The December 2010 event in a small Tunisian city hardly known to the world put the Middle East on top of the politics agenda of the world in a way very different from what we were accustomed to. The storm of democratic change that took hold in Tunisia became a revolutionary hurricane across the Arab Middle East and North Africa. In a region where authoritarian regimes hitherto always found ways to survive successive waves of change, a movement for freedom and sovereignty led by urban middle classes shook the established order to change the character of politics.
Revolutionary movements had their first impact in regime changes in North Africa, carrying to power in Tunisia and Egypt Islamic currents that had waited decades to mount the political stage in a legitimate manner. Although the search for change in Yemen, Bahrain, Jordan and, to a certain extent, Morocco was aborted, variously through repression or bribing the masses, there was no doubt that a different horizon had opened up in the political course of the region from what had been experienced so far.
That the struggle for freedom, sovereignty and dignity was carried out through social mobilization and peaceful organizing was antithetical to the dystopia celebrating violence represented by Al Qaeda. The assassination of Osama bin Laden, the Al Qaeda leader, by US Special Forces precisely when the Arab revolt had broken out was symbolic in making clear the bankruptcy of the line he stood for.
From another aspect, unable to break in the past with relations of dependency despite the reality of radical regimes created from putsches, countries of the region now entered a stage where they would possess sovereignty. During this transition, expected to be drawn out, questions remained, such as how and based on what principles Islamic parties that came to power would rule, in particular how they would establish relations with the West, or how a new distribution of power would come about in the regional order.
In the wave of change in the Middle East, the bloodiest and most complex struggle was in Syria. In this country, the intellectual and political centre of Arab nationalism, which finds itself the focal point of the power struggle in the Middle East, the regime would not give in easily. Thanks to support it has received from the region and the international system at large, it has persevered and fought for its life by waging war on its own people. Caught in a maelstrom where revolution mixed with counter-revolution and the search for democratic national sovereignty with the struggle for power between religious denominations on the basis of sub-national identities, Syria displayed all the risks and potentials of the Arab revolt in its creation.
For the third time since the end of the Cold War, the “Turkish model” was offered to countries undergoing change as the solution best adapted to Western interests. That Turkey warmed up to this potential outside its role as a “model”, that Erdogan, a devout leader, should, on his North African tour, state his preference for the secular state created favorable repercussions in the West. The AKP government of Turkey also established close links with Islamist parties poised to take power, helping them organize and generate practical outcomes.
In a country like Egypt, the most important in the Arab world, with a deep-rooted political tradition, this search for models would be unpopular and ideological proximity does not mean political alignment. Paradoxically, in the aftermath of Arab rebellions, expected to benefit Turkey and reinforce its tendency to act autonomously in its foreign policy, the approach of the last decade received a blow. Having drummed its foreign policy achievements for ten years and used this to gain legitimacy and power on the domestic front, the AKP government witnessed a dwindling of its space for autonomous action.
In his speech to the Ambassadors’ Conference in 2011, Foreign Minister Davutoglu described the position Turkey should hold within an international system in turmoil: “The part that we yearn for in this period for our country may be clearly stated, and I would like to resort to a new image, a ‘Wise Country’. A wise country that the world lends an ear to on global matters, one that foresees events, takes advance measures, generates alternative solutions. A country that senses a crisis in peripheral countries before the crisis has erupted, offering solutions to countries and regions with fine-tuned diplomacy.”
This talk was two weeks after events started in Tunisia with the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi, 11 days before Tunisian dictator Ben Ali fled, and three weeks before the movement in Tahrir Square began in Egypt. Neither Tunisia, Egypt, or countries such as Libya, Syria, Bahrain, or even Yemen that were to be the scene of striking developments throughout the year were mentioned in the talk.
To be fair, it was impossible to predict on 3 January 2011, how history would abruptly change in the Middle East. When events gained historic dimensions, Turkey, before conservative Arab governments, positioned itself correctly. In Libya, despite an early faux pas concerning the role of NATO, it sided with the rebellion, aborting a French attempt to keep Turkey out of the Western Mediterranean.
Having coexisted fraternally, deepened its affinity to and economic integration with repressive regimes, including Iran, Ankara changed course in foreign policy in light of these developments. Davutoglu explained this change of course at an ambassadors’ meeting in December: “To stop, look, interpret history calmly on a rational terrain from time to time, while history progresses, but without letting go of the rhythm and pulse of history requires a robust stance.”
