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Life in Migrant Neighbourhoods: Post-2010 Migration in Turkey and the Social Participation of Migrants

DENİZ YÜKSEKER, HATİCE KURTULUŞ,
UĞUR TEKİN, ESRA KAYA ERDOĞAN

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Heinrich Böll Stiftung Derneği Türkiye Temsilciliği

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List of Abbreviations

ABPRS	Address-Based Population Registration System
CAPI	Computer Assisted Personal Interviewing
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
ÇSGB	Ministry of Labour and Social Security (Çalışma ve Sosyal Güvenlik Bakanlığı)
EBRD	European Bank of Reconstruction and Development
ECHO	European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
EU	European Union
FHC	Family Health Centre
FRIT	Facility for Refugees in Turkey
GIZ	German Development Corporation (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit)
GİB	Presidency of Migration Management (Göç İdaresi Başkanlığı)
GSS	General Health Insurance Scheme (Genel Sağlık Sigortası)
HBSD	Heinrich Böll Stiftung Turkey Representation
HIPS	Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies
ICMPD	International Centre for Migration Policy Development
ILO	International Labour Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IP	International Protection
LFIP	Law on Foreigners and International Protection
MHC	Migrant Health Centre
PIKTES	Promoting Inclusive Education for Kids In The Turkish Education System
SGK	Social Security Institution (Sosyal Güvenlik Kurumu)
SPSS	Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
SUY	Social Integration Assistance for Foreigners (Sosyal Uyum Yardımı)
TEC	Temporary Education Centre
TNSA	Turkish Demographic and Health Survey (Türkiye Nüfus ve Sağlık Araştırması)
TP	Temporary Protection
TurkStat	Turkish Statistical Institute
UN	United Nations
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
YÖK	Turkish Council of Higher Education (Yükseköğretim Kurumu)

Acknowledgments

The “Migration and Social Participation in Turkey” project has gone through many stages, from developing the initial concept to designing the research, conducting the fieldwork, and writing up the findings. Many institutions and individuals have been instrumental in encouraging and supporting the research team throughout this extensive process. This endeavour would not have been possible without their support and participation. We would like to take this opportunity to express our gratitude to them.

We are grateful to Kristian Brakel, the former director of Heinrich Böll Stiftung Turkey Representation (HBSD), for proposing to us to carry out this study. He first brought up in 2021 the idea of conducting research in Turkey similar to the integration monitoring reports (Integrationsmonitor) in Germany. This study ended up being quite different in design from integration monitors. Regrettably, we were not able to complete the research before Kristian’s assignment in Istanbul ended in February 2023. We also thank Cem Bico, the project coordinator at HBS’s Turkey Representation, who provided continuous support and encouragement to us throughout the research. He managed the communication between HBSD and the research team impeccably and it was clear that he shared our enthusiasm for the research. From the methodological design of the study to the conduct of the fieldwork, data analysis and writing, his support has made our work much more efficient and productive. We would also like to express our gratitude to Dawid Bartelt, HBS Turkey Representation’s current director. We sincerely appreciate his continued support and understanding of the delays in the report writing process.

The research involved the collection of quantitative data from 17 provinces and qualitative data from five provinces. The quantitative data was collected by Akademetre Research and Strategic Planning using a fully structured questionnaire designed by the research team and administered on the sample determined by the research team. The quality of the data collected was greatly influenced by the cooperation and communication that took place during and after the fieldwork. We would like to express our sincere gratitude to the officials and staff of Akademetre for their exceptional diligence in handling this matter.

The successful completion of this extensive research, which involved data collection in 17 provinces and encompassed both quantitative and qualitative aspects, would not have been possible without the invaluable support provided in the field. We are grateful for the valuable contributions of our research assistants, Başak Kocadost and Deniz Kocabağlı, in carrying out tasks related to data collection, compilation, and transcription. Emrah Cengiz played a crucial role in accurately transcribing the data with great diligence and care. We are grateful for the invaluable assistance of our research assistants, Fatma Coşkun and Kardelen Kösen, who worked with us in Gaziantep and Mardin. Without their support, we would not have been able to conduct the planned interviews at the planned times. We would like to thank Fatma and Kardelen for their dedication and sincerity in their work.

Establishing communication and gaining the trust of individuals working in the field are crucial aspects when embarking on a qualitative field study. We were very fortunate in this regard. Dr Cansu Akbaş Demirel, a migration researcher, helped us enormously in establishing contacts with institutions, associations, and volunteers working with refugees prior to the qualitative field study in Izmir. We reached some institutions in Konya thanks to Yasin Durak's guidance and Adnan Teke's direct contacts. We would like to thank Cansu Akbaş Demirel, Yasin Durak and Adnan Teke for their support.

A study of this length certainly required careful editing. We thank Bilge Ceren Şekerciler for her meticulous proofreading of the Turkish report. Veysel Eşsiz translated the study into English, wading through all the tables, figures and jargon effortlessly. Simon Charles Popay proofread the English version with great attention to detail. We are very grateful to them for overcoming the difficult tasks of translation and proofreading.

The findings of a qualitative field study are presented by addressing the research objectives, highlighting the main themes, and discussing the concepts used. Regardless of the filters used, the only source of data in the field study is the information and insights provided by the individuals interviewed and observed during the research. The findings of qualitative research are ultimately shaped by the participants. A total of 72 interviews were conducted for the qualitative aspect of this project. To maintain the confidentiality of the participants and to adhere to our research methodology, we have chosen to present the qualitative data in an aggregated form without the names of the individuals involved. We are deeply indebted to the refugee rights advocates and service providers to refugees and migrants from civil society organisations, representatives of trade unions, employers and professional associations, teachers, health professionals, social workers, lawyers, local administrators, and community leaders in the five cities where we conducted qualitative fieldwork, although we are unable to list their names here. This research would not have been possible without their contribution.

Deniz Yökseker

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Preface

The parallels are striking: According to the latest integration monitor of the German state of Hesse, which was the initial inspiration for this study, employment, education, housing and discrimination are the most problematic issues for migrants and refugees in Germany. Structurally, the picture is much the same in Turkey, as the following pages will show. Language acquisition is also a common problem, as is the fact that the natives show little desire to socially interact with migrants. While there are significant differences in the services provided by the state to migrants and refugees in Germany and Turkey – health care is a sensitive example that the study looks at closely – structurally the situation of migrants in the different countries appears to be very similar.

It is one of the many merits of the study to insist that analysing migrants' social participation means analysing the fulfilment of their right to work, their right to equal access to education, their right to a decent livelihood and their right to a life free from discrimination. In a global context in which migrants and refugees are seen as a problem and increasingly as a threat, public opinion and governments tend to overlook the fact that these people have rights wherever they are, which is the essence of the old slogan: no human being is illegal – regardless of their documents or lack of them.

In Germany, as elsewhere in the European Union, there has long been a debate about migrant integration as a policy response to the problems and challenges posed by immigration. While politicians insist that migrants should be integrated, the authors of this study, by questioning the concept of 'integration' and the methodologies associated with it, help us as a German (and thus EU-based) foundation to sharpen our view of our own migration policies. Although the term is no longer used, the underlying approach to migration in many European countries is still assimilationist: Those who arrive must change and adapt to the status quo. Scholars understand 'integration' as a concept that addresses both migrants and members of host societies, and applies to different dimensions – economic, political, cultural. However, as the authors argue, 'integration' policies in the EU continue to treat the host society and migrants as homogeneous groups and natural analytical categories, with migrants having to move 'into' the host society, which remains essentially unchanged and acts as the referee for successful integration.

The authors therefore preferred the term 'social participation.' Focusing on migrant neighbourhoods, they looked at migrants, refugees and Turkish natives living there and how these three groups – including the natives – participate in the labour market, housing, education and other public services such as health care. The deficits faced by migrants are to a large extent shared by their native neighbours. In this way, the study also highlights the problems of native Turkish society.

The main finding of the study is that "migrants and refugees have become part of Turkish society." They actively participate in society, despite the challenges they face. They contribute to the Turkish economy, as well as to the general society and culture in the country. This finding is not as trivial as it sounds. Migration has been a part of humanity since the beginning,

and Germans have migrated to other countries and regions in the last few centuries, probably in greater numbers than any other ethnic group in Europe. Yet the debate in the EU about migrants and refugees is an anti-refugee and anti-migrant debate based on the assumption that migration is a) a threat to European societies and b) unmanageable. There are consequences: Not only has migration to Europe become extremely risky and deadly, especially for those trying to reach Europe by sea. But, also, anti-refugee policies and practices now violate the fundamental rights to asylum and protection.

What is becoming increasingly clear is that there are no ready-made formulas for states, international organisations or even societies in general to manage this growing demand for mobility or the public reactions to it. Beneath the political turmoil, there is a huge community of field workers, experts, academics, NGOs, INGOs, local authorities, chambers, trade unions, opinion leaders from different political traditions and volunteers who are trying to cope with the social consequences of migration and to solve real problems of real people more effectively on a daily basis. We at the Heinrich Böll Foundation in Turkey have been working on migration in solidarity with these actors for many years, and this research project is inspired by them and made possible by their efforts.

This study is meant to be a particular contribution to their efforts, with its findings as well as its methodological attempt to reflect the human condition as experienced by Turkey's migrant and migrant-receiving communities.

In addressing migration and public responses to it, there is also a need to be able to have discussions based on and using scientific evidence. This study provides a much-needed evidence base for talking about migration. Weaving together a large quantitative study that included both migrants and Turkish citizens, and a qualitative component that elicited the perspectives of civil society actors, it approaches social participation from a whole society perspective. We hope that this research will stimulate an open discussion about living conditions in communities where migrants and natives live side by side.

We would like to express our gratitude to Kristian Brakel, former Director of the Heinrich Böll Turkey Office up to February 2023, for his role in initiating the study, and of course to the authors, Deniz Yüksek, Hatice Kurtuluş, Uğur Tekin and Esra Kaya Erdoğan, as well as their research assistants and collaborators. As the Heinrich Böll Foundation, we are delighted to be able to contribute to the extensive scientific research on a significant issue for Turkey and the world on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the Republic. We hope that the research and the resulting recommendations will promote a better migration policy and politics based on human rights in Turkey – as well as in EU countries. This is urgently needed.

Istanbul, November 2023

Cem Bico, Dawid Bartelt

Summary

Turkey is currently the world's largest refugee-hosting country. The country is home to over 3.3 million Syrians, more than 300,000 refugees and asylum seekers from other countries, some 1.3 million foreigners with residence permits, and an unknown number of irregular migrants. However, there is a limited availability of official data regarding the numbers of migrants and refugees, as well as their living conditions and access to public and private sector services. Despite the significant academic research that has been conducted on the subject, these studies have certain limitations.

The present research was undertaken to address the need for comprehensive data on the social integration or cohesion of migrants in Turkey. While drawing on years of academic debates on integration and cohesion, we took a critical stance towards these concepts, which led us to prefer the concept of "social participation" in this research. However, when collecting data on the participation of migrants and refugees, it is crucial not to consider them in isolation from the experiences of Turkish citizens (also referred to as Turkish nationals or natives in this study) in similar processes. Moreover, it would not be sufficient to simply compare migrants and natives on a national scale using statistical averages. It is equally important to analyse them within the socio-economic contexts in which they live. With these priorities and principles in mind, the Migration and Social Participation in Turkey Project was carried out in 2022. The project, supported by the Heinrich Böll Stiftung Turkey Representation (HBSD), presents the results of a research approach that combines both qualitative and quantitative methods.

The quantitative research involved administering a fully structured questionnaire to men and women aged 18-49 in three samples: Turkish citizens (also called natives in this study), Syrian refugees and migrants and other migrants and refugees (also called non-Syrian migrants and refugees in this study). The research was conducted in 16 provinces with significant Syrian populations and in Van province. As part of the sample design, neighbourhoods with a high concentration of Syrians (non-Syrians in the case of Van) were identified in the provinces where the fieldwork took place, and the samples were drawn from these neighbourhoods. This ensured that the migrants and native were comparable in terms of socio-economic status. It also enabled the research to focus on working class communities. The Turkish sample consisted of 1,933 people, the Syrian sample had 1,427 participants, and the sample of non-Syrian migrants included 506 people.

The qualitative research involved 72 interviews with various stakeholders and experts, such as employees and volunteers of civil society organisations (CSOs) working in the field of migration and refugees in five of the seventeen provinces, namely Izmir, Gaziantep, Konya, Mardin, and Istanbul. The interviewees included a diverse group of participants, such as local administrators, muhtars, health professionals working with both migrants and locals, teachers, representatives of institutions supporting migrants and locals, and representatives of employers and professional organisations.

This study discusses the findings of the quantitative and qualitative research in detail in subsequent sections. The section presenting the results of the quantitative research discusses various aspects such as the profiles of the respondents, their housing conditions, educational attainment, labour force participation, and economic status. It also compares the Turkish and Syrian and non-Syrian migrant groups in terms of their Turkish language skills, social participation, satisfaction with their place of residence, perceptions of discrimination, and the ability to act independently in daily life. This section also examines the socio-economic profile of households, as the survey collected information on all household members. In addition, the data are analysed separately for each province where the fieldwork took place, highlighting any regional variations. The section presenting qualitative findings focus on migrants' and refugees' access to employment, housing, education and health; civil society's and municipalities' services geared towards them; and finally prejudices and discrimination towards migrants and refugees.

The key finding of this study is that, despite difficult living conditions, the migrant and refugee population in Turkey has become an integral part of the society. To explain this fundamental finding, it is necessary to look closely at both the quantitative and qualitative research findings.

