On February 15, 2016, the anniversary of Abdullah Öcalan’s arrest, a van painted with the traditional Kurdish colours and equipped with large loudspeakers drove from Syria to the border with Turkey. It stopped right before the barbed wire between Rojava and Bakur, which separates western Kurdistan from northern Kurdistan. With loudspeakers facing north, the van started playing folk songs and slogans loudly which especially exalted Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), who is imprisoned on the island of İmralı. A few days earlier, Turkey had expressed its worry over the ongoing developments in the Kurdish regions of Syria, and once more stated that it would not remain a mere spectator of the activities of the YPG (People’s Protection Units) in the Damascus region (The YPG is the military wing of the PYD, Democratic Union Party). However, these mutual showdowns did not go beyond non-functional actions and statements which occurred sporadically.
The Syrian crisis has provided these actors, the Turkish government but especially the PKK and the PYD, which is an offshoot of the PKK, a historical opportunity to strengthen their positions and exert pressure on each other. In fact, Turkey has been relatively quick to position herself in the Syrian crisis: She has taken an anti-regime stance and decided to support the Syrian opponents.
As a result of the chronic fear of the Kurdish aims and aspirations, the AKP (Justice and Development Party)-governed Turkey has invested in the Sunni Arab opposition in Syria in order to reinforce its influence in the post-Assad period and limit the Kurds’ efforts. A new power structure dominated by Sunnite Islam to be established in the neighbouring Syria would widen the zone of influence of the AKP-governed Turkey. It would also provide Turkey with extraordinary opportunities to influence the political mechanisms that specifically determine the Kurds’ status in the new Syria.
In July 2012, the PYD called for autonomy in Jazira, Kobani and Afrin, the three Kurdish cantons. Since then, July 19, 2012 has been considered to be the beginning of the Rojava Revolution by the PYD. Based on Öcalan’s ideas, the PYD issued a call to use the autonomy declared in Rojava as a solution model for all of Syria. However, it was implicit that this idea of local autonomy proposed by the PKK leader was not developed only for Syria but also the whole Middle East, including Turkey.
The Kurdish awakening in Syria was also received with excitement on the other side of the border, that is, in Bakur (North). Hundreds of people went to the border to see the unusually large PYD flags on the flag poles with their own eyes. Most of them could not believe their eyes when they saw the Kurdish flags fluttering freely in Rojava, which are the similar to the ones for which they had been heavily punished just for possessing, and which have become a sign of the Kurds’ struggle in Turkey for decades.
The Dilemma of Turkey
Turkey has never tried to hide the fact that it will not shut its eyes to the Kurds’ efforts to gain independence in the neighbouring countries. Another important factor which has aggravated the situation for Turkey is that the PYD has been very quick to take the law in its own hands politically and militarily in the Kurdish region of Syria, and it has pushed rival Kurdish actors to the margins in a decisive and partly violent manner. Since an organization which is faithful to the PKK has gained dominance over the Kurdish regions in Syria, Turkey has lost its opportunity of influence in Syria. Moreover, the Turkey-based Kurds’ status has been noticeably strengthened as the PKK has become an influential factor in solving the Kurdish problem in the larger regions of Kurdistan.
The potential consequences of the Rojava case have also played an active role in the unfolding of the events in Turkey, and the Turkish government’s veering away from the peace process which it had been negotiated with the PKK for some time.
Rojava As a Wall between Turkey and Her Sunni Arab Neighbours
There seem to be three factors which have brought the prospect of a unification of the three cantons one step closer to reality: ISIS has been wiped out of Kobani, Tal Abyad was conquered (2015), and the YPG has gained ground near Azaz in the province of Damascus. Such a possibility means that the Kurds would gain control of a unified area with a 500-kilometre border with Turkey.
Evidently, this would not only have a symbolic effect on the Kurds living in Turkey. If a small Kurdistan is established in Syria, Rojava will be the new neighbour of Turkey, which will separate Turkey from its Sunni Arab neighbours, decreasing her chances of becoming effectively active in Syria. Consequently, this would also force Turkey to revise her Kurdish policy, albeit reluctantly.
