On January 12, 2016, at 10.15 a.m., a suicide bomber carried out a deadly attack in İstanbul. But significantly, this happened near the Obelisk of Theodosius (Dikilitaş) located at the Sultanahmet Square, which is regarded as the heart of tourism in Turkey. When I heard about this attack, whose target was a group of German tourists, I first thought of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party), or TAK (Teyrêbazên Azadiya Kurdistan – Kurdistan Freedom Falcons), an organization following in the footsteps of PKK and coming to the fore solely with actions of “blind terror:”
The reason for such an association in my mind was that there had been months-long curfews in the Southeastern Region’s urban centers such as Cizre, Diyarbakır’s Sur district and Nusaybin; and by extension, blockades by security forces, and a high number of deaths, the majority of which was civilians. In previous years, one necessarily took such threats seriously, considering that, at those critical moments of the war waged by PKK against the state, the organization extended the war into the West, particularly aiming at touristic targets and causing a substantial number of civilian losses.
It shortly turned out, however, that the activist in question, killing 13 foreign nationals alongside himself, was the Syrian Nebil Fadli, who was connected with ISIS. As a matter of fact, this was not ISIS’s first action in Turkey. Before the general elections held on June 7, 2015, the organization carried out bombed attacks against HDP’s (Peoples’ Democratic Party) offices in Adana and Mersin, and also in its Diyarbakır rally. In the same year, Şeyh Abdurrahman Alagöz, an ISIS suicide bomber, killed 34 people in the Suruç district of Şanlıurfa on July 20. And on October 10, Alagöz’s brother Yunus Emre Alagöz, together with an unidentified ISIS militant, killed 109 people near the Ankara Central railway station.
But the target of all these attacks was the Kurdish political movement and/or leftist parties and organizations in solidarity with it. Here, ISIS’s main motivation was to exact revenge on the PKK, one of its chief enemies in Syria and, to a certain extent in Iraq, especially after they were defeated in Kobane (One should also stress that the socialist youth targeted in Suruç gathered there in solidarity with Kobane.).
In addition, one should also point out that a part of the public opinion in Turkey is not discomforted by these massacres and that they can even be content with them, on the basis of the logic of “my enemy’s enemy is my friend.” Furthermore, there is an argument that ISIS wanted to use these attacks to expand its already existent mass base in Turkey.
When considered from this point of view, the Sultanahmet attack was a first for ISIS, a surprising action posing a risk also to itself. This is because, especially in terms of logistics, Turkey is an extremely valuable country for ISIS. And by targeting tourism, one of the key sectors for economy in Turkey, ISIS ran the risk of losing this opportunity.
TAK’s Ankara Attacks
On 17 February 2016, at 6.45 p.m., we hear more news about another suicide attack organized in Ankara. Service buses carrying military personnel in the heart of the capital were targeted by a suicide bomber with a bomb-laden vehicle. The method used in this attack, which caused the death of 29 people in total, seemed to be an attack by ISIS, but because of the target fingers were pointed at the PKK. In the first statements made by the state, it was alleged that the bomber was a Syrian, therefore a PYD/YPG member. This was an effort by the government to persuade international public opinion of the fact that PYD/YPG was a terrorist organization. However, it was soon revealed that the aggressor was Abdülbaki Sömer from Van, who had used a Syrian immigrant identity card. TAK claimed the responsibility for this attack.
And within a month, another bombing took place on March 13, 2016, at 18.30, on Atatürk Boulevard near Güvenpark, at a point not far away from the previous attack’s target. This was again a bomb-laden car, ploughing into the crowds near the bus stops, and causing the death of 37 people. It was, of course, TAK (and therefore, PKK) that came to people’s minds, yet as there was not any clear official (military or police) target (there were some who alleged that the real target was the spot occupied by the Rapid Response Force spot, a full-time riot squad of the Turkish National Police, but this claim was not found convincing), people also considered the likelihood of an ISIS attack. However, it was soon understood that the aggressor was Seher Çağla Demir, who had been on trial for PKK propaganda. TAK also claimed the responsibility for this attack.
