The Evolution of the heritage from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic: The Idea of justice

Teaser Image Caption
Armenian orphans in the Haçin (Saimbeyli) region after the 1909 Adana massacre. Source: "1915 Öncesinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Ermeniler" (Armenians in the Ottoman Empire Before 1915)

We interviewed the historian Edhem Eldem about the 100th anniversary of the First World War, the Battle of Gallipoli and the Armenian Genocide on the occasion of the exhibition “Propaganda and War: The Alliance Front During the First World War.” This exhibition opened at Koç University Research Centre for Anatolian Civilizations on  December 24. Edhem Eldem has also contributed to the book that was published with the same title.

In the exhibition and book entitled Propaganda and War: The Alliance Front during the First World War, we mostly see material of German and Austro-Hungarian origin. But wasn’t it difficult for Allied states, such as the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria, which had just fought against each other in the Balkan Wars, to stand side by side?

Edhem Eldem: Yes, but fronts in 1914 did not unfold in the way the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria wanted them to. Until 1914, the Ottoman Empire had tried to ally with France and England but failed. It had to ally with Germany out of desperation. The major lines of the fronts were decided upon in Europe. Although the Ottomans had a background of military cooperation with the Germans, they decided upon this alliance at a very late date—a very desperate decision at the time.

Can we state that the industrial relationships with Germany belong to the Sultan Abdülhamid period?

Certainly. For the Ottomans, Germany was a new actor, not as powerful as the other states. It was also better at handling the Ottomans. The policy of Germany was complicated in 1878. Kaiser Wilhelm’s visit to Istanbul in 1889 is considered to be a milestone; he did this in defiance of Bismarck. German politics did not reflect a “Let’s embrace Abdülhamid” attitude at all; it was a personal factor. Abdülhamid welcomed this approach as he became increasingly isolated. He was known as a tyrant, the “Red Sultan,” and was pushed into a corner because of his atrocities against the Armenians. When the Russian threat grew bigger, he wanted support in Europe that would legitimize himself.

Alman İmparatoru II. Wilhelm'in Sultan Mehmed Reşad, Şeyhülislam Hayri Efendi ve Harbiye Nazırı Enver Paşa tarafından karşılanma töreni. Kaynak: "I. Dünya Savaşı'nda İttifak Cephesinde Savaş ve Propaganda"
So did he find that kind of support in Germany and not the other states?

Europe reacted very mildly, even with the Armenian massacres occurred in the 90’s. The European public reacted but the governments tried to conceal the situation.  The Armenian massacres in 1893-94 in Eastern Anatolia and 1895-96 in Istanbul invoked resentment among the liberals and socialists, and the religious factor also played a role. But the governments still only suggested not doing certain things. The fear of the possible crisis that could follow the political void encouraged them to sustain the system in some way.

The official history, on the other hand, has always stated that the Western powers aimed to overthrow and divide the Ottoman Empire.

It would be wrong to suggest that the Ottoman Empire was not exploited at all but, for exploitation to be possible, there needs to be a certain order that can be exploited as well as a certain stability which can sustain the order. They didn’t want to eliminate Ottoman rule, but they were prepared to discard it, assuming that it could not survive after 1914. They wanted a dependent stability. Şevket Pamuk calls this “dependent growth.” The regulation of debts in accordance with the Muharrem Decree in 1881 brought about a some economic stability. There was a trend of growth, but it was dependent. One thing that kept Abdülhamid on his feet was the capitulations to Europe. Some present Abdülhamid as an anti-imperialist hero, but this was not true; the Abdülhamid period saw all the major land or autonomy losses such as those of Cyprus, Egypt and Tunisia. In addition, Abdülhamid did everything that was necessary for the Armenian massacre to happen in Istanbul in 1896. But he did help the twenty-person Armenian committee, who had occupied the Ottoman Bank, go abroad without being imprisoned. He permitted this for the sake of the survival of the Ottoman Bank as an international institution. He could be extremely harsh in domestic policy but he could also be quite liberal when the opinions of the European states were in question. He tried to strike a balance and give the European states what they wanted.

