One of the most serious problems in understanding and discussing the Kurdish question in Turkey is that it is commonly seen as being confined to the boundaries of the Turkish nation-state. Observing current armed conflicts in the world, it is evident that a considerable proportion of these conflicts are not merely domestic developments; rather, they are mostly regional in character. Therefore, scholarly literature refers to conflicts as “regional conflict complexes,” 16 of which have already existed long before the outbreak of the wave of civil wars in recent years, which are impossible to be handled separately. It is inconceivable to examine armed conflicts within a nation-state; involving primary and secondary actors in a particular region is necessary as direct or indirect parties (Wallerstein, 2002).
The Kurdish/Kurdistan conflict in the Middle East is classified within this framework in the literature on conflict analysis and resolution. That is because any approach to understanding the Kurdish question in Turkey that can’t see beyond the Turkish nation-state boundaries recognised by the international system is bound to fail to provide a complete picture of the question.
It can be argued that some of the factors giving rise to the non-conflict period between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Turkish Republic (TR), which started in March 2013 and continued until July 2015, are regional in character. It was only by initiating a non-conflict period with Turkey that the Kurdish movement could shift its political-military power to Rojava (Western Kurdistan) and therefore use its capacity in an effective way. Likewise, it was only through engaging in a non-conflict period with the PKK that Turkey could have an opportunity—in a scenario in which it was thought Assad would fall from power—to fight a proxy war in Syria in which it could become an actor while being able to avoid the risk of middle-easternisation.
On the other hand, the reasons behind the starting and ending of a two-year non-conflict period can not be reduced only to regional-political factors. Once it was initiated, four main interrelated dynamics can be argued to have sustained the negotiation and non-conflict period.
Although the power of each factor to change the state of affairs had proved to be dependent on the political conjuncture, four major factors determined whether the two parties would resume the conflict:
) whether the parties avoided maneuvers leading to a “security dilemma,”
) whether the process was carried out based on legal grounds and mechanisms rather than de facto practices,
) whether methods ensuring socialisation of peace and reconciliation with the past were used, and
) whether measures were taken to prevent regional and external developments from increasing uncertainties which might bring the resolution process to a halt.
It leaves no room for doubt that, except for the first year, the non-conflict period became totally subordinate to developments in Rojava.
AKP’s Kurdish policy from 2013 to 2015
Considering steps taken by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) during the non-conflict period, it is apparent that it tried to put into practice many of the principles in the literature called “Terrorism Studies.” One of the major principles in the field prescribes: “Wise governments approach negotiation processes as instruments of managing terrorist violence in the long run” (Cronin, 2009: 36). In other words, through negotiation, state leaves no choice for the organization using effective political violence but a race against time. The main goal is to weaken the organization and progressively integrate it to the political regime, and thus eliminate any threat of counter-violence through military methods or negotiation.
An analysis of the two-year non-conflict period will be relevant to demonstrate that the AKP has fallen short of that bookish goal due to failing to read the dynamics in the Middle East.
In the first quarter of 2013, when the non-conflict period started, the major issue was the disarmament of the PKK. When the Kurdish movement carried out the initial withdrawal from Turkey, it demanded that legal regulations be enacted in order to proceed with the process. However, the demand was not met and therefore the withdrawal stopped in the upcoming months. In the meantime, the Turkish state continued building new military stations to improve its security infrastructure, and proceeded to construct dams/hydroelectric power plants to limit room for the maneuvering of guerrillas. The obligation of the conflicting parties to avoid the threat of a security dilemma on the basis of the principle of mutual trust, which is the first requirement for resolution of armed conflicts,1 had indeed never been fulfilled.
