In my interviews with various Kurdish groups outside PKK and BDP (Peace and Democracy Party) published in the independent news web site Bianet before Öcalan’s letter was disclosed, on March 14, 2013, it was evident that this relative optimism was based on the possibility of an end to the conflict, rather than a resolution of the Kurdish question. (http://www.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/145079-kurt-orgutleri-birlik-konfe… )
For instance, president of the Freedom and Socialism Party’s (ÖSP) Diyarbakır branch, Nusrettin Maçin said the following: “Those friends [meaning PKK members] started to lay down their arms of their own will. It is their most natural right. However, we shall not remain silent as regards the settlement process and negotiations concerning the Kurdish question.”
General President of KADEP (Participative Democracy Party) Lütfi Baksi, too, left the door open, saying “We are observing the process. We do not support a solution which excludes the expressions ‘Kurd’ and ‘Kurdistan.’ Nevertheless, we think that the process should begin one way or the other; the rest will follow.”
Of the other leaders we met at the time, Bayram Bozyel, Vice President of Hak-Par (Party for Rights and Freedoms), Sıdkı Zilan, a co-founder of the Islamist movement Azadi Initiative, and İmam Taşçıer, the General President of DDKD (Revolutionary Democratic Kurdish Association) also said that, although they had a positive opinion about the ending of the conflict, the process was not designed to resolve the Kurdish question.
In the two years that followed those interviews, we saw the relative optimism of the Kurdish organizations except for that of the BDP (which has now become DBP -Democratic Regions Party) disappear, ceding place to harsher criticisms towards PKK. For the Perspectives magazine, we met with officials from ÖSP, PAK (Kurdistan Freedom Party), the Azadi Initiative, Hak-Par, KADEP and Hüda-Par (The Free Cause Party), who all complain that they are not included in the process as interlocutors. Besides, these officials state—almost without exception—that the ongoing process is about the solution of not the “Kurdish question,” but the “PKK question.” In regard to ‘a single voice,’ it should be known that the groups except Hak-Par and Hüda-Par are indeed holding talks among themselves and testing the water for a possible dialogue with the government excluding PKK as regards the current process and the solution of the Kurdish question. This search for a common ground is based on the idea that the government’s talks with Öcalan do not include the solution of the structural aspects of the Kurdish question, such as collective rights.
No solution without the recognition of collective rights
The President of ÖSP’s Diyarbakır branch, Nusrettin Maçin believes that there is a yawning gap between the settlement of the Kurdish question and the ongoing talks with Öcalan: “What we had said back in 2013, when Mr. Öcalan’s letter was disclosed to the public, still holds today: The ongoing process is not geared to the solution of the Kurdish question; it concerns only the disarmament of the PKK and the democratization of Turkey. Time will tell how much progress they will make in this path. However, we do not expect this process to bring about recognition of the collective rights of the Kurdish people. For a solution to be reached, certain key measures should be taken. First of all, the existence of Kurds must be recognized in the constitution. Then comes education in mother tongue. Kurdish should become a language of education from primary school to university, and the second official language of the country. Thirdly, Kurds should be given legal status, that is the right to govern themselves. Unless these three rights are recognized, what they call the settlement process will remain limited to taking care of the problems and wounds created by the armed conflict. But the question itself will not be resolved.”
“The PKK must lay down arms”
Hak-Par’s General President Fehmi Demir agrees with Maçin as to the content of the process. Demir indicated that they find Öcalan’s words “guns should be silenced and politics should do the talking” in his letter to be very important, but that these words were not followed by action: “When Öcalan’s letter was disclosed in 2013, we had our doubts. We took Öcalan’s and the PKK’s declarations with a grain of salt. However, we did support the idea of silencing the guns. From the very beginning, we have disapproved of armed struggle, and instead believed that the problem should be settled through politics, through democratic means. They said that they would take the guns back to Kandil. We said back then, ‘Why take the guns to Kandil?’ If you are serious about laying down arms, do it here. The government can lay the legal groundwork, and armed militants can put down weapons and return home. Neither the government took such measures, nor did the PKK disarm and pull back to Kandil. The process has been drawn out longer and longer.”