According to the quantitative findings, both Syrians and non-Syrian migrants have high rates of labour force participation. Similar to the Turkish respondents, wages are the main source of income for Syrians and other migrants. However, the personal and household incomes of respondents from Turkey are significantly higher in comparison. The quantitative research showed that Syrian households have children attending school, but that the educational attainment of Syrian respondents is significantly lower than that of Turkish respondents. In terms of housing conditions, Syrians and other migrants were found to live in more precarious conditions than Turkish participants, with fewer rooms and inadequate levels of basic services. The average size of Syrian households is larger than that of Turkish households, while the average size of other migrant households is smaller, possibly reflecting the number of people who have migrated to Turkey for work.

In the study, Turkish respondents tended to give more negative answers to certain questions about life satisfaction, such as questions about the sense of belonging to the neighbourhood and the desire to continue living in Turkey. On the other hand, some respondents, including those among the Turkish and Syrian and other migrant populations, felt that they had been treated unfairly. However, there were differences in the areas in which Turkish respondents and migrants claimed to have experienced unfair treatment. In terms of independent mobility in daily life, both Turkish respondents and Syrians and other migrants faced challenges in a number of areas including finding employment, searching for rental property, and accessing healthcare services.

The focus of the qualitative research was on migrants and refugees. Interviews were conducted with representatives of various institutions in Gaziantep, Izmir, Mardin and Konya. In addition, interviews were conducted in Istanbul, the city with the highest population of migrants and refugees, to enhance the qualitative findings. The interviews not only validated

the findings of the quantitative research, but also provided insights into the underlying relationships and dynamics. A key finding highlights the role of prejudice and discrimination against migrants and refugees in contributing to unequal access to education and healthcare. This finding underlines that these prejudices have a significant impact alongside systemic issues. In the labour market, there is evidence that Syrians, Afghans, and other migrants are seen by employers as “cheap labour.” Many migrants work as low-paid and informal workers, while others have invested in Turkey and are engaged in activities such as manufacturing and wholesale trade. There are also individuals who are involved in small retail businesses. In terms of housing conditions, it was observed that in all five cities migrants and refugees tended to find housing in areas that were dilapidated or offered low rents. They typically live in residential areas close to their places of work.

The legal statuses of migrants and refugees in these areas determines their access to services, employment, and housing conditions. This includes factors such as residence permits, temporary protection status, and applications for international protection. Civil society organisations play a critical role in facilitating the social integration of migrants. The activities and capacities of CSOs working with migrants and refugees are closely linked to the level of financial support they can secure. Local authorities are another important actor in the social integration of migrants, but their activities are also influenced by legislation and the availability of resources. The provision of services to migrants by both CSOs and local authorities is closely linked to the legal status of migrants.

Another important finding of the qualitative research is the pervasive and sometimes institutionalised discrimination that cuts across all these areas. Discrimination remains a major obstacle to the social integration of migrants, significantly affecting their ability to participate fully in society and reducing the quality of their participation. It could be considered as one of the main barriers to achieving social cohesion.

Introduction

This study presents the findings of the “Migration and Social Participation in Turkey” project, which was carried out in 2022 using a mixed-methods approach. Before discussing the content of the study, it is important to understand the background to the study. Turkey is currently the largest refugee host country in the world and is home to probably around six million migrants and refugees. However, despite being a country of migration, quantitative data on refugees¹ and migrants in Turkey is very scarce. For this very reason, stereotypes rather than scientific data dominate the public discourse on the extent of migrants’ and refugees’ participation in the country’s social life. However, at a time when socio-economic inequalities are widening and anti-migrant rhetoric is on the rise, it is also important to emphasise that social participation is not just a matter for migrants. It is a critical issue for everyone in society, migrants and natives² alike.

Turkey as a country of migration

Turkey is home to some 3.35 million Syrians under temporary protection (“TP”), around 1.3 million foreigners with short-term, student, or family residence permits (GİB, 2023a), more than 300,000 asylum-seekers and people under international protection (refugees) (UNHCR, 2023), and an estimated several hundred thousand irregular migrants who have entered Turkey for work or in transit to European Union (EU) countries. In addition to these groups, there are at least 224,000 Syrians who have acquired Turkish citizenship (İçişleri Bakanlığı, 2022). In total, there are around 5.5-6 million migrants and refugees living in Turkey. By the end of 2022, these migrants and refugees made up an estimated 6.5-7% of Turkey’s total population of 85.28 million. In other words, Turkey is a country of migration, particularly characterised as a country of forced migration. Even before and after the establishment of the Republic, Turkey has witnessed significant – and often forced – population movements that have shaped the country through migration (Erder, 2018).³ Looking at the post-World War II period, the Muslim migrants who arrived from the Balkans in the 1950s, the Turks who fled political repression in Bulgaria in 1989-90, the rural-urban migration that began in the 1950s, and the forced migration of Kurds to the cities and the western part of the country during the conflict-ridden period of the 1990s represent different stages of this migration history.⁴ Since the 1980s, events such as the Iranian revolution, the Iran-Iraq war, the occupation of Afghanistan, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US invasion of Iraq, and civil wars and poverty in some sub-Saharan African

1 In this study, persons from other countries residing in Turkey are referred to as migrants and refugees. Refugee status is defined in international law. However, there are millions of people who have fled their countries due to persecution and mass violence, but who have not applied for or received refugee status. The Republic of Turkey adjudicates applications for international protection from groups seeking refuge in Turkey due to persecution in accordance with the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees, to which Turkey is a party. However, refugees who come from outside European borders and apply for international protection status are subject to the geographical restriction imposed by Turkey on the Convention and its 1967 Protocol. As a result, they must wait for resettlement in third countries, even if they are granted international protection. Since 2014, Syrians fleeing the war have been granted temporary protection status. There are also Syrians who have acquired Turkish citizenship, while others live in Turkey with valid residence permits. On the other hand, there are many irregular migrants from various countries in Turkey, some of whose applications for international protection have been rejected or who may have never been able to apply for it. In this study, the terms “migrants” and “refugees” are used interchangeably, regardless of how individuals arrived in Turkey and their status under international and national law. In other words, the term “refugee” is employed in its broader sociological meaning rather than in its limited legal definition.

2 In this study, persons who hold citizenship of the Republic of Turkey are referred to as “Turkish nationals” or “natives.” Although the term “native” implies being a local of a place, we do not intend to imply a sense of belonging by using this word interchangeably with the term “Turkish national.”

3 During the territorial losses of the Ottoman Empire, Muslim communities fled to Anatolia, while Christian groups were forced to leave the region in the early twentieth century. In addition, during the 1923 Turkish–Greek Population Exchange, hundreds of thousands of Orthodox and Muslim people were forced to move to Greece and Turkey, respectively.

4 On the other hand, labour migration to Europe in the 1960s and political asylum-seeking after 1980 continued unabated.

countries have made Turkey a destination or transit point for irregular labour migration, transit migrants, and refugees. However, the mass influx following the outbreak of the civil war in Syria in 2011 has led to an unprecedented increase in the number of persons seeking asylum.

During the 2000s, Turkey's relationship with the EU had a significant impact on migration management due to the country's involvement in accession and membership negotiations. The Law on Foreigners and International Protection ("LFIP"), enacted in 2013, has had a significant impact on legislation related to migration management (HBSD, 2019). The "Turkey-European Union Readmission Agreement" was signed in 2014. The "EU-Turkey Deal," signed in 2016, had a significant impact on migration management and became an important document concerning irregular migrants and refugees. The year 2016 marked the fifth year of the Syrian civil war, leading to the recognition of the permanence of the Syrian refugee phenomenon and Turkey's commitment to keep Syrians and other refugees and irregular migrants within its borders in exchange for a series of promised financial supports from the EU (GAR, 2021). Since then, numerous initiatives have been launched in various fields to help integrate refugees and migrants in Turkey, and efforts to collect statistical and academic data on the issue have gained traction. Thus, while Turkey has always been a country of immigration, in the last decade we have begun to discuss the harmonisation (or integration) of migrants (see Erder, 2020). However, it cannot be said that a comprehensive and sustainable set of policies for the integration of migrants and refugees has been established. Nevertheless, there are researchers who state the existence of de facto integration policies (Rottmann, 2020) and argue that migrants are to some extent integrated into society (Şahin Mencütek et al., 2023).

Quantitative data on migrants and refugees

Since 2016, a considerable amount of research has been conducted on the topic of the social integration of migrants and refugees, with a particular focus on Syrians. Some of these studies present findings based on qualitative data and/or investigate public policies concerning integration (e.g., Akcin et al., 2020; Danış and Dikmen, 2022; Özçürümez and İçduygu, 2020; Rottmann, 2020; Şahin Mencütek et al., 2023; Şimşek & Çorabatır, 2016; Şimşek, 2018, 2021). However, researchers are confronted with a challenge when analysing numerical data on social cohesion. There is no sufficient and reliable data available regarding the numbers of refugees and migrants in Turkey, as well as their distribution across provinces and their demographic and socio-economic characteristics. The Presidency of Migration Management ("GİB") website statistics, which are updated monthly and include Syrians with temporary protection status, applications for international protection, and foreign nationals living in the country with residence permits, are the most significant official data sources in this area. The GİB, however, does not provide a breakdown by provinces or borders but instead reports the total number of apprehended irregular migrants on a monthly and annual basis. Another important source of official data on foreign nationals living in Turkey is the tables compiled by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat) from the Address-Based Population Registration System (ABPRS). The annual data provided by TurkStat reveals the total number of residence permit holders and individuals with international protection identity but excludes Syrians with temporary protection status. Furthermore, TurkStat does not distinguish between residence permits and international protection applications in its data. The latest data published by TurkStat in 2022 reflects the figures from

2021. In addition to these sources, the Ministry of Labour and Social Security publishes annual statistics that provide information on the number and nationalities of foreign nationals holding work permits. As it is evident, there is a notable dearth of official data, and the data published by various institutions may not be consistent with each other. For instance, TurkStat's data incorporates individuals with international protection identity cards, which results in inconsistencies with the overall number of residence permits provided by the GİB. Additionally, the GİB provides annual figures for international protection applications but does not disclose the total number of applicants or status holders.

TurkStat does not directly collect data on socio-economic issues related to migrants and refugees. Specifically, while the Household Labour Force Survey, the Income and Living Conditions Survey, and the Household Budget Survey collect data on foreign nationals registered in the ABPRS or individuals with temporary protection status, the disclosed data does not include a breakdown by migration status.⁵

A further area where official data is not available is the number of individuals who have acquired Turkish citizenship and how they are distributed throughout the country. This topic has been a subject of significant debate, particularly in the context of general elections. There is limited data available on this matter, with only one research study utilising TurkStat's "birth-places by residence provinces" data to derive estimates (Dündar, 2023).

Yet, despite the limited availability of data collected or disclosed by official institutions, there are two significant research studies that have the potential to provide statistical representation for all Syrians in Turkey. One notable set of studies is the "Syrian Barometers" conducted by Prof. Dr. Murat Erdoğan, with the support of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (Erdoğan, 2020; 2021; 2022). The findings of these studies are based on quantitative surveys conducted with samples of both Turkish citizens and Syrians with temporary protection status, as well as focus groups involving Turkish and Syrian participants. The surveys include questions for Turkish citizens regarding their attitudes and perceptions towards Syrians and other refugees. Additionally, there are questions specifically for Syrians, which inquire about their thoughts on Turkey, their attitudes towards Turkish citizens, and their socio-economic situations.

Another important research study (HIPS, 2019) focuses on the use of the 2018 Turkish Demographic and Health Survey ("TNSA") to examine a sample population of Syrians who have been granted temporary protection status. The TNSA, which is conducted every five years by the Hacettepe Institute of Population Studies (HIPS), included Syrians for the first time in 2018. This study provides critical details on the demographic characteristics, employment, education, and health status of Syrians, allowing comparisons with the TNSA data collected from Turkish citizens. The Syrian Barometer and the TNSA Syrian Migrant Sample are similar in that they both focus exclusively on Syrians and build their samples using data on the distribution of Syrians at the district and neighbourhood level, obtained from government agencies. These data are not available to other researchers.

⁵ A study by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) estimates the number and employment status of Syrians in the labour force based on microdata from the Household Labour Force Survey conducted by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat). The ILO study says that TurkStat's microdata cover people who arrived in Turkey after 2011, including Syrians born abroad. Based on this information, researchers have made extrapolations about the labour status of Syrians (Pinedo Caro, 2020). It should be noted that Syrians have been represented in the sample of the TurkStat Household Labour Force Survey since 2017.

Rationale for the research

The Turkey Migration and Social Participation Project emerged out of the realisation that there is a scarcity of quantitative data on the integration of migrants and refugees in Turkey. The concept of conducting a quantitative research study on the integration of migrants and refugees in Turkey was developed and transformed into a research design through a series of discussions which took place in 2021 among the research team members, managers from the Heinrich Böll Stiftung Turkey Representation (HBSD), and other researchers.

Before conducting research on migrant integration, or “uyum” (harmonisation or cohesion) as it is referred to in Turkish, a conceptual definition was required. However, the concept of “integration” is widely debated and subject to criticism. There was also uncertainty regarding the accuracy of the concept of “migrant integration” in snapping the essence of “uyum” or social integration as understood in English. In addition, it was recognised that “migrant integration” is not synonymous with “social integration,” which is a fundamental sociological concept. Hence, it was necessary to engage in a conceptual exploration and discussion prior to commencing the research.

To this end, a group of migration researchers from Turkey and Germany convened in an online workshop organised by HBSD in June 2021. The discussions that took place during this workshop played an important role in shaping the conceptualisation and sampling design that we subsequently preferred to use in our research. To summarise the two conclusions we reached: We first agreed that integration should be a concept that covers all migrants and natives, not just one particular group. This is because contemporary societies are marked by difference, conflict, and polarisation rather than “harmonisation.” Secondly, in quantitative research we had to define how the sample would be constructed, i.e., which natives would be compared with which migrants. Assuming that their socio-economic conditions are comparable, we decided to sample from districts and communities where natives, migrants and refugees live together. Designing the sample in this way meant that the study focused on working class neighbourhoods where people with low- to mid-level incomes live. Therefore, the study does not include people with higher socio-economic status. We think it is important to take a conceptual detour to explain how we arrived at these choices.

