Although it acted as a loyal ally of Syria when the popular revolt broke out, Turkey nonetheless failed from March to August 2011, to convince the regime of Assad to undertake reforms to calm the discontent. One cannot over-emphasize that during that period, Turkey wished to avoid any deterioration in its relationship with Syria simply because this relationship was important in several ways. First of all, Syria occupied a central position in the new Turkish policy toward the Middle East, based on the principle of “zero problems” with its neighbours, allowing Turkey to project itself as a regional, and beyond, power. Secondly, there were economic motives in the quest for good relations with Syria. In addition to the importance of trade between the countries, Syria was, for the Turkish economy, the door leading to other countries in the region, notably Egypt, Jordan and the Gulf States. Thirdly, and most importantly, Ankara did not wish to jeopardize its cooperation with Damascus in the fight against the terrorism of the PKK, which in the past had been protected by Syria.
However, despite all efforts, Ankara was unable to avoid breaking with Syria, particularly from August 2011 onward, when Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan finally realized it was impossible to reason with his long-time friend and Turkey had no other option but to support the Syrian opposition. At present, and especially since a Turkish reconnaissance plane that violated Syrian air space was brought down by Syria, Turkey has been at the forefront of support extended to the opposition against the regime in Damascus. In effect, it was in Turkey and with help from Ankara that the principal Syrian opposition movement, the Syrian National Council Syria (SNC), saw daylight and established its headquarters. The SNC is certainly not the only opposition movement against the Assad regime, but it is the body most clearly recognized by the international community as an interlocutor and considered the de facto legitimate representative of the Syrian people. Turkey is also the major receiver of Syrian refugees continuing to flee hostilities between the loyalist army and rebel forces. As of the end of August, 80 thousand civilians had crossed the border and were settled in several tent cities, in particular near Antakya and Kilis. Finally, it is by harboring in its territory of the principal leaders of the Free Syrian Army that Turkey has most clearly been expressing its commitment in favour of a regime change in Damascus.
This clear-cut position adopted by Turkey against the Assad government is, before all else, a choice made by Prime Minister Erdogan. Over time, one can see clearly that Erdogan initially believed he could put his cozy relationship with Assad to use in order to find a way out of the crisis; to create dialogue between the regime and the opposition; and project Turkey, an emerging power, as a regional leader capable of overcoming crises without Western intervention. This gave short shrift to the obstinacy of the Syrian dictator, who trampled on Erdogan’s ego and vanity, thereby forcing him to make a U-turn, abandon Assad and pose as defender of the oppressed and repressed people of Syria. Nevertheless, the personal resentment was based on political and strategic considerations. The intransigence of Assad, so irrational when set against the “Arab Spring” and ouster of autocratic regimes in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, only led to the weakening of Syria and further condemned the regime to annihilation. It was time for Turkey to change its stance and start preparing the post-Assad setup. However, like many others, Erdogan underestimated the capacity for resistance of the regime. This misreading of the timing and balance of forces between the regime and the opposition led Turkey to an impasse. Every passing day adds to the uncertainty and risks Turkey faces. Confronted with unmanageable dilemmas, Turkey has gotten bogged down. Firstly, the prolongation of the Syrian crisis is causing considerable sharpening of the Kurdish question, threatening a degeneration of the war into a confessional one and a spillover into Turkey. Additionally, Turkey’s implication in the Syrian imbroglio puts the country’s provinces neighbouring Syria into difficulty, as their economy had been oriented towards Syria and its neighbours. Finally, the support given to the Syrian opposition has unforeseeable effects on Turkey’s relationship with some of its neighbours, namely, Iran, Iraq and Russia.
Aggravation of the Kurdish problem for Turkey
The Kurdish problem in Turkey, which goes back to Ataturk’s founding of the republic, and the development of this problem throughout the region, in Syria, Iraq and Iran, has without a doubt been the major preoccupation of Ankara for a number of years, but has become even more so since the destabilization of Syria. Turkey has made undeniable progress since the rise to power of the AKP in 2002 in the conception and management of its Kurdish problem, despite the current setback in this area.1 Significant steps have been taken thanks to the policy of democratic overture (demokratik acilim),2 a reform package meant to meet principal demands put forward by the Kurds.3 Insufficient as they may be, these reforms created results, modest at first but tangible: the teaching of Kurdish, creation of a TV channel and radio stations broadcasting in Kurdish and the possibility of conducting Kurdish studies at university. Even bolder and more audacious were talks carried out in Oslo between the Turkish state and representatives of the PKK regarding a political solution to the Kurdish problem,4 initiating for the first time a real dialogue between the two sides.
True, these steps slowed down a certain extent before the onset of the Syrian revolt. The Syrian crisis only contributed to the aggravation of tension and lack of confidence between the Turkish state and the actors representing the Kurdish cause, thereby creating a risk of postponing sine die the settling of the Kurdish problem in Turkey. The aim here is not a detailed analysis of the points on which the Turkish-Kurdish dialogue has foundered; let us concentrate on the impact of the Syrian conflict on the Kurdish problem in Turkey.
