This analysis looks at the regional dynamics before and after the 12-Day War between Israel and Iran and analyzes the opportunities and challenges the War has presented for Türkiye. It argues that the weakening of Iran leaves Türkiye and Israel as the main rivals in the region’s strategic balance. Syria risks being the major theater where this rivalry could escalate.
Christopher Phillips argues that the Middle East regional politics witness new parameters, changes, dividing lines, and dominant ideologies/identities almost every decade. The regional order in the first decade of the 2000s started with 9/11, the invasion of Iraq, and the collapse of Baghdad, “the gate-keeper” of the Arab world against Iran. The decade witnessed the rising power of Iran in the region, with other non-Arab states following suit – Türkiye and Israel. It enhanced the role of violent non-state actors, brought divisions based on sectarian identities, and a “new Middle East Cold War”, pitting Iran and Saudi Arabia against each other. The following decade, the 2010s, witnessed uprisings that swept over the region. While initially igniting a hope for change, the region ended up with a new wave of authoritarianism and civil wars during this decade. As a multi-actor, multi-layered war, the Syrian civil war became a stage of regional and international competition. It magnified the Iranian influence as Tehran and its affiliated web of armed groups fought in Syria alongside the Assad regime, helping it to survive, which consequently also helped Hezbollah to further increase its power in Lebanon.
Türkiye, as a staunch anti-Assad actor, hosted the Syrian opposition and refugees and came militarily into Syria after 2016. Israel, increasingly threatened by the growing power of Iran, found further common ground with the Gulf monarchies on the need to curb Iran’s power. The third decade of the 2000s came with a new agenda - a hope for a “normalized Middle East”. With a fragile equilibrium re-established in Syria and its subsequent reintegration into the Arab League; Türkiye emerging from regional isolation by abandoning its support for the Muslim Brotherhood and mending ties with Egypt and the Gulf monarchies; the signing of the Abraham Accords leading to Israel’s normalization with Bahrain, the UAE, Sudan, and Morocco; and diplomatic mediation between Iran and Saudi Arabia — normalization became the defining trend of the early 2020s.
Yet, this was rather short-lived. While Israel’s normalization through the Abraham Accords still holds, the region witnessed another spiraling of conflict, after the 7 October Hamas attacks, making the third decade yet again dominated by war. The emerging regional dynamics so far seem to serve the ascendance of Israel at the expense of the Palestinian issue, the weakening of Iran and its allies, and the challenge this poses for the Turkish role in the region. The Israel-Iran war of June 2025, the 12-Day War, can be read as a part of the competition over the regional leadership between Iran and its allies, Israel (supported by the Gulf monarchies through the continuing Abraham Accords), and Türkiye (in a loose cooperation with Qatar).
The aftermath of the Hamas attacks on Israel on 7 October 2023 created a strategic opening for Israel to escalate its confrontation with Iran and its proxy network, particularly Hezbollah. Throughout 2024, Israel launched a series of targeted operations against Iranian interests in Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon, prompting direct retaliation from Iran. When opposition groups, led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, began to march to Damascus in November 2024, Iran was too weak to counter the rebels’ revolt and consequently lost influence in the country. Israel’s most recent strikes were unprecedented as they weredirectly aimed at various nuclear, military, energy facilities, and top generals and leaders in Iran. These strikes were widely interpreted as a last-ditch attempt to dismantle Iran’s regional leverage, derail prospects for a renewed nuclear agreement with the United States, and isolate Tehran both regionally and globally, with the ultimate aim of fostering conditions for regime change.
