“As virtue is necessary in a republic, and in a monarchy honor, so fear is necessary in a despotic government”
Montesquieu
After it came to power in 2002, AKP (Justice and Development Party) promised numerous projects and reforms to the electorate. The new government started to create new institutions and pass laws in order to effect a rapid transformation of the public services, bureaucracy, diplomacy, justice system, public finance, defense industry and manufacturing. AKP made frequent use of the word democracy to fill its utopia of reforms with content, and particularly underlined its “human focus.” The government dubbed its program the “Silent Revolution”, and the book by the same name was published with a preface by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: “With this revolution, we replace the statist approach where the state views its own citizens as a threat with an approach that considers difference as richness, is committed to the citizen and to serving the citizen.”1 Paradoxically today, Erdoğan and AKP are back to defending a monist conception of the state: “We say Rabia, one nation, one flag, one state.”2
When we focus on the origins of this paradox, it becomes evident that AKP is going through a cultural and ideological crisis, in economic and political terms and as regards the day-to-day manifestations of politics. The economy of “Great Turkey”3 is dependent on imports, the dollar is on the rise and TL is losing value. International credit rating agencies are lowering Turkey’s rating due to political and economic uncertainty, which in turn has an adverse effect on foreign direct investment. The speculative behavior in the banking system and stock exchange is threading on thin ice.
The future of “Strong Turkey”s domestic and foreign politics is an enigma. On the domestic front, the crisis of legitimacy experienced by AKP since Gezi Park has crystallized into a crisis of representation after the general elections of 7 June. Although it remains a dominant mass party, AKP has lost its single party status, and has been obliged to give a break to its transformation of the regime’s building blocks.
As for foreign politics, the Kurdish movement has gained an international prestige by fighting the militarist and fundamentalist ISIS together with the USA and coalition forces, which has lead to a review of the plans concerning the Middle East. The Turkish foreign policy vision, loyal as ever to the pattern outlined in Prime Minister Davutoğlu’s book Strategic Depth, has become disconnected with the reality on the ground. The policy of “zero problems with neighbors” and various diplomatic overtures have become ineffective after the Arab rebellions started to undermine political Islam, and Turkey’s position as a role model has become more and more irrelevant.
As AKP runs short of values and principles to offer, it becomes increasingly aware that its only way out is changing the political juncture. The increased difficulty of addressing political subjects through the discourse of political Islam is leading the AKP to create a new juncture. As revealed by an analysis of the political and social developments in the last years, recent Turkish political history is in fact “an age of extremes.”
This can be seen in the Gezi Park protests; the corruption probe of December 17-25 involving senior state officials; the new era in capital-state relations as unveiled by leaked conversations; political cleansing across the bureaucracy under the pretext of fighting against the “parallel state;” the direct election of the president of the republic by the populace and the political threshold created by this new legal status; media footage showing the state providing logistical support to ISIS; the Kobanê resistance and its domestic repercussions, the elections of June 7 when the pro-Kurdish HDP (Peoples' Democratic Party) crossed the 10% electoral threshold for the first time in history; the massacre of 33 youth in Suruç; the return of OHAL rule (“state of emergency”) to the Kurdish provinces under the name of “special security zones;” air operations in northern Syria; the attacks on shops belonging to Kurds and on various political parties’ offices in the week following September 6; and the ban on access to various media outlets, detentions and arrests.
In this chain of events, the AKP is acting as both the protagonist and spectator, striving to turn political crisis into an opportunity for domination. Here, its main strategy for gaining the upper hand is presidential monocracy.4 However, a series of developments, including the direct election of the president by the populace through the general elections of June 7 and beyond, have undermined the political position of AKP and Erdoğan. The regime and its cadres have become stuck, right on the verge of a “New Turkey.” The recent military operations and prelude to civil war have proven that AKP is nothing but a copy of the “old Turkey” as far as its security paradigm is concerned.
