Kemalist and liberal conservative discourses ideologically reproduce the political system they are a part of and in doing so they inactivate alternative approaches. This ideological impact feeds a caricaturised historiography and a schematic theoretical approach, and is the cause of intellectual shallowness in political debates.1
The critique in relation to this ideological mangle should not be interpreted as a call abstracted from the value judgments propounded by positivism and an objective “scientific” approach. The issue is not about the debating of foreign policy by fake specialists who are not sufficiently competent and who do not implement scholarly approaches and methods, but on the contrary, it is about the restriction and marginalisation of the debates and the alienation of certain political values and attitudes. If we were to explain it through Jürgen Habermas’s theories, it is the narrowing of public space by the colonisation of our life-world through the duality of Kemalism and liberal conservatism. However, the democratisation of the field of foreign policy is only possible through the inclusion of social groups in debates because the policy is being implemented in their names. In order for this to be realised, we first have to begin with a critique of the existing ideological framework.2
World politics post-cold war
Two fundamental factors that determined Turkey’s current foreign policy emerged during the period stretching from the mid-1970s to the 1980s: 1) The neo-liberal transformation in the world economy and 2) The fall of the Soviet Union. These two developments were an indicator that the world order established after the Second World War was no longer valid. Contemporary Turkish foreign policy was shaped with the pursuits of an era when bipolar world politics ended. In the aftermath of the war, Turkey defined its security and national interests as being a part of the transatlantic alliance led by the USA. In this alliance Turkey was highlighting its geopolitical importance against the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War questioned the function of the transatlantic alliance and brought forth the obligation of its redefinition.3
The approaches of mainstream international relations define world politics post-Cold War as “unipolar”. According to this definition, the USA, with the capacity to use its military forces in all corners of the world whether it is on land, in the air, in the seas or in space, has become unipolar in international politics.4 The balance-of-power theory, a leading mainstream theory within the discipline of international relations, hypothesised that other states attained balance through allying against a hegemonic state and that in this way the anarchic structure of international relations progressed. The fact that there hasn’t been a military alliance against the USA, the sole hegemonic power of the system since the 1990s, obliges a theoretical and political evaluation of the discipline. Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth who state that the “states tend to balance against threats of hegemony over the system” as asserted in the balance-of-power theory, affirm that the USA is well past the hegemonic threshold and that it is very difficult to form an alliance against a hegemonic country. In view of economic, technological and military aspects, the USA has a capacity that is much greater than that of other states and all other potential alliances between other states.5
If the power of the USA is superior in the distribution of immediate capacity, it also has mobilised important dynamics that would in particular change neo-liberal transformation, the world economy and its socio-economic structure. During the Cold War there was a division of labour between the USA, Western Europe and Japan. Accordingly, the USA was going to provide security and keep its market open to products produced by its allies to enable their growth. In return, its allies were to keep the dollar in their reserves and would give the USA the opportunity to grow and spend. However, this strategy, possible in a bipolar world, is face to face with great problems in the unipolar world. First of all, in the absence of the Soviet threat the allies do not need any significant support of the USA for security. Secondly, being the prevailing monetary unit, the American dollar is no longer the only reserve and tool of barter. Thirdly, the growth of Europe and Asia is now much less dependent on the American market. Growth strategies based on exports are being replaced with economic strategies that target domestic and regional markets.6 In this context, it has to be emphasised that with globalisation the tendency towards regionalisation is on the up and regional economies are gaining importance.7 The control of regions and regional powers becomes a main priority in terms of the USA’s international superiority.8 It has to be kept in mind that the ascendant economies, gradually gaining importance in view of world economy, are included in groups such as the G20 and that they form the BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). However, based upon the aforementioned economic dynamics, to assert that multi-polarity is emerging would be tantamount to hasty and incautious reasoning.
Studies on unipolarity in international relations draw attention to the idea that the hegemonic state has significant consequences in view of its allies. A power that has attained unipolarity has decreased need for alliances. Therefore, second and third class powers become sceptical about receiving security from the unipolar power.9 It is possible to understand the policies these states follow through the “hedging” strategy followed in risky finance and insurance markets. In this strategy, powerless states take precautions against the possibility of the deterioration of relationships with the unipolar state that could perhaps induce a military crisis or the unipolar power withdrawing the security and economic aids it previously provided.10 The tangible policies with which this strategy is actualised should also be dealt with in each singular circumstance. However, in debates on unipolarity it is emphasised that powerless states would act in a way that would limit, affect or take advantage of the hegemony instead of pursuing a balance policy directly against the hegemonic state.11 Turkish foreign policy has been implementing a hedging strategy based on this since the 1990s. It is beneficial to define this context from which this strategy emerged when trying to understand the foreign policy of the AKP.