What he meant by a robust stance was Turkey’s will from late 2000’s until recently to open up spaces of freedom, carried on enthusiastically in the context of equilibrium between security and liberty. According to Davutoglu, “these regimes did not understand the equilibrium between liberty and security, something we established and stressed for a long time… A country or state perceiving its own people as a threat has no strength to make a leap forward.”
Starting to blend realpolitik with idealism and selectively take its distance from despotic regimes, Turkey’s foreign policy would own up, Davutoglu said, “those fraternal peoples who rise in the name of principles and fundamental rights such as the right to vote, stand for office or freedom of expression, which we see as rights for our own people.”
Deliberations of the West, panicked as it was in the face of Arab rebellions, and other powers, concerning the future of countries whose regimes were overturned resulted in circulation of the “Turkish model”. In effect, expecting salvation from the “Turkish model” was nothing new. This went back to when the Soviet Union disintegrated, as well as 9/11. A mission was attributed to Turkey both times.
The difference was that, helped by US failure after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Turkey’s maneuvering room considerably expanded. In this environment, armed with concepts like “core country” or “zero problems with neighbors”, Turkish foreign policy had become truly ambitious. From this vantage point, perhaps one of the most ironic outcomes of Arab rebellions is events restricted Turkey’s room to maneuver, forced it into closer contact with the US and revealed limitations of its power to shape developments in the region. The exemplary case is Syria.
1989-1999
With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Cold War ending, Turkey found itself in profound strategic isolation. Talking to Mehmet Ali Birand on Turkish television, then US Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger said that perhaps Ankara should focus on the Middle East since it is not at bottom a European country. Turkish foreign policy and security elite were concerned that with the weakening of the European security axis, or the disappearance of the most important raison d’être thereof, ties linking Turkey to Europe would seriously loosen.
Saddam Hussein’s occupation of Kuwait in August 1990 led Western allies to rediscover the strategic map and place Turkey once again in a critical position on that map. Initially, though, a crisis of confidence was experienced in the Atlantic alliance. Germany refused to take sides, in case of an outbreak of war, with Turkey in accordance with Article 5 of the NATO agreement and refrained from sending Patriot missiles necessary for defending the country. In the wake of the Gulf War evicting Iraq from Kuwait, the Soviet Union disintegrated. The independence of the natural resource-rich Turkic republics of Central Asia and Azerbaijan resulted in opening up an entirely new strategic and cultural geography.
This new strategic map resulted in the “Turkish model” being on the agenda for the first time. A country with a Muslim population, member of the NATO alliance, capitalist, secular, and democratic, all this meant Turkey was as valuable for its identity as its geography. Central Asian countries were supposed to imitate these systemic characteristics of Turkey; in return, Ankara would help integrate them into European institutions. This did not last long. After having a “big brother” for so long, these countries did not wish to see a new one. Moreover, Turkey’s capacity was insufficient to carry the burden.
Nonetheless, although the 1990’s were highly problematic with domestic politics, the role played by Ankara in the disintegration of Yugoslavia, successful participation of the Turkish Armed Forces in peace missions, and the strategic relationship developed with Israel led to renewed importance of Turkey in US strategic thinking. It is interesting that while this was happening, a large part of Turkish opinion regarded the US as an unreliable, dangerous, albeit indispensible, ally because it facilitated the de facto establishment of an autonomous Kurdish political entity in Northern Iraq.
In this period after the Cold War, when globalization and democratization were the two most important values, Turkey faced its most important problem on the domestic front. Turkish politics bore responsibility of raising its democratic criteria, restructuring its administration, and liberalizing its legal system by adopting a conception bringing the individual to the forefront. Unfortunately, after the death of then President Turgut Ozal, who had adopted this agenda, guardians of Turkey’s meager democracy, in particular the Armed Forces, turned the country inward using the low intensity warfare against the PKK and the imagined threat of the “sharia” as excuses. This intraverted Turkey, at loggerheads with the world, authoritarian, would loosen up after the US delivered PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan to Turkish intelligence in Kenya in 1999.
2001-2011
Ocalan’s capture created an environment that improved relations with Iran and Syria, which had been poisoned in the 1990’s because of support extended to the PKK by these regimes. Then US President Bill Clinton visited Turkey and relations between the countries came to be defined as a “strategic partnership”. The EU, which excluded Turkey in 1997, accorded Turkey status of candidate member as a result of the German change of government and intense US efforts.
