European elections 2024: A wake-up call

Even if the interest for the 2024 European elections was not equally pronounced in all 27 EU Member States, it increased overall compared to 2019. Rarely before a European election have the historical challenges, future and role of the EU been discussed, argued and even fought over with such intensity. The following topics – with varying degrees of emphasis, of course – took centre stage: Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the climate crisis, migration, and the EU’s economic situation and competitiveness.

This essentially positive development, namely the increased awareness of the importance of the European elections, was reflected in a higher voter turnout in some EU Member States.[1] However, it was overshadowed during the election campaign by the question of the extent to which right-wing populist parties will be able to capitalise on this increased awareness, with the accompanying fears and the escalating anger of the electorate in many places, triggered by targeted disinformation and smear campaigns. In short: to what extent is the European Parliament moving to the right?

The European Parliament is moving further to the right

The answer to this question is relatively clear: only the political groups on the right have made gains compared to their overall group strength in the outgoing Parliament.[2] Even if it will still take a few weeks before the groups are finally constituted, it is clear that the conservative European People’s Party (EPP) is the strongest force, with 186 seats (+10), according to current calculations. In addition, the far-right groups of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) and Identity and Democracy (ID) have gained 73 (+4) and 58 seats (+9), respectively, although nowhere near as many seats as feared before the election. It is still unclear whether these two parliamentary groups will continue to exist in their current form, or whether they will continue to grow – for example, through the currently non-attached Hungarian Fidesz MEPs – or whether there will be a new, merged far-right parliamentary group. According to the current calculations, all of the other parliamentary groups have lost seats. While the group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) mostly maintained their position, with their 135 seats (-4), the Liberals (Renew) and the Greens/EFA (Greens/European Free Alliance) suffered heavy losses, with 79 (-23) and 53 (-18) seats, respectively. The Left Group in the European Parliament (GUE/NGL) remained stable, with 36 seats (-1). Whether left-wing nationalist parties such as the new Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), the Slovakian SMER-SSD and the Italian Movimento 5 Stelle (Five Star Movement) will come together to form a new group is questionable, as at least 23 MEPs from at least a quarter of the Member States must join forces to be able to form a group in the EP. In the outgoing Parliament, 62 MEPs were not assigned to a political group. As things stand at present, there are 45 non-attached MEPs and 55 newly elected MEPs who do not currently belong to a political group in the outgoing Parliament. A large part of the non-attached MEPs is close to the ECR or ID.

The results of the European elections are not surprising, as they reflect trends at the national level. For some years now, right-wing populist parties have been making significant gains in all regions of the EU. The participation of far-right parties in government has an impact on the voting ratios in the European Council, which will pose major challenges for the new European Commission in terms of its composition and agenda. In the last legislative period, the European Parliament was an important corrective in this respect.

In Hungary, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has been firmly in the saddle since 2010 and has been working on his project of ‘illiberal democracy’ ever since. It is no secret that although elections in Hungary are free, they have not been fair for a long time. In this context, it is surprising that the Fidesz-KDNP party alliance recorded a loss of almost eight percentage points, with 44.8%; former Fidesz politician Péter Magyar and his TISZA party (EPP), which was founded just a few months ago, gained almost 30% from a standing start. In countries such as Italy, the Netherlands and Slovakia, far-right parties have also made it into government coalitions in recent years, while the Swedish minority government is supported by the Sweden Democrats. Geert Wilders and his Party for Freedom (PVV; ID group) were the strongest party in the last parliamentary elections in 2023. Even though the red-green list (GroenLinks-PvdA; Greens/EFA and S&D groups) came out ahead of Wilders in the European elections, and thus recorded a major success, the result cannot hide the fact that the PVV made the most gains in the Netherlands with six seats (+6). For almost two years, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, who is also the leader of the ECR party, has led the government in a far-right alliance. It is clear that Meloni’s efforts to give her far-right party Fratelli d’Italia (Brothers of Italy; ECR group) a moderate image are increasingly catching on in the EU institutions. With 24 seats, it becomes the third largest national delegation in the European Parliament, after the French far-right Rassemblement National (RN), with 30 seats, and the German CDU/CSU, with 29.

