Tunisia was the beginning of the “Arab Spring,” the uprisings that were impulses for changing the political and social identity of the region. Tunisia was followed by Libya and Egypt. While they did not manage to change the rulers in Libya, Egypt and Tunisia, many other Arab countries, most significantly Yemen, also experienced demonstrations and uprisings. With the self-immolation of a young man in Syria in 2011, the spark of the Arab Spring was ignited there as well. There, the people made it clear that the Syrian regime had to change by taking to the streets in demonstrations of tens of thousands and attacking government buildings.
As one of the countries that saw that the Asad regime would not be able to recuperate and that it was on its way out, Turkey reacted proactively, practically declaring Syria an enemy. Burnt by the first and second Gulf wars, consequently unable to establish its desired impact in Iraq's process of change and transformation and having to move within the boundaries set by the USA, Turkey seemed to not want to experience with Syria the dilemma that it encountered in Libya. This must be why a tendency fast developed to become the most influential actor in Syria “pregnant with change.”
Turkey's moves and counter-moves
Immediately before the Arab Spring, Erdogan and Asad had become such close friends that visa-free travel was instituted, important commercial agreements were signed, an anti-PKK collaboration was begun especially after Öcalan leaving Syria, and there was even talk about a special amnesty for Syrian Kurds that joined the PKK within the framework of AKP's 2009 Opening Policies towards the resolution of the Kurdish question in Turkey. What made the two come to such loggerheads?
Clearly, the most important trigger issue for Turkey had been the Kurdish question. In a Syria undergoing regime change, Turkey wanted to be on the good side of the potential new rulers from the start. Through first the Foreign Ministry, and later all its units, it started taking into its ambit all Syrian opposition, first the Muslim Brotherhood and the National Council, and then the pro-Al Qaida Al Nusra Front and the Iraq Damascus Islamic State. Not stopping there, it started organizing, and allegedly began to arm the Syrian opposition. In short, it started providing as effective a support as it could to the Syrian opposition.
Turkey's first step was to bring together the Change Conference in July 2011. While not as effective as hoped for, it was a positive first initiative. Held in Ankara, the conference provided Turkey, the USA and certain countries that supported Turkey taking on this role a solid idea on who was who, and how far one could walk with these groups. Another significant aspect of this conference was the attempt to sideline the Kurds, where Turkey was successful at this point in time. A few Kurdish oppositional individuals reacted weakly throughout the conference, and the conference surrendered to the perspective of the majority. Almost none of the demands of the Kurds were on the agenda of this first conference under the influence of Turkey. Subsequently, many other conferences were organized in Turkey, some of which were attended by representatives of Arab nations.
The pieces began falling more into place and the opposition started to take shape. Among the strong organizations in Syria, the Muslim Brotherhood began to pursue a policy that did not exclude Turkey while not being completely dependent on it. Whereas the establishment of the Syrian National Council was announced in Turkey in July 2011, the opposition did not come under direct influence of Turkey as assumed. The Syrian opposition, which receives support from Sunni Arab nations such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, did not warm up to the idea of being led by a non-Arab nation, despite its Muslim identity. The exaggeration of Turkey's role became more apparent in the Second Middle Eastern Conference, organized in the Hatay in December 2011 and focusing predominantly on Syria. Arabs underlined very clearly that they would not leave Syria to Turkey. Following the conference, there was a noticeable change in the newspaper and television news and op-eds that exaggerated Turkey's role.
Two coups and Syrian Kurds
Undoubtedly, the most important distinguishing factor between Syrian Kurds and other Kurds in the region is their semi-legal status. Kurds from Turkey who fled to Syria in the aftermath of the Sheikh Said rebellion of 1925 produced important cultural and literary works in Syria and Lebanon. Having the smallest population of Kurds in the region, Syria remained quiet in the face of Kurds' cultural endeavors and developments while it was a Syrian mandate. This continued after the end of the mandate as well. Policies targeting Syrian Kurds began to change when the Baath party came to power in 1963.
In a census conducted before the Baath party came to power through a coup, identity cards were taken away from around 150 thousand Kurds, who were rendered refugees. With the 1963 Baath coup, this policy was complemented by an Arabization policy in the Kurdish regions. With the law Hizan al-Arab, the first Asad took steps to create an effective Arab population in the Kurdish regions. According to the Syrian power, Kurds were migrants from Turkey, and that was why a blind-eye was turned to the various activities of Syrian Kurds as a cultural group.
The 1980 military coup in Turkey resulted in an intensive migration of Kurdish politicians to Syria. Almost all of the leading cadres of the Kurdish organizations from Turkey positioned themselves in Syria. The one organization that made the best use of its position in Syria was the PKK and its leader Abdullah Öcalan until they left the country in 1998.
