After the AKP won the elections on November 1, taking almost half the total votes and coming to power alone, President Erdoğan has been more on the country’s agenda more than the government. We interviewed Tarhan Erdem, Radikal newspaper columnist and the founder of KONDA Research on what the current period of conflicts and curfews declared in Kurdish provinces is likely to bring about, and also on the undiscussed proposal of “the democratic autonomy.”
You have said in an interview that you “have been an advocate of self-government since 1964.” Concepts like self-government, autonomy, democratic autonomy are all read by a certain section of society directly as separatism, though these issues have been debated ever since Prince Sabahattin. What sort of a self-government were you advocating for in 1964, and which position do you have today?
Of course, there have been some technical modifications to my 1964 definition. The principle in decentralization is to govern a settlement by those who live in that very settlement and elect their own administrators. The size of the population and geographical size should be minimized in conformity with this principle. For instance, there should be no neighborhood administration (muhtarlık) if you have a population of 30,000 and likewise a village shouldn’t be larger than 15 km2. A separate parliament and a separate administration can be formed in order to discuss and/or govern common problems and issues of neighboring settlements. The districts consist of villages and neighborhoods, the provinces consist of districts, the regions consist of provinces, and the country (of Turkey) consists of regions.
How about the democratic autonomy demanded by the Kurdish movement? Is it just an impracticable, unrealistic, idea of wishful thinking? Can this proposal be considered an act of war, even though it had been on the table all through the resolution process?
Decentralization is a universal system adopted in every democratic country. It should not be considered with regard to the proposing party if it conforms to the principle I have outlined above. Could a decentralized system be an act of war? Yes, it can be so in non-democratic countries; on the other hand, a state first needs to adopt decentralization as a system in order to establish democracy.
What do you think about the DTK statement for self-government? What is unacceptable in it to anyone from Artvin, Izmir, or Trakya?
I think there were correct observations, and of course it also included issues which need to be discussed more. One issue is that it defines local administrations as “increasing the duties delegated by the central administration,” whereas actually they should be saying the exact opposite. A local administration must have all authority. Let’s say you have the authority in this room, and someone else has authority in another room; if you both need a kitchen, you talk, build and use it together. This is the way one has to think about common spaces and issues. The local administration is responsible for everything that related to the administration of the locality in question, and if there is a common issue with the rest, only then they will sit and talk together. When there is an issue concerning Turkey as a whole—like defense, foreign policy, energy distribution as required by new technology—then the authority is left to the center. All what remains outside these kinds of situations belong to local administrations. A local administration takes the responsibility for everything but delegates some of them to the center because they need to be resolved concurrently; it is like this with some issues such as defense. You have to be able to audit the rules and regulations you have established. The municipal police can do that; however in the current situation the center lays down the rules—that the local authority was supposed to establish—and the municipal police enforces them. The DTK statement regarded the municipality’s enforcing of the rules it established as something equal with the defense of the country against foreign forces.
What might be the basic contradiction between the local administration approach the CHP takes and the one proposed in this statement?
The CHP is another party; some things are better left unsaid. It makes me sad. It would be something normal if one could bring forward a matter of country, a matter of state, and they might fall into dispute and disagree. However, they do not have such a problem at all. They have respect neither for the freedom of expression nor for a party member or a provincial president for that matter. Deniz Baykal has destroyed the party. A new party is necessary. If today things have turned out to be the way they are, this is partly because of them; we got here not only with what they have done but also because of their leadership.
What is your evaluation concerning the declarations of self-government in Kurdish provinces? Is it possible to say that the conflicts resumed with the denial of the Dolmabahçe accord has precipitated these declarations?
It is unbelievable negligence to suspend the Dolmabahçe accord—declaration, protocol, or whatever you would like to call it—just because of a one-man statement. The whole nation and the world watched the declaration of the protocol in Dolmabahçe; how in the world you can deny it? Yes, it would be possible to think about putting it on the shelf if you do not like it, but is it possible to deny it? As for the “declaration of self-government” by Kurds in some districts and neigborhoods, that was simply childish. It was not the thing to do. It has not brought any advantages and has harmed everything.
As far as we understand from İmralı Notes [İmralı Notları], since the very first committee visit Abdullah Öcalan has linked the resolution of the Kurdish question to democratization of Turkey in general. What do you think the major obstacle to that might be?
The democratization of Turkey has been prevented by those who held power, of course in the years leading to 1960s, and in the years following 1969, just like in the 1980s and in the 1990s. However, starting with 2010, what we see today is an attempt to change the regime and is quite different and dangerous in comparison to prior ones. But I believe our people will get through that, too.
Aside from the fact that demands of a democratic autonomy or self-government have not had the chance to be discussed adequately, the Justice and Development Party has recently signalled preparations for proceedings that seek to lift the parliamentary immunity of the Peoples' Democratic Party deputies. This is also what the president supports. In the light of the 1994 experience which saw four DEP deputies imprisoned, what consequences do you think such a situation can have?