According to Demir, no progress is made because the sides are focused on the elections: “The tension rose and fell according to the elections. That is, the electoral schedule set the tone. Besides, we view this not as a settlement process, but as a disarmament process. We think that weapons should be laid down. Settlement or peace is another issue, in our view. Settlement or peace can be attained only when the rights of the Kurdish people are recognized. In such a process, Öcalan, the PKK and others cannot be the sole interlocutors. All Kurdish organizations and the entire Kurdish people should be included.”
“The PKK should not disarm”
Although the Azadi Initiative is part of the talks for a common ground among organizations other than the PKK-DBP, its cofounder Sıdkı Zilan has a very different opinion about disarmament. After stating that they aspire for peace in Kurdistan and that the people also want peace, Zilan adds that it must be an “honorable” peace: “I would consider the PKK’s disarmament as treason. That is because, the means now controlled by the PKK—the young militants, weapons—belong not to the PKK or Öcalan, but to the people of Kurdistan. They are the result of 40 years of hard work. The PKK should turn into a national army and abandon its pro-Apo [nick name for Abdullah Öcalan] stance. It should become the Northern Kurdistan National Army. We must hold a Northern Kurdistan Congress, and there select an assembly which will govern the PKK and us. That is, we should have a government.” We remind Zilan that the PKK is a socialist organization, and whether he would be concerned with the fact that the government he proposes could be socialist. Here is his response: “The problem is not leftism, socialism nor Islamism. What counts is becoming national. Whether leftist or Islamist, you should be democratic. For us to hold a good position in the civilized world, we need to stick to civilized principles. We must embrace pluralist and participatory politics.”
“It is up to the PKK to decide on disarmament”
The President of PAK’s İstanbul branch, Ali Fikri Işık, responded very harshly to Zilan’s description of any PKK disarmament as treason: “Sıdkı Zilan’s suggestion that the PKK should not lay down weapons is very childish. It is up to the PKK to decide on disarmament and no one else can have a say. PAK thinks that the PKK should manage its relations with the state as it sees fit. Only the PKK can be held responsible for any positive or negative outcomes. When they decided to take up arms, they did not ask for our opinion. They do not have to do so if they decide to end armed struggle now.”
“Kurds and Turks cannot live together”
KADEP’s General President Lütfi Baksi, on the other hand, underscores the disparity between the compromises by the Kurdish movement and the issues on the table. He agrees with Işık as to whether the PKK should continue to wage armed struggle or not. Baksi says “Öcalan is entitled to negotiate with the state on his own behalf or on behalf of his organization; they can make peace and put down arms,” but adds that he cannot negotiate on behalf of the entire Kurdish people: “So much blood has been spilled, and such a fierce struggle has been waged – all for this? First of all, the Kurdish question cannot be resolved unless the state recognizes the Kurdish people and language in both ethnic and geographical terms. The PKK may go away, but another actor will follow suit. The PKK is not a reason but a consequence. A historical opportunity has appeared; this issue should be settled in a radical fashion. The experience of the past 90 years shows that Kurds and Turks cannot live together. This is the twenty-ninth rebellion. The best option is living side to side, that is within a federal system… Kurds should govern themselves.”
Baksi says that he was filled with hope upon listening to Öcalan’s 2013 letter, but that he has eventually lost all that hope. According to him, had the PKK created serious public pressure on the state after Öcalan’s letter, the state would have stepped back. Baksi considers that 25 million Kurds should be taken as the true interlocutor in the settlement of the issue. For this purpose, he believes that a commission or assembly of all Kurds should be created. He thinks that an imprisoned leader such as Öcalan simply cannot hold talks with the state, and that is why Kurdish organizations outside of the PKK-DBP are striving to create a common ground. Baksi suggests that it would strengthen the PKK’s hand if all organizations from Kurdistan became interlocutors. Baksi summarizes the efforts towards a common ground as follows: “Socialists, Islamists and liberal democrats can agree among each other. The result may be a front of sorts. There are plans, we shall see…”
“We have been left out”
Suggesting that “In the last hundred years, the Kurds were always beaten not in war, but at the table,” Baksi believes that history is now repeating itself. Baksi made a reference to the “Conference on the Kurdistan in Turkey” held in September 2011 in Diyarbakır, and said that: “In his message to the conference, Öcalan had indicated that he did not represent the Kurds. We nevertheless have been left out; we have not been provided with any information. All the other organizations are likewise left out. The negotiations are carried out only by the PKK and its supporters. I guess that the state is pleased with this. The goal here is Turkey-ification, to be followed by Turkification. At the Diyarbakır conference, four items were agreed upon: The recognition of the status of Kurds, education in mother tongue, the right to get organized under the name of Kurdistan and the recognition of the Kurdistan geography. However, Erdoğan continues to say ‘There is no Kurdish question.’ There is much talk about social and economic rights, but nothing about political ones.”
