Introduction, The Turkish 2015 G20 Presidency
The G20 Antalya Leaders’ Summit, hosted on 15-16 November 2015, marked the conclusion of Turkey’s year-long Group presidency. This presidency marked the 10th since the Group’s 2008 restructuring that included the introduction of these high-level summits as well as an expanded development portfolio. This working paper provides an introduction to the G20’s development agenda and the operations of its Development Working Group (DWG) under the Turkish presidency. The paper dedicates specific attention to Turkey’s discursive commitments to Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries and the extent to which it used the 2015 G20 presidency as well as other global platforms relevant to development to represent these as well as low income and least developed countries more broadly.
Turkey’s discursive commitment to represent these countries’ interests in the G20 platform may provide them with value-add returns if brought to fruition for three reasons. First, the Group’s members include leading traditional and new contributors of traditional official and other development assistance that is essential for the budgets of least developed and SSA countries. Second, the only SSA member of the G20 is South Africa even though the group debates issues highly relevant to the region. South Africa and other middle income or emerging economies have their own economic interests that do not necessarily mirror those of other SSA or developing economies. Indirect representation of SSA interests in the G20 is not equal to inclusion of those countries in G20 membership but does serve as a means of expanded representation. Third, the G20 potentially supplements, if not replaces, the role of the G8/G7 platform even when the latter meets as the G8/G7+5.[2] The G20s’ potential role requires input representing SSA country interests as well as broader low income and least developed countries to achieve a more open development agenda than that of the G8/G7.
This working paper introduces the Turkish G20’s development accomplishments and Turkey’s more general representation of these interests in the following sections:
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Section One |
An introduction to the nature of the G20, including the Group’s rotating presidency that fell to Turkey in 2015, and the broadening of its institutional objective since the post-2008 restructuring to include development |
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Section Two |
An introduction to the DWG and the status of G20 development commitments |
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Conclusion |
A summary of Turkey’s pivot to the SSA region as well as least developed countries – extensively documented to date in terms of physical examples of Turkish regional engagement – and how those dynamics were in flux since December 2014. |
The G20 Presidencies and the G20 Development AgendaThis working paper serves only as an introduction to the above topics. It does not provide extensive analyses or policy recommendations..
The G20 underwent institutional change in 2008 in relationship to the global financial crisis, resulting in the expanded G20 we recognize today. The Group’s 1999 founding was based on the establishing members’ perceived need for a shared platform in which to discuss strategic policy options among the finance ministers of the top 20 global economies as a response to the fallout from the Asian Financial Crisis. These members designed the platform to both address their experience of the fallout and align their response measures as a means of minimizing future crises. The Group therefore focused on technical financial issues between 1999 and 2008 with little attention dedicated to a broader development agenda.
The Group’s 2008 restructuring represented a rapid response to the 2008 financial crisis. Members identified the G20 as a pre-existing platform that could be easily adjusted to the far-ranging ramifications of the financial crisis and emerging economic realities. Maintaining the annual meeting of G20 financial ministers and central bankers, the restructured Group introduced a series of new meetings, including the high-level annual Leaders’ Summit concluding year-long presidencies, and established the new institutional purpose articulated in 2009 as the fostering of “strong, sustainable, and balanced growth” at a global level. This growth-oriented purpose introduced general if not idealistic objectives that opened the door for a significant broadening of the G20 agenda to include development.
The United States hosted the first meeting restructuring the G20 in Washington, DC. The role of the United States and the United Kingdom as driving members of the Group’s restructuring suggest how the G20 may parallel other DC-based platforms, such as those of the Bretton Woods International Financial Institutions. .
The G20 Summit process is described by many observers as representing a clear departure from, and an alternative to, the G8/G7 platform due in large part to the former’s inclusion of emerging economies. The diversity of G20 membership does establish it as a unique platform. Turkey is one of the Group’s 19 permanent member countries, with the EU collectively representing the 20th member. Group membership, which has remained static since 1999, no longer accurately reflects the world’s top twenty economies given the need for continuity over time. That said, these 20 member countries represent over 85% of total global output, almost 30% more than the G8/G7, implying it will adopt a more universal developmental perspective.
G20 members have not established a permanent secretariat although they have repeatedly discussed the option. To provide administrative support and a degree of consistency between presidencies, the annual presidency provides essential administrative support and operates in association with a governing troika. This troika is composed of the previous, current, and coming presidency countries. Supporting troika members are not to shape the current presidency’s priorities. They are instead to support handover and the integration of past themes into current pillars and priorities.