Conceptual background

The concept of migrant integration has been a topic of discussion and study in social science and policy for many years, particularly in North America and Western Europe. In a nutshell, migrant integration is “the process by which migrants become accepted members of society.” According to Penninx and Garces-Mascareñas (2016), this process involves newcomers settling into a community, engaging with the host society, and the subsequent social changes that occur because of migration. Although there are numerous classifications, this process can be divided into three dimensions: legal-political, socio-economic, and cultural. Moreover, it is a bidirectional process, affecting both migrants and host societies. Contrary to the assumption of assimilation theory, which assumes a unidirectional adaptation by migrants, according to this conceptualisation there is no homogeneous host society to which migrants integrate in a unidirectional and linear way. There are structural inequalities and cultural differences within the host society itself (Penninx and Garces-Mascareñas, 2016).

While this definition sounds appealing, it is a challenge to operationalise the concept of integration as a bidirectional and multidimensional process. Thus, the conceptual debate on migrant integration still lingers. One criticism of the concept of integration is that despite acknowledging integration as a bidirectional process, some studies remain too close to the concept of assimilation, which presupposes a unidirectional and linear process. Should integration be treated in a similar manner to assimilation, it would then entail expecting migrants to become increasingly similar to the mainstream society or even assimilate within it. The assimilation theory, which emerged in sociological research in the early 20th century in the USA, has two problematic aspects: First, only migrants were expected to “adapt,” with the assumption that the host society would remain unchanged. Second, the target community to which migrants were expected to adapt was a mainstream society, determined by social scientists and policy makers. This traditionally meant white middle-class Americans. There are still criticisms of the continued use of the concept of migrant integration in this manner today (Favell, 2019).

A further significant criticism is related to the core concept of “society” as utilised in integration studies. The idea of social integration or social cohesion predates the study of migration and can be found in Emile Durkheim’s sociology (Favell, 2019). Durkheim’s structural-functionalist sociological theory perceived society as an organic whole and prophesied that the “organs” that make up this whole would function harmoniously together. Drawing on the structural-functionalist theoretical approach, Niklas Luhmann (2001) introduced the concept of “system integration,” which is stripped of cultural characteristics. His theory of functional structural systems explained how systems include (Inklusion) or exclude individuals based on characteristics, thereby contributing a significant perspective to discussions on migrant integration.

If we trace the genealogy of the concept of social integration or migrant integration, we immediately notice that the moment nation-states designate their own citizens, they also define those who fall outside of this scope. That is, the very identification of the excluded also contributes to the homogenisation of the insiders. Hence, the concept of migrant integration becomes not about the integration of constituent components with each other, but rather refers to the integration of individual migrants into the redefined construct of “society” (Schinkel, 2018). In this scenario, a distinction is also made between the objects of integration (such as migrants, ethnic minorities, etc.) and those who do not require integration (namely, the mainstream host society). According to this critical perspective, “society” is treated as a unified entity without any issues, whereas migrants and ethnic groups are viewed as “problematic” population groups.

Another criticism of integration studies is the assumption that both the “local” society and migrants are homogeneous groups. On the contrary, there are additional layers that can be expressed through different sociological concepts within both migrant communities and the locals (Dahinden, 2016). Some of the key axes of this stratification are social class, gender, the rural-urban divide, ethnicity, etc.

The understanding of local society and migrant communities as homogeneous groups and natural analytical categories is somewhat related to integration as a policy concept and tool. One example of studies commissioned by public institutions in the EU are reports that aim to “measure” the level of integration of migrants in a country. Such reports analyse the trends of

divergence or convergence between the local community and migrant communities in relation to different socio-economic or socio-cultural variables (Favell, 2019). One example of such monitoring is the “integration monitors” that are conducted at regular intervals at the state level in Germany. These studies begin with the “common basic principles for migrant integration policy” established by the EU in 2004. These principles have been further elaborated in different policy documents (Council of the European Union, 2004). The policy priorities for integration, as identified later, include education, integration into the labour market, access to basic services such as housing and healthcare, and active participation and social inclusion (European Commission, 2016). The “key indicators” for integration, which were initiated in 2010, cover four main areas: employment, education, social inclusion, and active citizenship.

The report published by the State of Hessen is one of these integration monitors (HMSAI, 2020). The Hessen Integration Monitor examines statistical data comparing ‘persons of migrant origin’ and ‘persons of non-migrant origin’ in areas such as education and employment, housing, health, active citizenship and crime, language, and sense of belonging (HMSAI, 2020). The Hessen Integration Monitor also compares data on attitudes (e.g., sense of belonging, perceived discrimination, attitudes towards religious diversity, political interest, etc.) and behaviours (e.g., use of the German language, voluntary service, convicts and suspects, number of children per woman, etc.).

However, reports such as the Hessen Integration Monitor have been criticised for comparing migrants and non-migrants on the basis of averages and for including questions on normative issues.

How is the integration of migrants defined in Turkey? Article 96⁶ of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection regulates “uyum.” The same term is also used in the Presidency of Migration Management’s Harmonisation Strategy and Action Plan (GİB, 2018). On the GİB’s website, the said term is defined as a “*voluntary policy* that aims to contribute to the socio-cultural and economic development of *both the foreigner and the host society*, ensuring the integration of migrants into the host society and enabling foreigners to realise their abilities in all spheres of life, including the economic, social, and cultural domains, without being assimilationist” (GİB, 2023b). The terms “non-assimilationist” and “voluntary” reflect the official view in Turkey that migrant integration in Europe is assimilationist and imposed on Turkish migrants (Şahin Mencütek et al., 2023). Indeed, under the coordination of the GİB and sometimes with the support of the UNHCR, integration training programs based on voluntary participation are organised for Syrian individuals under temporary protection status, sometimes directly by provincial migration authorities and sometimes by national or local civil society organisations (CSOs).⁷

⁶ Article 96(1) of the Law (LFIP, 2013) assigns specific responsibilities to the relevant units of the Presidency for Migration Management. However, the law does not provide a precise definition of “harmonisation.” Paragraphs (2) and (3) address, on the other hand, integration courses that migrants can attend: “(1) The General Directorate may, within the limits of the economic and financial resources of the country, plan adaptation activities, using the proposals and contributions of public institutions and organisations, local administrations, civil society organisations, universities, and international organisations, to facilitate the mutual adaptation of the foreigner, applicant or holder of international protection status to society in our country and to provide them with the knowledge and skills that will enable them to act independently in all areas of social life in our country, in the country of resettlement or in their country of return, without the mediation of third parties.”

⁷ See, *inter alia*, GİB, 2023c, “Harmonisation Activities,” <https://www.goc.gov.tr/uyum-faaliyetleri> (Date Accessed: 03.07.2023)

While the term “uyum” is translated into English as “harmonisation” in legislative texts, we see that the term “social cohesion” is used in English versions of UNHCR documents and the Syria Barometers supported by UNHCR. In any case, considering both the Turkish and English connotations, we can say that this concept assumes the attainability of “social integration,” implying that both the local and migrant communities can resemble each other and can achieve cohesion within themselves and with each other.

In summary, the definition of “integration” as it relates to policy in the EU is still up for debate, but it is not sufficiently defined under Turkish law. The aim of our research was two-fold: to contribute to filling the gap in empirical information on migration in Turkey and to address and overcome existing criticisms of the concepts of integration and harmony while taking them into consideration.

In designing this research, we therefore based it on the following principles:

- Neither Turkish society nor the migrants and refugees living in Turkey are homogeneous entities. Both the native population and the migrants/refugees are made up of diverse groups with unique cultural and ethnic traits.
- Integration, harmony or social inclusion, or whatever term we choose, should not be characterised as the assimilation of one group into another or as a process of “melting into one pot” based on normative values.
- In our modern society, characterised by intricate diversities, inequalities, and conflicts, the aim of integration or harmony should be to ensure that everyone has equal access to rights, public services, and opportunities.
- Research on integration or harmony should pursue a rights-based approach.

Based on these fundamental principles, we considered the following in the research design:

- *Social Participation:* To steer clear of conceptual debates, we named the study “Migration and Social Participation in Turkey.” Our objective was not to measure the “integration” of one group into another or into a presumptive social whole, but rather to collect information on the “extent” to which individuals and groups participate in education, housing, employment, and access to rights, public services, and market regulations.

In this study, we only discuss the social participation of natives, migrants, and refugees. International instruments dealing with refugees propose three durable solutions: integration, voluntary repatriation in safety and dignity, and resettlement in a third country. While some studies consider the integration of migrants and that of refugees as separate issues, this is not our position. Forced migration and labour migration may be analytically and conceptually distinguished, but the same may be difficult to do empirically. We have therefore chosen to use a single conceptual framework.

- *Sampling design:* In the context of quantitative research, we have developed a sampling design that includes three distinct groups: natives, Syrians, and other (also called non-Syr-

ians in this study) migrants. In contrast to some quantitative studies that focus mainly on Syrians, our study also includes non-Syrian migrants and refugees in Turkey. As highlighted in many sections of this study, most integration programmes and initiatives funded by the EU primarily target Syrians (and sometimes also those with international protection applications or status). Turkey has a significant population of foreign residents, with at least 1.3 million people holding valid residence permits. In addition, there are several hundred thousand people living in the country without proper documentation. Some of these people have been living in Turkey for a number of years and intend to remain. They should therefore be included in the concept of social participation. Due to the lack of data on “other migrants,” such as those with a residence permit, those under international protection, and irregular migrants, categorised by nationality and province of residence, we were not able to further differentiate this diverse group in the sampling design. Our aim was to use survey questions to collect data on the diversity within this group. Furthermore, to select samples for Syrians and other migrants, we set the criteria for research participation as individuals who arrived in Turkey after 2010. Please refer to the methodology section for detailed information.

Nevertheless, our tri-cluster sampling can be interpreted as separating natives on the one hand and migrants and refugees on the other, despite our criticism of this distinction. However, based on the fact that we live in a classed and stratified society, we have chosen three samples that can be compared in terms of their socio-spatial characteristics. We specifically collected the three samples from neighbourhoods that have a significant population of Syrians. The only exception to this rule was in Van province, where the survey was conducted solely among natives and other migrants, as there is no significant Syrian population in that area. In terms of social class or socioeconomic status, the samples of locals, Syrians, and other migrants were similar to each other. To clarify, our study did not involve comparing the “average” of the local community with the “average” of migrants, which has been criticised in current scholarship.

In the present study, however, the quantitative research findings are presented by categorising the respondents as natives, Syrians, and other migrants. Nonetheless, the collected data forms a dataset that can be analysed using independent variables on socio-economic status, socio-spatial status and education. Utilising this dataset in future research can facilitate the exploration of a wide range of research questions. For instance, one can investigate the factors contributing to inequalities in access to services and rights, irrespective of migration status, by considering independent variables such as city of residence, gender, education, or income.

- *Designing the quantitative questionnaire:* Before designing a fully structured questionnaire for quantitative research, we reviewed studies such as the Syrians Barometer and the TNSA Syrian Migrants Sample. In addition, we reviewed questionnaires from other research initiatives on integration in European nations, including the Hessen State Integration Monitor, as well as studies conducted in the United States. In our research, we primarily focused on “social participation” and therefore to a large extent chose to exclude questions on normative attitudes, as we believed they carried subjective value

judgments. This is because queries such as “sense of belonging to the host country” imply that migrants are the only group that must adapt. Additionally, we did not incorporate inquiries regarding the perceptions and attitudes of both locals and migrants towards one another in the questionnaire. In addition to the Syrians Barometer, other studies are available on that topic (e.g., Morgül et al., 2021). The questionnaire’s attitude questions focused primarily on opinions regarding the living environment and future plans.

A key feature of the quantitative research is that the social participation of natives, Syrians, and other migrants is examined using the same fully structured questionnaire. The only exception is that questions regarding Turkish language proficiency were exclusively posed to migrants and refugees. This decision was made because, as stated previously, we insist that social participation must be inclusive of the entire population. In a society where socio-economic inequality is growing, a sense of social justice is eroding, and social polarisation is intensifying, the issues we address affect everyone, not just only migrants or only natives.

- *Designing the qualitative research:* To contextualise the quantitative data and comprehend the underlying reasons for the findings, the research also includes a qualitative component. Interviews were conducted with representatives of institutions working on education, employment, healthcare, and access to rights and services in the five cities, as well as with experts working in these disciplines. The interviews primarily focused on inquiring about the situation of migrants and refugees, including their access to rights and services. While some interviews did gather information about the conditions of natives in their respective regions, the main focus of the qualitative research was on migrants and refugees. While this could be a limitation in terms of research scope, it enabled the collection of rich data on the research topics.

Plan of the study

This study presents the findings of the “Migration and Social Participation Study.” The research includes both a quantitative dimension, which involved collecting extensive data, and a qualitative dimension, which involved obtaining in-depth data. The fieldwork for the research, which was commissioned by HBSD, was conducted from June to October 2022.

In the quantitative study, a fully structured questionnaire was used to conduct surveys with one person aged 18 to 49 in 3,866 households in 17 provinces. The sample included 1,933 locals, 1,423 Syrians, and 506 migrants from other nations. The survey collected data from both the respondents and the households they lived in. A questionnaire with 63 questions was administered in a total of 39 neighbourhoods spanning 17 provinces. These provinces included 16 provinces, clustered into three based on the proportion of Syrians with temporary protection status in their population plus Van. The design of the sample at this stage and the demographic characteristics of the sample are discussed in detail in the following section.

The section of the study that presents the findings of the quantitative research contains analyses of the profile of respondents, their labour force participation and economic conditions,

educational attainment, social participation, access to basic needs, interest in political life, and their ability to act independently in daily life.

