The presidential system is not a new topic in Turkey. After becoming president, Turgut Özal (1989-1993) had also made remarks in support of this system. The leaders of the Yeni Parti (New Party) founded by conservative politicians close to Özal also claimed that after fulfilling his term of office at the presidential palace in Çankaya, he would once again become party leader and continue his political struggle. Accordingly, this time, Özal would strive for a transition to the presidential system. This debate was cut short with Özal’s unexpected death.
Although some names in the Justice and Development Party (AKP) were always for the presidential system, this issue was brought up more systematically after the constitutional referendum of 2007. At the referendum, the electorate voted in favor of the direct election of the president by ballot, which in turn rekindled the debate around the presidential system. After the 2011 elections, all parties represented at the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) sent an equal number of MPs to form a Constitutional Commission in charge of penning a new constitution. Later, AKP presented a proposition to the commission on transitioning to the presidential system. Until that point, the commission had made considerable headway towards drafting the new constitution; however, AKP’s said proposition blocked the progress at the Commission which soon became defunct and was eventually disbanded.
In Turkish political history, the center right has occasionally brought up the presidential system, since it favors a strong executive. According to the center right, the fact that the legislative branch fails to form a strong executive is not only related to the handicaps of the legislative. The real handicap is the opposition from non-elected elites, namely the judiciary and the military. During the Cold War, Demirel used to argue that as a prime minister he needed to be vested with more powers so as to establish “democratic authority.”
The Constitution of 1982 disbanded the Senate; however, it increased the judiciary and military oversight of the political arena. According to unwritten rules presidents came from the ranks of the military, which restricted the political space (of the center right). However, signs of discontent about this issue abated after Özal became president. His presidency gave self-confidence to the center right, which stopped criticizing the president's vast powers and even demanded that these be expanded. With the exception of the presidency of Ahmet Necdet Sezer, who was well-known for his secular-minded approach (2000-2007), center right parties as a whole were confident that they now held the power to choose the country's president due to the shift in the political landscape. From that point onwards, “civilian presidents” were seen as an equilibrant force against interventions by the military and the judiciary.
What does the AKP's demands for a presidential system signify within the context of this short historical summary? Since the referendum of 2010 has largely eradicated the possibility of an intervention by the military or the judiciary, there is no more need for a civilian president from the center right to create an equilibrant force against them. Put another way, the siege laid by non-elected elites around the legislative and executive branches has become history since the 2010 referendum.
In this case, we need to remind ourselves what the AKP’s said demand is based upon. An AKP report dubbed “Vision for 2023” justifies such a transformation of the political system with the following: “Since the referendum has allowed for the election of the President by popular vote, it has become necessary to overhaul the political system in Turkey… the Presidential system, the semi-presidential system and partisan presidency need to be discussed in this respect… In order to prevent Turkey from losing its stability in the hands of weak governments open to outside interventions, Turkey must transition to a system where the people's will is better reflected in the government, the legislative and executive are totally separate and independent, the executive is efficiently held accountable by the legislative branch; the executive is stable, efficient, strong and unitary, where radical decisions can be taken swiftly to resolve crises and problems, and the executive is more transparently accountable to the populace.”
The passage refers to three alternatives: The presidential system, semi-presidential system and partisan presidency. Let me briefly take up the criticisms towards these voiced by those who defend the parliamentary system. Since the transition to multi-party politics in Turkey seventy years ago, a considerable amount of experience has accumulated within the parliamentary system. Even when the system ran into crisis, various solutions were produced through its internal dynamics.
For instance, although the Constitution of 1982 grants vast powers to the president, which may even be described as a potential semi-presidential system, most presidents have chosen not to execute these powers and thus set a precedent for their successors. Even Kenan Evren did not make use of his constitutional powers such as “Demanding the renewal of the elections for the Turkish Grand National Assembly” or “the right to preside over the Council of Ministers whenever deemed necessary.” Powers which could have transformed the potential semi-presidential system into reality were not deployed, and the result was a parliamentary system in which prime ministers play a much more significant and central role.
However, Erdoğan’s aides suggest that he could very well utilize these powers once elected president. Another issue not to be overlooked is the fact that presidents, although they had certain powers reminiscent of a semi-presidential system until 2007, were selected from within TBMM, which relegated them to a secondary position vis-a-vis prime ministers. Since presidents were not elected by direct popular vote, they did not enjoy the legitimacy to expand their authority. However, a president elected directly by the populace in 2014 can claim to have this legitimacy.
AKP’s 2023 vision includes the demand for a “unitary executive.” Nonetheless, the 2014 presidential elections might potentially create a dualistic or two-headed model vacillating between the parliamentary and presidential systems. This potential would quickly become reality under the presidency of a leader such as Erdoğan.