What was the real reason why Abdülhamid was called the Red Sultan? Was it specifically the Armenian slaughters?

Yes, this was why he was known as a ruler with blood on his hands. The whole issue was about the demand for autonomy in the six provinces called vilâyat-ı sitte (Erzurum, Van, Mamüretü’l Aziz, Diyarbekir, Sivas and Bitlis) where the Armenian population either constituted the majority or was powerful. The Ottoman system had “privileged provinces” (eyalet-i mümtaze) which had a different form of governance. Trying to appease the crisis in the Balkans, one major wish of the 1876 Constantinople Conference was the assignment of foreign officers who were able to answer the sensitivities of the population in the Balkans, or Ottoman bureaucrats who could build rapport with the population by taking their Christianity and ethnic identities into account.

Why was it not possible to permit an autonomous form of governance in the six provinces (vilâyat-ı sitte) while it was permitted in other regions?

A small region such as the Mount Lebanon did not stand out like a sore thumb. But they were aware that the Balkans were slipping out of their hands. Anatolia was perceived as a serious threat.

This psychology is generally attributed to the Unionists in the post-Balkan War period.

There are significant similarities and continuities between the Unionists and Abdülhamid. Even though the Unionists went through a short liberal period and believed in a merger of all elements under a parliamentarian regime for the sake of the survival of the Ottoman Empire, it did not last long. Not to say that it was highly likely, but an alternative order did exist in 1908. We cannot see it as a black and white picture of Muslims trying to sustain the country, on the one hand, and non-Muslims attempting to destroy or divide the country on the other. However, the empire could have had the capacity to bring the masses into power by representation on the basis of their self-identification –religion or ethnicity. Another advantage of empire was a bigger market. Perhaps Armenians and the Rums (Greek Orthodox) wanted to separate themselves from the empire. The number of Rums living in the Ottoman lands exceeded the number of Greeks living in Greece by several times. If it were true that those people wanted to join a nation state, they could have left. But the Ottoman lands were, in fact, their own lands. Their economic, social and cultural connections were important. Why would they leave?

In our official history, there is also the issue of joining another empire. But I guess the Armenians were not so keen on joining the Russian Empire, either.

Armenians had different opinions: those who wanted a nation state form based on ethnicity or religion; those who said “I had better accept the rule of those who are culturally or religion-wise closer to me rather than others.” Some said “this system can go on but I want to have the right to recognition and representation” as well as those who did not have an opinion at all. This is one of the biggest problems: It is forgotten that 90% of the Armenian population consisted of Anatolian villagers. The talk about the intellectuals, doctors, writers, merchants, bankers and others, 1% or 2%, does not correspond to the reality at all. Approximately 90% of the population were not so much different than the Muslim villagers in Anatolia. The Armenians had a more settled and urban profile whereas the Kurds were more migratory and organized in tribes (aşiret). Nevertheless, there were no big economic, cultural, social or even political distinctions. Arguing that everything was created by the elite is tricky. This is nationalism: you point to the extreme examples and it explains a whole population as traitors.

Galatasaray'da halk gösterisi, İstanbul, 1908. Kaynak: "1915 Öncesinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Ermeniler"
What was it that started to disturb the Armenians in their daily lives in the six provinces? Why did the Armenians ask for an autonomous sort of governance? Did the migrants coming from the Balkans and the Caucasus as well as the nomadic Kurds play a role?