Things have not gone as planned for the AKP government, as it has failed to bring the Sunni Arab section of the Syrian opponents into power and, thus, sustain a centralist Syrian state which has not made any promises to the Kurds. A unified Rojava would substantially disrupt the shipment routes Turkey has been using to support not only moderate opponents but also radical Islamists including the Al-Nusra Front and ISIS in recent years.
PKK/PYD: The Appeal of a Historic Opportunity
To top it all off, it is the PYD, the Syrian sister organization of the PKK, which is directing the events in Rojava since the PYD is the only actor that has political and military power in the region.
Since the day it was established, the PKK has been asserting a claim to the leadership of the Kurdish national struggle. Nevertheless, the primary goal of the PKK continues to be the solution of the Kurdish problem in Turkey.
The centralist approach of Turkey has always determined the political stance the PKK takes in the other regions of Kurdistan. As a matter of fact, the PKK was not politically active on behalf of the Kurds in Syria in the 80s and 90s not only because of its relationship with the Syrian regime but also thanks to the fact that it was allowed to set up camps in Lebanon which was under Syrian protection at the time. The PKK opted to see the Syrian Kurds as potential fighters and supporters of the main war in Turkey.
The discourse used to justify the stance taken at the time was always the same: “Bakur is the centre of Kurdistan. When we liberate Bakur, the independence of Rojava will be a matter of a few days’ time. To achieve this goal, Rojava must support the war in Bakur and postpone its own demands now.”
However, after Syria and Turkey signed the Adana Agreement on October 20, 1998, which caused Syria to stop supporting the PKK and deport Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK started to reposition itself. The PYD was founded at Kandil Mountain in 2003 with the objective of being active in Syria. But they underwent a serious investigation by the police forces of the Syrian regime and could not organize their demonstrations as effectively as the other Kurdish parties.
During the Syrian revolution in 2011, however, the PYD officers who had been sought for arrest in Syria returned there and started to assemble their staff with strict discipline and to silence potential political rivals one by one. The establishment of the three cantons in Rojava by the PYD has a direct effect on the peace process negotiated between Turkey and the PKK.
In addition to this newly acquired dominance over the Kurdish regions in Syria and the establishment of the military staff there, the YPG started to be recognized as a unique partner that can be effective against Islamist terror by the international community. All these factors seriously strengthened the PKK’s hand against the AKP government. The Rojava phenomenon has also created an unstoppable wave of solidarity and ecstasy among the Kurdish population in Turkey. Many young Kurds from Turkey are still leaving for Rojava to join the armed conflict in the region.
According to various estimates, the Kurds from Turkey make up 40% of those fighting on the side of the YPG and its female brigade the YPJ (Women’s Protection Units). The PKK is seizing upon the chance to use the developments in Syria as a fabulous historic opportunity for the Kurds to eliminate the injustice they have endured, and the belittlement which was caused by the Treaty of Lausanne and which has left a deep mark in their collective memory. The majority of the Kurdish population share the same opinion. While the PKK/PYD axis is trying to become a constant actor in the international fight against Islamist terror and to consolidate the status of Rojava in the negotiations held about the future of Syria, AKP’s Turkey continues to abide by its historical perspective which is marked by a fear of division and an inability to come up with its own political solutions.
Kurdish phobia of Turkey
The stance the AKP government took during the fights around the city of Resulayn in November 2012 and the Siege of Kobani in 2014/2015 has proved that Turkey views Rojava as a very big threat to her own stability. Whereas the Islamist fighters were openly supported and given passage through Turkish land to reach Resulayn in 2012, the YPG and YPJ fighters in the besieged Kobani were not able not receive any support for weeks.