For the qualitative study, four cities were selected from the sixteen provinces, which were divided into three clusters based on the proportion of the Syrian population. Gaziantep and Mardin were selected for the first cluster, Konya for the second cluster and Izmir for the third cluster. Data on employment, housing, educational attainment, health care, access to urban and public services, and experiences of unjust treatment in everyday life for both migrants and natives were collected through interviews with representatives of institutions that have knowledge, experience, and observations of economic and social life in these cities. In addition to these four cities, experts in Istanbul were interviewed to enhance the quality of the qualitative data. A total of 72 interviews were conducted using semi-structured questionnaires.

The section of this study which presents the findings of the qualitative research examines the labour force participation of migrants and refugees, housing, educational attainment, healthcare, the services provided to them by civil society organisations, and issues of discrimination. The conclusion section presents the main findings from both the quantitative and qualitative research, along with a set of policy recommendations concerning social participation.

QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH

Methodology

Establishing the sample and its provincial distribution

There are several challenges in establishing the required sampling frames for designing a quantitative study on both Syrians under temporary protection (TP) status and refugees who have applied for or been granted international protection (IP), as well as regular and irregular migrants in Turkey. The most significant among these are the discrepancy between the number of Syrians, who constitute the largest migrant group in Turkey, and those registered under temporary protection status by the Presidency of Migration Management (GİB) and the lack of statistical data on the spatial distribution of Syrians at sub-provincial scales.⁸ While the GİB's data reflects Syrians under temporary protection, the residency data in the *Address-Based Population Registration System* (ABPRS) is on migrants with residence permits and those who have IP applications and/or status who have registered at specific addresses through a civil registry. Moreover, the ABPRS data is not publicly available or available to researchers due to several cited security concerns. In fact, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), in its 2019 research conducted in Istanbul, suggested a higher number of Syrians in Istanbul, compared to official data, based on fieldwork carried out in the city's districts. According to the IOM's estimates, as of the summer of 2019, there were 621,320 Syrians registered under TP in Istanbul. However, they estimated that there were 963,536 Syrians residing in Istanbul during the said period based on their fieldwork (IOM, 2019). On the other hand, data on the numbers and spatial distribution of irregular migrants remains extremely limited. Thus, the absence of a sampling framework stands out as the most significant challenge in conducting a quantitative survey on migrants and refugees in Turkey.

The Syrian migrant sample frame and its provincial distribution

In the *Turkish Demographic and Health Survey: The Syrian Sample 2018* (TNSA), conducted by Hacettepe University's Institute of Population Studies (HIPS), the problem of the sampling frame was also articulated, and a method was developed to establish an acceptable sampling frame in the absence of one (HIPS, 2019). Due to the need to protect the confidentiality of the data on the Syrian population in Turkey maintained by the GİB, it was not possible to use the individual addresses of Syrians in Turkey to establish a sampling frame. Therefore, the sampling frame for Syrian households in the TNSA 2018 survey was designed based on the population size of Syrians in neighbourhoods (*mahalle*), the smallest administrative unit in Turkey (HIPS, 2019). GİB supplied the number of Syrians living under TP by neighbourhood to HIPS. In the HIPS study, by excluding individuals without neighbourhood, district, or provincial registration records, the official number of Syrians under TP in Turkey on October 23, 2018, which was 3,578,820, was reduced to 2,088,346. Using the same proportion for the purposes of the present study, the official Syrian population under TP in

⁸ This study uses the terms 'Syrians under temporary protection (TP) status', 'Syrians', 'Syrian migrants', and 'Syrian refugees' interchangeably. Not all Syrians residing in Turkey are under TP, some have no status, some are living with resident permits, and finally some have already obtained Turkish citizenship; these are the reasons behind employing multiple terminologies. However, as Syrians in Turkey fled their country of origin due to the conflict, they are primarily refugees.

January 2022, which was 3,736,091, was reduced to 2,168,634. It is important to note that Syrians residing in temporary accommodation centres (also known as “camps”) were treated as a separate stratum within these figures.

HIPS devised a second approach for the selection of neighbourhoods in the target provinces for the study. According to this approach, each neighbourhood to be included in the study should have at least 20 Syrian households and at least five Syrian households per every 100 households registered in ABPRS. Additionally, threshold values were established. Neighbourhoods with less than 500 Syrian residents and neighbourhoods with a ratio of Syrian residents to ABPRS-registered residents of less than 5% were excluded from the main framework. Consequently, the sampling frame was reduced to 1,110,339 individuals. According to this methodology, the TNSA 2018 sample of Syrian households in Turkey consisted of 759 neighbourhoods and 13 temporary accommodation centres. In 2018, at least one neighbourhood in 24 provinces of Turkey’s 81 provinces hosted more than 500 Syrian residents (HIPS, 2019, p. 162, Table A1 and Table A2). From these 24 provinces, 759 neighbourhoods in which at least 5% of the households were Syrian compared to all registered households were selected as the sampling frame for the HIPS study.

According to GİB data, the number of Syrians with TP status in Turkey increased by approximately 4% between October 23, 2018, and January 20, 2022, from 3,578,820 to 3,736,091. Although this caused some increase in the number of Syrians who lived in the TNSA 2018 study’s provinces and neighbourhoods, it was acceptable from the perspective of the present study’s margin of error. The sampling frame for this research project, “Migration and Social Inclusion in Turkey,” conducted in 2022, was based on the 759 neighbourhoods used in the TNSA 2018 Syrian Sample. In addition, the selection of provinces for the study was based on population density aggregation and geographical representation, considering the population of Syrians in January 2022 (excluding temporary accommodation centres). This provided an additional basis for the sampling frame, leading to the development of a sampling scale based on the number of neighbourhoods adopted in the TNSA 2018 Syrian Sample study.

Within this framework, the quantitative research sample for the “Migration and Social Participation in Turkey Project” was constructed in five stages as explained below.

Stage 1: Clustering of provinces by the ratio of Syrian population they host

The provinces hosting Syrians under TP in January 2022 were clustered into three groups based on GİB data:

The first cluster consisted of provinces where the number of migrants was 10% or more of the provincial population. Seven provinces were clustered in this group. These provinces, along with their respective Syrian population ratios, are as follows: Kilis (75.5%), Hatay (26.2%), Gaziantep (22.0%), Şanlıurfa (20.2%), Mersin (13.5%), Adana (11.4%), and Mardin (10.7%).

The second cluster included provinces where the number of Syrians under TP was between 5% and 9.99% of the provincial population. Five provinces were clustered in this group.

These provinces, along with their respective Syrian population ratios, are as follows: Kahramanmaraş (8.2%), Osmaniye (7.8%), Bursa (6.0%), Kayseri (5.9%), and Konya (5.5%).

The third cluster consisted of provinces where the number of migrants ranged from 1% to 4.99% of the provincial population. Twenty-four provinces were clustered in this group. These provinces, along with their respective Syrian migrant population ratios, are as follows: Nevşehir (4.4%), Adıyaman (3.6%), Malatya (3.9%), İstanbul (3.5%), İzmir (3.4%), Burdur (3.2%), Kocaeli (2.8%), Şırnak (2.7%), Batman (2.5%), Elazığ (2.2%), Niğde (1.9%), Isparta (1.8%), Hakkari (1.8%), Afyon (1.7%), Yalova (1.5%), Bolu (1.4%), Siirt (1.4%), Muğla (1.3%), Denizli (1.3%), Diyarbakır (1.3%), Ankara (1.3%), Sakarya (1.3%), Yozgat (1.3%), and Tekirdağ (1.1%).

Stage 2: Associating clustered provinces with the TNSA 2018 sample

The number of Syrians living outside the temporary accommodation centres identified in the TNSA 2018 and registered to an address was provided by GİB. As indicated above, applying the proportion of individuals without neighbourhood, district, or provincial registration records in the official number of Syrians under TP in Turkey, it was estimated that there was an officially resident population in January 2022 of 2,168,684. When this system of proportioning was applied to the provinces clustered into three groups, the following numbers emerged.

In January 2022, the official number of Syrians under TP in the first cluster of seven provinces was 2,015,934. When this number was proportioned to the total number of Syrians with residency registration (i.e., 2,168,684 among the total population of 3,736,091), the number of Syrians with residency registration in the first cluster was 1,170,159 out of a total of 2,015,934. When this figure is divided by the average household size of Syrian households in the TNSA 2018 survey (HIPS, 2019), which was established as 6, *the estimated population in the first cluster of 7 provinces was 195,026 households*. In the second cluster of 5 provinces, as per the calculation method explained above, the number of Syrians under TP with residency registration was 306,452 and *the estimated population was 51,075 households*. Finally, in the third cluster of 24 provinces, the number of Syrians under TP with residency registration was 632,680 and *the estimated population was 105,446 households*.

In the second stage of stratified sampling, excluding provinces where the proportion of registered Syrians to the total population was less than 1%, there were a total of 351,547 households across the three clusters. At this point, an appropriate sample scale has been constructed within the sample frame of the 24 provinces in TNSA 2018, considering the number of neighbourhoods and provincial representation in the three clusters.

In the sampling process, some provinces that were excluded from the TNSA 2018 because they had fewer than 500 households were included in this study to ensure regional representation and representation of the clusters described below, considering the proportion of Syrians in each province's population.

Stage 3: Provincial distribution of the Syrian migrant sample

In the third stage, the provinces and samples where the fully structured questionnaires would be administered were identified by taking into consideration the number of neighbourhoods where the Syrian population resides as well as regional representation. However, as provinces in the first cluster, such as Kilis, Hatay, Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, Mersin, Adana, and Mardin, either border Syria or are adjacent to the border, regional representation was restricted to the South and South-Eastern Anatolia. Thus, the Syrian sample⁹ was determined as follows:

Within *the first cluster* of 7 provinces, i.e., Kilis, Hatay, Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, Mersin, Adana, and Mardin, a total of 527 questionnaires were administered in four selected provinces (Gaziantep, Hatay, Mardin, and Mersin) based on the criteria explained above. Additionally, within *the second cluster* of 5 provinces (Bursa, Kahramanmaraş, Kayseri, Konya, and Osmaniye), a total of 256 questionnaires were conducted by face-to-face interviewing technique in three selected provinces (Bursa, Kahramanmaraş, and Konya). Finally, in *the third cluster*, there were 24 provinces where 1-5% of the local population were Syrian migrants. Under TNSA 2018, neighbourhoods with fewer than 500 Syrian households were excluded from the survey. Consequently, 4 provinces (Muğla, Nevşehir, Tekirdağ, and Yalova) among the 9 provinces in the third cluster that were excluded from the TNSA 2018 sample but which had Syrian populations ranging from 1% to 5% were included in this survey to strengthen regional representation. A total of 644 questionnaires were administered throughout the third cluster's 9 chosen provinces.

In all clusters, the surveys were administered to Syrian individuals between the ages of 18 and 49, considering gender balance. Thus, part of the quantitative research on Syrians was conducted via face-to-face interviews in 38 neighbourhoods selected according to sampling in a total of 16 provinces from the three clusters, in 1,427 households.

Sample of Non-Syrian migrants and their provincial distribution

Stage 4 of the sampling process involved creating a sample of non-Syrian migrants. According to the data obtained during the research design phase, apart from Syrians, there were 1.3 million migrants of different nationalities living in Turkey on short-term or renewed residence permits, approximately 300,000 international protection applicants or status holders, and several hundred thousand irregular migrants whose exact numbers remain unknown. Determining a sample frame for a quantitative study on migrants residing in Turkey with a short-term residence permits and irregular migrants presents a greater level of difficulty. The GİB provides data solely on apprehended irregular migrants. Moreover, apart from their number, annual breakdown, and nationality, no other official data is available on this population. This is why academic research on irregular migrants and IOM's studies assert that these migrants are primarily in Turkey for two reasons, and that these two reasons are responsible for their concentration in certain cities. Thus, notwithstanding Syrians, these two migration purposes were adopted as criteria in establishing a sample of migrants with or without residence permits. The overwhelming majority of these migrants arrived in Turkey to work or to transit to another country. Those who entered Turkey for transiting purposes also must work until they

⁹ While the only data available is on Syrians under TP as provided by the GİB, the Syrian sample to which the quantitative questionnaire was applied included Syrians who are in Turkey with a residence permit or who do not have any legal status.

achieve this goal. Therefore, irregular migrants often concentrate in provinces where labour markets are favourable. On the other hand, border provinces stand out for the entrance of irregular migrants and the return of those who were apprehended. In light of these findings, the sample of irregular migrants includes those in Van, another border province that is not included in the sample of Syrian migrants, in addition to Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara, Bursa, Mersin, Gaziantep, Muğla, and Konya, which have large labour markets and offer regional representation and are included in the sample of Syrian migrants. In these provinces, the same questionnaire was administered to irregular migrants residing in the same neighbourhoods where Syrian and Turkish citizens were surveyed.

According to the official data accessed during the research design and sampling stage, approximately 67% of the registered migrant population in Turkey was comprised of Syrians under temporary protection status (3,737,000 in 2022), whereas the remaining 33% consisted of foreigners with a residence permit (1,315,181).¹⁰ Despite the absence of specific data on irregular migrants among non-Syrian migrants, their number is estimated to be in the range of several hundred thousand, as stated above. Thus, the ratio of non-Syrian migrants to Syrians was estimated to be 35.5% and were included in the sampling as such. Structured questionnaires were administered to Syrians residing in the 16 provinces outlined above and to non-Syrian migrants living in the 8+1 provinces. After considering the sample size of Syrians in 16 provinces and categorising migrants in Van, where Syrian migrants were not included in the sample, as 'non-Syrian', the sample size of non-Syrian migrants was determined as 506, corresponding to 35.5% of the Syrian sample size.¹¹ In the distribution of this number to provinces, the population of provinces were considered as an indicator of their labour market size. The total population of the 9 selected provinces was 37,620,582 as of January 2022. When this number is proportioned to the respective populations of these provinces, Istanbul accounts for 42%, Ankara for 16%, Izmir for 12%, Bursa for 0.8%, Konya for 0.6%, Mersin for 0.5%, Van for 0.3%, and Muğla for 0.3%. In accordance with these percentages, questionnaires were distributed to be administered to non-Syrian migrants.