All of these played a role. Massacres in the Ottoman Empire date from the 15th century; they are typical in pre-modern societies. They were local and spontaneous, not chronic. The events leading to a massacre was either due to a military campaign or a specific event. In the 19th century these massacres were became modernized with the political environment. The massacre at Chios (1822) was exactly on the cusp of this change. The dynamics included looting by unconventional figures like bandits rather than a state decision. What happened in Bulgaria and what was done to the Armenian population in 1890 also had the same dynamics. However, the scope of the state’s intervention, control and demands gradually increased; this constitutes the real shift. In the Abdülhamid period, massacres stopped being an issue of social order and started to turn into a weapon of the state. For example, the Hamidian Regiments institutionalized an already existing tension between the nomadic Kurds and sedentary Armenians, which sometimes led to violent events. This kind of state terror developed after 1878 after the Europeans started to exercise pressure. Other than the local dynamics, we see that the state, and especially Abdülhamid, purposefully designed a policy on the basis of arguments such as “this will stop them from doing that.” Of course, we also do not know Anatolia well enough: there are the descriptions by officials such as consulates, which could be biased and exaggerated and also Ottoman history, which is based on a denial of everything. However, Istanbul was controlled and documented much better. I know 1896 well because I have studied the Ottoman Bank raid and the two-day events following it. Perhaps the death toll was about seven or eight thousand people as some sources and European newspapers claim but only the Ottoman sources can lead us to judge that at least one thousand people were beaten to death on the streets. This could not be possible without the Ottoman Sultan’s consent. In the case of a genocide or massacre, people always inquire about evidence, asking “what is the evidence for this?” They expect Abdülhamid to be dumb enough to write a declaration and state “kill all the Armenians you can get hold of.” It would be smarter to use common sense at this point. You cannot judge Abdülhamid in 15 different ways. You cannot see him as a powerful and stable sultan on the one hand, and a ruler who is not capable of maintaining public order and security on the other hand. He was either one or the other. We know that he created some kind of order at least in the centre with the help of the detectives, the Imperial Guard, the gendarmerie and the military police. Considering that hundreds and thousands of Armenians were killed like animals on the streets around the Yıldız Palace and the embassies, you definitely assume that there was someone in charge of all this. The events started all of a sudden and ended likewise. There is well-supported evidence that the police stations were used to distribute truncheons. This was state terror.

What was the relationship of the Unionists with the Armenian organisations like? The Dashnak and Hunchak parties seemed to also represent a populist and leftist vein...

Although Hunchaks and Dashnaks were considered leftist, their programs and behaviour had a streak of nationalism, too. By the same token, the Young Turks were nationalist even though they were liberals. Therefore, the aforementioned relationship was destined to turn into a conflict in a sense. We also should not disregard the fact that we are discussing a country where the most evident differences were based on religion and ethnicity. It was almost impossible to mobilize people on the basis of a Marxist or similar rhetoric. You could see this kind of rhetoric at the top but, in order to mobilize people, it was necessary to use religious or nationalist sentiments. It is still the same in Turkey. Liberalism requires that groups be properly represented, which was not the case either. Neither in 1876 nor in 1908 was it the case, and this constituted the problem. It was not easy to convince Muslims that non-Muslims were their equals. The well-known sentence “you will not call an infidel an infidel from now on” was a catchphrase in 1856. In today’s Turkey, it is only on paper that an Armenian, Jewish, Rum or other non-Muslim citizen of the Turkish Republic is equal to the others as most people still call them “foreigners.” Not much has changed. It is impossible to imagine that it could have been otherwise 100 or 150 years ago.

But the non-Muslim population was quite large at that time...

It does not matter. Minority is a concept created by the nation state. The Ottomans called it millet (religious community) but how did this notion operate? The Armenians were called millet-i sadıka (the loyal nation). The Ottoman system was plural but not pluralist. The precondition of this is inequality; one being the sovereign and the other preferably loyal. What manages the system is not equality but justice. Equality is still a misunderstood concept in Turkey. This is also the reason why we do not understand Europe. There is constant mention of a “just order” or “justice” in Turkey, including the names of some political parties. However, you can also be just in an unequal order. You can also behave in a just manner to your slaves and claim that the Ottoman slavery was a just order too, for example, by comparing it with the south of America. Or, if you are a non-Muslim, you can claim the right to live and perform your religious duties under a just order in the country. This corresponds to a liberal order in period when Europe was ostracizing and killing the non-Christians. But the system had a prerequisite: There was no equality. The whole of modernity, however, is based on equality. Since the French revolution, European politics has been shaped on rights, duties and equality. The Ottoman reform movement Tanzimat introduced this rhetoric; the Ottoman Reform Edict of 1856 (Islahat Fermanı) imposed it: “You will not consider non-Muslims as second class subjects from now on but as your equals;” thus, they would be able to go to the military and would not pay a “head tax”. Naturally, all hell broke loose after these statements. To put it more precisely, they said “ok” on paper but, inwardly, no one accepted it completely.