ISIS’s Attack in Beyoğlu
Six days after this blast, on March 19, 2016, at 10.55 a.m., another suicide attack was carried out this time in the İstiklal Street, which is considered the center of İstanbul. And it was again the TAK and/or PKK that spontaneously came to people’s minds, as there was a precedent for such an action. On October 31, 2010, at a time when the peace dialogue between the state and the Kurdish movement had just started, a youth named Vedat Acar had carried out a suicide attack in Taksim Square, killing himself in the process. Claimed by TAK, this attack drew negative reactions by some of the BDP (the Peace and Democract Party, i.e., HDP’s precessor) parliamentarians.
However, it was soon understood that this attack was not organized by TAK/PKK but by ISIS. It took some time to identify the perpetrator, Mehmet Öztürk from Gaziantep. Taking into account the fact that, apart from Öztürk, one Iranian and three Israeli tourists lost their lives, this action was deemed an extension of ISIS’s Sultanahmet attack.
Puzzling Problems
These suicide attacks (two of which were carried out in İstanbul, and the other two in Ankara, all within three months) raise a set of questions. It is quite difficult to understand why two transnational organizations (ISIS and the PKK) waging a pitiless war against each other primarily in Syria and partially in Iraq have entered into such a violent rivalry in Turkish territories. In normal circumstances, one would expect one of these organizations (particularly ISIS) to opt to remain silent, making the state direct all of its energy towards its enemy.
In fact, before the public could recover from the shock created by the massacre perpetrated in Suruç on July 20, 2015 and was still focusing on the issue of ISIS, the PKK changed the agenda with its own attacks, first targeting the military in Dağlıca, Hakkari, on September 6, 2015, and the police in Iğdır two days later, thus drawing the attention (more precisely, reaction and anger) from ISIS towards itself.
Another interesting and puzzling point is the fact that these parties are copying each other. As we have also stated in the introduction to this text, the bombing attacks in Ankara and claimed by TAK evokes the kinds of attacks carried out by organizations like Al-Qaeda in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. Likewise, the PKK’s history reminds us of the kinds of suicide attacks carried out by ISIS in Sultanahmet and Beyoğlu.
Another similarity is the way the responsibility of these attacks are claimed (or not claimed). As is known, the PKK traditionally does not claim the responsibility of attacks directly targeting civilians, stating that it does not promote such actions and that it is even against them. However, it does not resort to harsh words at all while referring to TAK when the organization claims such attacks. Even if the PKK used such negative rhetoric it would not be credible, as it is impossible for organized, costly and sensational strategic attacks like these to be carried out by a unit defining itself within the Kurdish movement without the PKK’s approval (and even its support).
While the PKK does not claim such attacks out of a concern to protect its image, there must be some other reasons for the silence of ISIS when it comes to Turkey. Usually, it immediately claims similar attacks organized in other territories, and is not disturbed at all by the image of “murderer of civilians.”
As we mentioned also in the introduction, Turkey is an extremely critical and precious country for ISIS especially in terms of logistics. This significance prevents ISIS from defining Turkey as a “battleground.” Nonetheless, after the fall of Mosul, the Turkish government opened some of its bases, in particular the İncirlik Air Base, due to pressure from the international coalition led by USA against ISIS. It has made it more difficult to cross the Syrian border and has attempted to launch a series of domestic operations against ISIS networks. In this regard, one can consider that the motivation behind ISIS’s Sultanahmet and Beyoğlu attacks was not to cause a great pain to Turkey but to sting it a little. It is thus possible to assume that these blasts are previews of much greater massacres to come, or a kind of blackmail attempt.
Changing Attitudes Depending on the Perpetrator
With their nearly alternate suicide attacks, ISIS and the TAK and/or PKK escalate the already existing tensions in Turkey, spreading fear among people, and blurring the lines of difference between each other. On the other hand, one can observe that primarily the state and also a significant portion of the public opinion adopt various attitudes in the face of these attacks. For example, the fact that some fans in Konya whistled and jeered during the minute’s silence in commemoration of the Ankara Railway Station massacre ahead of a football match between Turkey and Iceland (a similar situation also occurred in İstanbul before the game between Turkey and Greece while commemorating the Paris massacre) was not greeted with much astonishment.