Turkish officials and some independent analysts raised the question of resumption of relations between the PKK and Syria as a measure of retaliation for Turkey’s pro-opposition stance.5 It is in fact true that, parallel to the deterioration of the situation in Syria, the PKK stepped up its attacks on the Turkish army, most notably during raids in July 2011 and June 2012 that inflicted heavy losses on Turkish forces. For many analysts, these meticulously organised and conducted attacks are testimony to the fact that the PKK has begun to benefit again from assistance and support from Damascus. The raid of July 2011 was said to be directed by Dr. Bahoz, Syrian commander of the PKK.6 To be frank, an analysis of the balance of forces shows that the PKK does not need Syrian support in order to carry out armed action in Turkey, where it wields sufficient force, as it also does in Northern Iraq. The Syrian conflict has changed the overall situation for the PKK: it has become more suspicious toward the Turkish state and has been developing a regional strategy including the Kurds of Syria and Iraq.
In the Turkey-Syria-PKK equation, it is necessary to bring into the picture the relationship between the Damascus regime and the Democratic Unity Party (the PYD), the Syrian extension of the PKK, even if officials of these parties reject this characterisation, preferring to talk of ideological affinity.7 In the initial stages of the revolt, the aim of the Damascus government was probably to use this alliance against Turkey, but even more against the Syrian opposition, be it Kurdish or Arab.8 In effect, PYD forces have supported the Syrian regime mostly by preventing other Kurdish parties from entering the fray. The strategy of the PKK (and its Syrian affiliate) consists in reinforcing its positions to be able to wrest a status or representativity favourable to the Kurds in post-Assad Syria, even if it discredits itself in the eyes of regional actors for supporting Assad. Hence, support extended by the PKK to Assad is the result of a rational calculation involving the following objectives: weakening the position of Ankara to force it to grant new rights to the Kurds of Turkey and acting in a way that will allow the Kurds to enjoy a better status in the future Syria.9 Ankara is not oblivious to this strategy and yet tries tactlessly to influence the Syrian National Council in its negotiations with the Kurdish component of the Syrian opposition, which resents the Turkish interference. In reaction, Kurdish parties have boycotted gatherings of the SNC, opting to create their own bodies, thereby conferring upon them an ambivalent attitude vis-à-vis the Syrian regime. The cautious attitude adopted by the Kurds of Syria is also adopted by the Kurds of Turkey, who have even less confidence in the Turkish government, which has stepped up detentions among militants of the Kurdish cause suspected of belonging to the urban branch of the PKK, the KCK.10
The worst scenario for Turkey would be having promoted, due to its support of the Syrian opposition, the downfall of Assad and, through a boomerang effect, favoured the creation of an autonomous Kurdish region in Syria, where political and cultural rights the Kurds of Turkey have been demanding for decades would be guaranteed. Moreover, the prospect of an autonomous Kurdish region in Syria does not only worry Turkey, but all the forces of the Syrian opposition, which fear the disintegration of the country into Kurdish, Arabic, Sunni and Alawite regions. The SNC has gone out of its way to reassure the Kurds of Syria with respect to their rights in the new Syria and published a specific declaration on the Kurdish question.11 Nonetheless, Kurdish parties have continued to tread their separate paths, gathering in two major blocs, the Kurdish National Council (KNC), bringing together various parties, and the Democratic Unity Party (PYD), on its own, but stronger because it is armed. The emergence of an autonomous Kurdish region in Syria is a real possibility. At the end of July 2012, the intensification of hostilities and the weakness, or else complicity, of the Damascus regime permitted PYD militants to take control of several towns in the Kurdish region (Afrin, Derek, Qamishlo, Kobane and Amoude). To Turkey’s dismay, the Kurds will have to be taken into account in post-Assad Syria.12
The Kurdish issue is not to be underestimated, but one should not mask the other damage caused by the Syrian crisis. The possibility of the Syrian conflict progressively taking on a sectarian nature threatens to kindle tensions in Turkey and Ankara dreads the prospect of the division between pro-Assad and anti-Assad forces, between Sunnis and Shiites spilling over to the Anatolian Turkish, Kurdish, Sunni, Alevi etc. populations.
The prospect of sectarian war in Syria and its possible impact on Turkey
The Assad clan, which has ruled Syria for four decades, belongs to the religious minority of Alawites, an offshoot of Shia, which, by definition, places Ali at the centre of the faith.13 This Alawite minority extends to the Turkish province of Hatay on the frontier between the countries. Alawites are not to be confused with the Turkish Alevi minority, who also revere Ali, but are, nonetheless, different from Alawites. The common reverence for Ali does not suffice to consider them a homogeneous Shiite group. This confusion is common and conceals the reality of divergences and numerous divisions within this minority denomination of Islam. The Alevis of Turkey are a religious community with origins from pre-Islamic traditions and beliefs (mostly shamanistic and tengristic) of the Turkic tribes of Central Asia, mixed with Anatolian and Islamic beliefs.14 Close to 20 per cent of the population of Turkey and labelled under a deceptive generic designation, the Alevis in fact, form a disparate mass divided into different groups, most significantly of an ethnic nature.15 Some, for instance, are linguistically and culturally Turkish while others are Kurdish, called Zazas. The Alawites of Turkey, also called Nusairis,16 are the same as the Alawites of Syria, but their demographic weight in the population of Turkey is slight (500,000 out of a total population of more than 70 million).
The Alevis and Nusairis of Turkey and the Alawites of Syria share a feeling of persecution over the centuries by dominant Sunni groups, which is probably the reason behind their attachment and loyalty to any power constraining Sunni domination. On that basis, in Turkey as well as Syria, the Alevis, Nusairis and Alawites have traditionally supported secular regimes that limit Sunni domination. However, is this sufficient to create a united community transcending territorial, linguistic, ethnical and cultural barriers? In reality, beyond this shared perception of being the underdogs persecuted by the Sunni majority, the Alawites of Syria and Alevis of Turkey have fundamental differences in their religious practices. They do not speak the same language and there have been few instances interaction between communities.