While this was happening, Ankara, under leadership of then Foreign Minister Ismail Cem, began to build a multi-dimensional foreign policy in harmony with the post-Cold War period, as well as the theoretical pillars of such a policy. When the AKP came to power in 2002, the present foreign minister, who in past years was advisor to the prime minister, further deepened this approach and using concepts borrowed from his own theoretical approach established discourse for policies developed.
Meanwhile, a part of the security elite of Turkey, traditionally pro-Western, began to feel ill at ease when confronted with the democratization program rendered necessary by the EU accession process they knew would undermine the regime of military tutelage. This discomfort led to a Eurasianist strategic option to become more visible among these elites. Those who opted for the Eurasianist strategic orientation in later years were arrested and prosecuted for allegedly taking part in conspiracies against the government.
9/11 revived the discourse on the “Turkish model”. In counter position to the jihadist project of Al Qaeda, Turkey, “the NATO member with a Muslim population, a market-oriented economy, ruled by a secular democratic regime, albeit with defects” was a highly attractive alternative. The AKP rise to power added to this attraction. For the new party, despite its Islamist origins, enthusiastically implemented a democratic reform program that contributed to progress in demilitarization and establishment of the preponderance of civilian power in Turkish politics. No doubt, the EU accession process, supported overwhelming by the Turkish public, played a disproportionate role in the success of these steps. Thus, a new alignment between the values of the security community that Turkey belonged to and the fundamentals of domestic political life was brought about.
The unfortunate US adventure in Iraq, which Turkey opposed and warned against from the beginning and refused to be a part of on the basis of a parliamentary decision, upset the balance of forces in the region. With the US occupation paving the way to power of the Shiites and the Kurds, the balance of forces established for centuries in this region between the Sunnis and Shiites, favoring the former, changed.
In this new and different strategic environment, Turkey took the status quo as given and proceeded to establish an intense policy of engagement with its neighbors. It played a pioneering role in measures that may be considered revolutionary, such as eliminating visas with the aim of developing budding economic relations. In an article for the German Marshall Fund, analyst Ian Lesser assesses circumstances that surround Turkey as a “harmless environment”, despite the occupation of Iraq and the sectarian civil war raging in the country. The environment is harmless, since none of the actors is in a position to challenge the regional vision of and policy pursued by Turkey. In effect, the Syria and Iran policies of Turkey from 2003-2010 were implemented in the face of choices made by Washington.
As the impact of the armed forces in the making of foreign policy decreased, Ankara was able to get rid of groundless fears perpetrated since the foundation of the Republic and began to feel less unease with respect to the formation of a Kurdish political identity in Northern Iraq. Policies of the AKP government channelized the economic energy of the newly ascendant Anatolian business community to turn to business and new markets. Hence, in the words of Kemal Kirisci, Turkey went from being a “national security state” to more of a “business state”.
The AKP government focused on its own targets in the economic and political spheres and, in line with the definition of “core state”, tried to transform Turkey’s periphery as well. While efforts were rather painless in the Balkans, in the Caucasus, the overture to Armenia was aborted due to the harsh reaction of Azerbaijan. The Middle East was the region considered to be the most problematic and it received the greatest concentration. By remaining equidistant to all parties in the Middle East, Ankara strived to become a constructive party on unresolved questions in the region. In particular, it tried to mediate and resolve the impasse between its Western allies and Iran as a result of its nuclear program. While all this was happening on a visible level and Turkey appeared to be overzealous in defending Iran, the neighbors were carrying on their rivalry over Iraq, Gaza, Lebanon and even Syria.
The declaring of the agreement put together by Brazil and Turkey null and void by the United States was an opportunity missed in Iranian nuclear efforts. Brazil and Turkey had at least convinced Iran to sign an agreement, which involved some highly creative aspects. This attitude by Washington implied that the senior partner was showing the junior partner the limits of its power and room for autonomous maneuver. Because Ankara did not sufficiently comprehend this message, approximately one month after the agreement, it voted, together with Brazil, against the new sanctions package at the UN Security Council, despite a request by US President Obama that it abstain. This strained relations and the American, and more generally, Western media began to discuss whether Turkey was effecting a shift of axis. Having grasped the political cost of the “No” vote, Ankara agreed to the “missile shield” project at the Lisbon NATO summit and asked for radar to be used within the framework of this project to be deployed on its soil, thereby ending the debate.
