“Turkey did not hold back, waiting for stability before it invested in Somalia. Where others chose to plan their investments in safer places, Turkey put its people on the ground for the development of Somalia. Somalia is achieving significant developments, such as taking control of several areas that were in the grip of Al-Shabab. If it had not been for Turkey's generous support, along with the rest of the international community, we wouldn't have achieved such progress.”
These words were uttered by President Sheikh Mahmoud on January 2015 during the inauguration of the Mogadishu Airport terminal built by Turkish constructors. Somalia is one of the countries receiving foreign aid from Turkey. If we were to believe what Cemalettin Haşimi, Coordinator of the Prime Ministry Office of Public Diplomacy, claims in one of his articles, Turkey has helped Somalia to such an extent that it has succeeded in winning the hearts of the peoples of Africa.
Who can possibly ignore the benevolence of offering help to people in need! Who can deny the ‘magnanimity’ of Turkey and all the ‘sacrifices’ it has had to make to bring aid? But why is Turkey doing this? Is it only because of Turkey’s magnanimity and the fact that it goes to great lengths to afford aiding people, or is it because of pursuing some diplomatic, economic and hegemonic interests rather than good intentions? What is the role of development assistance activities in furthering these interests?
One of the first institutions to spring to mind when foreign aid is mentioned has been TIKA (Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency) in the 13-year Justice and Development Party (AKP) rule. According to the figures, there has been a considerable increase in the number of projects carried out by TIKA and the subsidies it has been granted since 2002 when the AKP came to power. The foreign aid has primarily focused on the regions of Africa, the Balkans, Eurasia and Central Asia. The AKP purports to have been offering generous foreign aid to regions in dire need of development. For that matter, the way the aid has been provided and the areas focused on will help to explain how the AKP government approaches the subjects of “aid” and “development.”
A story of “neo-colonialism”
What this relationship of aid brings to light is actually an old story. It is the story of imperialism or, “neo-colonialism” as Kwame Nkrumah called it in the post-World War II period. Could it be true that Turkey is attempting to become a neo-colonialist/neo-imperialist power with the pretensions of lending a helping hand to the unfortunate?
First and foremost, we need to explore how and why TIKA was established. Despite the fact that it became increasingly after the AKP came to power, TIKA was founded long before that in 1992. It started its operations with the aim to clear the wreckage that befell the countries called the “Turkic Republics” and to “respond to their restructuring, adaptation and development needs” after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1992 when Süleyman Demirel was the Prime Minister and Turgut Özal was the President of Turkey. It is well-known that both politicians attached importance to the Turkic Republics when they were in power, and considered each one of them to constitute an ostensibly natural sphere of activity for Turkey.
The notion of a “natural sphere of activity” also helped Turkey-based construction companies conduct operations in these countries in the following years. At this point, we can claim that TIKA was actually aiming at economic and hegemonic expansion at the beginning. After being established under the domain of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it became an organization working under the Prime Ministry of the Republic of Turkey in 1999. This change was of course motivated by a desire to increase the effectiveness of the agency. The aid and projects carried out by TİKA alternately declined and increased in connection with the economic crises Turkey. In the decade after TİKA was established, there was however a serious downturn before 2002. We see that Turkey opted to focus on its internal problems rather than spend energy on the neighbouring regions before 2002.
What happened after 2002? First of all, let us point to the fact that TIKA started to carry out its activities under a one-party government for the first time as of 2002. Despite the fact that some of the activities TIKA conducted after 2002 had started as part of the projects from the previous period, we can note considerable parallels between the AKP executives’ approach to foreign policy, and TIKA’s expanding scope of activity and the characteristics of the aid provided under AKP rule. Hakan Fidan certainly had an influence on the stance of TIKA concerning foreign aid activities. Fidan was to be appointed as the undersecretary of the National Intelligence Organisation later (2010). We can even claim that his “achievements” in the agency paved the way for his position as an undersecretary.
“Foreign aid is not always given on the basis of humanitarian concerns.”
Fidan served as the President of TIKA between 2003 and 2007. During this period, in 2005, the institution became the umbrella organization for all state-sponsored foreign aid. In 2013, the official amount of annual aid increased to over three billion dollars.