Yet, while the crisis in Syria worsens, growing into a sectarian war pitting Alawite against Sunni, and while the threat of foreign intervention that would eventually implicate Turkey as well hovers over the country, the question of the position that the Alevis of Turkey will adopt arises. Will they display solidarity with the Alawite regime of Assad? Can the progressive transformation of the conflict in Syria into sectarian war have consequences for the relationship between the Sunni majority and Alevi minority in Turkey? The 500 thousand Nusairis of the Hatay region, although they have lived under Turkish influence for decades, still have some sympathy for their co-religionists in power in Damascus17 but do not necessarily engage in defense of the regime. Since the beginning of the rebellion, they have been discreet and the rare manifestations of solidarity with Damascus, as in the demonstration in the border town of Antakya in February 2012, have attracted few people.18
The Alevis of Turkey, who are not Arabic speakers, speaking Turkish or Kurdish, have an even feebler feeling of solidarity with the regime in Damascus. Frankly, the events in Syria have put leaders of the Alevi community in Turkey in an awkward position. In effect, this community, traditionally maltreated by the Sunni majority, has always been at the vanguard of struggles against injustice and inequality. Now the situation in Syria has turned the tables. This is a case of a minority affiliated with Shiism, the Alawites, which oppresses the Sunni majority. It is difficult for the Alevis of Turkey, sharing a relatively common destiny with the Alawites, to support a group that has been committing atrocities that are hardly defensible from an ethical viewpoint. That is why the weak religious affinity does not bring the Alevis of Turkey near the regime of Assad or pit them against the majority Sunni population of Turkey. The confrontation between Alawites and Sunnis in Syria therefore has little prospect of spilling over into Turkey, pitting Alevi against Sunni as happened in Lebanon, which is a completely different case.
A politicisation of the Syrian question has arisen that tends to divide Turkish political elites. The government party, AKP, joined the anti-Assad camp, while opponents have adopted a discourse more favorable to the regime, without going all the way to supporting it. Erdogan’s position, motivated as much by political considerations as humanitarian and personal ones, is presented by his rivals as a sign of solidarity with the Sunnis of Syria who are fighting the Alawite Assad regime. Not believing for an instant that the motives behind Turkey’s support to the Syrian opposition is religious, Kurdish parties and Turkish far left parties put the Syrian question to use as leverage to attack AKP politics in their entirety. Each party that criticises Erdogan’s position with respect to the conflict in Syria has its own reasons and motives. For the CHP, the main opposition party, the aim is to bring Erdogan’s popularity down. The Turkish far left, the Communist Party of Turkey, the Workers’ Party and other similar ones, as well as the trade union left, all seem to share a deep conviction that events in Syria have less to do with a popular insurrection against an oppressive regime than a real conspiracy instigated by international capitalist and imperialist forces (sic).19 Even the very progressist and popular musical group Grup Yorum has publicly displayed its support for the Syrian regime, a “victim of an international imperialist conspiracy”.20 As for the Kurdish bloc and the BDP, they have had a difficult time to develop an independent position of their own. Although they have usually been very active fighting repressive regimes, they found themselves compelled as ever to copy the slogans of the PKK, which has opted to support the Assad regime.
Although the Syrian crisis has not had much impact on the relations between the different religious communities in Turkey, it has divided the Turkish political elite. The official participation of Turkey in an international military intervention would further poison the stakes of domestic politics. But, in effect, Turkey is already at war with Syria since it has been harboring part of the Free Syrian Army. This war also has an economic aspect and economic costs, which are laden with consequences for certain regions of the country.
The economic consequences of the Syrian crisis for Turkey
As a direct consequence of the official position against the Damascus regime adopted in August 2011, Turkey undertook, in tandem with Western allies and the Arab League, a series of economic and financial sanctions to force Assad to negotiate with the opposition. These sanctions included, most significantly, freezing of commercial transactions with the Syrian government as well as a similar freeze between the Turkish and Syrian central banks.21 These measures have brought to an end the flourishing economic and financial relations between the countries that had been developed when the two states were tied together by a strategic agreement. Hence, while Turkish exports to Syria continued to rise to USD 1.424 billion in 2009 and 1.845 billion in 2010, the figure for 2011 reflected a decline to USD 1.611 billion for 2011.22 For 2012, an official statement by the Turkish Minister of Economy talked of a near freeze in trade between the countries.23 The industry suffering most was transportation, which represented a vital activity in the economy of regions near the border, such as Gaziantep, Adana and Hatay.24 Tourism has also been seriously affected: before the revolution, 800 thousand Syrians visited Turkey each year. However, the major problem that the Turkish economy has faced since Syria was caught by the ravages of the rebellion is the impossibility for Turkish firms to transit their goods through Syria to the Gulf States and the Mashreq. Thus, Turkey’s trade with Egypt, Jordan and the Gulf States is threatened with a long disruption, for everything indicates that the Syrian conflict will last for many months.
However, the overall impact on the Turkish economy is not far-reaching. Trade with Syria does not represent a significant share of Turkish foreign trade. In 2011, Turkey exported goods and services at a total of USD 137 billion, of which, only USD 1.6 billion was sent to Syria.25 However, in the regions of Turkey close to the Syrian border, especially in the dynamic province of Gaziantep, the local fallout is more serious. Commercial and transportation firms find themselves in difficulty and forced to revise their whole strategy in order to export products. As this crisis will last some time, it is bound to impel Turkey to consider alternative solutions to safeguard economic interests in the Middle East. But, more serious than these economic considerations that have only a limited impact on Turkey is the fact that the firm commitment of the country against the regime in Damascus threatens to weaken Ankara’s relations with some of its neighbours that have a different outlook on the Syrian question.
