Turkey’s strategic location at the juncture of three continents has historically been the major driving force behind the design of her foreign policy. In the era of globalisation, geography is still important, although it has a new meaning. Today, the “new geography” forming Turkish foreign policy goes beyond geographical space and encompasses easy access to faster travel, expansive social media, the internet, multi channel TV, quick movement of people and capital, increased awareness of the “world” by the Turkish population and business community. In other words, the “new geography” partly relates to the economic sphere, partly to the political, social and cultural. Another parameter was added after the 9/11 attacks in New York, namely “the security”. However, this is different from the Cold War military concept of defence. The new type of “security” links discourse on defence to individual rights and liberties, effectively rendering them pivotal in international relations.
Hence, the new globalised set-up introduced a multi-layered social base for the analysis of international relations, interplaying economic with non-economic, political with cultural and religious. The parameters of the “new geography” necessitated winning the hearts and minds of the people in support of the policies pursued. Evidently, in this new era, it would be impossible to achieve a successful policy outcome without mobilising public opinion and the country’s human and social capital. By this token, investigation of any foreign policy should start by understanding policy makers’ perceptions of this “new geography”, especially their policy formulations based on the evaluation of economic, political and cultural structures that help in mobilising public support for its success.
As such, Turkey’s response to the recent developments in the Middle East is no exception. It has been constructed as an integral part of the policy makers’ perspective on the “new geography”, which is summarily referred to as new-Ottomanism. This is a thrilling “ci-devant” for a number of Turks as it is reminiscent of the nostalgic idea of reviving the great power politics of the “good old days”. This policy is now deeply swayed, posing a serious challenge in formulating a new/revised foreign policy based on compromising the structural realities of the country with the concrete situation in the Middle East and beyond.
The Epistemological Foundations of Turkish Foreign Policy in the “New Geography”
During the Cold War, Turkish foreign policy was formulated around NATO’s strategic framework, broadly defined by the geographic perimeters of the Western alliance. It is true that the collapse of the Soviet Union and with it, the end of the Cold War, did not produce an international order that can settle international legal and political disputes through well-defined guidelines and mechanisms. Since then, the prevailing international system reflects a set-up whereby disputes are resolved on an ad hoc basis. It is obvious that in such a complicated and challenging world, Turkey’s traditional foreign policy of preserving the status quo should change towards creating a new power axis in line with the “new international environment”, at the centre of which lies the use of water and energy resources (‹fleri and Dilek, 2012).
Turkey is on the crossroads for energy resources and natural gas pipelines running from Central Asia, Russia and Iran towards Europe (Aybar and Ozgoker, 2009). With the energy aspect of the “new geography”, Turkey gravitates more towards the US by extending its policy of strategic alliance towards a deeper economic collaboration, particularly with regards to energy resources. This is in line with the new US security architecture of the world. Given the current state of the US economy, Washington now relies on its allies more than ever for carrying out its global strategies. Turkey appears to go along with the American global strategy with regards to energy resources, as is the case with the Nabucco Pipeline and Southern Stream Project, both of which aim to reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian natural gas and oil (Ieri, 2012).
The USA, the EU and NATO are still decisive factors in formulating today’s Turkish foreign policy, particularly towards the Middle East. In fact, Turkey is more actively involved in NATO’s new international mandate and Turkish foreign policy is very much in line with the objectives of the EU. Hence, Turkey’s “new international presence” in the “new century” (and in the “new geography”) did not alter Turkey’s commitment to the Western camp. Furthermore, under the AKP leadership, Turkey perceived herself as an important messenger suitably modifying and carrying Western values to the Islamic world in the Middle East and beyond.