Turkish Foreign Policy in the neo-liberal context
Turkey’s position in the world hierarchy directly affects the policies it can pursue. Baskın Oran characterises Turkey as a “medium-size state” (MSS) and qualifies and describes the concept as follows: “A medium-size state is a country that can take advantage of a favourable international conjuncture, adopt a state protectionist model and detach itself temporarily from the international division of labour, secure a certain level of development and then open up to the world on the basis of export-led growth.”12 Even though Oran asserts that a MSS is a regional power it has to be pointed out that there is not any theoretical or conceptual clarity on this subject.13 It is assumed that regional powers have the largest share within the power capacity in their respective regions and that they can influence the entire region. Regional powers pursue imperial, hegemonic or leadership strategies.14 In the Middle East, a stage for the intervention of great powers throughout modern history, the emergence of such a regional power was blocked and in this respect, a distinctive region was shaped.15 As a matter of fact, serious criticisms about Turkey’s assertion of being a regional power are being voiced.16 In this aspect, comparing Turkey’s relative size in the Middle East with the relative size of the BRICS countries in their own regions can constitute as a simple test. In this regard, we can define Turkey as a MMS positioned in a geography where regional rivalry prevails. The most significant problem of such a state in a unipolar world is to render itself indispensable for the hegemon and to use the effect it brings in competing with other regional states. I define this strategy that the Turkish foreign policy has been following since the 1990s as power brokerage in the sense that it is the regional mediator of power that does not belong to it.
In the 1990s, the administrations of Bush senior and Clinton were a period in which the NATO was redefined according to the post-Cold War conditions.17 The principle question of that time in Turkey’s foreign policy was: “What will be the place of Turkey in the new order?” As emphasised by Gencer Özcan, during that period “Turkey lost its strategic importance in view of Western security arrangements in Ankara’s foreign policy circles and thus a concern that its defence structure and ally relationships would be negatively affected by the developments became predominant.”18 In this context the foreign policy of AKP and its conceptual expression should be evaluated hand in hand with the Davutoğlu doctrine, Turgut Özal’s neo-Ottomanism, Süleyman Demirel’s vision of “the Turkish realm from the Great Wall of China to the Adriatic” and İsmail Cem’s concept of “cross-regional, inter-regional and multi-regional power”. Despite the periodic political and ideological differences between them, the aim of all these foreign policy pursuits was to on one hand to emphasise the geo-economic importance of Turkey in view of its accumulated global capital and on the other to indicate its geo-political and geo-cultural significance in regard of the regional governance of the global order. In this respect, the Davutoğlu doctrine presents continuity with rather than disengagement from other Turkish foreign policies in the post-Cold War period. We should take a look at factors that bring about continuity in further detail.
The start of the neo-liberal transformation in view of Turkey’s addition to global politics is historically prior to the end of the Cold War and it is a process that determines the structural bounds of contemporary strategies. The neo-liberal transformation in Turkey was put into motion with the ingenuity of the 1980 coup d’état that brought the decisions of January 24 into being. This transformation can be summarised as a transition from the economic inward-oriented model to the strategy of export-led development, privatisation, international expansion and the deregulation of business markets. As with all regimes of accumulation, far from merely having economic effects, this transformation had long-term and significant political, social and cultural reverberations. In other words, the decisions of January 24, 1980 are the precursor of a social transformation beyond economic reforms.