The Syrian crisis threatens to weaken Turkey’s relations with its neighbours, Iran, Iraq, and Russia
Because the Syrian conflict is a crisis of significant proportions bound to create repercussions on regional equilibria, it will no doubt force Turkey to readjust its relations with its partners. Thus, Iran is in total disagreement with Ankara regarding the solution to the Syrian conflict. Partially for religious reasons, due to the kinship between Iranian Shia and the Alawite doctrine in Syria,26 but above all, for political and strategic reasons, Iran firmly supports the regime of Assad. For Tehran, events unfolding in Syria are the result of a conspiracy of the West in order to oust its principal ally in the region and isolate it even more on the international front. In line with this, Iranians think that Turkey is the Trojan horse of the West in the region, a classical reproach directed at Turkey by Iran that nonetheless has not prevented close relations between the two countries. It is a fact, though, that Iran believes Turkey and its Western allies are trying to use the insurrection in Syria to prepare ground for a new regime in Damascus, pro-Western and hostile to Iran.27Moreover, in the context of the Syrian conflict, Turkey finds itself on the side of two other regional powers that have traditionally been rivals of Iran: Saudi Arabia and Qatar. This fact exacerbates the sectarian tension between the Sunni and Shiite countries. This Iranian perception of Turkish commitments in Syria contributes to further deterioration of the already fragile relations.28 Without going back to the rivalry between the Ottomans and Safavids, we observe that since the Islamic revolution of 1979, ideological differences have been important between the two countries. The rise to power of the AKP removed some of these without, however, eliminating them all. Erdogan is certainly admired in Iran for his charisma as a leader and Islamic statesman, but paradoxically, this international aura worries Iran. For years, the political figure of Erdogan has become extremely popular on the Arab street and the AKP was already a model for certain Arab political tendencies even before the Arab Spring. Iran’s relations with Turkey received a boost when Turkey, together with Brazil, proposed to Western countries to act as mediator on the thorny issue of the Iranian nuclear programme,29 but then worsened when Turkey, on the basis of its commitments within the framework of NATO, agreed to the deployment on its soil of an anti-missile system aimed at Iran.30 It is in this overall context of a decent, but fragile, relationship that the Syrian rebellion erupted, with it hardly possible to find a common position between the two countries.
The question now is whether the Syrian conflict will seriously undermine Turkish-Iranian relations. Here, the turn of events in Syria and, in particular, the nature of the future regime in Damascus will be decisive. Iran will not welcome a regime that will strike an alliance with Turkey and the West and this will cause complications for the indispensible economic relationship between the two countries, whose interests are intertwined. Turkey depends on Iran for a significant part of its gas and oil supply, of vital importance for a rapidly growing country. Iran, isolated on the international arena and subjected to suffocating sanctions, cannot afford to break completely with Turkey. It also shares other common interests, particularly on the Kurdish question. Although at present Syria divides them, the development of the situation may push them towards cooperation. The granting of autonomy to the Kurds in the new Syria would exercise additional pressure on Turkish and Iranian governments from their Kurdish minorities and could push them to cooperate, despite their differences regarding Syria.
Even more than Iran, Russia has extended the greatest political and military support, if one believes the rumors, to the Damascus regime. It is true that Russia has economic and strategic interests at stake in Syria, but on this issue, the Kremlin is guilty once again for having acted as a spoilsport to preserve its status as a great power in the international arena, especially vis-à-vis the United States. Leaving Russian interests aside, let us concentrate on the impact of this pro-Assad policy on Russo-Turkish relations. Does this divergence between Moscow and Ankara on the Syrian affair threaten to damage the relatively good bilateral relations? The a priori answer is “No” since their national economic interests would prevail over other considerations. Turkish firms are very active in Russia, Russian tourists are flocking to Turkey, but above all, the countries depend on each other in the sphere of natural gas. Turkey needs Russian gas as much as it does that of Iran for its gas-guzzling economy.31 The Russians need this market. What is more, the project for the construction by Russia of a nuclear plant in Turkey has progressed too far for the sides to sacrifice it on the Syrian altar.32
In that context, the Turkish prime minister paid an official visit to the Russian capital in mid-July, at a time when the Syrian conflict turned even more deadly.33 The aim was to convince Russia to rethink the question and consider a new Syria without Assad, and to reaffirm the terms of economic cooperation so vital for both countries. Hence, the Syrian conflict is bound to create little impact on Russian-Turkish relations, provided Erdogan sustains his diplomatic efforts and devotes time and energy for maintaining good relations with Russia.