In case the opposition parties create a coalition government as a result of the 2015 general elections, the executive could well run into serious internal strife and instability. In that case, Erdoğan could experience the sense of impotence and loss of legitimacy experienced by Özal during the DYP-SHP coalition.
It can be presumed that in view of these possibilities, Erdoğan might try to amend the Constitution in favor of the presidential or semi-presidential system after the 2015 general elections. However, it will not be easy for him to to do so. In case the general elections yield results similar to those of the 2014 local elections, AKP will not enjoy the qualified majority required to revise the Constitution single-handedly. In that case, it will be forced to ask for support from Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP). However, it is rather improbable for HDP to approve of a presidential system based on further reinforcing Turkey's centralized structure.
Here the critical issue becomes whether the AKP is ready to carry out a radical reform toward democratic decentralization. Could the AKP draft a constitutional amendment and delegate some of its immense central power? It is not realistic to expect such a move from AKP, and this is the real issue at stake here.
Rather than sharing its powers with other political actors by revising the Constitution—and thus resolving the biggest problem in Turkish politics—the AKP is keen on further expanding its already immense political authority. However, this pursuit for maximum power inevitably creates instability.
The main reasons which the AKP presents to justify its demand for an overhaul of the system are “ensuring that the people's will is better reflected in government, that the executive and legislative are fully independent and separate, and that the executive is efficiently held accountable by the legislative branch”. The claim that these objectives cannot be attained within the current parliamentary system is not credible. Have we really exhausted all options inside the parliamentary system to ensure that the popular will is better reflected in government? Would not the abrogation of the present 10% electoral threshold be a step forward in this respect? Likewise, various revisions to the Law on Political Parties could stop MPs from becoming the henchmen of their party leader.
The objective: a more centralized structure
In other words, the legislative and its control over the executive can be significantly strengthened within the parliamentary system. If the electoral threshold had been 5% at the 2002 general elections, AKP would have won 266 seats. However, the AKP won 363 seats instead and became capable of revising the Constitution single-handedly. The simple fact that the 10% threshold will remain in the upcoming general elections gives us an idea as to whether or not AKP really wants a stronger legislative branch.
How can we be sure that the executive will be held accountable by the legislative branch in the presidential system if this is not the case in the parliamentary system? If a president who can run the country by decree also brings the prime minister's office and his party's MPs under control, that situation will be worse than the present one. Making the legislative stronger vis-a-vis the executive and at the same time rendering the executive more efficient are targets which can be attained inside the parliamentary system. One does not need to be a political scientist to see that the real goal here is a more centralized political structure.
Both our current parliamentary system, and the presidential system proposed by the AKP are incapable of deepening Turkey's democracy. Turkey cannot resolve its problems by preserving and reinforcing its current centralized model. The real issue is transforming the monolithic and centralized structure which monopolizes all legal and informal power. For that purpose, one must accept that politics involves multiple actors and pass reforms which allow for the separation of powers between different actors.
Such reforms can be achieved within both the parliamentary and presidential systems. In my opinion, it will be much easier to carry out such reforms within the parliamentary system since we have been gaining experience with it for the last 70 years. For instance, if we truly believe that it is wrong for the president to appoint university presidents—as is the case now—we should defend such powers to be delegated to the real actors in the field, that is the universities themselves. How much a say should the president have in electing members of the judiciary? If the TBMM is to play a role in the choice of judiciary cadres, should not this pass through appointment methods based on a “qualified majority” that oblige parties to collaborate? Clearly, the real problem is not choosing between the presidential and parliamentary systems, but rather upholding the democratic spirit and institutions.
Decentralization reform
A transition to the presidential system by keeping intact Turkey's current system of local government would lead to unsurmountable problems. The present legislation on local government is based on the model of “strong mayor, weak assembly.” In other words, the presidential system is already in place on the local level. If the central government also transitions to the presidential system, the legislative branch will be even more ineffective on both local and central levels.
What is needed is a change in the opposite direction: Establishing the “strong assembly, efficient mayor” model on the local level can only be possible if the legislative branch is likewise strengthened in Ankara. Put another way, we need to revise our parliamentary system so that local government is stronger. Enacting such decentralization reform must be our main systemic concern in the 21st century. Centering the entire debate on the presidential system amounts to intentionally diverting attention from the real issue.
It is not possible to govern Kurds this way and also the country as a whole. Think of it: even a tender for procurement of milk to schools is carried out by the central government. This kind of issue is not even delegated to local governments or parent-teacher associations. The presidential system is tantamount to a wrong diagnosis and wrong medication, to say the least. The decentralization reform or revolution remains the key issue which will determine whether Turkey becomes a democratic republic in the 21st century or not.
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1 AK Parti 2023 Siyasi Vizyon, Siyasal Sistem. http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/akparti/2023-siyasi-vizyon#bolum_