The ten presidencies between 2008 and 2015 each introduced their own themes and priorities regardless of the troika approach. As such, each presidency added significant breadth to the Group’s agenda. Each also attempted to make a unique imprint on the nature of the G20 as a product of its respective economic traits, worldview, and contemporary interests.
Turkey’s stated presidency characteristics included:
- Self-identification as a bridge economy, not only in its emerging status as having achieved industrial status but confronting the middle income trap, but also in its physical placement between continents as a symbolic global hub.
- A claim to represent the interests of states not included in direct G20 membership, especially those of low income and least developed countries, including those of the Sub-Saharan African region.
Criticisms regarding the G20’s increasing breadth, summarized below, are relevant to the Group’s evolving development agenda including representation low income, least developed, and SSA countries’ needs and interests.
The G20 is also exploring broader national and international growth strategies. It is doing so in regards to issues ranging from specific sector development, such as energy and infrastructure, to governance considerations, including transparency and intentionality underlying tax. The intense focus of G20 governments on infrastructure development applies to their engagement in low income, least developed, and SSA countries as well.
The Group has established various working and expert groups relevant to development. The Development Working Group (DWG) was created in 2010 and is the entity with responsibility for development in G20 non-member countries. However, there is a proliferation of other groups, generally managed by co-chairs of paired developed and emerging economies, which affect or overlap with the remit of the G20’s DWG. The diversity of these groups suggests the G20’s increasing range and relevance to global development debates:
2. the G20 Development Working Group and Progress on Development Commitments
The DWG represents the primary development platform of the G20. The DWG is relatively new, having been established by the Canadian presidency in 2010. The South Korean presidency followed with the DWG’s primary strategic plans: the Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth and the Multi-Year Action Plan on Development (MYAP). The former strategy introduces six primary development principles to guide G20 development work:
Active partners are associated with or otherwise contribute to the DWG. These partners include international organizations, globalized development foundations, and regional or international development banks. Examples of active institutions include the IFIs of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank; the World Trade Organization ; the Financial Stability Board; the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and member organizations of the United Nations.
The DWG faces several fundamental challenges. First is its portfolio overlap with other working and expert groups. One clear overlap is infrastructure development, central to development planning and therefore the DWG, which also fell under the remit of the Investment and Infrastructure Working Group that existed from 2014-2016. Second is the tendency of member countries to send representatives of their line ministries to the G20 rather than officials from more specialized development institutions.[4] Third is the exclusion of low- and less-developed countries to G20 membership. This exclusion leaves representation of their interests to G20 members, routine invitees, or policy-oriented and other supporting international organizations.
The 2013 Russian presidency introduced the accountability report process to monitor implementation of G20 development commitments. This process was the first attempt to track progress on G20 development commitments over time. The resulting 2015 Accountability Report identified 20 Group commitments covered by the 2015 Development Commitments Monitor. The Report codes progress on commitment status as: on-track, mixed-progress, stalled, completed with ongoing monitoring, and fully completed. The following table provides an overview of the Report’s finding, listing commitments in order of their status. The table also includes this author’s interpretation of commitments’ implications for SSA states.
3. Turkey and the SSA Development Agenda
In addition to the broader inclusiveness and investment goals, Turkey defined its G20 presidency as representing the interests of low income, least developed, and SSA countries. Despite its explicit commitment, Turkey did not drastically expand its direct participation or representation in the DWG. It also did not streamline the DWG’s activities in terms of coordination with other working and expert groups to eliminate overlap and focus more dedicated attention on those countries’ key development concerns. Turkey instead voiced its representational role not only at the G20 but also at other global development events in 2015. Turkey’s G20 representation of low income, least developed, and SSA countries therefore paralleled its broader engagement with these countries and their respective regions. As such, Turkey lost the unique opportunity presented by its 2015 presidency to achieve a closer, more genuine engagement of these countries that would have enhanced its ability to accurately voice their needs and interests in global development platforms such as the G20.