The case of Kobani, in particular, has clearly revealed that Turkey sees ISIS as the lesser of two evils in comparison with the YPG and does not consider the Islamist extremists as a threat to her national interests. The chronic phobia of the Republic of Turkey with regard to the Kurdish independence has shown its least expected face. Nevertheless, Turkey needs to take a different road and make historic decisions now. The events in Syria and Rojava have fundamentally changed the conditions for the solution of the Kurdish problem. In other words, Rojava has assumed a functional role for the PKK in the framework of the Kurdish problem in Turkey. The PKK has gained a certain importance thanks to the developments in Syria. It seems that the PKK will inevitably use this advantage in a possible conflict regarding the Kurdish issue in “Central Kurdistan” sooner or later—at least this is the intention of the PKK.
It is extremely uncertain whether the developments in Rojava and her autonomous status will be long-lasting. The military cooperation which the PYD has succeeded in making with both Russia and the US has also been a result of the strengthening of the Islamic State (ISIS). Despite the fact that both of these countries provide military support to the YPG, this cooperation in the fight against ISIS has not given a concrete political status to the PYD yet. Both countries, particularly the US, are cautious in their approach to the Arab opponents in Syria. Moreover, they did not show a strong will for the PYD to be invited to the negotiations in Geneva as a participant with equal rights, especially due to the objections of Turkey.
Unsuccessful attempts at reconciliation
The PYD and Turkey already tried to find a common ground for negotiations in 2013. After a few meetings between Salih Muslim and the representatives of the Turkish intelligence office in the Egyptian capital Cairo, Muslim was invited to Ankara twice in one month. However, the meetings held with Hakan Fidan, the head of Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization, did not suffice to discard the mutual distrust.
Apparently, Turkey is not ready to give up on her approach to the Kurdish issue, which does not foresee any political status for the Kurds but rather bestows a limited set of cultural and governmental rights on them. Therefore, Turkey expects the PYD to stop gaining support in the Kurdish regions of Syria, which can ultimately reinforce and advance the Turkey-based Kurds’ efforts. On the other hand, according to the PKK, the developments in Syria have already surpassed the scope of the AKP government’s approach to finding a solution, and aggravated the Kurdish issue in Turkey to such a degree that only an explicit political solution can appease the situation.
It seems that reconciliation is not likely to happen between Turkey and the PKK-PYD at least in the near future. The war in Syria has not ended yet and the political status of the Kurds in the region has been recognized neither nationally nor internationally. The Arab opposition sees the PYD as an actor supporting the Bashar al-Assad regime and, therefore, objects to accepting them in peace negotiations. Moreover, the PYD has antagonized all the other Kurdish political and civilian actors by way of merciless repression and threats as a result of its totalitarian discourse of power and desire to come to power alone. Examples such as the case in Amuda in 2013 where the PYD got rid of its political rivals and incidents such as the targeting of sivil society centers or the deportation of critical journalists to Iraqi Kurdistan demonstrate that only subordinate political powers and a controllable civil society are preferred.
On the other hand, Turkey uses all the possible ways it can to prevent the YPG from unifying the three cantons. Turkey’s bombardment of the YPG camps near Azaz clearly demonstrates how far the tension can rise between the two sides. In addition, the Turkish government intends to restore an anti-Kurdish alliance with Iran, which goes back a long way as both countries have their own Kurdish issues and are aware that they would not be exempt from the effects of a Kurdish renaissance in Syria. Iran might play the role of the arbitrator on behalf of Turkey in order to normalize its relationship with Russia, thus, bypassing an important ally of the PKK-PYD.
Ultimately, the Kurdish issue will continue to be the existential issue of Turkey irrespective of how the dynamics evolve in Syria. On the one hand, the mingling of the Kurdish issues in Turkey and Rojava, and the social bonds among the Kurds spreading to two sides of the border seem to pose a threat to the regional homogeneity of Turkey from the viewpoint of the Turkish-Kemalist politics. On the other hand, the very same conditions create a great opportunity for Turkey to seriously consider solving the Kurdish problem, and find a way to reach a historical reconciliation almost 100 years after the republic was founded. Because having zero problems with the neighbours can only be possible if a zero problem policy is followed within Turkey.