Turkish citizens (natives) sample and provincial distribution of the total sample

Thus, a total of 1,933 questionnaires were administered to 1,427 Syrians and 506 non-Syrian migrants. The **fifth stage** of the sampling process was identifying a sample of Turkish citizens (also called natives in this study). As explained in the conceptual framework in the introduction section, the present research analyses the social participation of migrants in comparison with Turkish citizens residing in the same neighbourhoods. Therefore, the same number of questionnaires (1,933) was applied to natives in the 17 provinces and 39 neighbourhoods (Figure 1-4). In this framework, the total sample size of the migrant and Turkish citizen population residing in the 39 neighbourhoods (Table 1-2) of the 17 provinces (Gaziantep, Hatay, Mardin and Mersin; Bursa, Kahramanmaraş and Konya; Ankara, Denizli, Diyarbakır, Istanbul, Izmir, Bursa, Nevşehir, Tekirdağ and Yalova; Van) was 3,866 in total.

¹⁰ The numbers were taken from the GİB's website. See: <https://www.goc.gov.tr/ikamet-izinleri#>; <https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638>. The GİB's data on international protection applications were neglected in the proportioning as GİB does not provide the number of international protection applicants or status holders, but rather the number of applications by year.

¹¹ The other migrants sample includes international protection applicants or status holders, migrants living on a short-term residence permit, and those with no legal status (i.e., irregular migrants). The research has deliberately refrained from describing those residing in Turkey with a residence permit as "regular migrants" since migrants in this group may easily become irregular when their short-term residence permit expires or is not renewed.

Table 1. Provincial distribution of the total sample

Province	Frequency	Percentage
Ankara	334	8,6
Bursa	346	8,9
Tekirdağ	104	2,7
Istanbul	758	19,6
Izmir	280	7,2
Hatay	358	9,3
Gaziantep	438	11,3
Mardin	110	2,8
Mersin	259	6,7
Kahramanmaraş	105	2,7
Konya	201	5,2
Denizli	110	2,8
Diyarbakır	133	3,4
Nevşehir	110	2,8
Yalova	64	1,7
Van	30	0,8
Muğla	126	3,3


Figure 1. Distribution of sample by provinces

Figure 2. Distribution of the Turkish citizen sample by provinces




Figure 3. Distribution of the Syrian sample by provinces




Figure 4. Distribution of the non-Syrian migrants sample by provinces




Table 2. Distribution of the total sample by neighbourhoods

Province	District	Neighbourhood	Frequency
Ankara	Altındağ	Ulubey	37
Ankara	Altındağ	Battalgazi	297
Bursa	Yıldırım	Yavuz Selim	143
Bursa	Nilüfer	Fethiye	203
Denizli	Pamukkale	Karşıyaka	110
Diyarbakır	Bağlar	Beş Nisan (5 Nisan)	133
Gaziantep	Şahinbey	Cumhuriyet	23
Gaziantep	Şehitkamil	Değirmişem	42
Gaziantep	Şahinbey	Beydilli	44
Gaziantep	Şahinbey	İstiklal	63
Gaziantep	Şahinbey	Vatan	68
Gaziantep	Şahinbey	Bülbülzade	96
Gaziantep	Şahinbey	Güneş	102
Hatay	Reyhanlı	Yenişehir	21
Hatay	Kırıkhan	Barbaros	41
Hatay	Reyhanlı	Kurtuluş	43
Hatay	Antakya	Narlıca	97
Hatay	Antakya	Akasya	156
Istanbul	Fatih	Molla Gürani	70
Istanbul	Fatih	Akşemsettin	105
Istanbul	Sultanbeyli	Mecidiye	112
Istanbul	Esenyurt	Yeşilkent	191
Istanbul	Küçükçekmece	Mehmet Akif	280
Izmir	Konak	Birinci Kadriye	59
Izmir	Bornova	Mevlana	221
Kahramanmaraş	Dulkadiroğlu	Dulkadiroğlu	39
Kahramanmaraş	Onikişubat	Necip Fazıl	66
Konya	Karatay	Şemsitebrizi	73
Konya	Meram	Sahibiata	128
Mardin	Kızıltepe	Sevimli	110
Mersin	Akdeniz	Siteler	39
Mersin	Toroslar	Alsancak	51
Mersin	Mezitli	Fatih	64
Mersin	Akdeniz	Yenimahalle	105
Muğla	Seydikemer	Kumluova	126
Nevşehir	Merkez	350 evler	110
Tekirdağ	Çerkezköy	Bağlık	104
Van	İpekyolu	Şerefiye	30
Yalova	Gaziosmanpaşa	Bahçelievler	64

Design of fully structured questionnaires, data collection, and analysis techniques

In the field research, a fully structured questionnaire consisting of 63 closed-ended questions was administered to one individual aged 18-49 in each of the 3,866 households across 39 neighbourhoods in 17 provinces using a computer-assisted personal interviewing (CAPI) technique. It was sought to have an equal number of men and women participants. For the Syrian and non-Syrian migrant samples, an additional criterion of participation was to have arrived in Turkey after 2010. Thus, migrations before 2010 were excluded from the quantitative survey. One package of questions in the form queried the household profile, allowing the gathering of a dataset pertaining to 12,164 individuals residing in the 3,866 households, including 5,514 Syrian migrants, 1,179 non-Syrian migrants, and 5,471 natives.

The questionnaire was prepared in Turkish by the research team. During the preparation, quantitative studies on migrant integration in Europe and integration monitors in Germany (e.g., HMSAI, 2020) were examined and critical literature in this field were reviewed. For Turkey, the TNSA Syrian Sample (HIPS, 2019) and Syrian Barometers (Erdoğan, 2022) were specifically reviewed. The data collection was conducted by Akademetre Research and Strategic Planning, which also translated the questionnaire into Arabic and Farsi. The researchers conducted pilot interviews using the Turkish form, and a native Arabic-speaking PhD student and a native Farsi-speaking social scientist reviewed the Arabic and Farsi questionnaires for clarity and language several times. The three-language questionnaires were then finalised and made available for distribution. Akademetre gave a training to its interviewers on the content of the questionnaire and the issues to be considered during the field research. Following the implementation of the pilot, data collection took place between June 17 and August 10, 2022. Interviewers conversant in Arabic and Farsi administered questionnaires in those languages. In provinces such as Ankara, Bursa, Istanbul, Izmir, Nevşehir, and Yalova, the field team informed the researchers that migrants generally spoke Turkish, and therefore the questionnaires were administered in Turkish. In contrast, in provinces such as Hatay, Gaziantep, Mersin, Mardin, Konya, and Gaziantep, many questionnaires in the migrant samples were administered in Arabic or Farsi (or accompanied by an interpreter). In particular for the Syrian sample, the field team included female interviewers, who spoke with female respondents. The Ethics Committee approval for the study was obtained from Istanbul Kent University's Ethics Committee (date: June 2, 2022, no: 6).

The questionnaire was designed to assess the social participation of both migrant and Turkish citizen participants. The questionnaire was divided into eight packages on the following topics: participant profile; satisfaction with life in Turkey and experiences and perceptions of unfair treatment; ability to communicate in Turkish (only for Syrians and non-Syrian migrants); economic status; interest in politics; social participation; the state of being able to act independently in daily life; and household profile. The first seven distinct inquiry packages consisted of questions for individual participants encompassing a range of topics including participant profile, labour force participation, economic status, social participation, access to education, access to social security, interest in politics, ability to act independently in daily

life, and access to housing and necessities. An eighth questionnaire package included inquiries regarding household members' birthplaces, citizenships or nationalities, genders, ages, educational attainment, labour force participation, and possession of social security benefits.

The sample had a 95% confidence level, corresponding to a margin of error of 1.42%. The data were analysed with SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) software, version 25. If every question on the questionnaire was answered in full, the questionnaire was considered valid. The data on the social participation of the Turkish citizen and migrant participants were compared using descriptive analyses (frequency distributions, means), and the results were presented through tables and graphs. Cross-tabulations were used to examine the associations between variables. Several queries were recoded to enhance the readability of the tables. During the recoding process, frequency distributions and commonly accepted social science analyses were considered. In queries where multiple responses were permitted, the analyses focused primarily on the response rate. When analysing data with multiple response options, it is possible to generate frequency and percentage tables by cases and responses. If at least one individual provided multiple responses during an analysis based on participants/cases, the cumulative percentage may exceed 100%. When analysing the percentage of responses, however, the distribution will always sum to 100%. The second method, analysing the proportion of responses, was chosen because it provides a more transparent and straightforward interpretation for tabulation and presentation.

Limitations of the quantitative study

The data collection coincided with a period of escalating anti-migrant rhetoric in Turkey, as well as an increase in detention, administrative detention, transfer to removal centres, and even deportation practices against irregular migrants and Syrians with temporary protection status. It is well known that conducting quantitative research with migrants is more challenging than with local communities. Administrative practices and an upsurge in racist discourse while this research was conducted also had an impact.

Upon completion of the data collection, Akademetre shared its fieldwork observations with the research team. The researchers convened an online meeting with the survey company's representatives in the selected provinces to gather their feedback on the fieldwork. Based on the reported observations, it could be inferred that the survey went largely according to plan across all the sampled provinces. In a singular locality within Bursa, a group of Syrian individuals initially exhibited resistance towards the execution of the survey; however, after the establishment of trust, the survey was successfully conducted within that neighbourhood. Notwithstanding that, the fieldworkers observed that certain migrants lacking temporary protection status, or a valid residence permit, exhibited reluctance to participate in the survey, and when they did, they abstained from providing their contact details. In this instance, questionnaires lacking contact information or questionnaires that had been abandoned were deemed invalid. Despite these incidents, the predetermined number of surveys was attained for each of the three samples. On the other hand, in certain selected provinces, several Syrian women declined to take part in the survey due to their husbands' disapproval. As described

in the forthcoming section on the demographic attributes of the sample, it is noteworthy that the proportion of female respondents in the Syrian sample is marginally lesser than that of male respondents. The proportion of female respondents is also lower among non-Syrian migrants, but this may be attributable to the greater number of male migrants who come to Turkey to work alone.


According to Akademetre's field team members, some respondents who appeared to be irregular migrants and/or employed in the informal sector did not want to share information on their legal or employment status with the interviewers. Indeed, when analysing responses to certain questions, the researchers noticed instances of inconsistency with the relevant legislation in Turkey. Specifically, this was observed in the responses to two questions pertaining to the legal status of Syrian and non-Syrian migrant populations. One was on legal status, (such as temporary protection, residence permits, international protection applications, etc.), and the other question was on social security. Therefore, the analysis in the quantitative study excluded responses from those two questions. Thus, it should be noted that this study lacks data on and an analysis of migrants' legal status and social security. Furthermore, a certain number of those surveyed in both the Turkish citizen and migrant communities declined to disclose their income. Since this is an issue frequently encountered with survey-based studies, and because the researchers were familiar with it, the questionnaire was designed in a manner that would assist researchers in deducing information about income. For this purpose, a set of inquiries were formulated and, in conjunction with data related to household and personal income, the responses to these inquiries were also examined.

Participant Profile

This section of the quantitative study explores the data collected from the profile questions included in the initial questionnaire package and the responses provided by each respondent. This section examines various demographic factors, including age, gender, citizenship, place of birth, language spoken in the household, educational attainment, employment status, length of sojourn in Turkey and in the neighbourhood, household size, and housing conditions.


Age and gender breakdown of participants

This study surveyed a total of 3,866 participants using a computer-assisted face-to-face/personal interview technique (CAPI) across 17 provinces and 38 neighbourhoods in Turkey. The participants were categorised into three groups: Turkish citizens, Syrians, and non-Syrian migrants, and their levels of social participation were comparatively analysed based on their respective profiles. Out of the 3,866 respondents, the gender distribution was as follows: 48.9% were male and 51.1% were female for the group of 1,933 natives; 58.4% were male and 41.6% were female for the group of 1,427 Syrians, and 58.3% were male and 41.7% were female in the group of 506 non-Syrian migrants. The higher proportion of women in the natives' sample, by about 10%, can be attributed to two factors. First, the questionnaires were administered to one household member between the ages of 18 and 49,

Figure 5. Gender breakdown (%)

and migrant women in migrant households tended to be more reluctant to take part in the survey as compared to their Turkish citizen counterparts. Second, some migrant households were comprised solely of men, such as those of migrant workers.

The age distribution and age ranges of the 3,866 participants in three groups were comparable and evenly distributed around a mean age of 32-33. However, it is observed that a higher proportion of the migrant groups were of active working age compared to the natives; this is reversed after age 40. That is, above the active working age range of 18-39, there was a smaller number of migrants in comparison to the Turkish citizens group. The number of natives between the ages of 40 and 49 exceeded that of migrants (Figure 6).

Figure 6. Age breakdown (%)

The age distribution of the Syrian participants has similar characteristics as the age range distribution of Syrians under TP according to the GİB's recent dataset. According to the GİB dataset, the proportions of Syrians with TP status aged 18-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, and 25-29 to the total number of Syrians with TP status aged 18-49 are 26%, 23%, 17%, 15%, 15%, 11%, and 8%, respectively. Similarly, the proportion of Syrians in the corresponding age ranges in the present study, out of the total number of Syrian participants, were 19.1%, 20.5%, 19.3%, 17.4%, 11.3% and 12.5%, respectively (Figure 6).

The cross tabulation of age and gender shows that men's and women's participation rates in the survey changed according to age (Table 3). While this age-gender differential was lower for Turkish citizens, it was higher for both Syrians and non-Syrian migrants. However, the proportion of respondents in the 30-34 age bracket was considerably higher among Syrian women and in the 35-39 age bracket for non-Syrian migrant women, compared to the proportion of Syrian and non-Syrian migrant men in those age groups, respectively (Table 3).