Much of the G20’s 2015 progress on its development agenda reflected processes begun before Turkey’s presidency. Turkey did little to leverage or otherwise specify these processes in terms of its stated intent to represent low income, least developing, or SSA countries. A primary initiative supported by international organizations in association with the G20 offering notable results in 2015 with minimal Turkish contributions was the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (BEPS), which continues today. As stated in Article 15 of the Turkish presidency’s final communiqué, the BEPS G20-OECD Project is to support the establishment of: “a globally fair and modern international tax system…”[8] The Project established the following baseline thresholds for all participating countries, of which there are now over 90 including low income and least developed countries:[9]
Base erosion, as well as other G20 actions struggling to address global taxation dynamics undermining development, represents an emerging classification of development concerns and intervention mechanisms. The DWG provided increased attention to low income and least developed country tax systems. In 2015, this support included the creation of recommended domestic tax policy tools for these countries presented by the IMF, OECD, UN, and WB to the DWG.[10]
The Turkish presidency did mark extensive progress in regards to BEPS with the OECD-G20 “Base Erosion and Profit Sharing Project Report.” This project, however, began prior to Turkey’s joining the G20 troika with the 2013 BEPS action plan that continued under the 2014 Australian presidency with the Group’s acceptance of seven key reports. Although not an initiative of the Turkish presidency,[11] BEPS’ relevance to low income, least developed, and SSA economies as well as its inclusion of members such as Nigeria, Senegal, and the African Tax Administration Forum offered a means by which Turkey could have used the G20 and DWG platforms to enhance its engagement of developing and SSA countries. It instead engaged with BEPS as a pre-existing initiative of the G20 and its external partners such as the OECD.
The Turkish presidency did take some unique initiatives during its presidency. For example, it was only the third Group presidency after Mexico and Australia to host a G20 Trade Ministers’ Meeting. This Meeting contributed to preliminary WTO discussions regarding central G20 development themes including inclusive growth and improved regional trade agreement coherence. Although the Turkish G20 presidency concluded prior to the December 2015 WTO Ministerial Meeting in Nairobi, Kenya, Turkey invited Senegal, representing Africa’s New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), and Kenya as host of the WTO meeting, to the G20 sessions.
The 2015 Turkish G20 presidency also embraced certain messages about sustainable global development. These messages included the issue of sustainable energy access and SSA countries’ energy gap. The presidency, however, did not extensively address previous development issues such as health development issues dealt with by Australia’s presidency in response to the 2014 West African Ebola crisis. Such lack of reference even contrasted with Turkey’s own Ebola response that included support to the African Union’s ASEOWA Ebola response mechanism.[12]
Aside from its hosting of the WTO Trade Ministers’ meeting, Turkey failed to strategically apply its G20 presidency – a presidency over a group of countries representing 85% of global GDP – to engage other development platforms on behalf of low income, least developed, and SSA countries. It had several opportunities to do so throughout 2015, a significant development year in regards to global activities that included a mixture of G20 and non-G20 events, including:
- UN Post-2015 Summit for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
- Addis Ababa Action Agenda and the Third International Financing for Development Conference
- UNFCCC Paris Conference of Parties(COP 21)
- WTO 10th Ministerial Meeting
- G20 Action Plan on Food Security and Sustainable Food Systems
- G20 Agricultural Ministers’ Communique
- G20 Call on Inclusive Business
- G20 Energy Access Action Plan
As already established, Turkey’s role in the G20 was more one of continuing pre-existing processes than adopting direct, active representation of low income, least developed, and SSA countries. Its role in the above-listed non-G20 2015 events, excepting that of the WTO, was also minor.
Turkey’s representation of these countries in 2015 did not therefore mark any notable change for Turkey. A baseline for such a statement, however, is necessary. Establishing the extent to which Turkey engages these countries outside of the G20, and the degree to which that engagement is unique, requires a baseline for comparison against the engagement of other countries and organizations as well as Turkey’s own progress over time. This working paper applies the following engagement categories for this baseline:
- Institutionalized diplomatic engagement
- Highly structured multi-year and/or multi-country development interventions
- Trade and investment-facilitating mechanisms
- Special and differentiated trade-related treatment
- Technical assistance, technological transfer, or other forms of technical cooperation
- Formal financial engagement
- Security cooperation
The following table provides a rough overview of Turkey’s current engagement of low income, least developed, and SSA states in these seven categories with general comparative references.
In regards to SSA engagement specifically, Turkey has increased its regional presence under the multiple Justice and Development Party (AKP) governments. The government signaled this engagement with the often-referenced but relatively uneventful 2005 Year of Africa. It followed this year with an Africa Plan, which was not widely circulated and offered few clear or measurable objectives, and the first Istanbul-based Turkey-Africa Conference. As has been extensively commented upon by descriptive articles on general Turkey-Africa relations, the most visible sign of Turkish regional engagement came with the government’s rapid opening of diplomatic mission throughout the region beginning in 2008 to 2009; this diplomatic engagement continues, with the President confirming in 2016 that he intends to have an operating Turkish embassy in every African country at a time when many European states are decreasing their regional diplomatic presence. Turkey has coupled its diplomatic expansion with the creation of new Turkish Airlines (THY) destinations supported by: (1) the government’s stake in the carrier and (2) the relationship between THY destinations and the willingness of Turkish businesses – especially SMEs – to enter new markets.