Avrupa basınında II. Abdülhamid karikatürleri.
Avrupa basınında II. Abdülhamid karikatürleri.
Especially the local administrative authorities refused to accept it, didn’t they?

Yes, and also even the ones at the very top. Ahmet Vefik Pasha is an interesting example. He was the parliament speaker when the parliament was opened for the first time in 1877. There was an argument and someone asked for other languages, for example Greek too, to be accepted as official languages. Ahmet Vefik Pasha shouted back “You shut up!” from the podium. Feeling righteous enough to do this, he considered his rival to have crossed the line. This is actually still happening in Turkey: If you do not conform to the Turkish citizen profile defined by the state and accept this situation with submission and loyalty, nothing bad will happen to you. But there is a cost to this: You cannot participate in politics and governance. The definition can change but it has a core, which is being Turkish, speaking Turkish and being Sunni Muslim. Being secular can also be added to the list in the period of Kemalism but being non-Muslim is still not there. Sunni Islam was imposed very forcefully in the Abdülhamid era but this worked only to a certain extent. The means of the Republic became stronger while the population governed is smaller; therefore, the state can impose things more forcefully. This can also be done under the guise of being secular or laicist. The state is able to completely camouflage this, telling the outside world “I am in fact laicist.” However, there is a big contradiction here in that a non-Muslim is not permitted to serve and get promoted in a state institution other than a small number of places, for instance, ”insignificant” places such as universities. Not much has changed since the beginning of the Republic but this pattern is becoming more and more evident thanks to technology and ideology.

Despite everything, the popular slogan of 1908 was “Freedom, equality, fraternity”...

The Ottomans also added a fourth notion: justice. This is a political, not a legal term. When the notion is used in party names such as “Adalet Partisi” (Justice Party) and “Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi” (Justice and Development Party), it does not refer to an efficient operation of the courts. It means they treat people according to their status; justice is the opposite of cruelty. Opposition in Turkey is usually conceived through an idea of being the underdog, the downtrodden. So when you say “you haven’t behaved in a just manner to me,” the same dynamics are operating again. The coming of the Justice and Development Party to power happened as a result of this discourse and the exclusion of exactly those people who did not conform to the secular profile: those diverging from the Kemalist stereotype. It is possible for the Muslims to organize themselves and redefine the system as they see themselves as the lords of the country. The non-Muslims, however, cannot do the same as their population has drastically diminished.

How was the idea of equality that developed in 1908 abandoned? In the struggle against the Abdülhamid regime, the Unionists must have had a sort of comradeship with the Armenian organizations, and they must have known the reason why Abdülhamid was called the Red Sultan...

It is difficult to go back the events and understand what was intended. It seems wrong to me to say that the Young Turks were actually planning the  It is also very difficult to understand how these people could turn their backs on those who shared the same fate as them when both were caught in a wind of liberalism and uniting against the autocracy in 1918. Not to mention the difficulty of understanding genocide. It is already extremely difficult to imagine a person finding it legitimate and necessary for another person, two persons or one million people to be exterminated. But prior to that they had other beliefs. This is a mystery. Enlightenment is not a perpetrator of genocide but it can carry an idea to its extreme limit. If you start to accept an idea gradually and follow it to the end point, you can end up in a terrible place. We know about the Nazis because it was much better documented. The problem here is that there was not enough documentation. Neither Enver nor Talât, nor Dr. Nâzım had proper memoirs... We even still do not know how bad or good Cemal was. As the discussions are still on the level of whether it actually happened or not, we cannot reach the point where we can expound on the details yet.