Finally, Iraq perceives a threat to its relationship with Turkey because of the crisis in Syria. Relations are further complicated by the fact that in an almost bicephalous Iraq, Ankara has to negotiate as much with Baghdad as with Erbil, the capital of the Kurdish autonomous region. Largely implicated in the domestic politics of Iraq, Turkey has seen its relations with the Shiite component of the Baghdad government worsen. Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki has even accused the Ankara government of deliberately poisoning relations between the Sunnis and Shiites of Iraq.34 Moreover, the Baghdad government accuses Turkey of maintaining privileged relations with the Kurdish autonomous government, which is nothing but a region in the north of Iraq, implying that, in its eyes, this represents a threat to the territorial integrity of the country. In effect, however, as much of a paradox this may seem, Turkey, a country that represses its own Kurdish minority, has established steady and solid relations with the Kurds of Iraq for the sake of economic benefit and out of political pragmatism.35
Shiite solidarity has led the Baghdad government to not oppose the Alawite government of Assad, which levels at Turkey the accusation of demonstrating sectarianism through its support for the Sunnis in Syria based on its privileged relations with the SNC, in which the Muslim Brotherhood, which is close to Turkey, has a strong position. Its powerful ally in the region, Iran, supported Baghdad in this. Although neither side wishes to take the slippery road of a sectarian drift, the Syrian crisis nevertheless crystallises the Shiite-Sunni fault line and further aggravates existing tensions between Ankara and Baghdad, just as it simultaneously reinforces Turkey’s ties to Erbil.
In effect, in its relations with Iraq, even more markedly since the Syrian conflict, it has become essential for Ankara to be on very good terms with leaders of the autonomous Kurdish region. The emergence of the Kurds of Syria as a new autonomous political, even military, force has added value to the good relations with Erbil, which is the only political actor capable of influencing the Kurds of Syria, including and, above all, the PYD, which seems to be a black sheep for Ankara because of its ties to the PKK. Turkey hopes to receive guarantees as to the containment of the Kurdish question in Syria through the secret mediation of the Kurds of Iraq. Erbil, on the other hand, can negotiate the preservation of direct economic and political ties with Turkey, which then strengthens its hand vis-à-vis Baghdad, which is not pleased with the lingering penchant of the Kurds for excessive autonomy. For Ankara, the Kurds of Iraq have become more important than ever in their capacity of preferred mediators for any future talks with the PKK. Paradoxically, by talking on an equal footing with the autonomous region, Ankara has increased the autonomy of this quasi-state of the Kurds, which does not necessarily coincide with its interests. Inevitably, the Syrian conflict is pushing Turkey into a new Kurdish dilemma and forcing it to seek external levers that it lends strength to, but can, in the long run, put it in a difficult situation.
Turkey’s fragile leverage for coping with the Syrian crisis
Being a frontline state, Turkey is seeking to come out of this imbroglio without excessive damage. The prolongation of the conflict sharpens the Kurdish question, affects its economy and puts its regional policy and leadership in jeopardy. Turkish efforts are focused on preventing the breaking up of Syria and containing Kurdish demands. To the extent that the outcome of the crisis is hardly foreseeable and the orientation of the future regime is an unknown, it is difficult for Turkey to influence these issues. Although the country does not possess sufficient leverage in this area, it nonetheless wields some instruments in order to defend its interests in post-Assad Syria.
Its trump card is the SNC, whose establishment it favoured based on several meetings held in Turkey and through the intermediation of NGOs close to the AKP. The Turkish government maintains very good relations with the SNC, which goes even further in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood within it, a force that is sensitive to the Islamic rhetoric of the AKP. The modest and little-known Turkmen minority has come out in favour of the revolution and may act as another lever for Turkey because it belongs to the Turkish world.
Concerning the Muslim Brotherhood, many analysts claim that the Turkish Prime Minister, who comes from a political Islamic background but later converted to a moderate conservative brand of Islam, aims to put his friends, the Brotherhood, in power in Damascus.36 This is a complex issue and requires recalling certain aspects of the ties between Turkish and Syrian Islamists and the question about the thinking of political Islam in Syria.
The thinking of the Muslim Brotherhood has unquestionably left its mark on that of Islamists in Turkey. This was especially true in the 1960’s and 1970’s.37 The historic leader of Turkish political Islam, Necmettin Erbakan, made clear his solidarity with the Brotherhood in Egypt, Jordan and Syria and hosted their leaders regularly in Turkey. However, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, although he was a close disciple and collaborator of Erbakan, sought to change his image and take his distance from political Islam when he came to power in 2002.38 This distance was even more marked in the case of the Syrian Brotherhood since Erdogan was pursuing an ambitious regional policy based on privileged relations with the Assad regime, who, following his father, applied repression on the Muslim Brotherhood and its sympathisers.39 Some of these took refuge in Turkey and were welcomed, such as Gazwan al Masri, a businessman who played a significant role in the “Mavi Marmara” operation aiming to break the maritime blockade of the Gaza Strip.40 From 1998, when relations were normalised, up to the eve of the revolution, the Turkish government contained a handful of Muslim Brothers settled in Turkey to prevent them from becoming a barrier to good relations with Syria.
The situation has somewhat changed since the beginning of the revolution in Syria. The establishment of the SNC in Turkey and the strength of the Muslim Brotherhood within this body instills confidence in Turkish politicians and AKP strategists to look to an alliance between Turkey and the Brotherhood in the new Syria. Whether this corresponds to reality or is a figment of the imagination, this is in any case precisely the target of the criticism leveled at Erdogan by the Turkish media that is most hostile to the AKP, in particular the ultra-Kemalists and Kurdish parties. But this fear is also voiced by the most secular forces of the Syrian opposition.
Yet, these allegations are not wholly unfounded. It is a well-known fact that the AKP seeks to seduce the Muslim world by presenting itself as a model political party that has reconciled Islam and democracy.41 In many Muslim countries that have had their share of the Arab Spring, such as Tunisia, the AKP experience is often cited as an example to be emulated or inspired by.42 Some Muslim Brotherhood leaders, such as Ali Sadr ad-Din al-Bayanouni and Mohammad Farouk Tayfour, who settled in Turkey in 2011, untiringly praise the merits of the Turkish model and the pioneering role played by the AKP in the conceptualisation of an Islamic model of democracy.43 However, to strike an alliance with the Syrian Brotherhood as a dependable and lasting support can be complex for the AKP.