Apart from that, legislation for protection of the resolution, which is a criterion existing in most of universal models for resolution, was operated by the AKP government to bring protection for those who carry out the process on behalf of the government rather than to protect the dialog/resolution process itself.2
Besides, despite constituting the Wise People Council paying visits to all the seven administrative regions of Turkey, no remarkable step was taken in favor of reconciliation with the past and socialization of peace. Among the seven reports that committees prepared, only the Southeastern Anatolian Report was made public; therefore, the principle of transparency had not been put into effect. Later on, the Gezi uprising and the AKP’s power struggle against the Gülen Movement were regarded by the AKP as justifications for delaying substantial steps towards the resolution.
Examples illustrating why and how the two-year resolution process had been mishandled are plenty. Nevertheless, it is also a well-known fact that on February 28, 2015, the Dolmabahçe Accord was shared with the public; in other words, it has been proved that an agreement on a road map for a resolution within the scope of a democratization process in Turkey was possible. So why has the process failed although an agreement was made on the guidelines of the negotiation process?
Two turning points
Bringing together historical and contemporary references made by Abdullah Öcalan in his letter, which was read in Diyarbakir on the Newroz celebrations of March 21, 2013, it becomes clear that the Kurdish Movement called on the AKP to form an alliance not only in Turkey but in the wider context of Middle East. The primary reason for the failure of the process has been the AKP policy in the Middle East. Two turning points—one in 2014 and the other in 2015—can be said to constitute the grounds for this argument.
First, due to its policy of extending the process over an indefinite period of time, the AKP missed the junctures where the process could have made a progress. Although objective conditions for taking substantial steps were present both after local elections on March 30, 2014, and also after the presidential election on August 10, 2014, the AKP preferred not to take any further steps.
When scrutinized chronologically, it seems obvious that the Dolmabahçe Accord was not agreed upon on February 2015, but rather on September 3, 2014, in the meeting between Hakan Fidan and Abdullah Öcalan in Imralı. A public declaration of the road map, forwarded to and acknowledged by Kandil in the same week, was postponed for weeks and then for months. The main reason was the outbreak of ISIS siege of Kobanî on September 15, 2014, and hence the AKP’s expectation that the Kurdish movement, having lost Kobanî, would sit at the negotiating table in a weakened position.
In line with this expectation, on October 5, 2014, Erdoğan enunciated that: “Kobanî is just about to fall!” At that momentous turning point, the Kobanî resistance gave international legitimacy to the PKK while it constituted a loss for the AKP, and hence for the resolution process. The AKP had gambled and lost the game and the resolution process received the first fatal injury. Thus, the AKP lost credibility among a major part of the Kurdish population as demonstrated by the Kobanî uprising of October 6-7.
The second turning point which had culminated in severing all ties between the two parties was when the YPG/J forces expelled ISIS from Tel Abyad and took control of that region in June, 2015, thanks to the support of air strikes by the anti-ISIS coalition. It must be noted that Tel Abyad had a double significance, both in terms of the policy the AKP has been pursuing in Syria for years, and in terms of the security crisis in Rojava.
Holding Tel Abyad was a significant strategic advantage for ISIS with regard to ensuring the transfer of militants, meeting logistic needs and gaining economic benefits. For Turkey, it was a safeguard against establishing an autonomous Kurdistan in the south. As for Rojava, taking hold of this city implied a possibility of uniting the cantons of Kobanî and Cizîr, a convenience for military activity in a wide region stretching from Shengal up to the frontiers of Euphrates river, and an opportunity to free Kobanî from being dependent on the Turkish border. In other words, the fall of Tel Abyad has almost made clear that the Kurds in Syria were going to be part of the project of an prospective autonomous democratic Kurdistan.
The new period of conflict and Rojava
The primary reason why the AKP has resumed the conflict is the fact that the party that ended up benefiting from the two-year non-conflict period was the Kurdish movement, not the AKP. In that period, the Kurdish movement established democratic autonomous regions ready for recognition by international powers, and it won a historic victory through the agency of The Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) by passing the election threshold by taking Kurdish votes from the AKP electorate.