Turkish position on the Israel Iran war and its opportunities
As the Israeli attack on Iran began, President Erdoğan said on X that the Netanyahu government’s “reckless, lawless and aggressive actions risk plunging the Middle East and the world into disaster” and added that they “do not want to see more bloodshed, destruction, or conflict” in the region. While calling on the international community to “put an end to Israel’s banditry, which threatens global and regional stability,” Erdoğan was rather cautious and remained short of condemning the U.S. strikes on Iran, as he wanted to keep good relations with President Trump. Turkish-U.S. relations have been on the rise since the beginning of Trump’s new term. The newly appointed U.S. Ambassador to Türkiye, Tom Barrack, is also the special envoy for Syria, to which Türkiye gives significant importance. Besides, the Ambassador’s statements regarding the possibility of F-35 sales to Türkiye and the lifting of CAATSA sanctions by the end of the year seem important indicators of Türkiye’s growing ties with the U.S., which Ankara would not want to disrupt. Also, not condemning the U.S. could have helped Erdoğan to play a potential role in mediation between Iran and the U.S.. This would not only enhance his image but also Türkiye’s role globally, and more importantly, could be used to ramp up domestic political support.
Türkiye has long viewed Iran and its regional network with caution. Over the past decade, the two countries have competed for influence—particularly in Syria—while maintaining a delicate balance through selective cooperation in areas such as energy and trade. Therefore, a weakening of Iran’s regional position is largely seen as a strategic gain for Ankara. Türkiye has also consistently expressed concern over the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran, fearing that it would shift the regional power balance decisively in Tehran’s favor. In this context, constraints on Iran’s nuclear program align with Türkiye’s interests. While recent bombings may, paradoxically, accelerate Iran’s drive toward nuclear capability rather than deter it, the short-term erosion of Iranian influence benefits Türkiye’s regional posture.
Israel also saw the limits of its power in this confrontation, albeit less than Iran. Israel hit Iranian nuclear centers hard, but despite the accompanying U.S. bombing, there is no certainty about the extent of the destruction of Iranian nuclear facilities. Iran has targeted and hit centers in Israel with its bombs, and Israel’s regime change strategy in Iran seems to have failed. Seeing the limits of Israeli power has also been an important factor for Türkiye’s strategic calculations in the region.
Is a weaker Iran good for Türkiye?
A National Interest article suggested that Türkiye would prefer to see Iran as weak and divided. However, I find this assertion questionable. While a weakened Iran—and by extension, its regional allies—could indeed benefit Türkiye’s ambitions for regional power projection, a divided Iran would also pose significant risks. Most notably, it could empower Kurdish groups within Iran, potentially fueling aspirations for autonomy. This would directly challenge Türkiye’s strategic interests, especially in light of the ongoing PKK disarmament process and the fragile state of the “Terror-free Türkiye” process at home. In this context, any renewed momentum on the Kurdish front in the region would be seen as highly problematic by Ankara.
Although the war has ended, its prolongment could have brought possible cross-border threats to Türkiye. A possible destabilization of Iran could lead to increased oil prices and disruption of gas flows to Türkiye, which could put the country’s already fragile economy at risk. Iran provides 13.5 percent of gas flows to Türkiye, and any change there could severely impact the Turkish economy. The prolongment of the conflict could also bring concerns about possible refugee flows, which would put further strain on Türkiye’s economy and society amidst the ongoing debate on the millions of Syrian refugees and programs to facilitate their return to Syria.
Kürecik NATO radar
As the war started, a heated debate emerged on Kürecik – the NATO-controlled radar station collecting information on threats from the Middle East, mostly Iran, in operation since 2012. The debate centered on two issues: whether the presence of the radar station could cause an Iranian attack on Turkish soil and whether the intelligence gathered from Kürecik was being shared with Israel in the war, helping it intercepts missiles from Iran with an early warning system. The answer to the first question seems rather easy, as it is not the radar system of the U.S. but of NATO; any attack on it would invoke Article Five and a collective response, which Iran would not want to confront. Thus, an Iranian attack on Kürecik remains highly unlikely. Yet the answer to the second question has been difficult to discern. Ankara officially denied any allegations that Kürecik served Israel’s interests during the war. Since its establishment, the question of whether intelligence was shared with Israel on Iran from Kürecik has been on the agenda. Over the years, on many different occasions, both Ankara and NATO officials underlined that this was to serve NATO members only, not third parties, namely Israel. However, the U.S. strikes on Iran in the recent war were conducted based on the information from Kürecik and indirectly served Israeli interests. Therefore, Ankara came under criticism from the opposition parties on this, considering how this system served Israel, albeit indirectly.