In the article Fidan wrote with Rahman Nurdun on the subject of TIKA and foreign aid activities, he states that foreign aid is not always given on the basis of humanitarian concerns. This assertion is an important starting point in order to understand the AKP’s approach to foreign aid. In the same article, Fidan and Nurdun mention that aid activities are also related to a country’s geopolitical position as well as to the cultural and historical ties between countries.
This approach to foreign policy prioritizing geopolitical position and cultural-historical ties reminds us of an all too familiar figure: Ahmet Davutoğlu. Davutoğlu published his book Stratejik Derinlik (Strategic Depth) in 2001 before the AKP rose to power. The book underscores Turkey’s geopolitical position and cultural ties to a great extent. Considering Turkey to be a “central power” which lies in the middle of many different regions and cannot be reduced to a single identity, Davutoğlu explains that Turkey can become a significant actor and agenda setter in the Balkans, Middle East, North Africa and Eurasia. Moreover, all these regions are thought to be areas of responsibility Turkey has inherited from the Ottoman Empire. According to Davutoğlu, Turkey should have a say in those regions so that it can become a global power. Davutoğlu was already a politician whose views on foreign policy were respected by the government before he served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs until August 2014 and as the Prime Minister afterwards. Therefore, it would not be wrong to suggest that he has been an influential actor for TIKA at least on the level of determining how and where the aid would be sent.
Davutoğlu ascertains that Turkey can exert a considerable influence with its Muslim identity on some regions, with its Turkish identity on other regions and as the heir to the legacy of the Ottoman Empire yet on some other regions. Fidan and Nurdun agree with this view and go on to claim: “Turkey can move more easily in these regions since it is a democratic and economically strong country that has ethnic and economic ties with the region.” This so-called strategic perspective is inconsistent in itself but to cover this subject would be beyond the scope of this article.
Another influential figure addressing the issue is Cemalettin Haşimi, Coordinator of the Prime Ministry Office of Public Diplomacy. What he says about development and foreign aid activities can illuminate how the AKP government views its relationship with the receiving countries. Similar to Davutoğlu, Cemalettin Haşimi considers Turkey to be a country which is now eager to extend its influence with foreign aid. That said, he explains the role of Turkish foreign aid initiatives in creating a humanitarian diplomacy and altering the understanding of global diplomacy.
TIKA as a tool for “establishing a zone of influence”
What then is this change which can be globally effective? What is implied when this question is posed, is the expansion of foreign aid activities and/or the ability to intervene in different regions on the globe at times of crisis. However, as both Fidan and Haşimi put it in their articles, foreign aid does not always only include “humanitarian” aspects.
According to the TIKA reports, foreign aid initiatives mostly cover improvement of infrastructure services, institutional structuring and the economic infrastructure; the expansion of formal education; capacity building projects; budget grants and humanitarian relief programs etc. All these merge under the name of “development assistance.” Some of the assistance is also given with regard to issues such as the opening of water wells or increasing the accessibility of health services, which can be of immense use to the local population.
In developing countries, however, some of the aid is spent on investments which urge the recipient country to implement a certain economic structure. Such investments include initiatives to develop the finance and banking sector of the recipient country, training of security forces, training of diplomats and training in investment models. The training conducted on the build-operate-transfer model in Cameroon or the support provided to Kyrgyzstan for the Turkish Products Exhibition organized by the Association of Kyrgyz and Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen can be cited as examples of this type of investment.
All these aid activities represent a certain approach to development. As a matter of fact, TIKA has become the medium through which the neoliberal understanding of development is being exported to other countries; this approach to development has been dominant in Turkey since the 1980’s and is pursued by the AKP government. Once such regions are included in current economic networks, they turn into efficient markets for the countries giving aid. It seems that TIKA has not been far from this principle since it was founded. Especially considering its objectives and the period it was established, it is obvious that TIKA has been used as a tool for establishing a zone of influence rather than as an aid agency.
Then what is different about TIKA during the AKP rule? First of all, the AKP has placed a lot of importance on TIKA, much more than the attention the agency received in the first ten years of its existence. At the same time, the AKP has imagined that it can gather enough force to take the “ambitious” steps, as Cemalettin Haşimi puts it, to expand its zone of influence and implement the foreign policy it desires. However, the AKP has also opted to go beyond economic aid activities by increasing and spreading cultural “investments” across different regions. Among the projects for which TIKA allocated resources have been the restoration of mosques, social complexes and tombs dating to the Ottoman era.