In the 1990s, the PKK had started taking its place as an important actor in the Middle East. Starting its armed struggle as an organization that was limited to Syria, by the 1990s it was an organization that had multiple military camps in the mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan, and as many in Northern Kurdistan in Turkey, with significant support.
This position of the PKK had an impact on the transformation of Kurdish politics in Syria. Until the beginning of 1990s, organizations with politics around the axes of Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party (I-KDP) and Iraqi Kurdistan Patriotic Union (I-KPU) were effective, but when the PKK announced its control in Syria and received mass support, they weakened. While the exit of Abdullah Öcalan from Syria and operations/policies that the Syrian government conducted against it in collaboration with Turkey resulted in a relative weakening of the PKK, until the Arab Spring, the PKK and those of the same political family remained the strongest Kurdish organization in Syria.
Shaping of the Kurdish opposition in Syria: the Third Way
After the Arab Spring, the fronts of the Syrian Kurds were divided into two at first. The PYD, whose politics are close to the PKK, established the Western Kurdistan People's Parliament (WKPP) with Arab opposition close to itself and a segment of Kurdish intellectuals. Led by the Syrian Kurds Progressive Democratic Party (SKPDP) and the Syrian Kurdistan Democratic Party (S-KDP), other organizations and unorganized individuals formed the Syria Kurdistan National Parliament (SKNP). There were also Syrian Kurds that lived in Europe, and they preferred to have close relations with the Arab opposition supported by Turkey and the foreign relations of Turkey. Some of them were given insignificant tasks within the Syrian National Council.
The first period of the Syrian Arab opposition organizing against Asad included a distanced stance to the Kurds, especially by the Muslim Brotherhood. As the strongest organized opposition at the beginning of the Syrian crisis, it appeared that the Muslim Brotherhood was experiencing a revanch of the 1982 Hama massacre with the Kurds. The Muslim Brotherhood, the then-strongest force of the Arab opposition who thought that the Kurds were also culpable for the Hama massacre, did not admit the Kurds as the third power in Syria alongside Sunni and Shia Arabs during the meeting held in November 2011 in Cairo and attended by all groups of the Syrian opposition. The Kurds declared that they would not be a people without a status in the future Syria. With March 2012, they began to focus predominantly on their internal organization, albeit on two different fronts. Whereas the SKNP later joined the opposition led by Ahmed Al Carba, PYD began to chart the political line that it calls the Third Way.
The WKPP, let by the largest organization of Rojava Kurds, endowed its Third Way politics with a strategic foundation and openly started implementing it starting in March 2012. The anti-regime protests began gaining strength on the streets of Rojava, and the Kurds started organizing the infrastructure of self-rule step by step. The first spark was ignited in Kobane in July 2012, where the people first took back the land that the state confiscated from them along with their identity. Local people's parliaments were set up, and the seeds of people's rule were planted in many areas from health to education, municipality services to security.
The initial spark in Kobane grew with Derik, Efrin and Qamislo. Kurds were both self-governing, providing for the security of their own region, and pursuing an effective policy so that the region did not become a battle ground between the regime and the opposition.
Meanwhile, unity talks began between the WKPP and SKNP. The political forces of Rojava came together in Erbil with the initiation of President Iraqi Kurdistan Region Masoud Barzani. Rojava Kurds, who signed the Erbil Agreement in July 2012, established the Kurdish High Council (KHC) with the participation of five members each from the WKPP and the SKNP. The establishment of the Kurdish High Council coincides with the official setting up of the Rojava military organization People's Defense Units YPG. By July 19 of 2012, the KHC defined the upper political rule of Rojava, and the YPG was its military force.
Intra-Kurdish tension and ISIS to the stage
As one of the parties making up the KHC, when the SKNP tried to apply co-management to rough equality in all areas of life, relations became tense. There was increasing tension between the S-KDP as the leading party of the SKNP and the PYD as the effective party of WKPP. The tension resulted in new problem between Rojava and Iraqi Kurdistan Region. With the initiative of the I-KDP, the Semalka boarder crossing, which is one of the most significant crossing points between Rojava and Iraqi Kurdistan, was closed except for humanitarian purposes.
Simultaneously, Turkey began to implement an embargo in Rojava as well. There was a desire to put out the freedom torch lit in Kobane in July 2012. People were forced to migrate and tamed with hunger. Intense effort was put into creating a new war front in an unpopulated Rojava under the control of pro-Al Qaida groups.
This was soon followed by military attacks targeting Rojava by the regional states. The support of Turkey has become more clear, as it wants to manage developments in Syria through an anti-Kurdish stance. There were also partial attacks previously. In March 2013, the pro-Al Qaida Nusra Front launched a comprehensive attack against Serekaniye (Ras al-ain), by crossing to it from Ceylanpinar (Urfa) in Turkey, and with the intention to clear the region from the influence of the YPG. The YPG resistance did not allow for that to happen. The Nusra Front had to withdraw and sign a ceasefire with YPG within a month. The resistance of YPG to Al Nusra allowed for women, as the symbols of Rojava's revolution, to become participants in the security and defense of the region through a separate unit. The Women's Defense Units of YPJ were established.