Reshuffling regional rivalry
As Iran’s power further declined with the 12-Day War, Türkiye found itself in an enhanced competition with Israel. Türkiye sees Israel’s increased power in the region as a threat, and Israel has been open about its concern about the growing role of Türkiye. Especially since the Assad regime collapsed and the al-Shaara-led interim government was formed, louder calls in Israel about the need to check Türkiye’s power began to be heard. Israel was called to “push back against Turkish expansionism now rather than later,” and news urging the Knesset to act swiftly to equip Israel’s leaders with the tools to set policy to meet the challenges posed by a resurgent Türkiye, with different scenarios of confrontation widely circulated.
Analyses making parallelisms between Ankara and Tehran also became common. Rubin argues that Türkiye was in a similar position to Tehran with its “domestic military industry, building a nuclear program under a civilian guise and acting as a state-sponsor of terror by supporting Hamas and Hezbollah.” He said, “combined with an anti-Israeli rhetoric, this creates a dangerous parallel” between Iran and Türkiye, calling on the West “not to ignore the potential threat from Türkiye.” Analyses from the Turkish side also pointed out the need to confront Israel. Yeşiltaş calls on Türkiye to implement “preventive frameworks” to “limit unilateral actors such as Israel” as “regional security cannot be left to the whims of actors whose strategic logic is based on escalating rather than reducing tensions”. However, as is well known, preventive frameworks not backed by military power would prove futile.
Despite the widespread idea of a potential Turkish Israeli confrontation, it still remains hard to think of the two countries attacking each other’s territory directly. First, such a military fallout will inevitably involve NATO. In case of an Israeli attack, Türkiye will call to invoke Article Five. In case of a Turkish attack, Israel will ask the U.S. to expel Türkiye out of NATO, which either way has heavy risks for the future of the Alliance. Second, such a confrontation between two of its regional allies will be against U.S. interests in the already delicate regional order. The U.S. will most probably intervene to prevent such a conflict. Third, the two countries do not directly threaten each other’s territory. Although Erdoğan argued last year that defending Gaza was defending Anatolia and Hamas was resisting against Israeli expansionist plans towards Türkiye, the two countries do not pose direct threats vis-à-vis each other. Besides, public support for a war with Israel would be limited. IstanPol’s recent poll in Türkiye indicates that only 37 percent of the respondents believe that Ankara’s policy toward Israel benefits the Palestinian people, while 40 percent think national interests and security should be prioritized in Türkiye’s approach towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in comparison to the 26,1 percent prioritizing regional diplomacy and mediation. Although one should not deny the significance of the de-escalation efforts between Türkiye and Israel in Syria that took place last April, in case the escalation continues between the two countries, one theater where we could witness confrontation could be Syria.
The emerging balance of power in the Middle East
On another front, the 12-day war demonstrated the weakness of the Syrian state and the new administration. Refraining from taking any position on the Iran-Israel War as it was concerned to be dragged into conflict, Damascus was stuck between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, the new rulers of Syria had no sympathy for Iran – they fought against Iran and its allies in Syria for over a decade and would want to see Tehran’s power decline. On the other hand, they were also concerned about the over-empowerment of Israel, fearing it could use this strength to put additional pressure on the Syrian regime, especially regarding the Golan Heights and the new settlements they built around it over the past year. So far, the weakening of Iran has served the interests of Damascus.
The interim government in Damascus has been trying to limit the Iranian role since December 8. In southern Syria, the interim government had some success in its attempt to close Iran’s weapons supply routes, especially over the border with Lebanon to Hezbollah. News from Homs in May indicated that some military operations disrupted the supply chain. Also, during the recent war, social media posts showed images of captured weapons by the Syrian authorities on their way to Hezbollah. In the northeast of Syria, though, the power of Iranian-linked groups is still high. Especially the shootings against U.S. bases by a group called Islamic Resistance of Iran still showed that Iran-related groups could operate in northeastern Syria.
