Political parties have run their course as well; their representative function works in a roundabout way, with various mediators and subcontractors. People’s demands and representation are not able to be dealt with directly. People and NGOs went out on the street and cried out their demands but it stopped there. Ministries constitute the heart of the state; the bureaucracy has become so bloated that it is about to burst. The cumbersome state is collapsing. There is discontent and violence.
Despite these problems, elections continue to be held. This competition is held under very unequal conditions in our country since the election threshold of 10% has been used as a weapon against the opposition for more than 30 years. Furthermore, some parties do not respect the existence of others and even ignore them. How can political parties compete in democracies if they ignore each other?
Let’s summarize the last ten years: political parties have proved incapable of producing alternatives; television channels and the print media have been appropriated by the governing party; the institutions of literature and art and the spaces of the city and culture have been damaged, destroyed or have turned into power-wielding cliques; education has been damaged by bad pedegogy and the goals of unscrupulous conservatives; independent and scientific production at universities has been impinged upon due to cronyism; and the freedom of social media platforms has been attacked. Just before the elections in June, attacks, bombings and coordinated street fights were organized in Turkey. Most of them targeted the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) but other parties were also attacked. The threshold that exists to “to banish the Kurd from seeing his mother”1 was finally overcome by a political organization that appealed to a larger part of the society instead of being restricted to being a Kurdish-based political opposition. People shattered the ideas fueling prejudice and the suffocating borders that they impose. The siege that the ruling party imposed for the last ten years was broken. The HDP brought back the colors that had begun to be regained in the city with the Gezi insurrection.
On the way to the elections: The phenomenon of AKP
The phenomenon of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has continued unabated for 13 years and but has now slowed to a crawl. Kurdish cities had languished after Özal’s promises left them hanging in 1990s. After that, people thought the AKP could be a power which would better their lives, thinking that “maybe our fate will change with this party.” The welfare of the people was partly enhanced with discretionary foreign and domestic funds and non-discretionary taxes. After its first governing period in 2007, dependency on the AKP increased. One of the most important reasons for that was that as a party, it had the courage to file a lawsuit against the military tutelage. People thought that murders by unknown assailants could be cleared up. However, neither the increased welfare nor the lawsuits were consistently followed up on. Welfare enhancement was palliative and the lawsuits were carried out with many mistakes and shortcomings; some people were persecuted for no reason and of those who should have been prosecuted, only a small number of people ended up going to trial—and then they were hosted in five-star boutique prisons.
The party tradition (the Democratic Society Party – DTP- and thereafter the Peace and Democracy Party –BDP-) had tried to create an alternative among the Kurds and ended up paying a huge price to that end. It had to fight against its fate that had condemned all of its workers to imprisonment and closure of the party several times. Nearly ten thousand people were arrested. At least one fourth of them are still in prison. The AKP did not recognize this party tradition representing the Kurdish opposition and insulted it several times, reaching a fever pitch before the 2015 elections.
The AKP showed no mercy in its attempt to suppress the protests for freedom that the citizens initiated in Gezi two years ago. While the police “wrote a heroic saga”2 many young people died. After the Newroz celebrations in 2013, it was claimed that “we have entered a peace process; people do not die anymore,” yet many were suffocated by the tear gas used in Taksim Square a couple of months later. The “security project” of the governing party which has aimed to neutralize the Kurds in Syria for the last five years has led to larger social, political and economic deadlocks.
CHP waited until the last moment
The Republican Peoples’ Party (CHP) has fueled nationalism and has continued to show how obsolete it is; however, before the last elections, it at least made a move of modernization in the economic sphere and made some statements regarding human rights and law. Despite all of these moves, CHP could not figure out a balanced position regarding the peace negotiations. Some of its members behaved hatefully toward Kurds while others declared tolerance for Kurds. The CHP was not able to overcome its prejudices or turn into a strong political alternative to the AKP and therefore could not take the lead. It could have supported the work of the HDP in the parliament to weaken the AKP and shown a clear stance regarding the issues of human rights and law, jurisdiction and education in one’s native language. But they did not do it. They even protested against one of their own members in the constitutional committee who supported the right to education in one’s native language as a fundamental right. If they had supported human rights and the dynamism of diversity, they could have gained more votes from the real social democrats. The votes that they could have gained would not have decreased the votes for the HDP. The extra votes that they could have gained would have come from the liberal sympathizers who are fed up with the AKP. But that did not happen; their votes made no impact. Voters who preferred the HDP to the CHP did not “lend” their votes; those who voted for the HDP made their choice based on the promises of the party.
Those who hate the Kurds, the Armenians and the Alevis cannot love Turks, either
The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) has insisted on the crudest and the most primitive kind of nationalism; however, it did take a stand against corruption and the security law. It criticized the excessive egocentric attitude of the President, talked about freedom and democracy frequently and continually brought up the corruption of the judiciary. However, their critique was not based on acknowledging and respecting diversity. The MHP thought that it would gain from abolishing the peace process and worst of all, it never even considered recognizing the HDP as a different party. It regressed completely, partially gaining votes from hate. This cannot be called a strengthening of democracy; it is only a cause of instability. The MHP was not even able to state that “the fundamental principle of democracy requires the existence of more than one party.” I think the MHP doesn’t love Turks, either. In fact, Turks need also need significant change and many Turkish people have come to understand that they will not gain anything with nationalism. The biggest obstacle of the MHP is that it cannot understand the developing values of the changing world. The MHP has proved incapable of seeing that ignoring the HDP means turning against modern values and principles. It still feeds on nationalist hate, anti-communism, anti-Kurdish and anti-Armenian hate and a lack of love for Turks. Their denial is consistent and this enabled them to gather votes from temporary enmities. Their other votes came from the nationalists who voted against unlawfulness and corruption.