Against such a background, academic cum Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, the architect of the new Turkish foreign policy, “elegantly” laid down epistemological foundations of the new Turkish foreign policy. In his 2010 article in Foreign Policy, he asserted; “as we leave behind the first decade of the 21st century, Turkey has been able to formulate a foreign policy vision based on a better understanding of the realities of the new century, even as it acts in accordance with its historical role and geographical position. In this sense, Turkey’s orientation and strategic alliance with the West remains perfectly compatible with Turkey’s involvement in, among others, Iraq, Iran, the Caucasus, the Middle East peace process and Afghanistan.”
According to Davutoglu (2010), Turkey has a good “understanding” of the Middle East, which would help her to operate there effectively. He also stated that its considerable experience with the institutional workings of Western values, a market-based economy and multi-party democracy can be best transmitted by Turkey to inspire the peoples of the region. These beliefs helped Davutoglu formulate his now famously swayed “visionary, consistent and systematic” methodological and operational diplomatic principles of “strategic depth”. Underneath this strategy lies AK Party officials’ frequently re-visited, but vaguely explained, idea of new-Ottomanism.
Davutoglu attempted to formulate a systematic and cohesive methodological approach to AK Party’s foreign relations, one part of which is defined as the “balance between security and democracy” and the other as the principle of “zero problems with neighbours”. Turkey aimed to play a more active role in international institutions (rhythmic diplomacy) while developing relations with other global actors not in competition but complimentarily. Turkish presence and presidency over important commissions on North Korea, Afghanistan and the “war on terror” at the UN Security Council during 2010 were shown as positive proof of the rhythm of rhythmic diplomacy.
The events, however, challenged these methodological and operational principles, rendering them ill-defined and analytically weak. The policy makers’ evaluation of the “new geography” was based on the premise that the role of the nation-state would become irrelevant in resolving disputes as “globalization” under the auspices of the US progressed (Aybar, 2008a). Even though the role of the nation-states in meeting and creating solutions for the global political, cultural, and economic turmoil was accepted, it was believed to be temporary. The involvement of the nation-state in this set-up would fade away while “the new global order” continued working to create needed mechanisms (Brzezinski, 2008).
Around such interpretations of the “new geography”, Turkish foreign policy is formulated by using broad, flexible and vague concepts such as “zero problems with neighbours.” These loosely used concepts in the epistemological construction of foreign policy were probably the most important obstacles in creating successful policies. For instance, in Davutoglu’s (2010) own words: “Turkey’s regional policy is based on security for all, high-level political dialogue, economic integration and interdependence, and multicultural co-existence. Such a policy views Turkey’s strategic relationship with the United States through the two countries’ bilateral strategic ties and through NATO. It considers its EU membership process, its good neighbour policy with Russia, and its synchronization policy in Eurasia as integral parts of a consistent policy that serves to complement each other. This means that good relations with Russia are not an alternative to relations with the EU. Nor is the model partnership with the United States a rival partnership against Russia.”
The answer to the question of what is meant by, for instance, “zero problems”, was left fully unexplained. It implied that as a state of “zero problems” is reached, this will effectively put an end to the management of conflicting interests by deriving innovative policies. It has been unclear however, how to determine when a problem reaches the state of non-existence, i.e. “zero”. This is particularly problematic in a region whereby troubles mushroom constantly from one end to the other. It is also unclear what is meant by “all” in the “security for all”, what is the exact height of “high-level political dialogue”, how to simultaneously achieve “economic integration and interdependence”, with what types of “cultures” will “multicultural co-existence” be accomplished. Answers to these questions are all left open ended. In fact, these and many more loosely used concepts enabled policy makers to interpret them conveniently as desired to fit the changing international conditions and situations. The above portrayal of Turkey–US relations vis-à-vis Russia, EU–Turkey relations vis-à-vis the US and Russia is very much a case at point.