II. Meşrutiyet'in ardından Manastır'da yapılan kutlamalardan; kurdelelerde "İttihat, Uhuvvet, Hürriyet, Müsavat, Adalet" yazıyor. Kaynak: "Manastır'da İlân-ı Hürriyet 1908-1909"
Was it possible for the Ottoman Empire not to join the First World War, which constituted the framework of genocide? Couldn’t they choose to remain neutral?

I don’t want to speculate. But 1914 was inevitable as they had prepared for it since 1890’s. It does not make sense to fantasize that the Ottomans could stand watching while the European states were eating one another up. What was the outcome of abstaining from war between 1939 and 1945? Today most of our problems originate from there.

Which problems for example?

The fact that we do not understand Europe. We do not understand how the European Union was established, or the sensitivity about individual rights, racism and freedom. We have not witnessed the same destruction as they have. Even after World War I, Turkey did not receive sanctions like Germany did. Today Turkey can attempt to write a heroic saga over one battle, the Battle of Gallipoli, which was in fact part of a lost war. You need to be quite creative for that. It is also true that after losing the war, Turkey was granted approbation and a letter of clearance in too short a time. This applied to the Armenian genocide and the war itself.

However, an international court was established in Istanbul...

But it ended immediately; those exiled returned soon after. Now Turkey can dare to commemorate 1914-18 as a part of its history without any bad conscience, even acting like the underdog. How is this possible. The 1920’s, then abstaining from the war, then being treated well after the 50’s thanks to the Cold War... The Republican period is generally considered to have cut ties with the Ottoman Empire, but the reality was different. First, there was a myth about Mustafa Kemal originating from the battle of Gallipoli. There was also an inclination to see the Ottoman Empire as a Turkish state. It was not like the one which is trying to be devised today but there was still continuity. They did not object to the empire per se; they just wanted their own revolution and change. In the 1950’s, the Ottoman perspective starts to come back through the 1453-1953 connection, similar to our situation now. In that regard, 1915 satisfied both the Kemalists and the religious groups.

I. Dünya Savaşı sırasında üretilen propaganda kartpostalları ve porselenleri. Kaynak: "I. Dünya Savaşı'nda İttifak Cephesinde Savaş ve Propaganda"
Could the German military officers have had an effect in the process of deciding on genocide?

It is difficult to state that the Ottomans learnt it from the colonial genocide the Germans carried out in Africa. The Ottomans had accumulated enough experience on their own, considering what they did in Chios in 1822, in Syria in 1860, in Bulgaria in 1876 and then against the Armenians in Anatolia and Istanbul in the 1890’s. There was a gradual evolution from pre-modern massacres to the more genocide-like ethnic cleansing. The Ottoman State was able to destroy what it did not want, and it was able to do this more and more violently and with specific results as time passed. I do not think it needed any inspiration or examples.

Let us come back to the exhibition and the book. What kind of reactions did the Germans and Austrians have as they were subjected to propaganda by the Alliance Front?

The information flow was very limited in the war time. One avoided openly mentioning the atrocities their allies had been engaged in. Nevertheless, we know that many German priests and even people who were part of the German army were indignant. Seen through the eyes of the opposite side, it was evident that the events were publicly heard since they were carried out by the enemy. Everyone tried to spin the situation. It was a matter of covering it up and supporting people for political causes. So this exhibition does not tell you about the war but about the onset or the expectations of the war, and all in a one-sided manner. When the average Turkish visitor sees the exhibition, s/he sees a reiteration of the national Turkish history and s/he perhaps does not even recognize that this was a lost war. There are ethical problems, too, such as using children’s images for war propaganda. These were very popular cartoons at the time. It is not possible to accept them in today’s civilized world but they are still tacitly accepted in Turkey. Although the visuals presented in the exhibition belong to a different age, they can be perceived by the Turkish public today in the same manner as theywere received back then, because the ideology and history is a bit frozen in the past. If the average European visits the exhibition, s/he might find the postcards with children’s images terrible. The average Turkish visitor, on the other hand, might find them quite adorable.