Apart from the above-mentioned initiatives, the AKP has embraced the Turkology Project, which started off in 2000, raising the level of investment made in the project every year. In 2011, the project was handed over to the Yunus Emre Foundation, whose board of trustees consists mostly of politicians from the Cabinet and whose administrative board includes the President of TIKA. The aim of the project is to export not only the dominant understanding of development and economy but also the Turkish language to other countries.
If we accept that one of the important steps of establishing neo-imperialist relationships is achieving cultural and linguistic supremacy, we can claim that TIKA has become one step closer to being a tool of imperialism. This relationship of supremacy is described with the notions of “hamilik” (patronage/protectorate) or “abilik” (being the older brother) in Turkey where a male-dominated discourse is prevalent.
The relationship of patronage mentioned here is meant to ensure gratitude in return for reciprocal aid activities rather than representing a unilateral relationship. On one part of the equation, there are conditions marked by income inequality, infrastructure deficiencies and a lack of education, which constantly reproduce poverty and trample on human dignity. On the other part of the equation, there is a superior figure who, again in Haşimi’s words, “wins people’s hearts through benevolence.” A pecking order emerges out of this relationship. Tayyip Erdoğan’s speech during his visit to Albania attests the expectations the government has from the recipient country. Albania is a country which receives foreign aid from Turkey. Turkey has built kindergartens and schools in Albania. When Erdoğan visited the country to attend the groundbreaking ceremony of the mosque built as a gift from Turkey, he requested the operations of the group known as the Gülen Community be stopped there. After the visit, an Albanian MP blasted this call in a speech addressed in the Albanian parliament, stating that Turkey was trying to impose demands when it purported to give aid. Such a demand on the part of Turkey per se gives away the quality of the relationship tried to be established through foreign aid activities.
Discontent at not taking a share of the benefits of exploitation
It can be seen that the underlying aim of the idea of a big and powerful Turkey and the concern over changing the dominant world order, which Fidan, Haşimi and Davutoğlu constantly underline for the sake of having an influence on international politics, is to fulfil Turkey’s desire to establish and profit from networks that are characterized by a superior-subordinate relationship and a lack of human dignity. Finally, it comes to light that this ostensibly “paradigm breaking” relationship consists of nothing else than merely renaming the superior party. While doing this, two things are used to disguise the objective of creating a pecking order under the pretension of humanitarianism: The democratic Muslim country identity and the narrative of being heir to the Ottoman Empire, both of them being catchphrases attributed to Turkey.
The issue discussed in this article is actually a different story than an ordinary initiative of development assistance or humanitarian aid. What appears in the foreground is Turkey’s concern over making its neighbouring developing countries more prosperous and integrated with the rest of the world. The characteristics of the aid provided and the relationships established with these countries, however, attest the existence of a new relationship of exploitation.
In contrast to the AKP’s attempts to portray itself as a political actor that is discontent with the current international order and acts as a “saviour” of the underdog, their main concern turns out to be the unease they feel about Turkey’s being denied a share of the relationships of exploitation, i.e., remaining outside the game as a player. TIKA, on the other hand, can be seen as a tool of the policies directed to this end. The assistance and projects carried out through this tool are the proof of the expansionist hegemonic foreign policy Turkey follows across different regions. The actors such as Fidan, Haşimi and Davutoğlu, who are influential in determining Turkish foreign policy, underline the foundations of this understanding in their articles.
References:
- http://www.tika.gov.tr/tr/sayfa/tarihcemiz-222
- Fidan, Hakan; Nurdun, Rahman (2008), Turkey's role in the global development assistance community: the case of TIKA (Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency), Journal of Southern Europe and Balkans Online, p. 1-20.
- Davutoğlu, Ahmet (2001), Stratejik Derinlik (Strategic Depth), Istanbul: Küre Publications.
- Haşimi, Cemalettin (2004), Turkey's Humanitarian Diplomacy and Development Cooperation, Insight Turkey, v. 16, Issue 1, p. 127-145.
- TIKA (2013), Kalkınma Yardımları Raporu 2013 (Development Aid Report), Ankara.