Using these analytical tools, Turkey presented herself as an active international actor with multilateral responses to multilateral problems. Turkish policy makers wanted to continue playing a role in the “new geography” primarily by diversifying foreign policy. It “opened up to the African continent” while trying to develop policies for the opening up by the People’s Republic of China to a more market based economy, one of the main competitors in Africa (Jaques, 2009). It manoeuvred between Iran and the European Union while trying to take a more solid position in the conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis. It attempted to formulate responses to the unclear outcomes in Iraq and Afghanistan. It explored ways in which Turkey can contribute to the “war on terror”, whereby hunting down “religious terrorists” replaced the “Communists”. Additionally, it assumed the co-leading role in the process of “alliances of civilisations” (i.e. multicultural co-existence) as a response to the “clashes of civilisations” thesis. It became an active supporter of the “Greater Middle Eastern Project” while believing that it coincided with the creation of the so called new-Ottomanism. Aras and Fidan (2009) outlines the scope of the new Turkish geo-strategy by using the concept of “new geography” in a different context.
The acute problems in the Caucasus, the Balkans and the Middle East pressured Turkey to continue playing its regional harmonizing role between its strategic allies and neighbours. The challenge of managing these tensions also appeared to put Davutoglu’s foreign policy formulations and above mentioned principles to the test. The changing nature of the economic and political set-up forced a reconciliation of domestic issues with foreign affairs; in other words, international relations that are now used to meet Turkey’s economic, democratic, social and religious ambitions as defined according to the perceptions of the ruling cadre within the AKP of the “existing realities of the world” setting. Thus, the understood “new geography”, when tested by concrete events, generally produced disappointing results. The root causes of the failures behind Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle East, its epistemological construction, can also be traced in the definition of the 2023 targets, creating a challenge to the government to revise and fill the foreign policy vacuum.
The Middle Eastern Crisis and Turkish Strategy
Under the AKP government, the multilateral dimension of issues relating to energy resources and political developments in the region, most finely crystallized around recent disturbances in Syria, forced Turkey to take a position not based on tactical/temporary solutions or conflict specific agreements but, instead, on her “economic and political” interests. Despite a warlike discourse, Turkey has chosen to oppose the Syrian regime on the basis of “human rights and democracy” that effectively helped to waive any use of direct military intervention. The Turkish position on Syria has been in line with the US and EU positions that do not desire to see the current conflict evolving towards an international armed conflict. This position also does not want to see any Iranian involvement in resolving the non-international war inside Syria. The very nature of Syrian geo-politics, her close economic, military and political proximity to Russia and internal ethnic structure prevents the escalation of civil strife to an international war.
Turkey’s “vision” of the Middle East, which led to an attempt to mediate between Syria and Israel and to help achieve Palestinian reconciliation, did not produce tangible solutions. In Iraq, Turkey wanted the Iraqi Sunni groups’ participation in the parliamentary elections in 2005 (Aybar, 2008a). Since then, despite denials by Turkey that its policy towards the region is not based on the religious sectarian divide in the Middle East, “unfair” accusations continued by including the position it takes in Syria that Turkey supports Sunni opposition to Syrian President Bashar al Assad. Turkey is involved in the Iranian nuclear issue as an integral part of its foreign policy vision for the Middle East, while Turkish diplomats developed a new language that prioritized Turkey’s civil-economic power. As mentioned above, the discourse on the principles of democracy and human rights has been compromised with the rampant economic interests. Turkey’s new vision for the Middle East encompassing the entire region and going beyond fighting against the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party), failed to deal with separatist terrorist attacks. In addition, Turkey’s emerging regional ambitions created tensions between Turkey and its neighbours and also with its existing strategic allies. This has effectively disqualified the zero problems policy (despite all of its good intentions).
Outcomes of the Arab Spring not only challenged the view of Turkey as the model “mild Islamic country” for the “newly emerging democracies”, but also resulted in some repercussions at home. The zero problem policy, like others formulated with sincere good intentions, did not produce the expected outcomes. Turkey’s problems with its neighbours are not resolved and new ones have been added. Problems with Armenia are pending. There are deep suspicions and lack of trust with the Iranians. The Cyprus problem has now extended to influencing Turkey’s entire full membership process with the EU.