All these events create the context for the rest of this article. However, we can focus on the AKP’s positioning itself as a dominant mass party as a factor which cuts across different chains of events. The gap grows between the dominant ideology defended by the party and the political form it exercises, and AKP tries to close this gap through ideological articulation. Since the “New Turkey project” has collapsed and the transition to presidential monocracy has failed after the elections of June 7, the regime now tries to reinforce its political line by capitalizing on the leadership cult, nationalism and warmongering. In this article, i will try to examine the AKP’s ideological deadlock since the general elections, its difficulty in being the carrier of the ideology that it preaches to social classes, and the changes in the parameters of the regime as AKP’s project of hegemony loses steam.
The legal configuration and two perspectives
An administration which relies on de facto rule leads to two kinds of risk.5 First, the government can arbitrarily define the political moment as it wishes. Any event or circumstance which threatens the interests of the government can be defined as an element of “state of emergency” or “crisis.” Second, a system of administration and sanctions is created according to the character of the juncture thus defined. The state’s control and violence is reinforced via security forces and the judiciary system. According to the French jurist Léon Duguit, the creation of exceptions to legality “leads to open-ended results.” Under certain circumstances, this may bring about the possibility of despotism.6
If we follow Duguit’s arguments, we could use the term despotism to define what is going on in Turkey. It is not a coincidence that Erdoğan talked of the presidency of the republic as “the executive presidency of the republic” before being elected, and simply as “presidency” after being elected. After remembering his statement that “The administrative system in Turkey has de facto changed,”7 we can point to two cases of de facto rule: First, he has used his presidential right to convene the cabinet, a right which presidents had refrained from after the military coup of September 12, 1980. Within the framework of his powers described in the Article 104 of the Constitution,8 Erdoğan called the cabinet meetings three times, and contributed to the regime’s transformation with this phenomenal gesture. This extraordinary situation which is not in line with the state’s traditions can nevertheless be explained by Erdoğan’s de jure powers.
Although these actions go against state traditions, they do fall within his constitutional powers, and Erdoğan concentrates more and more power at the Palace. Prior to the elections in June, Erdoğan tried to transfer his authority to the AKP. Erdoğan, who was expected to remain “impartial” as per the aforementioned laws, participated in the AKP’s electoral rallies, asked for 400 MPs from the population and debated with opposition parties as if he were a party leader -all of which suggested that he broke with his de jure position and moved towards a de facto presidency. By insisting on 400 MPs, Erdoğan took an active political role to safeguard the AKP’s single-party rule and thus suspended legality in the absence of any constitutional amendment.
Erdoğan’s and AKP’s request for 400 MPs in particular and demand for a shift to a new power scheme for “New Turkey” in general are related to their hegemonial project. Since Gezi, the AKP has been faced with a profound dilemma: The “New Turkey” project’s reliance on OHAL practices make it hard to distinguish its security paradigm from those of the past, and paints the image of a government which oscillates between the past and the future. Indeed AKP has chosen to abandon any references to the future, at least in the short term. The only maneuver available to the regime now is structural change with a legal and formal character. As the AKP loses its capacity to absorb class-based reactions, it requires a legal topos9 on which it can base its legitimacy and mobilize the state’s power.
The process-based interpretation presented by Duguit remains explanatory until a certain point; however, it does not offer us the methodology required to answer the question “Why does AKP insist on a presidential monocracy?” If we put it in a speculative way, “Has the AKP reached its natural limits?” or “Have a series of simultaneous and consecutive material relations placed a structural limit before the AKP?” The answer can be found through the perspective offered by Gramsci. The “advanced democracy” package put forth by the AKP and the project it formulates as “New Turkey” constitute a project of hegemony. As such it has a number of internal conflicts and dynamics.