“Serious ruptures may follow”
The President of PAK’s Istanbul branch, Ali Fikri Işık, has bold claims about the future of the process. In his opinion, Newroz 2015 could be a historical turning point: “The PKK or KCK will put an end to its presence in Northern Kurdistan and pull back its military units to Rojava [Syrian Kurdistan]. In 2015, Mr. Öcalan will finalize this historical process. That is, henceforth Kurds will make further gains only through a political struggle based on their identity, by winning over the Turkish and Kurdish public opinions. This is not the settlement of the Kurdistan question. This is the settlement of the problem between the state and KCK, or indeed of the KCK question. Is this a bad thing? Not at all. We support the settlement of the PKK question, but this cannot be seen as equivalent to the settlement of the Kurdish question. That is because the latter question still exists with all its ontological presence, its objective structure and continues to beg for a solution.”
According to Işık, it will be a problem to convince Kurds that the “settlement of the KCK question” is tantamount to the “settlement of the Kurdish question.” Furthermore, Işık adds that the reaction of Kurds to such an attempt cannot be known beforehand and that serious ruptures may follow: “I think the Kurdish movement has decided to take the risk of such a rupture. They view themselves as the biggest force. They see themselves as the end product, but we know better. The state will of course offer economic incentives. They will try to lead the Kurdish people astray. KCK will claim that the path to autonomy is finally open. We shall see how this will limit the power and impact of the Kurdish discourse which has been demanding the right to exist for the last five thousand years.”
Clash between Hüda-Par and YDG-H
A breaking point in the process came on October 6, 2014, when demos in solidarity with Kobanê spread across Kurdistan. On September 15, 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant attempted to invade Kobanê, a canton in Rojava, which pushed the Kurdish movement to assume a new position against the AKP (Justice and Development Party). That is because the the AKP overtly demanded the international community to tolerate ISIL attacks on Kobanê. In the first days of the ISIL campaign, Tayyip Erdoğan claimed that “Kobanê is about to fall”, and the people of Kobanê started to cross the border and enter Northern Kurdistan en masse. All AKP officials seemed to be rather pleased with this flux. They expected that Kobanê would soon fall to ISIL, YPG (People’s Defense Units, PYD’s armed wing) and the canton system in Rojava would take a heavy blow, and the AKP would become stronger vis-a-vis the Kurds. However, in late September, Kurds started to gather along the frontier between Kobanê and Suruç in solidarity demos, which were violently attacked by the Turkish military and police for days. Even as ISIL made rapid progress in Kobanê, on September 20 Turkey took back 49 employees of its Mosul Consulate who had been kidnapped by ISIL. On the same day, Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu arrived in Ankara together with the hostages and stated that September 20 was a day of celebration. However, even as he spoke, the people of Kobanê were fleeing to Northern Kurdistan to escape from ISIL’s barbarism and YPG was waging an all-out struggle. The situation in Kobanê created among the Kurds of the north an immense grief and a palpable anger towards the AKP. This grief and anger translated into mass demos in the first days of October. The demos for solidarity with Kobanê started on October 6 and reached proportions unseen in recent years. In many cities, especially Diyarbakır, there were news of clashes between Hüda-Par and YDG-H (Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement) formed by the Kurdish youth. The fighting went on for days and 40 people lost their lives, killed by the police or in the fighting between YDG-H and Hüda-Par. These clashes put on the agenda a new aspect of the problem: Hüda-Par.