Government representatives often refer to the depth of Turkish regional engagement. This working paper, however, defines it as one of intentional breadth over depth as demonstrated by these diplomatic and logistical strategies. An important question that has yet to be sufficiently answered by the government or descriptive assessments of Turkey’s SSA engagement is why Turkey prioritizes this broad engagement. Emphasis is generally on Turkey’s recognition of SSA opportunity and its willingness to represent the region in international platforms. As Turkish President R. T. Erdogan stated in a June 2016 Aljazeera article attributed to him:
Many people in the world associate the African continent with extreme poverty, violent conflict and a general state of hopelessness. The people of Turkey have a different view. We believe that Africa deserves better.[14]
Although insufficiently stated or monitored but demonstrated by Turkey-African trade missions and business forums, one primary driver is Turkey’s regional economic interests. These interests include that of Turkey’s contractors and SMEs given regional markets’ infrastructure expansion and opportunity space for low- to medium value-add products. A second related driver is the status and nature of Turkish networks throughout the region. The end of 2013 represented an important turning point in regards to these networks. Initiating this turning point was the set of changing political dynamics related to the Gülen movement that had established a broad-based Turkish presence in the SSA region maintaining strategic business and social networks, especially in regards to the construction and education sectors.
The government’s post-December 2013 regional engagement did not necessarily represent a total shift in its regional engagement characteristics. It did, however, represent increased effort focused in part on addressing those existing networks and establishing new, reliable Turkish networks. This engagement included: (1) increased traditional diplomatic actions, especially state visits and the expansion of diplomatic missions; (2) added attention to humanitarian intervention with minimal broad-based development support; (3) routinized business missions throughout the region; and (4) offered supplements to educational and other services formerly provided to regional states by the Gülen movement.
Turkey’s least developed country engagement slightly varies from its engagement of SSA countries, although the government’s loose planning for both regional categories haphazardly overlap. Turkish LDC engagement, which perceivably increased after 2007, is premised on the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ concept of LDCs similar to that of the UN OHRLLS. According to the Ministry, LDCs are:
…the poorest and weakest members of the international community, being economically, socially and environmentally the most vulnerable countries of the globe.[15]
Fundamental to Turkey’s engagement of these “poorest and weakest” countries is its self-identification as a unique global leader that is empathetic to the needs and interests of developing countries. In addition to its leadership role, Turkey also recognizes itself as a realistic model for these countries’ growth trajectories. Turkey establishes this twin role as follows:
As a middle income country, Turkey is in a better position to understand the requirements and concerns of the LDCs and is committed to do her best to be the voice of these countries at the international fora.[16]
Turkey premises this role on its post-WWII economic development trajectory, including experience with past IMF support packages; its post-2002 economic growth following the conclusion of its last cyclical crisis prior to the AKP government; and its plans to establish itself as the 10th largest economy by the Republic’s 2023 Centennial. It also premises its development role on its vision of the Ottoman past, which it describes as establishing contemporary Turkey as a historical brother to and protector of, rather than a former or neo-colonial power of, developing regions. Such descriptions include government references to Turkey as an African country and demonstrate what observers define as the neo-Ottoman turn of Turkish foreign policy in regards to SSA and broader LDC engagement.
Turkey’s 2007 hosting of the Annual Ministerial Conference of LDCs, held on 9-10 July 2007, marked its most visible turn to LDCs. It followed the 2007 conference with the Istanbul Declaration for LDCs supported by the United Nations and participating countries. Turkey then hosted the 2016 follow-up to the 2007 conference as well as the World Humanitarian Summit in the same year.
Signalling its desire to specialize and prioritize its LDC engagement, the Turkish government assigned a specific Ambassador to coordinate its LDC engagement.[17] This Ambassador was to guide Turkey’s three self-identified LDC roles defined by then-Prime Minister Davutoglu as those of LDC coordinator, provider of aid, and mentor.[18] Davutoglu stated that LDCs could “turn to [Turkey] for solutions whenever they needed”[19] given the breadth of support potentially offered by Turkey. The extent of Turkey’s expertise in LDC engagement requires further technical capacity development. However, its role as a source of immediate emergency response – especially in response to natural disasters – is established. This emergency response includes the actions of the Turkish Red Crescent and the Turkish government’s public emergency response institution of AFAD.