Table 3. Gender and age breakdown (%)


Turkish Citizens						
Gender	18-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49
Male	20.1	18.2	17.9	14.1	13.9	15.9
Female	21.3	17.6	14.5	18.4	13.4	14.9
Syrians						
Gender	18-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49
Male	20.4	21.5	17.9	18.7	11.5	10.1
Female	17.2	19.2	21.2	15.5	11.0	15.9
Non-Syrian Migrants						
Gender	18-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49
Male	22.4	23.1	20.7	16.6	9.2	8.1
Female	18.5	17.5	15.6	23.7	13.7	10.9

Citizenship, place of birth, and the language spoken in the household

A total of 49.6% of the 3,866 participants in the survey were born as citizens of the Turkish Republic. Only 0.4% of all participants had acquired Turkish citizenship through naturalisation (Figure 7).¹² 36.9% of the participants were Syrian nationals, while 13.1% were recent migrants from other countries. Afghans constitute the largest group of non-Syrian migrants at 4.8% of the total sample. Afghans were followed by Iranians (2%) and Iraqis (1.7%) (Figure

¹² The proportion of participants who had acquired citizenship through naturalisation was very low, if one considers the number of Syrians who have got Turkish citizenship. According to the Ministry of Interior, more than 223,000 Syrians had become naturalised Turkish citizens as of the beginning of 2023. On the other hand, the spatial design of the sample – focusing on neighbourhoods where there is a dense Syrian population – largely excludes the possibility of inclusion of foreigners who acquire citizenship through real estate purchases. As we discuss in later sections of this report, the low income levels of migrant participants would also exclude the possibility of citizenship acquisition through real estate purchases.


Figure 7. Citizenship status (%)



7). In order to focus on new waves of migration in the study, migrant participants were eligible to participate if they arrived in Turkey after 2010. Thus, earlier waves of migration (such as the migration from Bulgaria in 1989-1990) were excluded from the scope of the research.

Upon analysing the birthplaces of the respondents who participated in the survey, it was found that a total of 49.8% were born in Turkey. The rate in question is consistent with the proportions of both the Turkish citizen population and the overall migrant population in the sample. The absence of data on migrant children born in Turkey was a result of the survey's focus on individuals aged 18-49 and its scope which was limited to only migrants who arrived in Turkey between 2010 and 2022. Figure 69, included in the 8th section that portrays the household profile, presents the distribution of birthplaces of household members, irrespective of their ages.

Figure 8. Birthplaces of respondents (%)



Were you born in Turkey or abroad?
Base: 3,866

The survey encompassed inquiries regarding the languages spoken within the households of Syrian migrants and non-Syrian migrant groups, with the option of providing multiple responses. The linguistic preferences of Syrians were surveyed, and the results indicate that Arabic was the preferred language for 68.6% of respondents, while 28.1% chose Turkish, 2.2% used Turkmen, and 0.7% selected Kurdish. The responses obtained from non-Syrian migrants originating from different countries indicate a greater degree of heterogeneity: 37% of non-Syrian migrants reported Turkish, 20.3% Persian, 13.9% Arabic, 7.1% Pashto, and 4% Turkmen as their household languages. These are then followed by languages such as Uzbek, Azerbaijani, English, Russian, and Kurdish. Significantly, Turkish is a language that is frequently spoken in both groups, demonstrating a high degree of competency in the language of the host nation, which is crucial for migrants' social integration.

Figure 9. Language(s) spoken in Syrian households (%)





Figure 10. Language(s) spoken in non-Syrian migrant households (%)



Educational attainment

In response to a question regarding the last school attended, significant differences emerged between migrant and Turkish citizen participants. A total of 38.5% of Syrian respondents had only completed primary education, while 30.7% had also completed middle school but nothing higher. In total, 75.3% of the Syrian respondents had not attended high school. On the other hand, 16.1% of the Turkish citizen populations were only primary school graduates, whereas 18% had also completed middle school but nothing higher. The percentage of those who had not attended high school among this population was 36%. In terms of higher education and beyond, the gap between the natives and migrants grows even wider. A total of 8% of Syrian migrants and 5.5% of non-Syrian migrants were university graduates (or currently enrolled), while this rate increases to 25.8% for the Turkish citizen participants. In other words, at least six out of ten native participants were graduates of high school and higher education institutions, whereas at least seven out of ten Syrian participants had only gradu-

Figure 11. Educational attainment (%)



ated from institutions below the high school level or had no degree. In addition, differences in educational attainment between Syrian and non-Syrian migrants were also observed. Almost four out of ten Syrian participants had only completed primary education, while almost four out of ten non-Syrian migrants had completed middle school and nothing higher. The variation in educational attainment between the Turkish citizen population and multiple migrant groups can be explained by economic, cultural, and gender-related barriers to accessing education, as well as the compulsory basic education system in various countries.

Furthermore, the differences in educational attainment between the Turkish citizens and migrants varies substantially by age. While 61.5% of natives aged 18-24 had completed high school and nothing higher, 25% had either graduated from or were enrolled in higher education institutions. In other words, 86.5% of the Turkish citizen population aged 18-24 had received education at a high school level or beyond. Among migrant populations of the same age, 29.5% of Syrians and 21% of non-Syrian migrant groups had completed high school and/or higher education. In the age group 45-49, the percentage of individuals with an education level of high school or above was 36% for the Turkish citizen population, 21.4% for Syrians, and 19.2% for the non-Syrian migrants group. Notable is that the difference in this age range, which represents the highest age group in the sample, is not as pronounced as in the 18-24 age range. In neighbourhoods where similar income groups reside, there is an inverse relationship between age and educational attainment of both the Turkish citizen population and the migrant population, particularly among the young. This instance also highlights the obstacles and disadvantages migrant youth face in gaining access to education. In addition, increasing education enrolment rates in Turkey over the past two decades have had an impact on this situation, particularly for the Turkish citizen sample.

Table 4. Age and educational attainment distribution (%)

Turkish citizens						
Age	Illiterate	Literate	Primary school	Middle school	High school	University or higher
18 – 24	0.0	1.0	2.3	10.3	61.5	25.0
25 – 29	0.3	0.0	4.6	12.1	37.3	45.7
30 – 34	0.6	0.6	10.3	18.3	34.0	36.2
35 – 39	0.3	1.3	20.0	21.6	30.8	26.0
40 – 44	0.8	1.5	34.2	25.1	28.9	9.5
45 – 49	1.0	4.4	34.0	24.6	29.3	6.7


Syrians						
Age	Illiterate	Literate	Primary school	Middle school	High school	University or higher
18 – 24	3.7	4.8	32.4	30.1	18.4	11.0
25 – 29	1.0	3.1	36.5	31.4	19.1	9.6
30 – 34	2.5	2.9	38.5	29.5	17.5	9.1
35 – 39	3.2	3.6	37.9	35.5	13.3	6.9
40 – 44	1.2	2.5	44.1	29.2	19.9	3.1
45 – 49	5.1	3.4	47.2	27.0	10.7	7.3

Non-Syrian migrants						
Age	Illiterate	Literate	Primary school	Middle school	High school	University or higher
18 – 24	1.9	15.2	26.7	35.2	13.3	7.6
25 – 29	7.6	10.5	22.9	32.4	21.0	5.7
30 – 34	5.3	5.3	26.6	39.4	21.3	2.1
35 – 39	4.0	8.1	23.2	39.4	17.2	8.1
40 – 44	5.4	3.6	16.1	42.9	28.6	3.6
45 – 49	10.6	23.4	27.7	19.1	14.9	4.3

Length of sojourn in Turkey and in the neighbourhood

Under the methodology section, it has already been stated that only migrants who have arrived in Turkey since 2010 were included in the sample. In this context, the length of sojourn in Turkey for the Syrian and non-Syrian migrant groups were inquired about in the survey. It was found that 71.6% of Syrians had been living in Turkey for 4-8 years, whereas 7.1% had been living for 3 years or less. The percentage of Syrians who had been living in Turkey for more than 9 years was 21.2%. These data suggest that the period spanning from 2014 to 2018 witnessed the zenith of Syrian migrant arrivals into Turkey, with a subsequent decline in migration rates since 2019 (Figure 3). For the non-Syrian migrants group, it was observed that the length of sojourn in Turkey was primarily concentrated in the bracket of 5 years or less (69.3% of this group). The graphical representations showing the length of sojourn in Turkey for Syrian and non-Syrian migrants illustrates the differences in these migration stays. While Syrian migration went through a notable surge from 2011 to 2018, followed by a subsequent tapering off, the sojourn length of non-Syrian migrants is concen-


Figure 12. Length of sojourn in Turkey (%)



How long have you been living in Turkey since your last arrival?

Base:	Syrians	Non-Syrian migrants
	1,427	506
Average:	6.6	4.5


Figure 13. Length of sojourn in Turkey (%)



trated in relatively short periods, such as 2-5 years (Figure 12). It is observed that the length of sojourn in Turkey for this group was comparatively short than for Syrians, possibly due to reasons such as an absence of a legal status, desires of moving to another country, and only having a short-term residence permit.

The length of stay in a neighbourhood also differed between the Turkish citizen and migrant populations. While the mean length of stay for the Turkish citizen population in the surveyed locality was 7 years, it was roughly 5 years for Syrians and approximately 3 years for non-Syrian migrants. Among the Syrian population, 44.5% had resided in the same neighbourhood for 4-6 years, and this rate decreased to 26.3% for non-Syrian migrants. Among the non-Syrian migrant population, 41.9% had maintained a residency in the same neighbourhood for a period of 2-3 years, while 26.9% had resided for a year or less. This data indicates that the level of spatial mobility among the non-Syrian migrant group was higher in comparison to that among Syrians, and that their residency status is less secure than that of Syrians. Moreover, an analysis of the length of stay in the same neighbourhood among the Turkish citizens showed that their level of spatial mobility was also high. While the mean length of stay of the Turkish citizen populace was 7 years, the percentage of those residing in the same neighbourhood for over 11 years was 21.2%. These figures suggest that the native participants had a relatively low rate of long-term residency in neighbourhoods with a high concentration of migrants in the population.


Figure 14. Length of sojourn in the neighbourhood (%)



Participation in the labour market

A question on the employment status of the respondents revealed that the general employment rates were comparable between the Turkish citizens (63.9%) and the migrants (58% for Syrians and 68% for non-Syrian migrants), with the highest rate observed among non-Syrian migrants. Considering that the non-Syrian migrant group primarily comprised individuals who migrated to Turkey for employment or as a transit to another country, the data aligns with this situation (Figure 15).

In addition, an analysis of the employment status distribution based on gender among the Turkish citizen and migrant samples reveals a significant disparity. In the natives sample, the employment rate for males was 85%, whereas it was only 43.7% for females. However, the employment rate among male Syrian respondents was 87.3%, while it was only 16.7% for females. In the non-Syrian migrant group, the employment rate of women was relatively high compared to that of Syrian women. In this category, the employment rate of men was significantly higher at 89.5% compared to that of women at 37.9%, which is closer to the employment rate of Turkish citizen women (43.7%). The highly limited involvement of Syrian women in the labour force can be attributed to two main factors: a more profound gender inequality within Syrian households in contrast to Turkish-citizen families, and the fact that Syrian households, which are often larger, assign the responsibility of caring for children, elderly, and persons with disabilities predominantly to women. Due to restricted access to social services for migrants, particularly in areas such as childcare, elderly care, and services for individuals with disabilities, women bear the entire burden of household care activities.

Figure 15. Employment status (%)


Base:	Turkish citizens 1,933	Syrians 1,427	Non-Syrian migrants 506
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Table 5. Gender and employment status distribution (%)

Gender	Turkish Citizens		Syrians		Non-Syrian migrants	
	Yes, I do	No, I don't	Yes, I do	No, I don't	Yes, I do	No, I don't
Male	85.0	15.0	87.3	12.7	89.5	10.5
Female	43.7	56.3	16.7	83.3	37.9	62.1


The question concerning the employment status of respondents, including whether they were working as an employee or on their own account, revealed that paid employment was the predominant form of employment in all groups, with the highest rate of 93.6% among non-Syrian migrants. Paid employment among Syrians was 88.8% and 83.2% among the Turkish citizens (Figure 16). As described in the methodology section, the selection of neighbourhoods for the research sample was based on the concentration of Syrian migrants. All 39 neighbourhoods where the research was conducted had relatively low rents and were populated by individuals working in labour-intensive sectors. Thus, the rates of respondents working on their own accounts, which were 16.8%, 11.2% and 6.4% for natives, Syrians, and non-Syrian migrants, respectively, are directly related to the socioeconomic structure of these neighbourhoods. The qualitative research conducted as part of the project indicates that a sizable proportion of those working independently in these neighbourhoods were small business owners and artisans. Typically, Syrian entrepreneurs run small enterprises that provide goods and services to the Syrian population residing in the neighbourhood.

Figure 16. Paid and self-employment status of respondents (%)




The percentage of respondents with regular, full-time employment as paid employees was 75.7% for the Turkish citizens, 59.1% for Syrians, and 60.6% for the non-Syrian migrants. While only 8% of native participants were part-time or daily-wage employees, this increased to 35-40% of migrants (Figure 17). On the other hand, the percentage of employees in managerial positions and those with specialised professions falls to 1% or less in the migrant population. These figures therefore indicate a significant disparity between the Turkish citizen and migrant respondents in terms of secure and permanent employment and point to the limited opportunities for migrants to work in managerial or specialised professions.