The first effect of the neo-liberal transformation in view of Turkey’s foreign policy was the development of its economic and political relationships with Middle Eastern and Islamic countries. Until 1986-87, the first Özal administration made use of Middle Eastern and Islamic countries as a market for its low-quality export products and construction services and also tried to reinforce the capital stock that Turkey required with Arab capital. However, when it became apparent that this strategy would not be feasible in the long term, attention was directed at the strategy of uniting with the European Economic Community (EEC). Prior to the 1980s, there had been a cautious approach to Europe due to the inferiority of Turkish business’s lack of capacity to be competitive. Just as the Middle Eastern markets were insufficient in creating the export market Turkey’s growth strategy required, the economic relationships with Middle Eastern countries could not be an alternative to establishing relationships with European countries in the area of technological transfers.19
In 1991, the First Gulf War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union changed Turkey’s strategic scenario from top to bottom. In the bipolar world politics, the geo-strategic position Turkey had had against Soviet threats was the most important value that was able be marketed to her transatlantic alliance. The dangers of losing the unique geo-political status required Turkey, as it was said at the time, to emphasise its strategic importance in the New World Order. Özal undertook notable ventures in this context: the approach of neo-Ottomanism developed regarding South Kurdistan and the approach as a protectorate in view of Central Asian republics and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, which ended up being more permanent and successful despite the other ventures. Özal, who believed that new opportunities were forming for Turkey in global and regional post-Cold War politics, expressed this idea when he said, “Gates of prayer have been opened for Turkey.”20According to Hasan Celal Güzel, Özal “had a plan to connect Turkey with the Kurdish-Turkmen federation, which was to be established after the events that might take place in Northern Iraq. This politics was a plan that could be evaluated within the framework of ‘Neo-Ottomanism’.”21 In Iraq, in spite of his prior assertions, Özal couldn’t get the results he wanted with what he was willing to bargain with. However, this strategic concept called “neo-Ottomanism” that stipulated the expansion of the Turkish influence (if necessary within the bounds of a federate constitutional framework) into the Kurdish regions bordering with Syria and Iraq, also inspired the foreign policy of the AKP after Özal’s administration.
In the 1990s, the National Security Policy Document was altered twice. In 1992 Syria, Iraq and Iran were confirmed as the principle sources of threat instead of Greece, the Soviet Union and its continuation, the Russian Federation. In 1997, the number one threat was specified as “reaction”.22 According to Şule Kut, “The innovation in this foreign policy wasn’t that it reformed Turkish foreign policy or that it changed policies, but was rather based on the innovation of the international arena in which foreign policy took place and that the new era had given birth to new types of problems and opportunities. In the post-Cold War era, there weren’t any radical changes in the core principles, approaches or even in the priorities of Turkey’s foreign policy. In other words, Turkey’s new foreign policy is in essence not much different than her old foreign policy.23
The Davutoğlu doctrine
It has been voiced by both supporters of and opposition to AKP that since it came to power in 2002 it has caused a significant fracture in Turkish foreign policy. It has been emphasised that the AKP, particularly regarding the direction specified by Ahmet Davutoğlu, has shown a more dynamic and active foreign policy approach in comparison to the traditional Kemalist foreign policy. According to this viewpoint, Kemalist foreign policy, acting from the perspective of Westernisation, was inward-oriented and defensive. In return, the approach expressed as neo-Ottomanism is outward-looking, active and bases itself on the self-confidence bestowed by imperial tradition.24
The Davutoğlu doctrine that took this difference as its basis is founded upon the adaptation of the dichotomy of the public and bureaucratic elite, which lies at the centre of AKP’s populist expression, into foreign policy.25 According to Davutoğlu, the reason why the great American, English, German and Russian strategic schools do not exist in Turkey is the identity crisis that has been experienced since the political reforms made in the Ottoman state in 1839, known as Tanzimat. What lies at the heart of this crisis is that elites of the state, who emulate the West and are strangers to their own people, have an inferiority complex and do not have the self-confidence to come up with an active strategic mode of thought. In Davutoğlu’s viewpoint, the factors that implement the power capacities of a state through a multiplier effect are strategic thinking, planning and political will.26 Davutoğlu defines Turkey’s modernisation through the “divided self” concept of psychologist R.D. Laing: republican elites who have not been able to rid themselves of ontological insecurity are condemned to a passive and introverted turn of mind.27 Thus Ahmet Davutoğlu’s fundamental criticism in view of Turkish foreign policy repeats the historical narrative that forms the basis of AKP’s political expression and the liberal conservative temper. The principle point of this narrative, called “theories of populist constitutional development” by Bülent Tanör, is that it