First of all, the strength of the Muslim Brotherhood is often overestimated, both by supporters and opponents. A quick look at the history of political Islam in Syria would show that the Brotherhood was never able to reconstitute itself after the destruction it was subjected to in 1982.44 Even officials of the Brotherhood admit the fraternity lost a big chunk of its popular base,45 to such an extent that the Islamic element in the Syrian revolution may not necessarily be tied to the Brotherhood. Within the country, Salafist cells and others affiliated with Hizb ut-Tahrir are also active and their views are different from those of the Brotherhood.46
Although absent from Syrian territory, the Muslim Brotherhood is certainly well-organised abroad within the SNC, but even there they do not wield a monopoly in the sphere of Islamist ideas. Certain religious dissidents, such as Mahmut Osman, who has lived in Turkey for several decades,47 are in the SNC without being affiliated with the Brotherhood. Finally, another Syrian Islamist party in exile in London, the Justice and Construction Party,48 whose members are younger and more dynamic, are beginning to shadow the greying historic leadership of the Brotherhood.
The idea that Islamists will dominate the new Syria, beginning with the Muslim Brotherhood, is a product of the paranoia of partisans of ultra-secularism, of some Islamophobic Western media and traditional allies of the Assad regime, such as Russia (which is also Islamophobic).49 One cannot compare Syria to other Arab countries where Islamists, traditionally strong as in Tunisia or Egypt, came to power riding the crest of the Arab Spring. A simple look at the demographic data and ethno-denominational composition of the Syrian population rebuts the arguments of those who are fearful of Islamists. In effect, assuming democratic elections were held in a pacified Syria tomorrow, Islamists could only hope to receive about 30 per cent of the vote. They would not be able to count on Christians (10 per cent), the Alawites (10 per cent), Druze and Circassians (5 per cent), or the Kurds (10 per cent), who would vote based on nationalism or identity. Even within the Arab Sunni majority, a landslide of the Islamist vote would not be earth shattering for the overall results given the extreme division of different groups both within the country and among expatriates. That is also the reason why Erdogan refuses to bet solely on the Brotherhood and diversifies Turkey’s contacts and intermediaries within the SNC and beyond.
The Syrian crisis brought to light a small Turkmen community, the existence of which was unknown until recently.50 This community speaks a language very close to the Turkmen spoken in Iraq and feels very close to Turkey.51 Its identity seems to be quite feeble, but it has, nonetheless, been awakened thanks to the revolution. Numerically weak (500 thousand at most), this community has provided Syria with statesmen as important as Shukri al Kuwwatli, president from 1943-1949 and again from 1955-1958. The place that Turkmens occupy in the history of Syria is as assimilated and Arabized Syrians, rarely as a minority with a consciousness of belonging to a Turkish identity.
With the revolution however, the community restructured itself and created its own movement, the Turkmen Democratic Movement of Syria, which collaborates closely with the SNC, where it has a small representation. Its aim is to benefit from its particular ties to Turkey to obtain specific rights in the new Syria.52 Can this community become a lever for Turkey similar to the Turkmens of Iraq, who established a serious collaboration with Turkey? Their small number and quest for an identity between a forgotten Turkishness and an adopted Arabness indicate otherwise.
Conclusion: Syria creates a setback for Turkish ascendancy in the Arab world
The levers that Turkey can use to influence the future of Syria are weak and marginal, both in relation to the Turkmens and the Muslim Brotherhood in the Syrian National Council. Alone when confronting its domestic and regional dilemmas, the country has no choice but to turn to the international community, in particular its Western allies and the United Nations, in order to be part of shaping the destiny of Syria and defend its national interest.
Until recently, good relations between Turkey and Syria graphically brought alive the Turkish policy of engagement toward the Middle East. Syria, once the main enemy of Turkey, became, towards the end of the 1990’s, Ankara’s most loyal ally in the region. The Arab Spring catapulted into power political forces close to the AKP and fed into the popularity of Turkey in the Arab world, even contributing to the obliteration of the hesitations and tergiversations of Erdogan about developments in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. The Syrian crisis demonstrates the limits of the “zero problems” with neighbors policy so dear to Davutoglu’s heart. The Syrian crisis turning into a nightmare will probably put an end to the regional policies of Turkey and threatens to destroy all the capital of sympathy and soft power that Turkey could boast in its Middle Eastern surroundings.
Yet, Erdogan’s management of the crisis has not been bad in general. On the contrary, it was sensible and diplomatic during the first few months, but as the Syrian regime hardened its stance into an all or nothing attitude, Turkish policy acquired more belligerent traits. Like others, Erdogan expected a swifter transition. Now, after 19 months of relentless struggle, the government has still not given up and Syria finds itself bogged down in a civil war that threatens to destabilise Turkey. However, the real bombshell for Erdogan seems to be the emergence, especially clear after July 2012, of a Kurdish political force in Syria controlled by the PYD and PKK, which comes as a blow to Turkish leverage.