On the economic front, Turkey’s trade with its neighbours and nearby regions has substantially increased in recent years. Turkey’s growing economy required exploring opportunities with neighbouring countries, but such co-operative tracks have been highly damaged, as is the case with Armenia and Syria, which in turn negatively effects economic relations with other countries like Iraq and Iran, not to mention the domestic Kurdish unrest damaging economic gains in these countries. The impact upon the SMEs has been severe and made the AKP foreign policy highly questionable in the eyes of its supporters.
Drivers of Turkey’s “new-Ottomanism” towards Africa and the Middle East
The new Turkish security architecture, based on the Greater Middle Eastern Project (GMP), led Turkey to show an interest in African affairs. The end of the Cold War in 1989, the first Iraq War in 1992 and ensuing developments in the Middle East required Turkey to shift its security emphasis to the broader region beyond the Sahara. In line with the shift in security concerns, a new operational plan was developed in 1988, known as the ”Opening Up to Africa Policy” plan (Aybar, 2008b). Hence, in the beginning of the 21st century, as Africa began receiving interest from a variety of emerging market countries such as China and India, Turkey also raised its interest in the African continent. Today, Turkey’s interest in Africa is strategical and the African Union has also declared Turkey to be a strategic partner. At the same time, Turkey has become one of the largest donors in developing countries in Africa.
The last of the Ottoman territory on the continent, today’s Libya, was lost in 1913. The Turkish presence in North Africa left behind a large Turkish population, as well as cultural and religious ties to the mainland (Aybar, 2008b), sources for important inspirations for the new-Ottomanism. Turkey’s presence in North Africa was more recently challenged in Libya after the collapse of Muammar Qaddafi’s regime when Turkey began repatriating Turkish workers from Libya, which effectively brought an end to the presence of mainly SMEs and construction firms that had been operating there since the early 1970’s.
Examining the nature and scope of Turkish–African relations in a broader context reveals its existing links with the global economic division of labour conditioned by sectoral complementarities and trade. A close investigation of the nature of Turkish international economic interactions reveals existing differences in breadth, scope and depth in the business strategies between large conglomerates and small and medium sized enterprises. The larger firms mainly direct their attention to the EU for their exports and show interest in buying into the EU-based companies through mergers and acquisitions (M&A) while SMEs are more inclined to invest in neighbouring countries, North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa (Aybar et al., 2010).
Clearly, the goals of a variety of outward investors have varied by region too. The larger conglomerates have wanted to access technology and skills in the European Union and low-cost labour in Africa and Asia. They have also sought natural resources in the newly independent Turkic countries of Central Asia and responded to growing demand in the emerging markets of Asia and Africa. Product diversification, along with regional diversification, was also an important strategy and a way to turn the crisis into opportunity (Aybar et al., 2010).
The way in which Turkish Outward Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) shapes up also reflects on the international position the government takes. In the new international set-up, the government follows a policy of reconciliation between the SMEs, the so-called Anatolian Tigers (AKP’s main source of votes), with the interests of the larger conglomerates, probably another important obstacle for its formulation of foreign affairs. It appears as though the larger conglomerates, the main drivers of Turkish OFD,I are prepared to accept the government’s guidance as long as it fits in with their broader business strategies and orientations.
Conclusion
In the opening paragraphs of this article, it was proposed that the policy makers’ responses to the changing international order came from a methodological conceptualization of the new structures in the world. In the Turkish set-up, however, it is argued that the policy formulation is based on highly fluid, indeterminate concepts. The most important lesson drawn from the analysis of the new Turkish foreign policy is that the interpretation of the “new geography” by the policy makers that dominated the policy has failed to produce expected outcomes. It also led to overstretching available resources with mismatching desired targets it has put forward. The policies failed because of miscalculations between domestic resources and international ambitions. The realities of the Middle East, its ethnic and religious make up, Turkey’s strategic location and complex water and energy issues, as well as the domestic economic and political set-up rendered the present Turkish foreign policy “null and void” in responding to these by reconciling national interests in a dynamically changing world.