Figure 17. Occupational distribution of those with paid employment status (%)




When the occupational distribution of those working on their own accounts was compared between the Turkish citizen and migrant samples, it was found that natives had a higher concentration of self-employed shopkeepers (and craftspeople) and small producers with 1-10 employees (53.4% and 24.5%, respectively) than the migrants. In contrast, most Syrian own-account employees were self-employed shopkeepers (and craftspeople) (67.7%), while non-Syrian migrants were either self-employed shopkeepers or were engaged in street vending (36.4% and 36.4%, respectively) (Figure 18). These percentages align with the qualitative research findings. That is, in neighbourhoods with a high concentration of Syrians, groceries, fruit shops, patisseries, restaurants, barbers, repair shops, phone stores, clothing stores, recycled material collectors, and scrap dealers, run by Syrians alone or with family labour, were becoming more common.



When respondents among the Turkish citizen and migrant populations who reported not working were queried about the reasons, 56.2% of the Turkish citizen population, 76.5% of the Syrians, and finally 73.5% of the non-Syrian migrants cited being a housewife/househusband as the reason. It has been found that in all three categories, gender inequality shaped the structure of their participation in the labour market. However, as was mentioned previously, this data further revealed disparities between groups in terms of youth participation in the labour market. While 24.1% of the Turkish citizen sample reported being a student as the reason for not working, this percentage was only 8.3% among the Syrian and non-Syrian migrant groups. In addition, the percentage of non-Syrian migrants who were unemployed despite actively seeking work was 16%, which was considerably higher than the rates for the natives (11.3%) and Syrians (8.8%) (Figure 19).

Figure 19. Reasons for unemployment among respondents (%)



The reasons for unemployment differ by gender among the Turkish citizen and migrant populations. While for unemployed men in the Turkish citizen population, being a student (54.2%) and the inability to find a job (24.6%) were the most prevalent reasons for not working; for women, however, being a housewife was the primary reason (69.2%). The percentage of unemployed Turkish-citizen women who were not employed because of being a student was 16.4%. These percentages, on the other hand, vary considerably among Syrians. While the inability to find a job was the leading cause of unemployment among Syrian men (40.6%), this was followed by being a student (29.2%). The high unemployment rate among Syrian women (92.3%) is primarily attributable to their status as housewives. Only 3.8% of unemployed Syrian women reported being a student as a reason for not working. Moreover, the status of women in the non-Syrian migrants group is comparable to that of Syrian women. Among the non-Syrian migrant group, the percentage of unemployed men who were unemployed due to an inability to find a job was around 70%, whereas the percentage of unemployed men not working due to being students was 19.4%. These findings don't only indicate that the unemployment of Turkish citizen and migrant populations is differentiated by gender, but also raise two other critical results. First, there is an approximately fourfold disparity for women between the Turkish citizen and migrant respondents who were not in the workforce because they were still in school. This indicates that female employment is higher in the Turkish citizen population than among migrants, and that women of working age have greater access to education in the Turkish citizen population. The second is that the unemployment obstacles also vary between the three groups of male respondents. For Turkish citizens, continuing education is the primary reason for not being in the workforce, whereas this reason is secondary for migrant men. Based on the data available up to this point, it is readily evident that a substantial percentage of migrant men are either employed or actively seeking employment.

Table 6. Reasons for unemployment and gender distribution (%)

Turkish citizens							
Gender	Retired	Student	Home-maker	Unemployed - actively seeking work	Unemployed - not actively seeking work	Unable to work due to a permanent illness or disability	Working without pay in a family business
Male	4.9	54.2	4.9	24.6	7.7	2.1	1.4
Female	1.3	16.4	69.2	7.9	4.9	0.4	0.0


Syrians							
Gender	Retired	Student	Home-maker	Unemployed - actively seeking work	Unemployed - not actively seeking work	Unable to work due to a permanent illness or disability	Working without pay in a family business
Male	6.6	29.2	2.8	40.6	7.5	13.2	0.0
Female	0.0	3.8	92.3	2.0	1.0	0.6	0.2

Non-Syrian migrants							
Gender	Retired	Student	Home-maker	Unemployed - actively seeking work	Unemployed - not actively seeking work	Unable to work due to a permanent illness or disability	Working without pay in a family business
Male	0.0	19.4	0.0	71.0	9.7	0.0	0.0
Female	0.0	5.3	90.8	3.1	0.8	0.0	0.0

Household size and housing conditions

When respondents' household sizes were queried, variations were observed between the Turkish-citizen and migrant residents. The average size of a Turkish-citizen household was four people, compared to five for Syrians and three and a half for non-Syrian migrants. In addition, whereas 41.5% of the Turkish citizen population's households consisted of two to three people, this figure was 18.3% among Syrian households and 54.7% among non-Syrian migrant households. 48.1% of the Turkish citizen households consisted of four or five individuals. This result corresponds to the average household size in Turkey. While 37.6% of Syrian households consisted of four or five individuals, 38.5% of non-Syrian migrant households did. There were very few households with six or more members in the Turkish citizen sample (8.1%), compared to 38.7% among Syrians and 5.7% among non-Syrian migrants. As documented by other studies,¹³ the average size of Syrian migrant households is larger than that of natives and non-Syrian migrants. The difference in household size between Syrians and non-Syrians is notable and can be attributed to the nature of households. In other words, while Syrian households are predominantly composed of one or more families under TP and living in the same household, non-Syrian migrant households are comprised of individuals who arrived in Turkey for work or transit purposes and have no family ties between them.

¹³ In the TNSA Syrian Migrant Sample, the household size was found to be six (HIPS, 2019). The Syrians Barometers also used the same figure (Erdoğan, 2022).



Most Turkish-citizen and migrant participants resided in housing units with '2+1' and '3+1' room configurations, according to an analysis of their housing conditions. 42.7% of natives were residing in 3+1 residences, while 48.4% percent were residing in 2+1 residences. 53.1% of Syrian participants were living in 2+1 residences, while 33.8% reside in 3+1 residences. Considering that the average household size of Syrian respondents (five) is larger than that of the Turkish citizen population, it is evident that migrants often reside in housing units with insufficient room numbers relative to the number of inhabitants. Non-Syrian migrant participants were concentrated in 2+1 residences, with 58.5% living in such units. A total of 21% of non-Syrian migrants were residing in 3+1 residences. The percentage of non-Syrian migrants who were living in 1+1 residences was 16.4%, which is higher than the percentage of Syrians (9%) who were doing so (Figure 21).




Figure 22. Turkish citizens' level of access to basics in the home (multiple choice) (%)






Figure 23. Syrians' level of access to basics in the home (multiple choice) (%)



A question concerning the extent to which the residential unit meets basic needs revealed that 18% of Turkish citizen participants did not have access to natural gas in their residences. This percentage rises to 35.9% for Syrians and 41.5% for non-Syrian migrants. In the 39 neighbourhoods where fieldwork was conducted, 7.5% of native participants' homes lacked internet access, compared to 18.1% of Syrian participants' homes and 36.8% of non-Syrian migrant participants' homes. The greater spatial mobility and irregular migration status (lack of legal status) of non-Syrian migrant groups compared to Syrians and Turkish citizen participants is a significant factor in their lower access to internet at home. Although the percentage of natives and Syrians who lived in homes without essential sections such as toilets, bathrooms, and kitchens remained consistently below 1%, the percentage of non-Syrian migrants living in homes without a kitchen was comparatively high at 5.3%.

Figure 24. Non-Syrian migrants' level of access to basics in the home (multiple choice) (%)




Could you tell me which of the following items are to be found in your home?

Base:	Turkish citizens	Syrians	Non-Syrian migrants
	1.933	1.427	506

When queried about the essential household appliances they own, nearly all Turkish-citizen and migrant participants (98-99%) reported having a refrigerator. 96% of natives had both an oven and stove in their residences, while among migrant groups oven ownership dropped to 71.4% for Syrians and 76.2% for non-Syrian migrant participants. The percentage of Syrian residences with a stove was relatively low at 70.3%. The rate was 93.1% for all non-Syrian migrants. One possible explanation for the low stove ownership rate among Syrians is the extent of deprivation in rural areas where the most impoverished households reside in some of the sampled provinces. Dishwashers, air conditioners, and computers/tablets have the

Figure 25. Ownership of household appliances (%)




Which of the following items do you have in your household?

Base:	Turkish citizens	Syrians	Non-Syrian migrants
	1,933	1,427	506

greatest disparities in domestic appliance ownership between the Turkish citizen population and migrants. While 84.1% of the Turkish citizen population surveyed owned a dishwasher, only 25% of Syrians and 39.3% of non-Syrian migrants did. Likewise, 29.1% of the Turkish-citizen participants had air conditioning in their residences, compared to 4.9% of Syrians and 3.7% of non-Syrian migrants. 44.1% of Turkish-citizen households owned a vehicle, compared to 4.3% of Syrians and 5.5% of non-Syrian migrants. Comparing Turkish-citizen and migrant participants in terms of household appliances reveals that natives have an advantage in terms of ownership of luxury items such as air conditioners, computers/tablets, and dishwashers, and have a higher ownership rate of these appliances than migrants.

When asked about the ownership of the housing units in which Turkish-citizen and migrant respondents were residing, it emerged that 51.1% of the Turkish citizen population were homeowners, whereas 43.6% were tenants. The rate of homeownership among Syrian migrants was 0.8% (11 people), while it was 3% (15 people) for all non-Syrian migrants.¹⁴ The homeownership rate among members of the non-Syrian migrant group suggests that a limited number of individuals may have acquired housing by working in specialized professions in Turkey or by transferring assets from their home countries. The migrant respondents had substantially higher rates of renting than the Turkish-citizen participants. This rate was 97.5 percent for Syrians and 94.3 percent for all non-Syrian migrants.



¹⁴ According to existing legislation in Turkey, Syrians cannot acquire immovable property in Turkey, unless through forming partnership firms with Turkish citizens. A regulation that prohibit Syrians from buying property in Turkey that dates from 1967 is still in effect. For this reason, Syrians cannot acquire Turkish citizenship through buying property either (see, Indyturk, 2022).

When investigating the relationship between migrants' ownership of housing units and their length of sojourn in Turkey, it was found that the 11 Syrians who owned their homes had resided in Turkey for at least four years. It can be assumed that the length of sojourn in Turkey has a positive effect not only on homeownership, but also on supporting housing demands, such as living in a family-owned property without paying rent. In other words, all Syrians who have been in Turkey for less than three years are tenants in the residences in which they reside. Similarly, when considering the homeownership of non-Syrian migrant participants based on their length of stay in Turkey, all individuals who have been in the country for less than three years are tenants. Non-Syrian migrants who have resided in Turkey for at least four years are found to own their homes (15 individuals in total), reside in employer-provided accommodation, or reside in family-owned properties. Homeownership among non-Syrian migrants suggests that some have brought their accumulated assets from their home countries and settled as homeowners in Turkey, whereas living in employer-provided housing is associated with agricultural labour and specialized professions. Importantly, the lower homeownership rate among migrants is also influenced by the sampling methodology, which is based on communities with a concentration of low-income wage-earners, as described in the Methodology section.

Table 7. Length of sojourn in Turkey and household ownership status (%)

Syrians				
Length of Sojourn in Turkey	Owner	Tenant	Employer-provided housing	Family-owned property
3 years or less	0.0	7.3	0.0	0.0
4-8 years	63.6	71.6	76.5	86.0
9 years or more	36.4	21.1	23.5	14.0


Non-Syrian migrants			
Length of Sojourn in Turkey	Owner	Tenant	Employer-provided housing
3 years or less	20.0	39.0	50.0
4-8 years	67.0	24.0	43.0
9 years or more	13.0	7.0	7.0

Economic Status

The survey included a series of questions regarding participants' household and personal income, sources of income, ability to meet essential expenses, and general economic situation. A significant number of participants declined to answer inquiries about their monthly household and personal incomes. After excluding participants who refused to answer the question, the analysis shows that the average household income of Turkish-citizen participants was close to twice as much as the average household income of migrants.


Household income

26.4% of native participants, 9.3% of Syrian participants, and 42.7% of non-Syrian migrant participants refused to respond to the question regarding their households' monthly incomes (Figure 27). According to the information provided by those who responded to this question, the vast majority of migrants had incomes below 6,000 Turkish Lira (TL), while only one-third of the Turkish-citizen respondents fell into this income bracket. 85.5% of Syrians and 77.2% of non-Syrian migrants had household incomes of less than 6,000 TL. 44.1% of Syrians had household incomes below 4,000 TL, compared to 14.1% of the non-Syrian migrants. The reported household incomes of the Turkish-citizen respondents exhibited a greater degree of variation. The percentage of those reporting an income below 6,000 TL was at 34.2%, while the percentages of those reporting incomes between 6,000 and 7,999 TL, 8,000 to 9,999 TL, and 10,000 TL and above were 31.7%, 14.3%, and 19.8%, respectively. Only 4.8% of Turkish-citizen respondents reported household incomes of less than 4,000 TL.



The following were the mean monthly household incomes for the three groups: Turkish citizens: 7,586 TL, Syrians: 4,329 TL, and non-Syrian migrants: 4,994 TL. Given that the fieldwork was conducted between June 17 and August 10, 2022, it is reasonable to infer that the majority of responses correspond to a time when the net minimum wage was 4,253 TL. Responses from August likely reflected that the net minimum wage had been raised to 5,500 TL on July 1. In this regard, it is important to note that the mean household incomes of Syrian and non-Syrian migrants were somewhat lower than or within the minimum wage range.

Figure 28. Household income (excluding those who declined to respond) (%)



In an examination into the relationship between household income and citizenship, it was observed that 84% of individuals with a household income below 4,000 TL were Syrians, 10% were Turkish citizens, and 3.8% were Afghan. Among those who reported a monthly household income of 10,000 TL and above, 86% were Turkish citizens, 11% were Syrian, and among the non-Syrian migrants 0.9% were Iranians, 0.6% were Iraqis, 0.6% were Uzbeks, and 0.3% were Turkmen.