On its own, Turkey cannot cope with the situation. Admitting this weakness damages its aura. It is looking for levers and instruments to make use of within the Syrian opposition, among countries of the region and in international bodies. The spectre of the emergence of a Kurdish autonomous region at its borders should impel Turkey to finally take up its own Kurdish problem with courage and will-power. However, the task is not easy. The public is no more prepared for it than the political elite and the reflex for repression dies hard. It is dismaying to see the Turkish government accords priority to recourse to force rather than engaging in dialogue. The Turkish prime minister bears a personal responsibility in this cul-de-sac. While public debate exhausts the possibility of agreement and national consensus on the question of abortion, which was never a real issue in Turkey, the government fails to initiate a real dialogue with the Kurds and rethink post-modern Turkey, all the while imagining itself a regional leader of international stature.
Footnote
1. Jake Hess, “The AKP’s ‘New Kurdish Strategy’ Is Nothing of the Sort”, An Interview with Selahattin Demirtas, Middle East Research and Information Project, May 2, 2012, URL: http://www.merip.org/mero/mero050212.
2. Muharrem Erbey, “The ‘democratic opening’ and the illusion of advanced democracy in Turkey”, Open Democracy, August 23, 2011, URL: http://www.opendemocracy.net/muharrem-erbey/democratic-opening-and-illu….
3. International Crisis Group, “Turkey: Ending the PKK Insurgency”, Report, N° 213, September 20, 2011, URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/turkey-cyprus/turkey/21….
4. Hemin Khosnaw, “Secret Talks Reported between Turkey and Imprisoned PKK Leader”, Rudaw, July 11, 2012, URL: http://www.rudaw.net/english/news/turkey/4942.html.
5. Oytun Orhan, “Suriye Türkiye’ye Karfl› PKK Kozunu Oynuyor (mu?)”, ORSAM, February 14, 2012, URL: http://www.orsam.org.tr/tr/yazigoster.aspx?ID=3208.
6. Murat Gürgen, Muharrem Çaglar, Zeki Dara, “Yine Bahoz yine Da€l›ca”, Habertürk, June 20, 2012, URL: http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/752237-yine-bahoz-yine-daglica.
7. Mahmut Hamsici, “Suriye’nin kuzeyinde iktidar Kürtler’e geçiyor”, BBC Türkçe, July 24, 2012, URL: http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkce/haberler/2012/07/120724_pydinterview.shtml.
8. Bakr Sidki, “The Kurds and the Syrian Revolution”, Henrich Böll Stiftung, March 2012, URL: http://www.lb.boell.org/sites/default/files/downloads/Bakr_Sidqi-The_Ku….
9. Bakr Sidki, http://www.lb.boell.org/sites/default/files/downloads/Bakr_Sidqi-The_Ku….
10. Gareth H. Jenkins, “The Latest KCK Arrests: One Step Closer to Breaking Point”, Central Asia Caucasus Institute-Turkey Analyst, June 4, 2011, URL: http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/turkey/2011/111107A.html.
11. “SNC: National Charter: the Kurdish Issue in Syria”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, URL: http://carnegie-mec.org/publications/?fa=48436.
12. Patrick J. McDonnell, “Turkey says it won’t let Kurdish rebels operate in north Syria”, Los Angeles Times, July 27, 2012, URL: http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-turkey-syria-kurds-….
13. Halm, Heinz, The Shi’ites: A Short History, Wien, Markus Pub, 2007.
14. Paul White, Joost Jongerden (eds.), Turkey’s Alevi Enigma: A Comprehensive Overview. Leiden, Brill, 2003.
15. Abdulkadir Yeler, “Shi’ism in Turkey: A Comparison of the Alevis and the Jafaris”, Journal of Shi’a Islamic Studies, Vol. 3, No. 3, London, 2010.
16. Abdulkadir Yeler, “Aleviler Suriyenin Neresinde? Arap Bahar›nda Mezhep Faktörü”, Türk Asya Stratejik Araflt›rma Merkezi, URL: http://www.tasam.org/tr-TR/Icerik/4491/aleviler_suriyenin_neresinde.
17. Ceren Kenar, “Esed Rejimi, Nusayrilik ve Suriye…”, Taraf, 09/07/2012, URL : http://www.taraf.com.tr/ceren-kenar/makale-esed-rejimi-nusayrilik-ve-su….
18. “TURKEY: Hundreds of people in border town of Antakya demonstrate in support of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad”, February 20, 2012, URL: http://www.itnsource.com/shotlist/RTV/2012/02/20/RTV555612/?v=0&a=1.
19. Suriye’ye Karfl› Emperyalist Müdahale Vatana ‹hanettir, Odatv, 25/06/2012, URL: http://www.odatv.com/n.php?n=suriyeye-karsi-emperyalist-mudahale-vatana….
20. Kübra Parmaks›zo€lu, Grup Yorum: ‘Suriye’deki Yönetimi destekliyoruz’, Habertürk, 21/07/2012, URL: http://www.haberturk.com/kultur-sanat/haber/760702-grup-yorum-suriyedek….
21. Veysel Aynan, “Turkiye ve Arap Birli€i’nin Suriye’ye yapt›r›m kararlar› ve olas› sonuçlar›”, International Middle East Peace Research Center, http://www.impr.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/suriye_yaptirim_rapor….
22. “Suriye s›n›r›nda ekonomik canl›l›k darbe yedi”, Ekoayr›nt›, 07/12/2012, URL: http://www.ekoayrinti.com/news_detail.php?id=100571.
23. “Suriye s›n›r kap›lar› mühürlendi, d›fl ticaret çöktü”, Timeturk, 25/06/2012, URL: http://www.timeturk.com/tr/2012/07/25/suriye-sinir-kapilari-muhurlendi-….