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A shift to the right with political aftershocks

In some countries, the shift to the right has been particularly extreme and is causing political aftershocks. In Belgium, where a new federal parliament and regional parliaments were elected at the same time as the European elections, Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo resigned due to the poor performance of the Liberals and the success of the far-right parties. In France, President Emmanuel Macron dissolved the National Assembly following the election victory of the RN, which, with 31.4%, achieved twice as good a result as Macron’s governing alliance, and announced snap elections for 30 June and 7 July. This decision has caused surprise and perplexity, not only in France. Whether Macron will manage to unite a majority behind his alliance in three weeks, which he did not involve in his decision, is more than questionable, and the situation is extremely unclear. However, Macron could be crushed between two emerging alliances on the left and right. Macron is therefore playing high stakes and risks exacerbating a domestic political crisis that could also be dangerous for the EU. In Germany, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) came in second ahead of the SPD and the Greens, with 15.9%, despite two preliminary investigations into its lead candidate Maximilian Krah for possible bribery and alleged payments from Russia. With particular regard to France and the eastern German states, it must be noted that right-wing extremists have become the strongest force throughout. The fact that Emmanuel Macron and the German traffic light coalition government have emerged from this election so weakened is one of the worst pieces of news from this election, given the important role that France and Germany play in the EU.

Greens with some heavy losses, but also new gains

The result is particularly painful for the Greens/EFA. While they were the fourth-largest group in the European Parliament in 2019, they have now fallen to sixth place behind the far-right groups. Out of the 18 seats they are losing, nine were lost by the German Greens and seven by the French Greens. The Greens have lost ground, above all, in their traditional strongholds, and also where they are currently involved in governments. In Germany, at first glance, they have suffered a strong demobilisation of their own voter potential, especially among young voters.

On the other hand, the Greens/EFA have been able to celebrate their first electoral successes in some central and eastern EU Member States. New Green MEPs from Slovenia, Croatia and Latvia will join the EP. In addition, Greens were successful in larger left-wing alliances in the Netherlands, Italy and Spain, while in northern Europe they either made gains (Denmark) or limited their losses (Finland and Sweden). However, the high loss of seats and the weakening of the French and German delegations in the Green group will have far-reaching consequences, including in terms of the resources that the group will have for its work in the future.

Majorities must be organised more bindingly

In the past, the EP relied for a long time on a majority of the grand coalition of the EPP and S&D. However, this began to crumble during the last legislative period, making the votes of Renew necessary to obtain majorities. Beyond this coalition, alternative majorities have also been formed with the Greens in certain votes. Numerically, the EPP, S&D and Renew still have a majority in Parliament (400 out of a total of 720 seats), especially together with the Greens/EFA (taking the number to 453 seats). Therefore, there is still a democratic and pro-European majority, but it has shrunk and is much more fragile. As there are often dissenters in votes due to the plurality of parties in the parliamentary groups, the question is how stable and reliable majorities can be organised in the future. Not only does this uncertainty call into question the ability to act in key policy areas, it also jeopardises the role of the European Parliament as a reliable counterweight to illiberal and nationalist members of the European Council, such as Orbán and Meloni. A democratic, pro-European alliance with the Greens/EFA would be just as important for political stability and the European Parliament’s ability to shape the future as a clearly binding cooperation between the political groups. However, during the election campaign, Ursula von der Leyen did not rule out cooperation with the ECR, which also includes the Polish PiS (Law and Justice), alongside Fratelli d’Italia. It seems that the EPP is currently aiming for a scenario in which it works with changing majorities, including with the ECR. Immediately after the election, however, the leaders of the S&D, Renew and Greens/EFA made it clear that the exclusion of cooperation with the ECR is a condition for an alliance with them. For them, it is clear that if future majorities in the European Parliament were achieved in an alliance with the ECR, this would be a departure from the European policy guardrails of recent years.

The European Green Deal as a litmus test

In December 2019, with the tailwind of the climate movement, the then newly elected European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced the European Green Deal as a ‘man on the moon moment’, which was intended to create the conditions for the transition to a modern, resource-efficient and competitive economy. This was before the pandemic and before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. With the rapid emergence of crises, conflicts and wars, the forces of resistance to necessary change processes have also increased. It is debatable whether such a complex package of political initiatives should be heralded as a moon landing. The fact is that we are very far from a successful landing. The Green Deal has lost its appeal. There is no doubt that important measures have been put in place that need to be followed up and readjusted in the coming years in order to make the EU competitive and fulfil its commitment to be climate neutral by 2050. In the European Parliament, however, voices from the EPP, ECR and Renew are saying that a pause is needed. The EPP wants to push through a reorientation of the European Green Deal and warns that environmental policy measures could cause an investment deficit in Europe. Like the Greens/EFA, it is calling for an Industrial Deal to restructure industry, but unlike the Greens/EFA, it is not calling for this as a supplement to the Green Deal, but as an alternative to its implementation. In recent months, the EPP and ECR have caused numerous blockages, dilutions and delays in the adoption of measures to implement the objectives of the European Green Deal, jeopardising the transition to a sustainable economy and job creation. And this at a time when global competition is intensifying, and the US and China are investing heavily in green technologies. It would be a fatal decision to slow down the implementation of the European Green Deal or to review its objectives, as the ECR calls for in its election programme. If Ursula von der Leyen is re-elected and wants to credibly pursue her core project of the last legislative period, she would actually have to rely on the support of the Greens/EFA. The question is how serious the EPP and Renew really are about an ambitious deal.

