Turkey between two worlds: Geopolitics of China’s rise and the Western response

The opinions expressed in this article are solely that of the author/s and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Heinrich Böll Foundation.

China’s rise and its potential consequences for the international system has been a topic of debate among journalistic, scholarly and diplomatic circles since at least the 1990s. Following the 2008 global financial crisis, the “China Model” with its emphasis on government regulation and central planning has gained new prominence as an alternative to neoliberal capitalism. This has led to global geopolitics being largely shaped by the rivalry between China and the US, with the former backed by Russia and the latter finding its major company in the EU and Japan. Washington has interpreted China’s rise as a direct challenge to its hegemony in the economic, political and technological realms since at least the Barack Obama administration. Following Donald Trump’s election to the presidential office in 2016, Sino-US tensions have risen to new heights, with trade wars, technological espionage and the COVID pandemic becoming new avenues for this rivalry. Where does Turkey stand in the so-called ‘New Cold War’ between China and the US today? Although Turkey is a long-time member of the NATO alliance and a candidate to the EU, the answer to this question is not straightforward.  

‘Decline of the West, rise of the East’?

A key term commonly used in Turkish foreign policy circles today, ‘strategic autonomy’, implies that Ankara does not want to be squeezed in the current Sino-US competition. Maintaining a healthy distance from both great powers, however, is not that easy. Turkey’s sour relations with the US and the EU, due to disagreements over Syria, Eastern Mediterranean energy reserves and many other issues in the past, render this a difficult bargain. Besides, Turkey is member of NATO – a transatlantic military alliance that officially declared Russia and China as a major challenge in its Madrid Summit of 2022. This, at the very least, means that Turkey’s in-between position will be harder to sustain in the military and technological domains. Nothing illustrates this risk better than Turkey’s recent S-400 crisis or its abandoned missile deal with China back in 2013.

Today’s Turkey does not stand between the East and West only in a geopolitical sense, but also on normative grounds. The erosion of the country’s democratic credentials is a continuous theme that draws a wedge between Ankara and Brussels. China may not enjoy an overwhelmingly favorable perception in Turkey, but the latter’s anti-American sentiment is much stronger, and may even become a permanent fixture following the Gaza crisis of 2023-2024. Washington’s strictly pro-Israeli stance is frowned upon in Turkey while Beijing’s foreign policy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) resonates much better with Ankara. Shortly before the Gaza crisis, China was hailed as the new great power in this region, potentially replacing the US with its economic prowess and political influence. China has friendly ties even with long-time regional rivals, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, which also boost its chances of mediation and peace-building. Although the US administration seemingly brought its hard power back to the Middle East to support Israel, China is likely to remain more popular among Arab countries in the future. A huge plus for Beijing is its disinterest in conducting military operations, waging wars and launching invasions in the region. Whereas Turkey is closer to the Western Hemisphere in many respects, it also shares its neighbors’ view that China is a relatively benign actor in the region.

A shared history of semi-colonialism and a present marked by pragmatism

Beijing and Ankara also see eye-to-eye in other matters. Both countries, for instance, demand a louder voice for emerging countries in global governance institutions. They also share a common emphasis on the principles of territorial sovereignty and non-interference, although Turkey has generally been much more appreciative of humanitarian interventions than China in the past. Despite their marked differences on Kosovo or the Syrian civil war[1] , however, Ankara and Beijing share a skeptical perspective toward Western intrusions – a sentiment that is not unrelated to the collective memories of Chinese and Turkish experiences with European imperialism in the late 19^th and early 20^th centuries.

China’s relatively benign image in Turkey, does not, of course, translate into cooperation in every sphere of life. At the grassroots level, Turkish companies compete against China in the Middle East, Central Asia and Africa on a daily basis. While China has greatly increased its economic influence in Central Asia in recent years, particularly through trade agreements, loans and energy-related investments, Turkey enjoys a soft power advantage based on its cultural, historical and linguistic affinities with the region. This special relationship is executed through various institutional mechanisms, most important of which is the Organization of Turkic States. Turkey has a similar cultural bond with Middle Eastern countries and it exerts influence mostly through its historical ties and Islamic credentials. On a practical level, construction firms from China and Turkey rival each other in Arab countries, with Syria’s reconstruction process becoming a potential new arena for such competition. The success of Turkish business actors, of course, also depends on the future course of the country’s troubled economy. 

Much of today’s Sino-Turkish relationship is guided by a strong element of pragmatism. Regardless of the mentioned competition, Turkey perceives China as an economic partner, an investor and a lender – roles which have only grown in significance after the launch of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)[2]  in 2013. Unlike in Europe, where perceptions of the Chinese BRI have greatly deteriorated in recent years, Ankara remains committed to the project. Although the total volume of Chinese BRI investments in Turkey has failed to substantiate the long-propagated idea that Turkey occupies a crucial geographical location between Asia and Europe, overall views of the BRI in Turkey are still positive. Kumport [3] and the Istanbul-Ankara high-speed railway[4]  are the token projects for Chinese BRI investment in Turkey. A major reason for the BRI’s continued popularity in Turkey is the prospect of building the ‘Middle Corridor’[5] , which is also known as the Trans-Caspian Transport Route. This commercial route, which is projected to stretch from Central Asia to Europe, with links connecting the Caspian Sea, the Caucasus and Turkey, had been on Turkey’s agenda long before it was incorporated into the BRI scheme in 2015. Although its financial backing still remains murky, the Middle Corridor has gained a new appeal in Europe after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, since it may provide an alternative to the Northern Corridor, or the Trans-Siberian railway.

There is little evidence that Turkey’s enormous trade deficit with China (which amounted to 38 billion USD in 2022) is a crippling factor in Sino-Turkish relations. Although there are some government policies in place, such as the recently issued Distant Country Strategy, [6] which aims at boosting Turkish exports to Asia-Pacific countries, these are not likely to transform the structural aspects of this asymmetric relationship. Turkey’s current economic difficulties also make China an ideal source for loans that avoid IMF prescriptions. Likewise, the “de-dollarization” debate, which tops the headlines particularly during BRICS summits, appeals to Turkish decision-makers.

In order to maintain its strategic autonomy between China and the US, Turkey will need to find ways to minimize the drawbacks of its geographical – if not also ideological – distance from both ends of the Pacific. Today’s Turkey does not hold a key position in China-centered global supply chains but nor does it particularly benefit from the Western ‘friendshoring’ policies that aim at curbing China’s dominance in global manufacturing. A similar picture emerges with regard to the large connectivity projects sponsored by the EU and the US, such as the Global Gateway[7]  or the Build Back Better World[8] , which aim to counter China’s gigantic Belt and Road Initiative in the developing world. While it is clear that the Chinese BRI did not deliver on its original promise in Turkey, it is equally uncertain whether Turkey will have a major role to play in these new Western initiatives. Likewise, the prospects of ‘decoupling’ in the technological realm may create new hurdles for Turkey, as the country has chosen to rely on the Chinese technology giant Huawei to build its 5G infrastructure. In the foreseeable future, Turkey’s multi-faceted cooperation with China will take place in a NATO country which continues to depend on European markets for its export goods. Whether or not Ankara will find a comfortable maneuvering space between Washington and Beijing, therefore, is a question that few are willing to ask.