24. Mehmet Ezer, “Suriye’deki olaylar en fazla Hatay ekonomisini vurdu”, Radikal, 29/07/2012, URL: http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=1….
25. Sur l’évolution du commerce extérieur turc, voir http://www.tradingeconomics.com/turkey/indicators.
26. Martin Krämer, “Syria’s Alawis and Shi‘ism”, URL: http://www.geocities.com/martinkramerorg/Alawis.htm.
27. Alex Vatanka, “Syria Drives a Wedge between Turkey and Iran”, Middle East Institute, http://www.mei.edu/content/syria-drives-wedge-between-turkey-and-iran.
28. Giorgio Cafiero, “Will Syria Cause a Divorce Between Iran and Turkey?”, Foreign Policy in Focus, July 5, 2012, URL: http://www.fpif.org/articles/will_syria_cause_a_divorce_between_iran_an….
29. Parisa Hafezi, “Turkey, Brazil seal deal on Iran nuclear fuel swap”, Reuters, May 6, 2010, URL: http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/05/16/us-iran-nuclear-deal-idUSTRE6….
30. Reuter, “Iran warns over NATO’s anti-missile radar in Turkey”, Reuters, September 6, 2011, URL: http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFTRE7851IV20110906.
31. Leyla Karakaya, “Turkey Played its Hand Well in the Energy Game”, TEPAV, 2011, URL: http://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/1330691043-7.Turkey_Played_its_Han….
32. fiebnem Arus, “Turkey’s Pact With Russia Will Give It Nuclear Plant”, New York Times, May 12, 2010, URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/13/world/europe/13turkey.html.
33. “Rusya’ya Esedsiz yönetim önerdik, düflünecekler”, HaberRus, July 19, 2012, URL: http://haberrus.com/politics/2012/07/19/rusyaya-esedsiz-yonetim-onerdik….
34. Nick Ottens, « Diplomatic Crisis Between Iraq, Turkey Deepening”, Atlantic Sentinel, April 29, 2012, URL: http://atlanticsentinel.com/2012/04/diplomatic-crisis-between-iraq-turk….
35. Gönul Tol, “Turkey Cozies Up to the KRG”, National Interest, May 29, 2012, URL: http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/turkey-cozies-the-krg-6975.
36. Utku Çak›rözer, “‘Erdo€an’›n iste€i Müslüman Kardefller’i Suriye’de iktidara getirmekmifl”, Cumhuriyet, February 29, 2012, http://t24.com.tr/haber/erdoganin-istegi-musluman-kardesleri-suriyede-i….
37. Ali Bulaç, “Müslüman Kardefllerin Türkiye ‹slam’› uzerindeki etkileri”, Hasan El-Benne ve Müslüman Kardefller Uluslararas› Sempozyumu, Tebli€ler, Genç Birikim Yay›nevi, Ankara, 2012, pp. 291-300.
38. Interview with Mohammad Farouk Tayfour, deputy comptroller general of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and representative in the Syrian National Council, Istanbul, June 19, 2012.
39. Olivier Carré, Gérard Michaud, Les Frères musulmans: Egypte et Syrie (1928–1982). Paris, Gallimard, 1983.
40. Steven G. Merley, “Turkey, the Global Muslim Brotherhood and the Gaza Flotilla”, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, http://jcpa.org/text/Turkey_Muslim_Brotherhood.pdf.
41. Ipek Yezdani, “Muslim Brotherhood debates Turkey model”, Hurriyet Daily News, 14/09/2012, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=muslim-broth…. See also Feriha Perekli, “AK Party Model for Islamists”, Insight Turkey, July 2012, http://www.insightturkey.com/ak-party-model-for-islamists/articles/187.
42. Dorothée Schmidt, Marc Sémo, “Un modèle turc pour les révoltes arabes?”, Politique Internationale, Paris, Spring 2011.
43. Interview with Mohammad Farouk Tayfour, deputy comptroller general of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and representative in the Syrian National Council, Istanbul, June 19, 2012.
44. Sami Moubayed, “No Room for Political Islam in Syria“, Asia Times, May 10, 2005, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/GE10Ak01.html.
45. Interview with Mohammad Farouk Tayfour, deputy comptroller general of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and representative in the Syrian National Council, Istanbul, June 19, 2012.
46. Aron Lund, op.cit., pp. 60-66.
47. Interview with Mahmut Osman, Member of the Syrian National Council, Istanbul, 17 Juin 2012.
48. Abdulrahman Alhaj, “Political Islam and the Syrian Revolution“, Al Jazeera Center for Studies, http://studies.aljazeera.net/ResourceGallery/media/Documents/2012/6/10/….
49. Joe Lauria, “Fears of ‘Islamists taking over Syria’ fuelling Moscow’s support for Damascus”, The National, June 15, 2012. URL: http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/fears-of-islamists-tak….
50. “Suriye’de de€iflimin ortaya ç›kard›€› toplum: Suriye Türkmenleri”, Orta Do€u Stratejik Araflt›rmalar Merkezi, November 2011, URL: http://www.orsam.org.tr/tr/trUploads/Yazilar/Dosyalar/2011127_orsam_rep….
51. Minhaç Celik, Kazim Piynar, “Suriye Türkmenleri: Tek dayana€›m›z Türkiye”, Zaman, July 27, 2012.
52. Interview with Abdurrahman Betra, vice-president of the Turkmen Democratic Movement of Syria, Istanbul, June 21, 2012.