Consent and force exist simultaneously in projects of hegemony. When force comes to play a more prominent role than consent, it is possible to speak of a shift from hegemony to domination.10 All regimes which are based on force in the final instance have to depend on mechanisms of consent such as popular participation in politics or public services, as well as legal systems. Governments require a canon of laws and administrative authority in order to justify and legitimize their actions and policies. Erdoğan’s insistence on 400 MPs was a harbinger of his ultimate project. If Turkey transitions to a presidential system, then the de facto merger of the legislative, executive and judiciary powers will become legal, and this political sterilization will open the door to further maneuvers. Then, any reaction from within the party or from the opposition will be easily absorbed inside the limits of bourgeois law and parliamentary politics. AKP has described this model as the “Turkish style presidential system,”11 emphasizing its desire to create a new establishment which goes beyond the limits of Western style parliamentarism.
The foreign media’s use of concepts such as authoritarianism or sultanism to describe what is happening in Turkey is a result of this development.12 The personalization of power by Erdoğan and his clique within the regime reinforce the perception that an aggressive style is more important than meritocracy in public institutions, transparency in economics, and moderation in diplomacy, and that Turkey has abandoned pluralist parliamentary norms. We could refer to concepts such as Oriental despotism as described by Karl Wittfogel, liberal autocracy, or a Weberian definition of authority (Herrschaft) to put forth the argument that the AKP has gone beyond the limits of bourgeois parliamentary rule. Although explanatory to a certain extent, such theoretical schemes fail to interpret “authoritarianization” correctly.
There is a difference between authoritarian actions taken by Erdoğan or a single individual within the state apparatus, and the authoritarianization of the state apparatus as a whole. For a holistic reading of authoritarianization, we need to visit Poulantzas. His description of authoritarianization focuses on the relations between the state apparatus, dominant mass party and mid-level bureaucracy. In an authoritarian state apparatus, executive, legislative and judiciary branches de facto merge and the seat of political power shifts from the legislative to the executive. The technical and structural distinction between these branches disappears, and singular and personalized legal regulations put an end to the rule of law. As rule of law weakens, political power loses its prestige and may resort to antidemocratic and when necessary illegal means. As such the authoritarian state can overcome the crisis of the state and gets a chance to continue the “strong state” tradition which will safeguard the market rationality.13
The criticism of authoritarianism to “New Turkey” project is accurate only in a structural context. Otherwise, criticism inspired by humanist politics will single out Erdoğan and present him as the main antagonist, leading attention away from the other dynamics and antagonisms within the system. Underlying Turkish liberals’ frequent calls to normalization is a person-focused interpretation of authoritarianism, which suggests that politics will once again become rational after Erdoğan quits politics. Of course, it is possible to speak of authoritarianism on a personal level, too; however, what brings a person such as Erdoğan to his current position and grants him political clout is concrete relations in the form of the state. If we go back to our argument, Erdoğan’s position is not unimportant; however, this position can only be grasped within the context of party-state relations.
Father’s place in the body politic
In Lacan’s theory of psychoanalysis, the figure of the Father stands out. According to his conceptualization of the name-of-the-father (nom-du-père), the Father reminds his children that he is the founder of the symbolic order and of the legal order, by saying “no!” and giving commands. Coupled with hierarchy, the name-of-the-father inscribes its name in the symbolic universe and thereby “symbolizes authority.”14 As such the Father, “regardless of his presence or absence” becomes “the symbolization of law-making and prohibitive authority.” As a cult and phenomenon, he may be likened to the steady leg of the drawing compass. Having had himself elected president of the republic, built the Palace as his fortress, organized rallies to call for the presidential system, and now trying to become a de facto president, Erdoğan holds a position within the regime and AKP corresponding to the name-of-the-father. With the efforts of AKP supporters and various public relations teams, various images and roles have been ascribed to Erdoğan in order to give a collective personality to the Father.
Erdoğan is described with adjectives such as “the founder of the AKP,” “the head of state,” “the man from Kasımpaşa” to show that he is a man of the people, “the tall man” to emphasize his physical predominance vis-à-vis other party leaders, and “commander in chief” as was the case at the latest rallies. This superiority in different areas inevitably imposes Erdoğan’s authority over the party and government. In this attempt to grant omnipotence to the Father, the body politic increasingly merges with Erdoğan’s body and his every sentence becomes like a piece of legislation or an article of law.
Nevertheless, Erdoğan’s body, which is treated like the political and legal embodiment of the “nation’s will” is becoming fragmented. Now that the nom-du-père, the commanding Father, cannot become the president, he feels increasingly trapped within his palace, so much so that he has asked for help with his status saying “This body no longer fits in this shirt” in various speeches.15
Although he is capable of exercising his constitutional powers in full, Erdoğan is well aware that as long as the current constitution and system remain intact, the advancement of his party and his career will slow down. In the imagination of the AKP, which plans to compartmentalize power in “New Turkey,” there must be a hierarchical, clear-cut chain of command between Erdoğan and the party. However, the HDP has radically changed the distribution of seats in the parliament by passing the electoral threshold, and has thus suspended plans for a presidential monocracy.
As such, there is no real tension between Erdoğan and AKP, which in fact tries to render the regime more manageable by resolving the crisis of legitimacy and representation with new legal configurations. Erdoğan actively intervened in the coalition talks following the June elections, the selection of the AKP’s new Executive Committee and the creation of the new lists for MP candidates, which suggests that he preserves his position as nom-du-père albeit with some loss of prestige.
AKP cadres also further their political careers by instrumentalizing the images and symbolism associated with the leadership cult around Erdoğan, in some kind of a symbiosis. However, Erdoğan’s being stuck within the Palace hampers this mutually beneficial relation. The party cadres tie their destiny to that of Erdoğan, which creates a structure that can stand only as long as Erdoğan’s political presence lasts. This worries those party members who defend a more institutionalized party, as well as Abdullah Gül and others who define the AKP as a movement of the “virtuous.”16
The concept and ideological milestone of political war
Another recent indication that the “New Turkey” project has come to a standstill, is AKP’s attempt to overcome its electoral defeat through ideological revision. The decline of the “New Turkey” momentum, brought about by the HDP’s electoral victory around the slogan “We will not let Erdoğan become president”17, led to a new course of policy after the elections. For the Turkish raison d’état in general, it is not acceptable for the Kurdish political movement to receive six million votes or 13%, and then get two seats in the caretaker government. However, for the AKP in particular, their project has been blocked after the HDP made it to the parliament as the fourth party. This has prompted the AKP to take certain political and ideological measures, turning pragmatist maneuvers from means to ends for the party.
On the political front, the AKP has started to organize domestic politics on the model of low-density warfare, mobilized the security bureaucracy and initiated work on new legislation. The government referred to Law no. 2565 on Military Forbidden Zones and Security Zones to declare “special security zones” to close down and isolate Kurdish provinces.18 On the ideological front, after realizing that it has lost its Kurdish voters in these provinces to the HDP for good, the AKP moved into the stage of absolute antagonism.19 To counter the HDP’s political theses, the AKP has tried to portray the HDP as a micro Kurdish party outside of mainstream politics.
Often identifying the HDP with the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) in speeches and debates, the AKP centered its propaganda around the slogan “We do not want PKK in the parliament” as was seen in the “Millions Unite in a Single Voice Against Terrorism” meeting held in Istanbul. Although they state that “There never was a Kurdish question in this country,”20 the AKP attempts to criminalize the HDP, which has become the strongest party in the Kurdish provinces, and thus directly or indirectly lays the groundwork for ethnic polarization.
In the week following September 6, 2015, the members and offices of the HDP and left-wing political parties were subjected to attacks, arson and lynching. Although these were organized attacks, the presence of large masses who heeded this call points to the basis of such a polarization. After the general elections in June, the word “Kurd” was rendered synonymous with “terrorist” in a systematical and regular effort.
The transformation of the word “Kurd” into an object of hatred has a long history. What is specific about the AKP rule is the new threshold crossed by the HDP—the Kurdish political subject—and the regime’s attempt to respond to this through special operations. As the political discourse targeting the HDP and its officials becomes more and more established, it becomes possible to mobilize people on ethnic grounds. Mobs with nationalist and racist motivations entrust their personality to this mass mobilization and start to circulate freely in a search for an object of hatred.
To understand the origins of hatred in terms of mass psychology and political psychology, we could turn to Terry Eagleton. What underlies nationalist and provocative fundamentalism is the attempt to build one’s self in antagonism to one’s opponent. Eagleton suggests that the ugly pleasure taken in destroying the other becomes the only way of proving to ourselves that we are alive. As such, this hollowness in the core identity of aggressive mobs is like a premature taste of death. The way to overcome this trauma is to liquidate those who live with their own identities. According to Eagleton, the Nazis viewed Jews as a slimy nothingness or surplus, a decadent sign of humanity’s shameful fragility. In order to preserve the integrity of their identity, Nazis had to eradicate this sign.21 Likewise, the word and image of “Kurd” delay the aggressors’ coming to terms with their own class positions and conflicts, and every second of this delay helps mask the naked political violence employed by the powers that be.
What is needed to translate the ethnic polarization in the society into votes is a political structure capable of circulating the nationalist discourse skillfully and appealing to subjects through such a discourse. In this climate built on objects of hatred, the AKP strives to reach beyond the boundaries of political Islam to become a center of attraction for the masses with conservative and nationalist tendencies. After the Suruç massacre, the Prime Minister launched an “anti-terror campaign” saying that “From today onwards, this has become a large-scale operation. It is not limited to a single day or region.” However, under the pretext of fighting the terrorism of ISIS, the PKK and the DHKP/C, the government is conducting police operations to intimidate the opposition and the “campaign” is supposed to protect the “motherland.”
This political logic centered around the protection of the motherland after the general elections is shaped not by a discourse rooted in political Islam, but a discourse which can mobilize the masses towards a concrete target and image of the enemy. Erdoğan, who had once criticized the AKP’s ex-MP from the province of Ordu, Idris Naim Şahin, for his nationalistic reflexes while he served as the Minister of the Interior, now reintegrates nationalist codes to the party’s ideology to secure its future.
In debates on nationalism with rival politicians, AKP uses the rhetorical tactic of discursive struggle.22 This discursive struggle, aiming at not presenting rational arguments but discrediting and marginalizing the opponent, is inherent to capitalist democracy. While the previous discursive slogan “One Nation, One Flag, One State” had a more communitarian tone, now the defense of the country’s unity is put forth with emphases on being “national” and “native.” Erdoğan has requested 550 national and native MPs at the rally “Millions Unite in a Single Voice Against Terrorism,” proving that his concept of identity overlaps with the nationalism of the MHP (Nationalist Action Party). In this discursive dedifferentiation with the MHP, the only factor which distinguishes the AKP is its capacity of mobilizing the state apparatus and accelerating the ideological circulation via this apparatus.
Rather than entering a nationalism competition with the MHP in the elections, the AKP turns the nationalist ideology into the dominant ideology. As a “comprehensive and historical” ideology, nationalism describes the ethnic group, nation, village, tribe and denomination to which the subject belongs.23 The more frequently these descriptions are emphasized, the more polarization and fragmentation are aggravated. This momentum turns into a vicious circle, which may in the short term lead to more votes for AKP. However, it will destroy the basis for cohabitation in the long term. Continuing the political debate with HDP through “comprehensive and historical” codes brings about the possibility of civil war. “Civil war is a highly tumultuous period for the society and state,”24 and the distinction between the war’s initiators and fighters usually disappears as violence begets chaos.
The political position that the AKP assumes due to its ideological stance is the concept of political war, which brings civil war as a possibility into the picture. Erdoğan had taken a defensive position during the days of Gezi, saying “This is a new War of Independence for us.” Thus he had declared that he was at war, and branded everyone who opposed his party’s interest as “traitors” and “lobbyists.” Today, the regime’s strategy prioritizes not defense but offense, and organizes domestic politics along the lives of the war concept, which polarizes opposing sides, radicalizes politics, and aggravates fanaticism.
The shift of hatred towards different individuals and institutions helps the regime gain time to veil the conflicts created by the AKP and Erdoğan. In order not to lose its grip on power, the AKP has mobilized the police and army, starting a period of hegemony armored with force. It tries to prove the “strength of the state” in the eyes of all social groups and classes, renew its image and take restorative measures to secure the political success required for the presidential system. What AKP overlooks however is the dialectic nature of the war that it has started for political purposes. Hobbes had written the following in Leviathan:
“And because all signs of hatred, or contempt, provoke to fight; insomuch as most men choose rather to hazard their life than not to be revenged, we may in the eighth place, for a law of nature, set down this precept: that no man by deed, word, countenance, or gesture, declare hatred or contempt of another. The breach of which law is commonly called contumely.”25
Conclusion without solution
“I call something impossible, if its existence is in contradiction with itself.”26 This aphorism of Spinoza’s can be adapted to current-day Turkey: After setting out with visions of a “New Turkey”, “Strong Turkey” and “Turkey 2023,” the AKP ended its democratic overtures once these came into conflict with its interests. It chose to disregard “the national will”—once an object of fetish—as soon as it manifested itself in another party. All these point to the impossibility of the AKP. The party, which has invested general elections with its desire for the presidential system due to the requirements mentioned above, cannot be reduced to the Palace; nor can it be abstracted from it. An analysis on the regime must refrain from synthetic distinctions between Erdoğan and the AKP and instead focus on the structural political and ideological atmosphere created in Turkey in the last few months. Even as the AKP’s “impossibility” crystallizes day after day, it is in vain to wait for any normalization—which would be like waiting for Godot.
1 Sessiz Devrim: Türkiye’nin Demokratik Değişim ve Dönüşüm Envanteri (2002–2014), Kamu Düzeni ve Güvenliği Müsteşarlığı, Ankara, 2014, p. 10
2 “İstanbul’da ‘teröre karşı tek ses’ mitingi”, Sputnik News, http://tr.sputniknews.com/turkiye/20150920/1017861862.html
3 See articles by Korkut Boratav and Erinç Yeldan. Korkut Boratav, Seçim arifesinde ekonomik göstergeler, BirGün, 17 May 2015, http://www.birgun.net/haber-detay/secim-arifesinde-ekonomik-gostergeler…, Erinç Yeldan, “Ulusal ekonomide derinleşen kırılganlıklar”, Cumhuriyet, 2 September 2015, http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/koseyazisi/358385/Ulusal_ekonomide_derinle…
4 “A monocracy based on the ballot box is called the presidential monocracy.” Maurice Duverger, Siyasal Rejimler [Political Regimes], translated by Teoman Tunçdoğan, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, pp. 25–26.
5 Muammer Oytan, “Fransa’da Olağanüstü Durum ve Koşullar Kuramı”, Amme İdaresi Dergisi, Vol: 14, No: 2, June 1981, p. 65
6 Ibid, sf 65
7 Hürriyet, 15 August 2015, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/29815380.asp
8 Especially the following powers described in Article 104: “To preside over the cabinet or to call the cabinet to a meeting when deemed necessary,” and “to declare state of emergency or state of siege with a decision of the cabinet which he presides over, and to issue executive decrees.” https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/anayasa.uc?p1=104
9 Position, location, space
10 Antonio Gramsci, Selections From The Prison Notebooks, (edited and translated by) Quentin Hoare ve Geoffrey Nowell Smith, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971
11 “Türk tipi başkanlık sistemi bal gibi olur”, Sabah, 27 February 2015, http://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2015/02/27/turk-tipi-baskanlik-sistemi-b…
12 “Democrat or sultan?”, The Economist, http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21579004-recep-tayyip-erdogan-sho… “Sultan at bay”, The Economist, http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21654054-voters-say-no-authoritar… “Recep Tayyip Erdogan: Turkey’s elected sultan or an Islamic democrat?”, The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/24/recep-tayyip-erdogan-turkey
13 Nicos Poulantzas, Devlet İktidar Sosyalizm [State, Power, Socialism], translated by Turhan Ilgaz, Epos Yayınları, Ankara, 2004, pp. 251-270. Bob Jessop, ‘Poulantzas’s State, Power, Socialism as a modern classic’, in L. Bretthauer et al., eds, Reading Poulantzas, Merlin, London, pp. 42-55.
14 The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book X: Anxiety (ed. Jacques-Alain Miller), Polity, NY, 2014: http://www.lacan.com/seminars1a.htm “Freud’s Oedipal triangle of mother-father-child is described by Lacan with name-of-the-father on a symbolic level.” Slavoj Žižek, İdeolojinin Yüce Nesnesi [Sublime Object of Ideology], translated by Tuncay Birkan, Metis Yayınları, İstanbul, 2011.
15 “Erdoğan: Bu beden, bu gömleğe sığmıyor”, Cihan, 7 March 2015, http://www.cihan.com.tr//tr/erdogan-bu-beden-bu-gomlege-sigmiyor-wCHMTY…
16 Abdullah Gül is clearly unpleased with AKP's current state. He made the following comments on the party via his official Twitter account: 'The AKP started out as a movement of the virtuous, and was established to serve the nation in line with the values of fraternity, consultation, frankness and gratitude.' August 14, 2015, https://twitter.com/cbabdullahgul/status/632214912488574976
17 “HDP’den Erdoğan’a rest: Seni başkan yaptırmayacağız”, Radikal, March 17, 2015, http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/hdpden_erdogana_rest_seni_baskan_yap…
18 Some media outlets suggest that there are more than one hundred special security zones. “An Interactive Map of 72 Special Security Zones”, Bianet, September 17, 2015, http://bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/167579-72-ozel-guvenlik-bolgesinin-int…
19 What we mean with absolute antagonism here is the denial which gradually surfaced during the so-called “solution process.” The process was started by AKP under the name “The National Unity and Fraternity Project” allegedly to bring about the “resolution through democratic overtures” of the Kurdish question; however, it was suspended after political tension escalated between Erdoğan and the HDP. See “Erdoğan: There is no Kurdish problem, only Kurds have some problems.” Sabah, May 2, 2015, http://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2015/05/02/erdogan-kurt-sorunu-yoktur-ku…
20 “President of the Republic Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, ‘In this country, we never had a ‘Kurdish’ question’”, Haberler.com, 15 March 2015, http://www.haberler.com/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-balikesir-de-7078164-habe…
21 Terry Eagleton, Kötülük Üzerine Bir Deneme, translated by Şenol Bezici, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2011, p 90–91.
22 For discursive struggle, see Fredric Jameson, “Globalization And Political Strategy”, New Left Review, no. 4, July-August 2000.
23 Göran Therborn, İktidarın İdeolojisi İdeolojinin İktidarı, translated by İrfan Cüre, Dipnot Yayınları, Ankara, 2008, s. 37–38.
24 Leon Trotsky, Onların Ahlakı Bizim Ahlakımız [Their Morals and Ours], translated by Sertaç Canpolat, Özne Yayınları, İstanbul, 2000, p. 46.
25 Wootton, D. (Ed.) Modern Political Thought - readings from Machiavelli to Nietzsche, Hacket Publishing, 1996.
26 Benedictus de Spinoza, Siyaset Üzerine Seçmeler, translated by Afşar Timuçin, Morpa Kültür Yayınları, İstanbul, 2003, p. 118.