Unable to come to terms with the March 2013 attack, the Nusra Front attacked Serenakiye again in July 2013. The attack took place through Turkey again. This time, al Nusra had not only the YPG established for people's defense, but also the newly established Women's Defense Units of YPJ in its target. Rojavans defended Serekaniye, situated right across from Ceylanpinar, with a magnificent resistance.
Faced with an organization that has received the support of nations in the region, that trespasses borders with ease and that is equipped with heavy weaponry, the Kurds protected Serekaniye. In a short while, the flag of KHC was hung in Serekaniye as representing the political will of the region.
The emergence of ISIS, which has become a menace for Rojava and the whole region, occurred at around the same time. Al-Nusra and the ISIS, which were predominantly concentrated in Iraq, started meetings to become a single organization. Although the meetings did not go as desired, the ISIS declared to its establishment that al Nusra had joined them. In this period, where the Muslim Brotherhood kept losing its power as one of the strongest oppositional forced in Syria, a new Islamic organization came to life in Rojava and Syria: the ISIS.
The ISIS received the same support as al-Nusra. Crossing through Turkey, the militants were easily able to join the war in Syria. Establishing its presence in Fallujah and Anbar in Iraq, the ISIS turned to Raqa through Deyrezor in the Sunni region of Iraq. At the same time, it attacked Serekaniye and Kobane in Rojava.
Capturing almost all Sunni settlements in central Syria, ISIS was ineffective in the face of Rojava's resistance. Rojavans protected not only themselves but also the Arab villages under attack by ISIS. The attacks by ISIS intensified at the same time as Rojava focused on the declaration of its autonomy.
Rojava: An oasis where the people can breathe
The Social Contract, which can be understood as Rojava's Constitution, was adopted in the first month of 2014. This was followed by the declaration of cantons. Cizire was declared as a canton on January 21st, Kobane on January 27th and Efrin on January 29th. The Arabization policy that was started in the mid-1960s is the reason for moving to a canton system in Rojava. With the declaration of the cantons, Syria where the war has been experienced at its cruelest, Rojava became an oasis where not only Kurds, but also Arabs, Assyrians, Armenians and other peoples and faiths could breathe.
Whereas the biggest aggressor against this oasis was the ISIS, those that supported and paved its way are also significant. Using Turkish territory and receiving financial and arms support from Saudi Arabia and Qatar, ISIS used the anti-Sunni policies of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Maliki to its benefit and expanded the military mobilization it began in Fallujah and Anbar.
10 June 2014 became a new beginning for both Iraq and Rojava. The ISIS captured Mosul, the 3.5 million capital of the state of Ninova, without any resistance. With the weapons taken from the military barracks deserted by the Iraqi army, it headed towards the Salahattin and Diyala states of Iraq. It started to push for Baghdad at the same time.
Unable to overcome the resistance of Kurds at Rojava, ISIS attacked Kobane, which it saw as the weakest link in Rojava, with the heavy weaponry it captured in Iraq. Having already taken under its control Til Ebyad between the Cizir and Kobane cantons, and therefore the eastern front of Kobane, ISIS also captured Cerablus, the western front between Efrin and Kobane cantons.
The ISIS also took over Raqa, the southern front of Kobane and Syria's oil region. Marching on with forces that bow down to it in newly conquered regions, ISIS had Rojava Kurds in its target again. On 2 June 2014, it attached the village of Zor Mixar through Cerablus in Kobane's western front. It also intensified its attacks on Kobane on three fronts and with heavy weaponry.
The YPG spokespersons announced that ISIS is committing massacres of the civilian population. There are also claims that ISIS is using chemical weapons in its attack on YPG forces. Analyses by the doctors of the Kobane Health Ministry found traces of chemicals in the corpses of three YPG members. YPG commander Redur Xelil called upon international forces to investigate the chemical attacks by ISIS. In this period of heavy attacks, Rojava's strongest party PYD called out to the Kurdish people at large with the YPG, saying, “If Kobane falls, Rojava falls, Kirkuk falls...”
PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan's call joined Kobane's cry. In his declaration from Imralı prison the PKK's leader asked for a response to Kobane's call for mobilization. Hundreds from Turkey set up tents in Suruc on the border with Kobane to support the resistance of Rojavans. Hundreds of young people travelled to Rojava to support Kobane's resistance. The Rojava Revolution was sparked in Kobane on July 19. Now, Kobane continues to guard this revolution by resisting the aggression of the ISIS. In Syria, the Asad government is still in power and a significant part of Syria is under the control of organizations that are either off-shoots of or in solidarity with Al Qaida, which is on the list of most dangerous terror organizations.