explains our “political and constitutional developments with a formation they call ‘bureaucracy’ which embodies the ‘contradiction’ between the groups they call ‘classes’ and ‘the public’. In this schemata ‘bureaucracy’ is the one which plays the role of the ‘hegemon’ and ‘oppressor’”.28 According to Tanör, these theories of the Turkish right voiced by Ahmet Hamdi Başar and Celal Bayar also formed the basis of thought for Kemal Tahir, Mehmet Ali Aybar, Sencer Divitçioğlu, İdris Küçükömer, Murat Sarıca, İsmail Cem, Ahmet Yücekök and Bülent Ecevit, which led to these right-wing theories being in fact conceptualised by left-wing intellectuals.29 Academic studies that explain the political development of Turkey through the tradition of ancient state also contributed theoretical depth to this liberal-conservative narrative by the distorted interpretation of Max Weber.30
The political function of the populist narrative based on the dichotomy of the bureaucracy and the public was the unification of the rising middle-class and financiers with the urban poor, which emerged through the neo-liberal transformation in the 1980s and are on the losing side of Turkey’s addition into global capitalism, in a coalition by the AKP.31
A concept frequently visited by Davutoğlu also became the cornerstone of AKP’s internal politics: the initiative. According to Davutoğlu, only “societies with a strong sense of identity and belonging based on an understanding of mutual time-space can activate psychological, sociological, political and economic factors and with an established cultural structure can have the opportunity to realize strategic initiatives that can be continually renewed.”32 “A state that is not secure in its human factor cannot open up to new strategic horizons.”33 The metaphor of “initiative” taken in stride in Davutoğlu’s book significantly permeated the daily political narrative and became an indicator describing initiatives developed by the government in relation to the problems in both regional and internal politics such as the Middle Eastern initiative, the African initiative, the Kurdish initiative, the Alawi initiative and the Romany initiative. In respect to grand strategies, Davutoğlu also mentions the requirement of a philosophical initiative as a precondition of a new initiative in the world order. For example, he suggests that the order of the United Nations, which he criticises because it is Euro-centric, should be questioned and made more inclusive regarding the presumptions it is based on.34
According to Davutoğlu, the post-Cold War world is formed of super states, great states, regional powers and small states. While super powers only consider super powers in their strategic planning, states in the lower ranks of the hierarchy are required to consider the strategies and tactics of each other as well as those states that are superior to them. Regional powers such as Turkey can create space to manoeuvre in the conflict areas of great powers and super powers, and attain the status of “great state”.35 Davutoğlu asserts that in the period post-Cold War, a development from bipolar geo-politics to balance-of-power model took place.36 After the end of the Cold War, a short-term “monopolistic structuring centring on America” formed, but with the gradual emergence of the mechanism of balance-of-power, regional powers directed their attentions at suitable, flexible and alternative policies.37 With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, geo-political vacuums formed in the region of Eurasia; Turkey is situated right in the middle of these vacuums that included the Balkans, Caucasia, Central Asia and the Middle East. The old republican strategy that used the geo-political position of Turkey to preserve the status quo is insufficient for preserving Turkey’s security. Instead, Davutoğlu suggests that Turkey’s global status can be raised by extending its regional spheres of influence and defines this as a “strategy of gradual initiation into the international framework”.38
In this context, the concept of avoiding trouble with neighbouring states was a strategic approach put forth for creating manoeuvring room for Turkey. Turkey should have established a network of multi-dimensional and multi-track relationships that complete each other instead of establishing alternative alliances.39 Turkey obtained an important opportunity in this path with the prestige it gained from the Middle East and from the anti-war American and European public when the memorandum of March 1, 2003, requesting the use of Turkish soil by the USA for their operation in Iraq, was rejected at the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. In hindsight, even if this decision had an important place in evaluations regarding Turkish foreign policy, it is not possible to assert that the rejection of the memorandum was the result of an AKP strategy. Abdullah Gül, the president at the time, urged members of parliament to vote with their consciences. Bülent Arınç and Davutoğlu (the head consultant of the time) openly opposed the memorandum while Erdoğan (the chairman of AKP) wanted the memorandum to be accepted.40 Therefore, in this respect it is not correct to evaluate this show of hands as a strategic breaking point in Turkish foreign policy. As a matter of fact, on March, 20, two days after Erdoğan became the prime minister and received a vote of confidence, the forces of the USA and Great Britain began their Iraq operation and the Erdoğan administration passed a bill that would allow the American planes to use Turkish air space through the assembly.41 However, the distrust the memorandum of March 1 created in American-Turkish relationships and the exclusion of Turkey from Iraq after Saddam was captured affected Turkey’s behaviour in the Arab revolts.
