[9].

At the same time, the humanitarian system brings its own set of constraints. Turkey has hosted millions[10] of Syrian refugees over more than a decade, and protection-focused programming once occupied a central place within the aid architecture. Yet the post-earthquake surge in humanitarian funding in 2023 was short-lived and did not translate into long-term structural planning. Donor priorities increasingly revolve around return, often presented as voluntary, inevitable, or even desirable[11].However, the gendered implications of return remain one of the most poorly understood dimensions of the Turkish–Syrian context. As an example, during my work in earthquake-affected areas like Adıyaman and Hatay, I encountered many women suddenly carrying the full burden of their households after their husbands returned to Syria and did not come back, forcing them to manage childcare, unstable work, and legal insecurity alone. A gender-blind approach to return will produce gender-blind outcomes, particularly when documentation gaps, custody issues, inheritance problems, and mobility restrictions disproportionately affect women. Without strong legal and policy advocacy, the conversation around return becomes detached from the lived realities of women’s everyday survival.

Against this backdrop, thinking about the role of the Turkish feminist movement requires both recognition and critique. On the one hand, Turkey’s feminist and queer movements remain among the most resilient civil society actors despite political repression. They retain litigation capacity, experience in legal mobilization, and a long history of shaping national debates on violence and equal rights. These movements continue to protest, organize, and sustain public pressure at a time when all forms of opposition face increasing constraints, making their resilience especially significant. This institutional memory and expertise represent one of the most important resources for any transnational feminist collaboration.

“Projectization” trap 

On the other hand, the traditional women’s and feminist movements in Turkey have historically struggled with intersectionality[12], and the integration of Syrian women in advocacy work has often remained limited to project-based or service-oriented involvement rather than shared political work[13]. While some organizations such as women’s cooperatives, community-based groups, and certain long-established feminist institutions have made genuine efforts to include refugee women, these efforts often fall short of transforming governance structures or leadership pathways. The “projectization” of women’s rights work, driven by donor cycles and reporting obligations, further narrows the scope of advocacy. With most funding tied to service delivery, organizations lack stable support for long-term political mobilization.[14] This is particularly evident in relation to refugee rights, an area that is both highly politicized and increasingly risky for organizations dependent on state regulations[15].

Interestingly, queer movements and the Kurdish feminist movement in Turkey have often been more inclusive of refugee activists, creating political spaces where refugee voices are not peripheral but integral. Their experience demonstrates that the limitations facing feminist organizations are not inherent to Turkish feminism, but the result of structural constraints and conceptual blind spots that become especially visible in the context of displacement.

These dynamics suggest that the central question is not how Turkish feminists can “support” Syrian women, but how to build a shared feminist platform capable of resisting anti-gender backlash and producing meaningful political agency for both communities. Such a platform would need to move beyond donor-defined project cycles, which inherently limit sustainability. It would also require a common vocabulary that resonates with younger audiences, particularly in a climate where conservative actors excel at framing gender equality as a cultural threat. A renewed feminist language that articulates gender as a lens for understanding power, not as an imported ideology will be crucial.

Building a joint feminist front 

Furthermore, legal advocacy must remain a cornerstone of any transnational feminist strategy. Turkey’s experience demonstrates that rights-based legal frameworks, even under hostile political conditions, can shift cultural norms over time and create potential for social transformation. For Syrian women engaged in discussions about constitutional processes, governance, and post-conflict political structures, the lessons from Turkey’s feminist legal advocacy, both victories and setbacks, offer essential insights.

Ultimately, building a joint feminist front requires confronting hierarchy directly. Solidarity cannot be structured around paternalistic or one-directional support. It must instead be anchored in shared governance, mutual learning, and political equality. Syrian women bring forms of political knowledge shaped by war, displacement, and survival under authoritarian and fragmented governance. Turkish feminists bring deep experience in legal mobilization, rights-based organizing, and navigating shrinking civic spaces. Both confront anti-gender movements that are transnational, networked, and well-resourced. Building an alliance capable of responding to these forces demands a model of cooperation that mirrors this transnational architecture.

In an age of democratic backsliding, resurging ethno-nationalism, and shrinking civic space, the work ahead cannot rely on strategies that were effective a decade ago. The challenge is not only to protect existing rights, but to re-imagine how feminist movements can forge new forms of transnational solidarity that are resilient to political disruption. In keeping with a feminist tradition that insists on agency and political possibility, even when circumstances are difficult, I want to underline that this moment also offers meaningful openings. In a time when both countries navigate their own forms of political transition with the elections in Syria and the ongoing peace process in Turkey, a feminist approach to transitional justice, grounded in shared experiences and priorities becomes more crucial than ever. If built on shared political principles, sustained collaboration, and equal representation, a joint feminist front between Turkey and Syria can generate the kind of transformative power that today’s anti-gender climate seeks to constrain. 