Turkey has yet to realize its self-styled description as a leader of, and model for, low income, least developed, and SSA countries has yet to be realized in practice. Its G20 presidency offered an opportunity for such realization. It did not, however, fully maximize this opportunity. Given Turkey’s current domestic and regional challenges including those of a security and economic nature, representation of these countries is no longer a priority.
[1] This paper does not represent the views or opinions of the Heinrich Boll Foundation.
[2] The +5 are the next five largest emerging economies: Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa.
[3] For more on the DWG’s operations, see the G20 DWG Information Exchange Facility at: http://www.g20dwg.org/.
[4] T. Fues and M. Saltzmann (7 December 2015), “What Can the G20 Contribute to International Development Cooperation,” The Current Column: DiE.
[5] Multilateral development banks including the Asian Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, African Development Bank, World Bank, and Inter-American Development Bank among others circulated the report “Partnering to Build a Better World: MDB’s Common Approaches to Supporting Infrastructure Development,” on 18 September 2015 to the G20 DWG and the G20 Investment and Infrastructure Working Group. For the full report, see: http://g20.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Paper-on-MDB-Common-Approaches-to-Supporting-Infrastucture-Development.pdf.
[6] For the full quote, see: ILO, “ILO and the G20,” http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/how-the-ilo-works/multilateral-system/g20/lang--en/index.htm.
[7] These and similar organizations provided essential inputs for the 2015 presidency exemplified by their co-authored report “Income Inequality and Labor Share in G20 Countries” for the G20 Labor and Employment Ministers’ September 2015 meeting. For the full report, see: https://www.oecd.org/g20/topics/employment-and-social-policy/Income-inequality-labour-income-share.pdf.
[8] Turkey G20 2015 (December 2015), G20 Leaders’ Communique Antalya Summit 15-16 November 2016, Article 15, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/11/16-g20-summit-antalya-communique/.
[9] OECD (9 October 2015), “OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project forwarded to G20 Heads of State in November,” https://www.oecd.org/g20/topics/taxation/g20-finance-ministers-endorse-reforms-to-the-international-tax-system-for-curbing-avoidance-by-multinational-enterprises.htm.
[10] These organizations presented these recommended tools to the G20’s DWG in 2015 in the report “Options for Low Income Countries’ Effective and Efficient Use of Tax Incentives for Investment,” https://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/101515a.pdf.
[11] OECD (9 October 2015), “OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project forwarded to G20 Heads of State in November,” https://www.oecd.org/g20/topics/taxation/g20-finance-ministers-endorse-reforms-to-the-international-tax-system-for-curbing-avoidance-by-multinational-enterprises.htm.
[12] Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (15 April 2015), “No: 116, 15 April 2015, Press Release Regarding the Turkey’s Assistance for the Struggle against Ebola Virus Outbreak,” http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-116_-15-april-2015_-press-release-regarding-the-turkey_s-assistance-for-the-struggle-against-ebola-virus-outbreak.en.mfa.
[13] Certain estimates are based on OECD member countries’ voluntary reporting to the Organization’s Development Assistance Committee with limits on the categories and dates of submitted data.
[14] T.R. Erdogan (1 June 2016), “Turkey: Africa’s Friend, Compatriot, and Partner,” Al Jazeera Opinion http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/06/turkey-africa-friend-compatriot-partner-160601070207148.html
[15] D. Erpek “Turkey and the Least Developed Countries: A New Partnership,” Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-and-the-least-developed-countries_--a-new-partnership.tr.mfa.
[16] Ibid.
[17] D. Erpek “Turkey and the Least Developed Countries: A New Partnership,” Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available from: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-and-the-least-developed-countries_--a-new-partnership.tr.mfa.
[18] AK Party (12 November 2014) “Davutoglu Spells Out Turkey’s Vision for G20 Presidency” AK Party Website, https://www.akparti.org.tr/english/haberler/davutoglu-spells-out-turkeys-vision-for-g20-presidency/68578#1.
[19] AK Party (12 November 2014) “Davutoglu Spells Out Turkey’s Vision for G20 Presidency” AK Party Website, https://www.akparti.org.tr/english/haberler/davutoglu-spells-out-turkeys-vision-for-g20-presidency/68578#1.