While Iranian power is on decline in Syria, the country is at the center of the growing Turkish-Israeli rivalry. Türkiye, having supported and hosted the Syrian opposition for years and having close relations with some of the new leaders, saw an important leverage for itself in the country’s future after December 8. Israel also saw new opportunities in relation to the new regime in Damascus. It tried to exert influence by expanding territory around the Golan Heights and through its relations with the country’s Druze minority. Supporting Syria’s position on further limiting Iran’s role and its weapons routes, Israel has been eyeing the Turkish role and power in Syria. Having declared the establishment of a Turkish military base as its red line back in April, Israel is trying to limit what Türkiye wants to pursue in Syria - an active role in building the country’s political infrastructure, defense and military sectors; its economic and trade relations; reconstruction after the recent lifting of sanctions, to name a few. Despite the de-escalation meetings between Israel and Türkiye in Syria, the country seems to be a fertile ground for a confrontation, if not a direct war between Türkiye and Israel.
Recent news points to negotiations that have intensified after the 12-Day War over a possible peace agreement between Israel and Syria. Iran’s weakened power and an already weakened Hezbollah leave Türkiye as the main opposition to such a move. News from Israel indicates how competition with Türkiye is one of the major drivers towards seeking a peace agreement with Syria. After the ousting of the Assad regime, Israel has declared the 1974 nonaggression agreement to be null and expanded its settlements around the Golan. The reports from the negotiations point out the Israeli insistence on keeping the Golan as Israeli territory, which seems unlikely to be accepted by Damascus. Demands from the Syrian side are noted to include no Turkish bases in the country; no Iranian or Hezbollah presence; and no military deployments south of Damascus, close to Golan. Such a deal bears high risks for the legitimacy of the new Syrian regime. Yet Israel sees a window of opportunity in making a deal with Syria at the moment, with the demonstrated weakness of what remains of the Axis of Resistance.
Yet, attacks from Israel on Damascus, on the Ministry of Defense, on 16 July in support of the Druze community in Suwayda seem to jeopardize peace negotiations at least temporarily. These developments also raise critical questions about Israel’s strategic interests in Syria and their implications for Türkiye. Prior to the July 16 strikes, clashes had erupted between the Druze population, Bedouin tribes, and Syrian military forces, with the latter accused of carrying out field executions against Druze civilians in Suwayda. Israeli bombings can be understood not only as a part of its quest to protect the Druze community, whose members in Israel serve in the Israeli army and therefore also give a positive message to them, but also to avoid any presence of the Syrian army in the south, close to its border. Israel, through the bombings, is also trying to keep the new Syrian regime weak, ready to accept its terms. This is against Türkiye’s interests in two ways: Türkiye wants a functioning, unitary, central state in Syria, and a weak Syria could witness further instability in Türkiye’s southern border. Damascus could become more receptive to Israel’s demands, and Israel could control Syria’s south, which could jeopardize a strong Damascus regime. Second, a weak Syrian state could be unsuccessful in integrating the Kurdish groups effectively into the Syrian state structure and the central Army, which could be problematic for Türkiye’s ongoing “peace process” with the PKK.
The 12-Day War magnified the challenges for Türkiye regionally, particularly vis-à-vis Israel. Putting the developments in Syria at the center of its policies, Türkiye needs to rethink what kind of tools it has to enhance its role in Syria and the region, and if it is aiming to limit Israel’s regional role, what it could do to stop a possible normalization of Israel-Syrian relations. Also, going beyond the promise of lifting borders, economic cooperations, security councils, and building houses, Türkiye needs to recalibrate its strategy to match the needs of the new Middle East, whose actors are increasingly seeking loose alliances, building interconnectivities, and maintaining relationships through both hard and soft power.
This article was written as part of a joint project of Heinrich Böll Stiftung and IstanPol and was first published on the IstanPol website. The views stated in this paper belong to the author and need not agree, partly or entirely, with the institutional views of IstanPol or Heinrich Böll Stiftung.