Official authorities have either tried to lessen the effect of attacks apparently carried out by ISIS in Suruç and Ankara with speculative phrases like “cocktail terror” (i.e., PKK-ISIS cooperation) or paved the way for their immediate oblivion. But if there had been serious interrogations about the bombs detonated in HDP’s Diyarbakır rally on June 5, 2015, it would have been possible to prevent the Suruç massacre. And if there had been serious interrogations about the Suruç massacre, it would have been possible to avert the Ankara Railway Station blast. Considering the fact that these two suicide bombers were recorded in the state’s list of 21 suspect people, one can infer that what we are face to face with a situation more serious than mere negligence. It is for sure that this attitude of disregard was made easier by the fact only foreign tourists were the victims of Sultanahmet and Beyoğlu attacks. On the other hand, attacks attributed to the TAK and/or PKK have been transformed into tools of propaganda in accordance with the strategy of “total war” embraced by the state for a while now against the Kurdish movement.
This double attitude certainly exacerbates the current polarization in Turkey. And it would not be realistic at all to claim that we have a clue or a glimmer of hope for a possible way out.
Taking into account that a solution to conflicts in Syria and Iraq is not looming on the horizon, and that, even worse, there is a high likelihood that these conflicts will escalate, one must unfortunately conclude that climate of terror will continue to prevail in Turkey for quite a while.
“Those wanting to create social unrest especially at election times always carry out these kinds of terrorist actions. The nation must be sensitive in this regard. A provocative action was previously carreid out before the elections in Diyarbakır just so they [HDP] would ‘pass the threshold’ and be ‘seen as a victim’. We saw the same film in Diyarbakır and in other places.”
Veysel Eroğlu, the Minister of Forestry and Water Affairs, on the explosion that occurred at the Ankara Peace rally on October 10, 2015:
“The structure we call ISIS can be seen, in its kernel, as a radical terrorist structure, but the mass of people participating in it includes Turkmens –with a significant majority–Sunni Arabs, and Kurds. We must take this into consideration. Previous discontents, indignations, exclusions, and insults led to a sudden broad reaction on a wide front. If, as we have always advised in a friendly and brotherly way, Sunni Arabs had not been excluded from the process in Iraq, there would not be such an accumulation of anger in mainstream Sunni Arab provinces like Mosul and Anbar.”
Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs, on June 11, 2014:
“These are some connections not only with PKK, but also with circles pursuing sensational developments and some circles within the parallel structure. Obviously, some people attempt to do something by jumbling them all together, which we call cocktail terror. This also includes the PKK and DAESH. Most of these bombers were not in Turkey before.”
“The nature of what happened, whether it is an attack or quite a different act, all these will be brought to light especially by the specialist team from Ankara. These are things that are always to be expected, not only in the context of these elections. This is why our security forces take maximum precautions. This is not something concerning only Turkey; one can find such pre-election events all over the world. And the terrorist organization lies at the center of this stratagem. Whatever the nation wants the nation gets; if the nation says that they [HDP] pass the threshold, they will do it, and vice versa. It is that simple.”
The President of the Republic Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, on the explosion at HDP’s Diyarbakır election rally on June 5, 2015:
“This event that occurred here just in front of the railway station is an event that shows the way terror is collectively carried out. Now some of them are saying, ‘DAESH did it’, or whomever did it… Here there is DAESH, there is also PKK, there is also Al-Muhaberat, there is also the terrorist organization PYD active in northern Syria. They planned this action all together. No one should deceive anyone. Whatever happened in Suruç is obvious, and whatver happened in Diyarbakır is obvious, too.”
The President of the Republic Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on the Ankara Peace Rally at a speech made at the HAK-İŞ’s (The Confederation of Turkish Real Trade Unions) General Assembly on October 22, 2015:
“Whatever their names or abbreviations maybe, that makes no difference for us. In our opinion, there is no difference between the PKK, the PYD, the YPG, the DHKP-C, or the MLKP. Turkey is the primary target of all terrorist organizations active in this region. This is because Turkey wages a struggle, without exception, against all of them and with the same determination. Is there any country in the world that struggles against DAESH and pays a price against terrorism as much as we do? Furthermore, we are continuing our struggle against the separatist terrorist organization with the same determination and energy. We should not give any chance to terrorist organizations, to separatists, and to those who are destructive. There is no way other than exposing the separatist terrorist organization for what it is and passing on this truth to the public.”
The President of the Republic Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, concerning the bombing at the Sultanahmet Square on January 12, 2016:
