Turkey and climate change talks on the eve of the Paris Agreement

Once again, the global climate policy is at a critical crossroads. It is expected that when the 21st Conference of the Parties to the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) convenes in Paris in December 2015, a new global agreement will be agreed upon in order to help attain the UNFCCC’s ultimate goal. This has been defined as stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Key issues here are whether the negotiations begun in 2011 will indeed result in a new agreement, and the nature of the agreement that will be reached at the end of the talks.

The main aspects of this new international pact, which will most probably be named the Paris Agreement, were already laid out at the Durban Conference of 2011. In this framework, not a group of countries—as was the case in the Kyoto Protocol—but all parties will commit to the new agreement with measures for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Nevertheless, this agreement binding all countries will be placed under the umbrella of the UNFCCC and be based on its principles. Accordingly, the Paris Agreement will have to abide by the responsibility sharing system outlined by UNFCCC’s basic principles.

Nonetheless, on the eve of the Paris Conference, it is still hard to talk of any real progress as to how the Durban resolution of five years ago will be implemented. Numerous questions have yet to be answered, e.g. , what are the legal aspects of the agreement, how binding are the commitments promised by the parties, how the parties will be grouped by type of commitment, and whether there will be mechanisms in place to facilitate attaining the declared targets.

It can be seen that a reductionist approach whose dominant discourse claims it is correct to measure the success of the Paris Conference and its agreement with the number of participating states is an attempt to cover up the fact that the agreement will not contribute to the protection of the world’s climate. 

An approach which would reduce the success of the Paris Conference and an agreement on the number of participating states tries to dissimulate the fact that its policy does not contribute to the protection of the world’s climate. Although a new agreement is urgently required to fight global climate change and to expand the basis of collective action, rich countries are striving to shift more of the burden of these urgent measures on developing countries. In this respect, it can be said that the Paris Agreement will be designed not to reinforce measures for fighting against and adapting to climate change, but rather to restructure the international climate regime by revising the order established by the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol.

The climate regime from Copenhagen to Paris: back to the drawing board

In this regard, the key events of this shift were the Copenhagen Consensus of 2009, reinforced by the Cancun Agreements of 2010, and finally the Durban Resolution of 2011 which overhauled the international climate policy. This led to significant progress being made since Copenhagen in the shift towards a system distinct from the UNFCCC plus the Kyoto system. In addition, some progress was achieved in the transition from the Kyoto regime, which was said to have malfunctioned due to its inability to integrate the countries mainly responsible for emissions into the global action scheme.

 A key element expected to be changed by the Paris Agreement is the general perspective that underlies international climate policy. This opinion, which attributes the Kyoto Protocol’s inability in limiting emissions to its top-down structure, puts forth the thesis that the new bottom-up commitment system of the new agreement will encourage the participation of states and increase the number of parties fighting climate change. Thus, they propose a shift from a regime that views binding commitments as the norm and flexibility as the exception, to an order where flexibility and volunteering become the norm. However, it is clear that such a flexible order will fail to respond to the planet’s climate crisis because it is based on a global agreement outlining the non-binding climate measures that states will determine according to their national conditions.

The Paris Conference can be considered successful only if it yields an agreement introducing ambitious, fair and binding commitments. Such a comprehensive agreement should be based on a mechanism of compliance considered binding by all parties, which sets commitments for limiting or reducing emissions, introduces measures for global or national adaptation to the effects of climate change, puts in place a mechanism which will cover the losses and damages associated with climate change, and offers financial, technological and capacity-increasing support to poor countries in terms of reduction, adaptation and losses/damages.

Nevertheless, the drafts presented to the last meeting held before the Paris Conference, in mid-October, weaken such expectations. Although the draft agreement sets the global policy target as keeping the temperature increase below 2 °C, it does not include medium- and long-term collective emission reduction goals which would help reach this main target. The 2013-2015 review on the convenience of the 2 °C target and the resulting export report indicate that the 2 °C target should be taken only as a safety limit, and that the global policy must indeed strive to keep the increase below 1.5 °C. More importantly, the report suggests that the 2 °C target cannot be attained with the measures currently in place and requires a radical overhaul in the medium- and long-term. It states that, by mid-century, global emissions must be slashed by 40-70 % in comparison to their 2010 levels; and that zero or negative emissions must be attained by the end of the century. As such, a fair climate agreement that can stand up to the challenge should target 1.5 °C, as suggested by the expert report, and set medium- and long-term global emission reduction goals accordingly. The intended national contributions presented to lay the basis of national targets in the Paris Agreement will lead to a 2.7 °C or 3.5 °C rise in global temperatures in comparison with pre-industrial levels even by optimistic projections, and thus have to be revised in order to reach these medium- and long-term goals. Clearly, developed countries should be the first to revise their contributions upwards, as their current national contributions do not reflect their historical responsibilities. Such a correction is urgent for attaining the ultimate target of the UNFCCC, which lays the basis of the Paris Agreement, and for establishing global climate justice.

While this debate continues on the international arena, let us take a look at Turkey’s progress on this front. Where does Turkey stand in the nascent climate regime on the eve of COP21, and are its contributions still limited by “special conditions”? To answer these questions, we need to take a look at Turkey’s position in climate talks and its recent declaration of intention.

From “wait and see” to “special conditions”: Turkey in climate talks

Scientists generally choose to divide Turkey’s journey through the climate talks into periods.¹ The first period spans from the late 1980’s when Turkey first joined climate change discussions to 2009, when it became a party to the Kyoto Protocol. In this era, Turkey chose to view the issue as an international environmental problem and opted for a “wait and see” approach instead of taking action. Unwilling to compromise its international interests and keen on siding with the developed countries, Turkey placed its signature under the UNFCCC annexes along with other OECD members. Later, however, Turkey declared that it would be unable to fulfill its commitments. Then Turkey waged a struggle to make the parties accept its “special conditions,” and refrained from any reduction commitments. The fact that Turkey’s both aggregate and per capita greenhouse gas emissions are below most developed countries and that its economic and social indicators are much different from developed countries can be considered the basis of Turkey’s “special conditions” argument.

Having become a party to UNFCCC (2004) and KP (2009) after guaranteeing its freedom of any commitment, Turkey was in a way neither inside nor outside the circle. Therefore, the “wait and see” policy of inaction gradually shifted to the “special conditions” approach. Within that period, we saw Turkey’s first attempts at formulating its climate change policies. The Law on Renewable Energy, the Energy Efficiency Strategy Document, the National Climate Change Strategy, the National Climate Change Action Plan, the National Notifications submitted to the UNFCCC Secretariat, the Regulation on Greenhouse Gas Monitoring and other relevant legislation date from this period. The crucial issue here is that qualitative rather than quantitative targets were set. It would not be erroneous to say that the pressure from the international community and the ongoing global process were the main forces behind these developments.

The slow and ineffective nature of the international talks on climate change and the Copenhagen 2009 summit ending in fiasco led to public criticism around the world. The resulting pressure opened the way to the creation of a new climate regime in Paris in 2015. In a process in which no country can participate without assuming responsibilities, Turkey  has started to weigh its options and entered a third period, according to scholars.

On the way to Paris: Turkey’s Intended Nationally Determined Contributions

Turkey submitted its Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) for Paris to the UNFCCC Secretariat on 30 September 2015, just one day before the deadline. Turkey failed to meet expectations, having set its goal as a 21% reduction over the increase predicted by the base (reference) scenario for 2030. Turkey’s total greenhouse gas emission in 2013 was 459,1 MtCO2, and the base scenario in the INDC predicts an emission of 1.175 MtCO2 by 2030; the country claims that it will “reduce” this latter figure to 929 MtCO2 by adopting certain measures (Chart 1). In actual fact, however, Turkey plans to roughly double its emissions by 2030. Another remarkable issue is the scarcity of quantitative goals in the INDC. The most of the listed measures for various sectors were already presented in the previous official strategy documents. They do not require any additional effort and in fact frequently contradict with previous measures. For instance, 5. National Notification’s goal of rising installed capacity in wind energy to 20 GW by 2023 is either in clear contradiction with the INDC’s target of bringing this capacity to 16 GW by 2030, or represents a downward revision. Turkey states that it may benefit from international market mechanisms to attain its targets, suggesting that it may bring about this “reduced increase” by purchasing credit on the market.

74% of the countries which had presented their INDC’s by October 19 put forth an emission reduction target. Half of these represent a reduction over the base scenario, and remarkably, most such countries hail from Africa and Latin America, rather than from the G20—of which Turkey is a member, or the EU, to which Turkey has an accession bid. Only 14% of countries present no climate change adaptation measures in their INDC, and Turkey is unfortunately in this group (Chart 2). Turkey is among the Mediterranean countries which will be severely affected by climate change and therefore demands climate finance; as such, it is a crucial problem for Turkey to ignore the issue of adaptation, as if it were a rich country such as the USA, Canada or EU member states. Let us remember that, the declaration of the Safranbolu Conference of March 25-27, 2015 in Turkey strongly emphasized the need to integrate climate change adaptation to INDCs; however, Turkey’s INDC does not live up to this.

As a member of the OECD and the current president of the G20, Turkey’s responsibilities concerning climate change are increasing. According to a study by the World Resources Institute (WRI), Turkey accounted for 0.97% of global greenhouse gas emissions in 2012. If we look at only energy-related emissions, Turkey’s share stands at 0.72%. In PwC’s annual Low Carbon Economy Index for the years between 2000 and 2014, Turkey posted -0.6% annual average change in carbon intensity, and is thus part of a group of five countries which made the least progress, including the fossil fuel giant. The change in Turkey’s carbon intensity was only 4.4% between 2013 and 2014. The fact that Turkey’s per capita emissions will surpass most large countries by 2030 suggests that “special conditions” should not really have a place in future talks (Chart 3) and that we need to go “beyond” these special conditions.

Even as conditions and responsibilities change rapidly and the world moves towards a low-carbon future, Turkey’s position has barely changed. In the Bonn meetings held between October 19 and 23 to formulate the draft to be presented at the COP21, Turkey gave signals that it will strive to preserve its position based on “special conditions” and not be a pioneer in the fight against climate change. It proposes that the expression “developing countries” in the draft text be replaced with “developing countries including countries whose special conditions are accepted by the parties.”

Insisting on this position may isolate Turkey and weaken its hand in the Paris negotiations. That is because many developing countries’ INDCs and political messages are much more proactive than those of Turkey. In the new climate regime, where even China plans to lower its greenhouse gas emissions after 2030, Turkey’s refusal to act in this direction represents an irony which will not be lost on anyone. Furthermore, (as of October 1, 2015) 42 of the 65 countries which stated a target of reduction over the base scenario have more ambitious targets than Turkey. On the other hand, it would be a mistake to compare Turkey only with developing countries. As a OECD and G20 member and a candidate to the EU, Turkey must assume responsibilities much larger than it currently does.

The principle of “equal, common, yet differentiated responsibilities and relative capabilities in light of different national conditions” frequently mentioned in climate change talks should not be seen as a shield of immunity for countries whose development models are based on fossil fuels. This would not contribute to the fight against climate change nor benefit Turkey in any way. In this respect, Turkey must abandon its aims which cannot be realized in Paris and start to raise the bar for the transition to a low carbon economy, while asking for support from all actors. No progress will be possible unless we realize that we are in a wrong spot on the energy-climate-development triangle, and that this is not the only alternative available to us.

We need a more participatory, inclusive and transparent policy-making process and governance, which may only come about through a radical reform in the structure and functioning  of Climate Change and Air Quality Coordination Committee (İDHKKK). After the general elections are over, Turkey should act quickly to create a transparent structure subject to civilian control, where the central government, private sector, as well as the academy, civil society, local governments and all other climate policy actors are represented equally. A debate on Turkey’s development model based on fossil fuels should be initiated in this structure and a number of alternatives should be formulated to revise the INDC. Designing a new INDC document in the light of these measures may offer Turkey a legitimate basis for its transition to a low carbon economy and the new climate regime.

Let us hope that Paris turns out to be a breaking point in this respect and that Turkey becomes a part of the solution rather than the problem.