They would like to repeat something similar, but it will not have the same result this time. Those deputies were arrested in the parliament before they had attended a court hearing. As of today, March 2, going that far to arrest deputies would obviously be a scandal. But in any case they intend to do something like that; it will mean the same thing in essence. The Justice and Development Party and the entity which is referred to as the deep state have started to keep company in the last few months. Of course when we refer to the Justice and Development Party government, we should regard it as Erdoğan. When first he was elected as president, he was giving clues of what he had in mind but this is way too much now. Besides, Davutoğlu has not surrendered to such an extent yet. From now on, one should take it for granted that Erdoğan and the deep state have made an alliance. Anything is possible now.
Do you see any possibility for AKP circles to raise an objection to domination of the President reaching such an extent? This had become the case in spite of a party decision, for example, during the parliamentary voting on the motion concerning the Iraq war.
But the parliament in 2003 was quite different from the present parliament, and so was the AK Party group back then. Similarly, Erdoğan was another person until 2010. Although he changes each month and in each period, the person after 2011 is a totally new Erdoğan. Today is incomparably different from the year 2003. Today is incomparably different even from 2009. The turning point in 2010 was the decision to pass a new law concerning presidential elections. The president then had been elected for seven years, and the new law was to reduce that period to five years. However, with the influence of Erdoğan the seven years rule was maintained by an additional article; therefore the law was not enforced as five years for that presidential period. The provision inserted into the law as “The President of the Republic shall be elected for a term of office of seven years... [but] cannot be elected for a second time” so that Gül would no longer be able to become a candidate for presidency. So Erdoğan’s decision to have his one-man rule was taken in 2010, before the 2011 elections. After that decision Erdoğan was no longer the same person as before, and the same goes for the AK Party as a political organ.
Therefore, the AK Party parliamentary group is entirely different, too.
Absolutely. Compared to the previous years, the consultation procedure for determining candidates was also different in 2011 and 2014. Some small-scale tendency surveys were made before the elections in 2002 and 2007, but there is quite a differnce between the way parliamentary candidates were determined in 2011 and 2014 and the way they are being determined today. There is no reason to expect any dissent to appear here.
What was the primary reason behind Erdoğan’s decision for one-man rule? Was that the referendum?
Exactly, he made his decision right after the referendum. If he had made that decision to hold the 2010 referendum, then he would have had to hold the elections in 2012 rather than 2011. The parliamentary constitutional amendments passed in 2007 shortened the parliamentary term to four years, so the 2011 elections were carried out in accordance with that rule. Although the same amendment included also shortening of presidential term from seven years to five years, the current presidential term was extended to 2014 on the ground that “it does not apply to the president-in-office, therefore it lasts seven years.” That is to say, the same logic was not applied when it came to the parliament, and the elections were held in 2011—which was certainly the right thing to do. That is because the will of the parliament was revealed in August and its referendum was held in September 2011. Therefore, the parliamentary election was decided in the year 2011 and held in June, which means the amendment was applied in the parliamentary election. The decision for one-man rule was taken at that very point in 2011, on the ground that “things does not work like that when the judiciary exercises a review of expediency, when the judiciary and the parliament interfere.”
What was voted in the referendum was partly a restriction on judicial review. And it is excactly the eternal dream of the right-wing as Demirel once put it: “Were it not for the foals, the white horse would easily rear up.” What do you think of that?
All governments have had complaints about higher judicial bodies, but this is different. The situation was never that obvious until this point. After all, what I am saying is that I think the decisive moment is 2010 when the decision was taken to have a one-man rule.
That is to say, before Gezi Park protests, and the December 17/25 corruption probe.
Before that, of course. It was those very attitudes and actions which led to those events!
And it was before the power struggle against Gulen movement had been revealed…
This is no doubt a power struggle, however it is not a decisive one.
Tayyip Erdoğan is a political figure who has continously been in the public eye for such a long time, particularly since his election as a mayor in 1994. Was there any telling sign earlier on that could be interpreted as his intention for one-man rule?
15 years is a considerable time for a person and for a politician. Yet there is an important interview he gave when he was the mayor. At the end of 1994 or early in 1995, as far as I remember, in an interview he gave to Nilgün Cerrahoğlu, Erdoğan expressed his opinion frankly as; “Democracy is a means for us, rather than an end. Democracy is like a train. We shall get out when we arrive at the station we want…” I do not remember any other remark by him but those words were crucial. For that matter, I wrote an article briefly saying that “it is a remark that defines him.” This is the only example that I can cite if you ask me. In spite of that remark of his, and despite that fact that I have taken it into consideration and written about it, I do not consider Erdoğan to be the same man as the one in the first half of the year 2010, at least in terms of shifting gears and direction.
The Turkish right-wing has always had the aim of coming to power alone, constituting the parliamentary majority, and making constitutional amendments alone. What is distinctive about the current period in comparison to previous attempts?
We have never been faced with such enthusiasm and determination before.
Was there not a similar enthusiasm when Özal became president?