What next for reform and enlargement?

The second particularly important area that a new majority in the European Parliament will have to focus on is the EU’s enlargement and neighbourhood policy. In 2019, no one expected this policy area to be characterised by such an intense dynamic a few years later. Warnings from central and eastern EU Member States about Vladimir Putin’s expansionist policies were not heeded by Western European governments, above all by the German federal governments under Angela Merkel. Since 2022, a neo-imperialist war of aggression by Russia – which not only wants to wipe Ukraine off the map as a sovereign state, but also aims to destabilise the EU – has been raging in Europe. Russia’s war against Ukraine has been a brutal reminder for over two years that the enlargement of the EU is a geopolitical necessity. But it is more than that – it is also an opportunity for the future of the EU. However, future rounds of enlargement can only contribute to strengthening the EU if they are accompanied by fundamental reforms. In response to the questions of how reform and enlargement can succeed and how the EU can become more effective, the Heinrich Böll Foundation has presented political recommendations that describe the potential for a successful reform process and the important role that Germany can play in this for a number of policy areas. The reform and enlargement agenda must be driven forward by the EU institutions in the coming years. However, this is only possible if the EPP, S&D, Renew and the Greens/EFA pull together. Because nothing is further from the minds of the anti-democratic forces in Parliament than combining the enlargement of the EU with fundamental reforms that increase the EU’s ability to act.

Responsible coalition of democratic, pro-European forces

An impressive and astute observation by former Czech President Václav Havel is more relevant today than ever: ‘An inherent disadvantage of democracy is that it ties the hands of those who are honest about it, while allowing those who do not take it seriously to do almost anything’. In the next legislative period, it will be important that those who are honest about democracy draw red lines to those who do not take democracy seriously. Submissively and naively extending a hand to anti-democratic forces, and thereby making them acceptable, will not make the EU more capable of acting, but more fragile and vulnerable. Keeping fires started by right-wing populists burning or – worse still – pouring oil on these fires is not a political strategy for preserving democracy, but a declaration of bankruptcy, with serious consequences for democratic societies. The democratic and pro-European forces must realise the seriousness of the situation, and they must reach for the fire extinguisher together and with a cool head. They should form alliances with a claim to shape politics and – beyond election campaigns – invest in de-escalating, transparent and credible communication with citizens. A special focus must be placed on young voters, who are increasingly turning to far-right parties in an alarming number of countries. In Germany, 16% of 16–24-year-olds voted for the AfD, an increase of 11 percentage points compared to 2019. The Greens lost 23 percentage points in this age group and are lagging behind at just 11%. In France, the RN became the strongest force among voters aged 18 to 34, with 32%, ahead of the far-left party La France Insoumise (20%). In Poland, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s Civic Platform (21 seats in total, including 18 for the EPP) fortunately won the European elections ahead of the PiS (ECR; 20 seats), but the far-right Konfederacja entered the European Parliament for the first time with 12% and six seats. Thirty per cent of 18–29-year-olds voted for Konfederacja, making it the strongest force among young voters.

The shift to the right in many EU Member States is not a snapshot. It is important to stop this trend, and not just since this election. Of course, it is not only the political parties that are called upon here; the results are rather an appeal to all democratically committed people and organisations. Particularly in view of the upcoming elections to the German Bundestag and the French presidency in the course of the new legislative period of the European Parliament, this task becomes especially clear in light of the results of the European elections. A responsible coalition of democratic, pro-European forces is needed in the European Parliament. This coalition must promote an enlargement of the Union that goes hand in hand with the necessary reforms in all policy areas in order to guarantee the ability of a democratically organised Union to act in the future. In this context, the ability and willingness to listen to each other, even in difficult times, and to discuss and argue respectfully with each other in order to reach constructive compromises, is important. History has repeatedly shown that the European Parliament is a place for objective negotiations and finding compromises across party lines and national borders. This must be preserved. It would be naïve to believe that the foundation for this European democratic narrative can be taken for granted.