If the MHP does not enter into a coalition with the other two opposition parties and resume the opposition it called for against dictatorship before the elections, it runs a high risk of falling below the election threshold. However, if Meral Akşener3 becomes the co-president of the party, the hate speech may decrease to some extent. In fact, the MHP might have entered into a coalition with the opposition parties to fight against corruption and the security law in order to clean things up. Only then could the MHP have had a chance for the future. In discussions on a coalition government, the MHP claims that it cannot promise to give any ministries to the HDP. We have progressed from the saying “Do not let the Kurd see his mother” to the point of saying “Do not let the Kurd be a minister.” What progress!
With the rise of the HDP, Turkey approximates the democratic world
The Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) is not one of the parties of the system. On the one hand, it is a continuation of the tradition dating back to the People’s Labour Party (HEP) of 1990s while on the other hand it attempts to represent each and every community and individual marginalized by inequalities and unlawfulness. The biggest force which had a great impact on the monumental resistance and development of the HEP tradition was their belief in women’s equal participation in politics. They empowered the women’s organizations in Turkey on that matter and have set a good example for other parties. In addition, the principal role attributed to the balance between labour and ecology has also contributed a lot to this party. Representative democracy worked when these contemporary principles contributed to overcoming the ten percent barrier. All those who supported and contributed to this party should not stop giving it their energy so that it doesn’t succumb to the urge for protocol/indispensable power/status, which is a highly contagious political disease in Turkey.
Election results call for reconciliation; people want peace and freedom
People said, “We need a culture of reconciliation.” It was as if they said, “We cannot be parted from one side completely to choose the other side, pull yourselves together.” According to the post-general elections research conducted by IPSOS,4 the desire for reconciliation was expressed by more than six million people who voted for HDP. 87% of the voters of HDP are for reconciliation while 76% of all citizens demand reconciliation. These figures are actually very close because the needs of these groups do not differ at all; it is the fundamental need of all to have rights, freedom and self-confidence.
Why is a coalition that important? The reason is that people who do not know how to respect pluralism in daily political culture are to be forced somehow into reconciliation. Politics is about dialogue, negotiation, sharing and reconciliation; it is not about putting people through the mill. In political activities, there is as much and sometimes even more drive and need for cooperation as there is a potential for conflict. Deceitful discourses of “progressive democracy” which have promised democratization have exhausted Turkey. Turkey has to be democratized at a faster pace, with participatory and radical steps. Therefore, parties which have been in opposition for the last 13 years have to create a form of cooperation on the fundamental matters on which they agree. That is required by patriotism. The AKP wants to prevent this and is favor of early elections. The AKP wants to use the election threshold of 10% again and plans to increase its votes by using all the discretionary and non-discretionary funds it has, even those of the presidency and the prime ministry. The AKP plans to continue along its path with analyses that ignore the people. However, the election results gave the message that both the “analyses which do not account for the people” and the legend of the “statesman” have come to an end.
What may happen today and how may it happen?
People who are politically active in Turkey need to adapt the culture of reconciliation. It seems the cadres which are closest to being able to do this are the cadres of the HDP, which adopted the system of co-presidency, are experienced in forging alliances and have successfully strengthened and extended their own identity. These cadres are the ones which are most likely to move away from the model of the “statesman.” People do not want to reinforce the nationalism of the AKP and the MHP. That kind of a coalition would put the peace process in danger as well. It would increase the tensions with Syria, on the borders and with respect to issues on immigrants. What the people want is to neutralize the AKP. In other words, the HDP, the CHP and the MHP should take the first steps to file lawsuits and enact laws regarding 1) corruption, 2) the repressive security laws, 3) lack of judicial independence, and 4) the problem of border security and immigrant issues. Within a year, it would be possible to go to the polls after the election threshold has been lowered. In that way, the concept of “becoming a citizen of Turkey” (Türkiyelileşmek) could be replaced with the goal of democratization on fundamental points. A coalition of the CHP and the AKP would not lead to a regression in the peace process and could strengthen the CHP in terms of social democracy. However, the issue of corruption and the crisis of the judiciary cannot be solved by that coalition.
Legislation can be quickly passed on issues where there is consensus. The higher ranks of the MHP say that they “respect the choice of the citizens” but then go on to say “I do not recognize the HDP.” What a contradiction! MHP insults all voters when it says that it does not recognize the party which has been approved by more than six million people. People want reconciliation, not a bargain for the seats. No party has the right to claim to be the “the most irreplaceable party” under the current conditions in Turkey.
However, conservative individuals who are repressed in every respect, who lack confidence and have financial difficulties have not been cured of the disease of the “leading head.” Most party supporters long for a single leading head and think that a strong leader can do everything.
A coalition based on fighting corruption and the femicide would open the way for consensus. An effective and determined struggle against gender apartheid would be the first and foremost important step towards the construction of a culture of reconciliation.