Turkey’s policies seemingly in defense of Iran were not the sole source of the debate on the shift of axis. Starting with Israel’s attack on Gaza, relations deteriorated rapidly. When the AKP took power, it initially tried to carry on as good relations as possible with Israel, with a flexibility and realism hardly to be expected from a party with its ideological origins. However, it did not refrain from taking steps that strained relations with Israel, such as inviting Hamas leader Khaled Meshall, living in Damascus, to Ankara in the wake of Palestinian elections. Deteriorating relations were brought to the verge of rupture as a result of the attack by the Israeli army on the Mavi Marmara, flagship of the aid convoy to Gaza, during which nine Turks were killed. Since the Israeli government twice withdrew at the last moment from offering apologies, relations between the countries have practically come to naught since May 2010. Although tension with Israel brings considerable benefit to the government in domestic politics in a country where the public loathes Israel’s policies toward the Palestinians, in the atmosphere of instability and uncertainty of the Arab rebellions, both countries suffer from the interruption of relations.
Turkey’s taking an initiative in this period and being able to act with considerable autonomy has been made possible by a confluence of circumstances. On one hand, Turkey earnestly coveted EU accession and put its house in order. On the other hand, it strengthened its economy and by pursuing a careful line tried to create a zone of interest around it. The chaos in the region, weakness of regional forces, military presence of the US in Iraq and the fact that Turkey is considered the only regional power that can counterbalance Iran contributed to the achievements of its foreign policy at this time. However, for this policy to be sustained and effective, the status quo would have to continue. With the status quo overturned by the Arab revolt and awakening, and with the withdrawal of the US from Iraq, Turkey found itself in a more challenging environment.
2011-
The uprisings that shook the Arab Middle East brought discourse on the “Turkish model” again onto the agenda. In the course of events, the question was posed whether movements from an Islamic background, like the AKP, would be able to rule without harming the system under the domination of the West. Time and the course of history will answer that question. In the meanwhile, Turkey’s prestige and its ambitions to become a regional or global power has been damaged.
With the deepening Syrian crisis in 2011, the struggle over the regional distribution of power exploded on the basis of a discourse referring to sectarian polarization. With outside forces meddling in the struggle, Syria became a battlefield for new geopolitical competition. In this context, Turkey displayed a performance that was miles away from being an actor of decisive weight, despite all the advantages geography accorded it. Furthermore, its close relations with erstwhile partners such as neighbors Iran and Russia, both of which have a stake in Syria, were strained.
The realities of the new period and the fact that the regional power struggle has come to involve a variety of actors, mean for Turkey, first and foremost, that limitations will be imposed on its room for autonomous action. Beyond that, despite the anti-American ethos of the public, Ankara and Washington will engage in closer cooperation. Its resources dwindling, the US feels the need for regional allies; Turkey, for its part, will wish to feel the power and support of Washington behind to master developments it cannot shape on its own and guarantee its own security. The economic crisis and deeper identity crisis that the EU is suffering from create a dual problem for Turkey. On one hand, the waning of the EU perspective and the fall in the public’s support have eliminated a critical incentive for the democratization of Turkey. A worrying setback has come about in the effort to restructure Turkish democracy with a view to shape it on a veritable basis of the rule of law and a liberal understanding. Tied to this, the reduction in the attraction of Europe has raised the possibility of Turkey being pulled into the Middle Eastern vortex. For this reason, more authoritarian political discourse and action, as well as a less sensitive discourse on religious denominations, may cause problems for Turkey, as they have in the past.
Having aptly assessed the historic nature of Arab rebellions and seen as legitimate the demands for liberty and sovereignty put forth by this movement, Turkey was not able to calculate correctly that a different kind of historical development would follow the Syrian conflict. The Kurds, unable to receive their due when the new order designed by Britain and France was established in 1918-1922, acquired, after 90 years, a political identity first in Iraq and now have found the opportunity to change their status in Syria. If one dimension of the new order to be established in the Middle East is the sectarian war that seems to have some future yet and another is the prospect of Islamist movements to come to or share power, one final dimension is the fact that the political status of the Kurds will be different from what it was the past.
This kind of development will bring into its sway not only Iraq and Syria, but also Iran and Turkey, which both have considerable Kurdish populations. The duty of foreign policy makers in Turkey at this stage is to assess the new environment cool headedly, measure the country’s power and capacity accurately and overcome the ongoing crisis with as little damage as possible. Already, the ill-advised policies pursued in the Syrian crisis has pushed Turkey into isolation in the UN system, the inflow of refugees has begun to eat up its resources and resulted in tense and hostile relations with neighbors such as Iran, Iraq, and Syria that can put pressure on Turkey through the intermediary of the PKK.
The reintroduction of the regional vision will only be possible after this hurricane has settled down.