Özal just aimed to work more comfortably, and becoming president was simply a convenience in his case. I think Özal should have remained the prime minister and party leader; this would have been more suitable with regard to his ideas, objectives and aspirations. The current situation we are confronted with, on the other hand, is quite different. It means disregarding the constitution, and even overthrowing the constitution. Once you overthrow the constitution, what is going to happen to your objectives then? By doing so, you are actually destroying your objectives.
If this is an unprecedented case throughout the republican history, is it possible to think that Tayyip Erdoğan and his circle compare the status, rights and powers of a possible presidential government to those in the Atatürk period, and by the same token, make their power look like equivalent to his?
The model in Turkey had always been the same until 2002. Prime ministers did not have an office in Istanbul before: not İsmet Paşa or Menderes and or Süleyman Demirel. Besides, Atatürk was not a man who wanted to display his power. He would do it when it was required: one example is the Law on the Maintenance of Order (Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu). The republic had been established and some men were grumbling in İstanbul. It was a display of power against them. Of course, there are also other reasons, it was not that simple, but this was the essence of the matter. Today’s Çankaya Palace did not exist at that time. The palace he lived was a little better compared to the bureaucratic standards of the time, that’s all. Needless to say, he had a liking for dressing well and he lived a luxurious, sumptuous life. The present figures are in no way comparable to Atatürk.
So, what might be the reason for some elements of the state, or for the deep state, to move toward this alliance centered around a one-man rule?
As they see it, there is no problem at all as long as the state does not intervene with them and does what he says. But the real state is not the state they think it is. It is not bureaucracy. The real state is the society you govern, the state on the surface and the deep-seated one.
Following the leak of the records of Oslo negotiations and also those of the resolution process, the developments did not seem to lead to much public resentment. How do you explain the fact that the popular will and the social mood has proved to be reversible within a few months?
It can be interpreted with the one-man decision. He wants to proceed to a one-man rule through elections. In fact back in April he had foreseen the result of the June 7 vote. However, since the evening of June 7, he wanted to bring down the HDP under the electoral threshold, and therefore raise AK Party votes to such a high level that it could make a constitution on its own. If you look through the chronological order, you can apparently see who has started the armed conflicts since July 14. TV channels were given the information that “the conflicts have started” when no gunfire had been heard yet. The policy of accusing the HDP of taking joint action with PKK was put into force right after the elections. And still they describe Selahattin Demirtaş as a member of a terrorist organization. The conflicts started with such an attitude and they were carried out like this. Is it a policy for any state to proceed with an attitude like “the struggle against terrrorism is going to last until we make sure the weapons are buried under concrete”? The struggle against terrorism has to aim to eliminate terrorism. Does the way to end terrorism mean attacking wherever you see a weapon? There is no place where terrorism has been eliminated with such a policy and there is no place where it can be eliminated in this way.
We have never seen curfews and blockades in Kurdish provinces imposed in such destructive ways before …
Certainly. The issue is clear: Erdoğan is going towards a one-man rule, and that goal is behind everything he tries to do. Everything is arranged according to that purpose. You can see this in all his speeches, the way he explains terrorism to the people, foreign policy, military affairs, schooling issues and everything else; they are all addressed and discussed in the name of one’s personal policy and according to one’s own future.
Can any determinant correlation be said to exist between a presidential system and a solution to the Kurdish question?
For Kurds, it is an issue of decentralization in government, and this ought to be the issue for Turkey, too. For example, the reason why İstanbul has become such a ridiculous place is the dependency of the local administration on the central authority. The lack of freedom of expression is also significant, of course. I do not think that the Kurds will say “we can live with that man even if these conditions are not satisfied.” If he continues with this policy, this war will never end. But if he sits and talks, that is quite another story. At the moment when the HDP shrinks below the electoral threshold and more than 340 or 350 AK Party deputies are elected, you can say that everything Erdoğan has said will disappear. He will be in a situation where he will say “we are going to do what our Kurdish brothers are asking.” Yet I doubt whether the Kurdish people will accept that. They have gained a lot of experience.
Can we say that the conflicts nurture nationalism and the support for presidential system rises in this kind of an atmosphere?
Yes, it is done precisely for that purpose, to blame everything that happens on the HDP. Only five percent among those who regard what happened as terrorism say “I will note vote for them.” Erdoğan is aware of that and exploits it. If you ask the ordinary citizen in the street, the HDP is responsible for everything that has happened. That is be normal when there is so much pressure on the press and when they monopolize conversation in media. No matter what you say, TVs do not broadcast and newspapers do not publish.
Can we describe the point we have arrived today as a new regime?
We can describe it as bringing the regime to another point by partly conforming to the existing rules. We can talk about the operation that has been going on to change the regime for some time now. For instance, there were four or five ministers accompanying the president during his last journey. This is not common practice, but it is because he gives instructions to people who accompany him on trips. In the past, when the president went abroad, a minister would accompany him. That might be a foreign minister, if she hasdtime, or another minister of energy or import and export, depending on the purpose of the journey. But now there is a different situation. Let us see how the people will judge this problem; we don’t know that yet.