Resuming the fight against the Kurdish movement has been possible only through a negotiation process with the US. Opening Incirlik Air Base for US air strikes on ISIS allowed the AKP to buy extra time for a few months in order to prevent losing any more power in the Syrian equation. Therefore, it becomes possible to argue that this negotiation has slowed down YPG/J progress against ISIS.
As seen in the case of Tel Abyad, requirements for winning a decisive victory over ISIS are not complicated: the existence of a land force fighting at least as organized and determined as the ISIS, and effective air strikes by the anti-ISIS Coalition.
The absence of the latter means a long-lasting combat engagement and suffering heavy losses on the part of YPG/J. Since July 22, 2015, when the AKP signed the Incirlik Agreement with the US, YPG/J forces have confined themselves to gaining a series of achievements on the existing fronts without attempting to open new fronts, while there were strategic cities like Cerablus which could have been taken with US support.
Since the very beginning, there has been a likelihood that must have cause the AKP to feel anxious, inasmuch as it has become entangled in the Syrian civil war in all aspects, including the ones which are not known to us. This is the possibility of turning Turkey into any Middle Eastern country suffering a crisis of permanent unmanageability.
There are two reasons behind the fact that the AKP has not targeted ISIS with any remarkable air strike although it signed a final agreement on air strikes on ISIS, on August 24, 2015. The first reason is the collusion between the AKP and ISIS based on Islamic fraternity as it was clarified during solving the hostage crisis. The other reason is that AKP refrains from attacking ISIS because it can potentially carry out violent activities in Turkey.
The AKP has sufficient reason to fear ISIS that has allegedly carried out the attacks in Diyarbakır on June 5, in Suruç on July 20, and in Ankara on October 10, but has never claimed responsibility for the attacks. The last of these attacks, which so far invariably helped to protect the political line the AKP upholds, has had a different impact. This time the attack has proved that the AKP policy in Syria poses a serious threat to all citizens of Turkey. The most important consequence of the present political process is opening up the process for an increasing middle-easternization of Turkey.
More and more people want this civil war to come to an end, which is going on since 2011. Russia’s direct military intervention to the war has reinforced the possibility for realization of the project in which Assad remains in power; a unified Rojava is recognized by the international powers; and ISIS and other jihadist groups are weakened and dissolved in the long run.
The Obama administration needs an alliance with the YPG/J forces more than ever in order to strengthen its hand in domestic politics with new victories against ISIS, and also to regain its political reputation in the international community, which it has lost after Russian intervention. US support to possible operations on Cerablus or Raqqa will demonstrate that Turkey has run out of time it has bought by signing the Incirlik Agreement. Also, it’s no secret that Putin does not take a stand against unifying cantons of Kobanî and Cizîr, inviting democratic autonomous Rojava cantons to open a diplomatic mission in Russia.
Considering the domestic political dynamics in Turkey, almost all surveys by reliable polling companies indicate that elections to be held in November 1, will not present a different picture compared to elections held in June 7. If Erdoğan will not attempt a final gamble, and if elections will be held as free and fair, then it will not be very possible for the AKP to continue the current war moves against Kurdish movement with the same speed.
Although returning to the negotiating table will probably not be done very quickly in the case of a coalition government, what is known is that the situation in the Middle East is once again going to be the decisive factor. The AKP policy in Syria has very little chance of success now. Therefore, the question must be: To get out of the quicksand, what are the ways to minimize humanitarian and political cost that the AKP is going to bring to Turkish and Kurdish peoples?
1 It must be noted, however, that this generalization refers to an ideal resolution process. There are current counter examples to this requirement where a peace agreement was signed. For instance, it was possible to proceed to the final stage in the Colombian peace process without having fulfilled the requirement mentioned above.
2 Two legal regulations regarding the resolution process have been made throughout the non-conflict period. The first one was the law enacted on April 25, 2014, protecting MIT officials who carried out negotiations with PKK. The second regulation was the law enacted on July 10, 2015, called The Law on the Termination of Terrorism and Reinforcement of Social Integration, which provided legal immunity for AKP government officials against any possibility of legal prosecution in the future.