Following the memorandum of March 1, the event that was considered to be an indicator of Turkey’s new foreign policy was experienced in the relationships with Israel. However, Prime Minister Erdoğan’s “one minute” storm off at the Davos Summit in 2009, was a reaction to Israel’s rejection of Turkey trying to be regional protector and mediator rather than an emotional and ideological reaction. As Gürkan Zengin (one of the journalists in support of the politics of Davutoğlu) points out, the two countries in the region were in opposition to Turkey’s “mission of establishing order” and her initiative of founding regional peace: Israel and Iran.42 Both the memorandum of March 1, and Turkey’s relationship with Israel resulted in the idea of “axis shift”, that Turkish foreign policy was distancing itself from Western alliances.43 However, the assertion that a radical change was taking place in Turkish foreign policy was an exaggeration.44
Turkey’s policies on Syria were also shaped by expectations of intervention. The government, calculating that the USA and NATO would sooner or later intervene in Syria, gradually cornered itself into a foreign policy with great emphasis on religion. Turkey, aiming to increase its own strategic value within the transatlantic alliance through its zero-trouble policy and striving to raise its global status with its regional influence, gradually found itself in a more isolated situation. The more Turkey became a party to the civil war in Syria alongside Qatar and Saudi Arabia, the more it became stuck in sectarian politics. In this respect, Turkey began to pursue politics in a way that clashed with the policies of the USA. The memorandum of March 1 should have shown the government that it couldn’t force the USA into an action that it didn’t desire. In 2003, Turkey had not been able to stop the USA from declaring war on Iraq and in 2013 she was not able to persuade the USA to intervene in Syria. However, in 2003 Turkey had pursued peaceful politics and didn’t take any risks with regard to its own security. Thus, in this regard the interventionist politics Turkey implemented in Syria had great cost. The strategy Davutoğlu formulated was based on establishing an area of influence around Turkey and to meet the ethnic and religious conflicts outside the boundaries of the county by using that area of influence as a buffer belt. The bombing that resulted in the death of 52 citizens in Reyhanlı in May 11, 2013 meant the end of this strategy. Just as Turkey was getting out of a 30-year old conflict and entering a peace process, accompanied by a broad-based popular demand for peace and consensus for peace was achieved, the regional policies of the government carried the conflict in Syria to inside the borders of Turkey and the most tragic terrorist attack of recent times was to take place in Reyhanlı. The political narrative that emphasised Sunnism referred to by the government alongside the attack on Reyhanlı increased the worries of Alevi citizens for their security and also created a threat of denominational polarisation in the country.
In this context, the reasons behind the miscalculations of AKP administrations, beginning with an interrogation of similar aims and strategies of post-Cold War governments, should be questioned. The answer to this question lies in internal politics rather than in foreign policy. In a populist narrative, the Davutoğlu doctrine asserted that it is different from that of alienated republican elites because it is rooted in historical traditions and represents the people. The doctrine suggested that self-esteem would be enough to become a regional power. The historical reality this ideological approach overlooked was that republican groups had to retreat from the Middle East because they lost the war, not because they were Western. As Cox debates in the example of Japan, for an MMS to be able to act independently from the global hegemonic system it has to be based on a social order outside the dominant socio-economic model. The AKP, a product and conveyer of the neo-liberal transformation in Turkey, does not have the will or the capacity to realise a change of this sort.45
1 For a detailed and theoretical explanation on the fundamental discourse mentioned in this essay please see: Birdal, M.S. (2014): The Davutoğlu Doctrine: The Populist Construction of the Strategic Subject, in Ahmet Bekmen, İsmet Akça and Barış Alp Özden (eds.): Turkey Reframed: Constituting Neoliberal Hegemony, London: Pluto Press, pp. 92-106.
2 Habermas, J. (1972): Knowledge and Human Interests, Boston: Beacon Press, s. 301-317; Cox, R. W. (1996a): Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory, Robert W. Cox and Timothy J. Sinclair (ed.): Approaches to World Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 85-123.
3 For a mainstream theoretical approach that advocates the idea that NATO became politically non-functional please see; Waltz, K. (2001): Structural Realism after the Cold War, G. John Ikenberry (ed.): America Unrivalled: The Future of the Balance of Power, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 29-67.