In addition, in order to pursue desired foreign policy objectives, Turkish human and social capital had to be mobilized. It has been established that the presence of “new geography” parameters makes public opinion backup a necessity in pursuing foreign policy. There have been attempts to achieve this, for instance, in support of polices pursued in Sudan and Somalia. Live Aid type concerts were arranged while pop-stars were invited to participate in state-sponsored visits to Africa. These attempts have been highly disappointing and failed to mobilize the desired public support. More recently, public opinion turned against the government’s refugee policy as complaints have risen against the “Syrian guests”, particularly in the bordering provinces with Syria. The other area where public opinion has been rather critical relates to the OFDI. Increased Turkish OFDI raised concerns from an ill-informed public about the consequences of investing abroad that capital outflow was leading to the “stealing of jobs from the Turks.”
Finally, to formulate a foreign policy based on concrete analysis of the realities of the country it is necessary to draw up a market-friendly industrial strategy that takes into account world division of labour and industrial complementarities while reconciling these with well-defined global principles. If Turkey wants to become an active international player, as envisioned in its 2023 targets explained above, it needs to mobilise its population behind these. However, up to now, the government’s efforts to raise public consciousness has been disappointing and highly fragmented, as well as exclusive, as is the case with aid to Somalia or with relations with Iran and Syria.
References
Aras Bülent and Hakan Fidan (2009): “Turkey and Eurasia: Frontiers of a new geographic imagination”, (Türkiye ve Avrasya: Yeni Co€rafi Hafzala’n›n Hudutlar›), New Perspectives on Turkey, No. 40, pp. 195-217.
Aybar Sedat (2012): “Turkish Economy and the Development of Its Financial Sector”, in Aybar and Charambides, Turkey on the Doorstep of Europe, Panteion University, Athens, ISSN 1986 – 4698, pp. 32 – 39.
Aybar et al. (2010): Emerging Markets Global Players Report – Turkey, with University of Columbia, Vale Columbia Center.
Aybar and Ozgoker (2009): “Bat› Enerji Güvenli€i Ve Türkiye”, (Energy Security of the Western World), Trakya Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, No. 2, Vol. 11, pp. 319 – 334.
Aybar Sedat (2008a) (Editor): Türkiye’nin Ortado€u Politikas›, (Turkey’s Middle-Eastern Politics), Kadir Has University Publications.
Aybar Sedat (2008b): “Türkiye – Afrika ‹liflkileri”, (Turkey – Africa Relations), Almanak 2007 Analizleri, Sosyal Arast›rmalar› Vakf› (SAV), pp. 353 – 373.
Brzezinski Zbigniew, (2008): America and the World: Conversations on the Future of American Foreign Policy , Basic Books (September 2008), ISBN 0-465-01501-8.
Davutoglu Ahmet, (2010): “Turkey’s Zero Problems Foreign Policy”, Quoted on 28/08/2012, from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/05/20/turkeys_zero_problems_….
‹fleri Emre and A. O€uz Dilek (2012): “Yeni Enerji Jeopoliti€inde NATO’nun Enerji Güvenli€inde Tamamlay›c› Rolü ve Türkiye’nin Potansiyel Katk›lar›”, (NATO’s Complimentary Role in Energy Security and Turkey’s Potential Contributions at the New Energy Geopolitics), Akademik Bak›fl, Volume 5, No. 10, p. 229.
‹fleri Emre (2012): “Ya ‹ran Nükleer Program› Enerji ‹çinse? Türkiye’nin Enerji Güvenli€ine Yans›malar›”, (What if Iran’s Nuclear Program is for Energy? Implications for Turkey’s Energy Security), Ortado€u Analiz, Volume 4, No. 42, p. 55.
Martin Jaques (2009): When China Rules the World, Allen Lane, London.