[1]Kuhar, Roman, and David Paternotte, eds. Anti-gender campaigns in Europe: Mobilizing against equality. Bloomsbury Publishing PLC, 2017; Korolczuk, Elżbieta, Agnieszka Graff, and Johanna Kantola. "Gender danger. Mapping a decade of research on anti-gender politics." Journal of Gender Studies (2025): 1-20.

[2] Kuhar and Paternotte, Anti-Gender Campaigns in Europe; Elżbieta Korolczuk and Agnieszka Graff, “Gender as ‘Ebola from Brussels’: The Anticolonial Frame and the Rise of Illiberal Populism,” Signs 43, no. 4 (2018): 797–821.

[3]Reuters, “No Evidence U.S. Spent $50 Million on Condoms for Gaza” (Jan. 30 2025) https://www.reuters.com/fact-check/no-evidence-us-spent-50-million-condoms-gaza-2025-01-30/

Alan Jaffe, FactCheck.org, “Trump Administration Makes Unsupported Claim About $50 Million for Condoms to Gaza” (Jan. 30 2025) https://www.factcheck.org/2025/01/trump-administration-makes-unsupported-claim-about-50-million-for-condoms-to-gaza/

[4]CARE International, She Leads in Crisis: Ensuring Women’s Leadership in COVID-19 Response and Recovery (Geneva: CARE International, 2021); Development Initiatives, Funding for Gender-Relevant Humanitarian Response  (2022).

[5]ODI/HPG, Victims, Perpetrators or Agents of Change? Gender Norms in Humanitarian Protection (London, 2025); Reuters, “UN Aid Agencies Told to Avoid ‘Controversial’ Language Amid Political Pressure,” February 14, 2025  https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/society-equity/us-targets-diversity-equity-inclusion-united-nations-2025-02-14/

[6]Derya Ercoşkun Şenol and Yusuf Şenol, “Assessment of Turkey’s Legal Framework on Combating Violence against Women After the Withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention,” Public and Private International Law Bulletin 45, no. 1 (2025): 1–21; Ayşe Güneş and Çağlar Ezikoğlu, “Legal and Political Challenges of Gender Equality and Crimes against Women in Turkey: The Question of the Istanbul Convention,” Women & Criminal Justice 33, no. 1 (2023): 14–27. Burcu Özdemir-Sarıgil and Marella Bodur Ün, “Contesting the Norm Contester: Responses to Turkey’s Withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies (2025).

[7] Kaos GL, “Yargı paketine tepkiler çığ gibi büyüyor: ‘LGBTİ+ karşıtı yasa tasarısı çöpe,’” Kaos GL Haber Portalı, October 17, 2025 https://kaosgl1.org/haber/yargi-paketine-tepkiler-cig-gibi-buyuyor-lgbti-karsiti-yasa-tasarisi-cope 

[8]Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye, “President Erdoğan Announces 2025 as the ‘Year of the Family’,” official statement, 2024.

[9] İNGEV, Research on Violence against Refugee Women in Southeast Turkey (Istanbul: İNGEV, 2024).

[10]According to UNHCR data, as of mid-2025, Türkiye hosted approximately 2.52 million Syrians under temporary protection, while an estimated 474,000 Syrians had returned to Syria by early September 2025. https://reliefweb.int/report/turkiye/unhcr-turkiye-fact-sheet-september-2025

[11]UNHCR Türkiye Operational Update – March 2025https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/2025-07/türkiye-operational-update-march-2025.pdf. ; Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan (3RP) – Türkiye Country Chapter 2023–2025, 2024, https://reliefweb.int/report/turkiye/turkiye-3rp-country-chapter-2023-2025-2024-update-entr.

[12]Diner, Cagla, and Şule Toktaş. "Waves of feminism in Turkey: Kemalist, Islamist and Kurdish women's movements in an era of globalization." Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies12, no. 1 (2010): 41-57. Arat, Yeşim. "Toward a democratic society: The women's movement in Turkey in the 1980s." In Women's Studies International Forum, vol. 17, no. 2-3, pp. 241-248. (1994).

[13]Dağtaş, Seçil, and Şule Can. "“Distant Toleration”: The Politics of Solidarity Work among Turkish and Syrian Women in Southern Turkey." Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society 29, no. 1 (2022): 261-284; Can, Şule. "Refugees as ‘Projects’: Humanitarian Responses to Displacement and Refugee-Led Organisations in Southern Turkey." Journal of Humanitarian Affairs 6, no. 1 (2025): 24-37.

[14]Çağla Parlak, Hilal Gençay, Özgün Akduran Erol, and Zeynep Ekin Aklar, “Building Transformative, Collaborative, Feminist and Accountable Funding Ecosystems for Feminist Organisations in Türkiye,” in The Architecture of Change: Feminist Pathways to Financing Gender Equality (2025)

[15]Amanda Gray Meral, Mia Tong, Josephine Whitaker-Yilmaz, Türker Saliji, Ceren Topgül, and Meryem Aslan, “Refugee Advocacy in Turkey: From Local to Global,” Humanitarian Policy Group Working Paper, Overseas Development Institute (2021).