4 Walt, S. (2009): Alliances in a Unipolar World, World Politics 61(1), pp. 92-93.
5 Brooks, S.G and Wohlforth, W.C. (2008): World out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
6 Mastanduno, M. (2009): System Maker and Privilege Taker: U.S. Power and the International Political Economy, World Politics 61(1), pp. 149-154.
7 Hurrell, A. (2007): One World? Many World? The Place of Regions in the Study of International Society, International Affairs 83(1): 127-146; Väyrynen, R. (2003): Regionalism: Old and New, International Studies Review 5: 25-51.
8 Gowan (2000): 37-43; Art, R. (2004): Europe Hedges Its Security Bets, T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michael Fortmann (ed.): Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 179-213; Kirshner, J. (): States, Markets, and Great Power Relations in the Pacific, G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno (ed.), International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 273-298.
9 Jervis, R. (2009): Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective, World Politics 61(1), p. 212.
10 Tessman, B. and Wolfe, W. (2011): Great Powers and Strategic Hedging: The Case of Chinese Energy Security Strategy, International Studies Review 13(2), p. 216.
11 Walt (2009): 87-88; Jervis (2009): 207-209; Ikenberry, G.J., Mastanduno, M. and Wohlforth, W.C. (2009): Unipolarity, State Behaviour, and Systemic Consequences, World Politics 61(1), pp. 19-20.
12 Oran, B. (2001): Introduction: The Theory and Practice of Turkish Foreign Policy, Baskın Oran (ed): Turkish Foreign Policy 1919-2006: Facts and Analyses with Documents, University of Utah Press, 2010, p: 13.
13 On the elusiveness of the MSS concept please see; Cooper, D.A. (2011): Challenging Contemporary Notions of Middle Power Influence: Implications of the Proliferation Security Initiative for “Middle Power Theory”, Foreign Policy Analysis 7(3), p. 319.
14 Destradi, S. (2010): Regional Powers and Their Strategies: Empire, Hegemony and Leadership, Review of International Studies 36(4), p. 905.
15 Miller, B. (2004): The International System and Regional Balance in the Middle East, T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michael Fortmann (ed.): Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 239-266.
16 Uzgel, İ. (2010): Türk Dış Politikasında Bölgesel Güç İlüzyonu (The Illusion of Regional Power in Turkish Foreign Policy), Osman Bahadır Dinçer, Habibe Özdal ve Hacali Necefoğlu (ed.): Yeni Dönemde Türk Dış Politikası: Uluslararası IV. Türk Dış Politikası Sempozyumu Tebliğleri (Turkish Foreign Policy in the New Era: The 4th International Turkish Foreign Policy Symposium Papers), Ankara: USAK, p. 61-66.
17 Gowan, P. (2000): The Euro-Atlantic Origins of NATO’s Attack on Yugoslavia, Tariq Ali (ed.): Masters of the Universe? NATO’s Balkan Crusade, London: Verso, s. 3-45.
18 Özcan, G. (1998): Doksanlı Yıllarda Turkey’nin Değişen Güvenlik Ortamı (Turkey’s Changing Security in the 1990s), Gencer Özcan ve Şule Kut (ed.): En Uzun On Yıl: Turkey’nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış Politika Gündeminde Doksanlı Yıllar (The Longest Ten Years: The 1990s in Turkey’s Agenda of National Security and Foreign Policy), Istanbul: Boyut, p. 17.
19 Uzgel, İ. (2004): Ulusal Çıkar ve Dış Politika: Türk Dış Politikasının Belirlenmesinde Ulusal Çıkarın Rolü 1983-1991 (National Interests and Foreign Policy: The Role of National Interest in Determining Turkish Foreign Policy 1983-1991), Ankara: İmge Publications, pp. 163-310.
20 C. Hakan Arslan, Hacet Kapıları (Gates of Prayer), Vatan, May 3, 2004, http://haber.gazetevatan.com/0/27176/4/yazarlar.
21 Güzel, H.C. (2007): Kuzey Irak: Kürtçülük ve Ayrılıkçı Terör (Northern Iraq: Kurdishness and Separatist Terror), Istanbul: Timaş, p. 118.
22 Özcan, G (1998): p. 19.
23 Kut, Ş. (1998): Turkey’nin Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Dış Politikasının Anahatları (The Outlines of Turkey’s Foreign Policy post-Cold War), Gencer Özcan and Şule Kut (ed.): En Uzun On Yıl: Turkey’nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış Politika Gündeminde Doksanlı Yıllar (The Longest Ten Years: The 1990s in Turkey’s Agenda of National Security and Foreign Policy), Istanbul: Boyut, p. 57.
24 Mufti, M. (2009): Daring and Caution in Turkish Strategic Culture: A Republic at Sea, London: Palgrave; Taşpınar, Ö. (2008): Turkey’s Middle East Policies: Between Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism, Carnegie Papers 10, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Middle East Center.
25 Birdal, M.S. (2014).
26 Davutoğlu, A. (2008): Stratejik Derinlik: Turkey’nin Uluslararası Konumu (Strategic Depth: Turkey’s International Position), Istanbul: Küre, pp. 17-34.
27 Davutoğlu, (2008): pp. 59-63.
28 Tanör, B. (2008): p. 107.
29 Tanör, B. (2008): pp: 107-134.
30 Dinler, D. (2003) Turkey’de Güçlü Devlet Geleneği Tezinin Eleştirisi (The Criticism of the Powerful State Tradition in Turkey), Praksis 9, 17-54; Sönmez, E. (2010) Klasik Dönem Osmanlı Tarihi Çalışmalarında Max Weber Etkisi (The Influence of Max Weber in Classical Period Ottoman History Studies), Praksis 23(2), pp. 39-62.
31 Hale, W. ve Özbudun, E. (2010): Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case of AKP, London: Routledge; Öniş, Z. (2006): The Political Economy of Turkey’s Justice and Development Party, M. Hakan Yavuz (ed.): The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Party, Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, pp. 207-234; Tuğal, C. (2007): NATO’s Islamists: Hegemony and Americanization in Turkey, New Left Review 44, pp. 5-34.
32 Davutoğlu, A. (2008): p. 23.
33 Davutoğlu, A. (2008): s. 37.
34 Davutoğlu, A. (2011): Kriz Odaklı Değil, Vizyon Odaklı Dış Politika (Vision-Focused and not Crisis-Focused Foreign Policy), Küre Yayınları (ed.): Cumhuriyetçilik, Milliyetçilik ve İslamcılık (Republicanism, Nationalism and Islamism), Istanbul: Küre, pp. 9-14.
35 Davutoğlu, A. (2008): pp. 74-79.
36 Davutoğlu, A. (2008): pp. 74-79.
37 Davutoğlu, (2008): p. 32.
38 Davutoğlu, (2008): pp. 115-118.
39 Zengin, G. (2010): Hoca: Türk Dış Politikası’nda ‘Davutoğlu Etkisi’ (The Hodja: The “Davutoğlu Effect” in Turkish Foreign Policy), Istanbul: İnkılap, pp. 86-91.
40 Zengin, (2010): pp. 137-151.
41 Bila, F. (2007): Ankara’da Irak Savaşları: Sivil Darbe Girişimi ve Gizli Belgelerde 1 Mart Tezkeresi (Iraq Wars in Ankara: Memorandum of March 1 in Classified Documents and the Initiative of Civilian Coup), Istanbul: Güncel, p. 230.
42 Zengin, G. (2010): pp. 227-228.
43 Inbar, E. (2011): Israeli-Turkish Tensions and Their International Ramifications, Orbis, pp. 132-146.
44 Pope, H. (2010): Pax Ottomana? The Mixed Success of Turkey’s New Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66838/hugh-pope/pax-ottomana.
45 Cox, R.W. (1996b): Middlepowermanship, Japan, and Future World Order, Robert W. Cox and Timothy J. Sinclair (ed.): Approaches to World Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 241-275.
46 Davutoğlu, A. (2008): Stratejik Derinlik: Turkey’nin Uluslararası Konumu (Strategic Depth: Turkey’s International Position), Istanbul: Küre, pp. 17-34.
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M. Sinan Birdal
Mehmet Sinan Biral completed his Ph.D. in international relations at the University of Southern California. His main research interests are foreign policy, the theories of international relations and the theories of politics as well as the sociology of politics. He is the author of the book entitled The Holy Roman Empire and the Ottomans: From Global Imperial Power to Absolutist States. He works as assistant professor at the Department of International Relations of Işık University.