Well-known for his close contact with Hüda-Par and having served as the defense lawyer of Hizbullah, the precursor of Hüda-Par, Sıdkı Zilan explains the roots of this conflict as follows: “A committee which included representatives of many organizations as well as NGOs and opinion leaders from Kurdistan, got together with DTK’s (Democratic Society Congress) co-President Hatip Dicle and Hüda-Par’s Vice President Hüseyin Yılmaz. Such talks are also held in Europe between Hizbullah and PKK. I also heard that there is correspondence between the two sides. Some kind of a mechanism seems to be in place.” Where does the problem lie then? According to Zilan, “Hüda-Par thinks it has a legitimate right to exist in Kurdistan. The PKK, however, never saw them as a legitimate movement of Kurdistan. PKK demands that they should apologize from the people of Kurdistan. Hüda-Par, however, claims that it has already apologized in its manifesto. I encouraged the creation of Hüda-Par. I think that it is positive for Hizbullah to go legal and put down its weapons. Hüda-Par may turn into a movement of Kurdistan; its body already belongs to Kurdistan, though its soul has yet to follow suit. Due to their mutual antagonism, Hizbullah and the PKK are blind to certain facts: ‘If the status of the Kurds is recognized, PKK will become predominant…’ We believe that the Turkish system of domination should be pulled back from Kurdistan. Some, however, may believe that the PKK is the main issue.
In his answers to our questions, Hüda-Par’s Abdurrahman Caner seems to approve of Zilan’s observations: “From its legal party officials to its leaders in Kandil, PKK must finally accept that the organizations which think differently are not necessarily the state’s puppets or counter-guerillas…”
Hüda-Par’s solution proposals
Caner reiterates the criticism by other Kurdish organizations as regards the issue of interlocutors. He, too, thinks that organizations other than PKK should become interlocutors in the process. Caner summarizes Hüda-Par’s solution proposals for the Kurdish question as follows:
The Kurds must be viewed as one of Turkey’s two constituent peoples. Kurdish must become the second official language. Schools, barracks, avenues, streets, etc. which bear the names of perpetrators of oppression and discrimination should be renamed immediately. The ostracizing and discriminating Turkist discourse which dominates the definition of citizenship, the rest of the constitution and the official language should be abandoned. The original names of settlements whose names were changed must be restituted. The village guard system which leads to multiple problems must be immediately dissolved, albeit without putting the current guards in a dire situation. The cases of disappearances and unsolved murders, which number in the thousands, should be solved in rigorous investigations and the perpetrators must be held accountable. Likewise for burnt villages and forced migration. The past illegal activities in the region by organizations such as Ergenekon, JİTEM, etc. must be analyzed in-depth. It must be officially recognized that Kurdish scholars, especially Sheikh Said, were persecuted and the state must apologize from their relatives and the entire Kurdish people. The locations of the graves of Said-i Nursi, Sheikh Said and Seyyid Rıza among others must be disclosed. The archives of the courts called İstiklal Mahkemeleri must be opened immediately. The madrasahs must be ameliorated and returned to their original function. The permits given to the madrasahs must enjoy official status. An investment drive must be started to ensure that the region, left behind for a long period, attains the economic welfare of western provinces. The region must enjoy affirmative action in this sense. In demands for naturalization, Kurds from overseas must be offered the same assistance and priority provided to Turks from Western Thrace and other regions. A political amnesty must be declared to allow those who had to flee abroad for political persecution or prison sentences to return to the country, and to enable political prisoners to return to social life. The rigid centralist system must be ended, local governments must be strengthened and all local officials must be elected by the people.
CHP’s proposals
Hüda-Par’s propositions point to a surprising convergence with the CHP, the Republican People’s Party. The CHP’s suggestions concerning the Kurdish question focus on similar points. Let us take a look at some proposals in the draft law presented by the CHP to the Parliament in regard to the settlement of the Kurdish question: Lowering the electoral threshold to 3%, abolishing bans on using other languages in political propaganda, dissolving the village guard system, declaring Newroz as an official holiday, turning the Diyarbakır Prison into a museum, assisting people who want to return to their villages, cleaning mines from large plots of land and handing these over to poor peasants, lifting time limits in cases of unsolved murders, eradicating all limitations on public demos, erasing all personal data acquired by the state through illegal means, lowering by half the statute of limitation in sentences by the DGM or State Security Courts, transferring various powers to local government... The CHP also demands the settlement process to be managed by the Parliament.
It is clear that organizations outside of the PKK and the DBP reach an interesting convergence regarding their solution proposals for the Kurdish question and opinions about the talks with Öcalan. Notably, Sırrı Süreyya Önder’s claim that “We are closer to peace than ever before”, is not shared at all by these organizations. In case Öcalan pens a new letter for the upcoming Newroz celebrations and organizations of Kurdistan outside the PKK and the DBP create a common platform, the terms of the debate shall become clearer than ever.