Table 8. Household income and country of citizenship (%)

Income	Turkish Citizen	Syria	Afghanistan	Iran	Iraq	Turkmenistan	Azerbaijan	Uzbekistan	Russia	Moldova	Nigeria	Morocco	Kuwait	Other
3,999 TL or less	10.0	84.0	3.8	0.1	1.3	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.4
4,000 - 5,999 TL	36.8	47.1	9.3	2.1	2.6	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.3	1.1
6,000 - 7,999 TL	73.1	19.8	1.9	2.6	0.6	0.2	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.8
8,000 - 9,999 TL	82.9	11.8	2.0	0.4	1.2	0.4	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.4
10,000 TL or more	86.2	11.0	0.0	0.9	0.6	0.3	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3

A pattern can be observed between Turkish citizen participants' household income and their level of education. For instance, 42.9% of Turkish participants who are illiterate have household incomes of less than 4,000 TL, while none of them have incomes above 10,000 TL. Only 5.8% of Turkish citizen participants who have higher education degrees have household incomes less than 4,000 TL, whereas around one third (35.6%) of this group have household incomes above 10,000 TL. The same pattern is also valid for other educational and household income levels for the Turkish citizens sample; as educational level increases, household income also increases.

But the expectation that household incomes will increase in tandem with the educational attainment of the participant does not appear to be valid to any significant degree for the Syrian sample. 53.1% of Syrian participants who were illiterate had household incomes below 4,000 TL, whereas none of them have household incomes above 10,000 TL. 47.6% of Syrian participants who had higher education degrees or above had household incomes of 4,000 TL or less, whereas among the same group only 3.9% had household incomes of 10,000 TL or more.

In the non-Syrian migrants' sample, it is noteworthy that for all educational levels of participants, the highest percentage of household income range was between 4000 and 6,000 TL. As educational attainment of non-Syrian migrant participants increased, there was a slight increase in the level of household incomes.

In conclusion, the household incomes of Syrians, regardless of educational background, are extremely low. This information points to a phenomenon commonly observed among migrant labour known as skill de-qualification, which is brought about by the difficult conditions for Syrians residing in Turkey to obtain work permits and the exceptionally small number who have been able to obtain them¹⁵ (Sert, 2016; Karadeniz, 2023). This observation may not apply equally to non-Syrian migrants due to the presence of participants of varying nationalities and positions in Turkey. As mentioned in the preceding section concerning homeownership, this may be related to non-Syrian migrants working in Turkey in specialized occupations.

15 According to the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, the number of Syrians with work permits at the end of 2021 was 91,500, 62,369 in 2020, 63,789 in 2019 and 34,573 in 2018. (See ÇSGB, <https://www.cs.gb.gov.tr/istatistikler/calisma-hayati-istatistikleri/resmi-istatistik-programi/yabancilarin-calisma-izinleri>. Access date: 18.05.2023. In contrast to the number of work permits, it was estimated that over 800,000 Syrians were employed in Turkey before the pandemic (Caro, 2020).

Table 9. Educational attainment and household income distribution (%)

Turkish citizens					
Educational Attainment	3,999 TL or less	4,000 - 5,999 TL	6,000 - 7,999 TL	8,000 - 9,999 TL	10,000 TL or more
Illiterate	42.9	14.3	28.6	14.3	0.0
Literate	21.4	7.1	50.0	21.4	0.0
Primary school	6.6	33.2	39.4	9.3	11.6
Middle school	4.5	30.6	41.4	10.4	13.1
High school	2.3	36.1	29.2	15.2	17.2
University or above	5.8	17.4	21.8	19.3	35.6

Syrians					
Educational Attainment	3,999 TL or less	4,000 - 5,999 TL	6,000 - 7,999 TL	8,000 - 9,999 TL	10,000 TL or more
Illiterate	53.1	37.5	9.4	0.0	0.0
Literate	33.3	50.0	13.9	2.8	0.0
Primary school	49.1	40.5	6.9	1.6	2.0
Middle school	39.5	45.2	9.9	2.0	3.5
High school	39.7	40.7	12.0	3.8	3.8
University or above	47.6	31.1	13.6	3.9	3.9

Non-Syrian migrants					
Educational Attainment	3,999 TL or less	4,000 - 5,999 TL	6,000 - 7,999 TL	8,000 - 9,999 TL	10,000 TL or more
Illiterate	40.7	51.9	3.7	3.7	0.0
Literate	10.9	78.3	4.3	4.3	2.2
Primary school	12.0	58.7	22.7	5.3	1.3
Middle school	12.5	62.5	19.3	2.3	3.4
High school	11.1	66.7	11.1	2.8	8.3
University or above	5.6	55.6	16.7	16.7	5.6

When examining the relationship between household income and household size, the most notable finding is that nearly half (48.5%) of Syrian respondents with household incomes below 4,000 TL were residing in households with six or more individuals. This indicates that their per capita incomes are less than 670 TL per person per month. In contrast, roughly one-tenth of the Turkish-citizen respondents (11.8%) and non-Syrian migrants (9.8%) with household incomes below 4,000 TL were residing in households with six or more individuals. Nearly half (48.8%) of non-Syrian migrant respondents with household incomes below 4,000 TL were residing in households with four to five persons. About one-third (35%) of Syrians in the same income bracket were residing in households with four to five people. In other words, 83.5% of Syrians with household incomes below 4,000 TL and 58.6% of

non-Syrian migrants with the same income level were living in households with at least four persons. In contrast, 51.5% of Turkish-citizen respondents fell into this category. This relationship between household income and household size demonstrates that Syrian households have a substantially lower per capita income.

Table 10. Distribution of household income and number of persons living in the household (%)

Income	Turkish Citizens				Syrians				Non-Syrian migrants			
	1 person	2-3 persons	4-5 persons	6 persons or more	1 person	2-3 persons	4-5 persons	6 persons or more	1 person	2-3 persons	4-5 persons	6 persons or more
3,999 TL or less	1.5	47.1	39.7	11.8	5.1	11.4	35.0	48.5	0.0	41.5	48.8	9.8
4,000 - 5,999 TL	1.7	43.1	51.7	3.6	7.6	28.0	37.5	26.9	1.6	47.0	45.9	5.5
6,000 - 7,999 TL	2.0	35.0	54.5	8.4	0.0	18.0	45.1	36.9	0.0	29.5	54.5	15.9
8,000 - 9,999 TL	2.5	36.8	45.6	15.2	6.9	27.6	27.6	37.9	0.0	38.5	46.2	15.4
10,000 TL or more	0.4	33.0	53.5	13.1	0.0	16.7	44.4	38.9	0.0	55.6	33.3	11.1

When looking into the relationship between household income and ownership of essentials in the residence, in the lowest income bracket (below 4,000 TL), Turkish-citizen respondents had higher ownership rates of the aforementioned essentials than Syrians and non-Syrian migrants. The most notable exception is that the lowest-income Syrian households had a higher rate of connection to the internet. This may be due to their increased desire to communicate with family members in other countries. In contrast, the rate of internet connection ownership was lower across all income categories for the non-Syrian migrants. This may be because some members of the non-Syrian migrant group reside in bachelor-style shared housing as opposed to family residences. Possibly because of this, the rate of natural gas access in the house was also low among non-Syrian migrants across all income brackets. While a small proportion of Syrians with modest household incomes had access to natural gas, this proportion rises as household incomes rise. In summary, the overall analysis reveals that most Turkish-citizen respondents had higher ownership rates of essentials in their homes, whereas Syrians and especially non-Syrian migrants have extremely low rates of natural gas and internet connections (primarily in lower-income households).

Table 11. Distribution of household income and ownership of basics in the house (%)

Turkish citizens														
Income	Bathroom		Kitchen		Internet		Electricity		Running Water		Natural Gas		Toilet	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
3,999 TL or less	100.0	0.0	97.1	2.9	72.1	27.9	100.0	0.0	82.4	17.6	75.0	25.0	100.0	0.0
4,000 - 5,999 TL	99.8	0.2	99.5	0.5	90.4	9.6	99.3	0.7	98.3	1.7	74.9	25.1	99.5	0.5
6,000 - 7,999 TL	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	93.8	6.2	100.0	0.0	99.1	0.9	68.7	31.3	100.0	0.0
8,000 - 9,999 TL	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	97.1	2.9	100.0	0.0	96.1	3.9	87.7	12.3	100.0	0.0
10,000 TL or more	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	97.9	2.1	99.6	0.4	99.3	0.7	95.4	4.6	100.0	0.0

Syrians														
Income	Bathroom		Kitchen		Internet		Electricity		Running Water		Natural Gas		Toilet	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
3,999 TL or less	99.8	0.2	100.0	0.0	90.4	9.6	99.5	0.5	99.5	0.5	56.0	44.0	99.3	0.7
4,000 - 5,999 TL	100.0	0.0	99.8	0.2	73.7	26.3	99.8	0.2	100.0	0.0	68.3	31.7	99.1	0.9
6,000 - 7,999 TL	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	77.9	22.1	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	67.2	32.8	100.0	0.0
8,000 - 9,999 TL	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	96.6	3.4	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	89.7	10.3	100.0	0.0
10,000 TL or more	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	94.4	5.6	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0

Non-Syrian migrants														
Income	Bathroom		Kitchen		Internet		Electricity		Running Water		Natural Gas		Toilet	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
3,999 TL or less	100.0	0.0	92.7	7.3	58.5	41.5	95.1	4.9	100.0	0.0	39.0	61.0	100.0	0.0
4,000 - 5,999 TL	99.5	0.5	88.5	11.5	66.1	33.9	99.5	0.5	99.5	0.5	45.4	54.6	99.5	0.5
6,000 - 7,999 TL	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	45.5	54.5	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	43.2	56.8	100.0	0.0
8,000 - 9,999 TL	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	46.2	53.8	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	46.2	53.8	100.0	0.0
10,000 TL or more	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	66.7	33.3	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	66.7	33.3	100.0	0.0


Income sources

Participants in the study were asked about the sources of their monthly household income. According to the responses to this question, the largest source of household incomes were wages or commercial income for all groups, including Turkish-citizen respondents (78.2%), Syrians (65.4%), and non-Syrian migrants (88.1%). Syrians were the most likely to indicate receiving social assistance from the government or other institutions, with a rate of 22.3%. Syrians (11.9%) were also the most likely to report receiving financial assistance from family members and relatives. Only 7.9% of Turkish-citizen respondents reported receiving social assistance, compared to 7% of non-Syrian migrants. The share of Turkish-citizen respondents who received financial support from family members and relatives was 7.6%, compared to 2.3% for all non-Syrian migrants. Notably, 4.6% of Turkish-citizen respondents reported receiving a pension as part of their household income, making them the most likely group to do so. However, 2.2% of non-Syrian migrants declaring a pension income indicates the presence of retired household members from countries such as Iran and Iraq.

From the responses to this question, the following conclusion can be drawn: wages (and commercial income, as indicated in the same response option) are the most significant source of income for the vast majority of participants' households. Funded by the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO), the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRIT) provides social assistance to Syrians and other refugees who satisfy certain criteria. The Social Integration Support for Foreigners (SUY) program currently serves 1,541,829 individuals and 278,691 households, according to data from the Turkish Red Crescent from March 2023. Currently, SUY assistance transferred onto Kızılaykart (a debit card issued by the Turkish Red Crescent for cash assistance) is 300 TL per individual (Kızılaykart, 2023). In addition to educational and maternal-child health-related assistance, the FRIT program offers additional forms of assistance. The assistance provided by the FRIT program explains why more than one-fifth of Syrian respondents reported receiving social assistance in their households. Since SUY is also provided to families with four or more children and to families with a high proportion of dependents, it is reasonable to infer that the proportion of these assistance benefits relative to household income rises as the size of the household increases. The eligibility of refugees with international protection applications/status to receive SUY (particularly Iraqis and Afghans) is most likely the reason why 2.2% of non-Syrian migrants include social assistance in their household income.

Despite the assistance provided through SUY and FRIT, it is important to note that wages and commercial income continue to be the primary sources of income for Syrian households, while pension income, which provides some income security, is significant only for Turkish-citizen respondents. However, it is essential to note that the sample consists of individuals between the ages of 18 and 49, which is another significant reason for the low percentage of households with pension income.

Figure 29. Monthly income source of the household (%)




Personal income

A pattern like that observed for the household income question is also observed for the “What is your personal monthly income?” question, with a significant percentage of participants choosing not to respond: 33.9% of Turkish-citizen respondents, 52.2% of non-Syrian migrants, and 8.8% of Syrians. It is possible that the slightly higher tendency of Syrian participants to respond to both the household and personal monthly income inquiries is related to the social assistance income their households receive.

When the respondents who declined to answer this question are excluded from the analysis, a parallel pattern emerges between the respondents’ reported personal monthly income and their responses regarding household income discussed above. Nearly all Syrian respondents (89.4%) and non-Syrian migrants (91.4%) were earning less than 6,000 TL. Among non-Syrian migrants, 24.7% had a personal income of less than 4,000 TL, while 43.3% of Syrians fell into this category. There was a comparatively even distribution of Turkish nationals between those with a personal monthly income below and above 6,000 TL (51.6% and 48.4%, respectively). All respondents in the three groups who responded to the question about personal income were employed.

Based on responses to questions about household income and personal income, the following were the average incomes of the three groups: the average monthly household income was 7,586 TL for Turkish-citizen respondents, 4,329 TL for Syrians, and 4,994 TL for non-Syrian migrants (Figure 28). The average monthly personal income reported by Turkish-citizen respondents was 6,162 TL, while it was 4,205 TL for Syrians and 4,175 TL for all non-Syrian migrants (Figure 30).


Figure 30. Personal monthly income (%)



What is your personal monthly income?

Base:	Turkish citizens	Syrians	Non-Syrian migrants
	1,235	827	344
Average:	6,162 TL	4,205 TL	4,175 TL

Figure 31. Personal monthly income (excluding those who didn't specify their income) (%)



Base:	Turkish citizens	Syrians	Non-Syrian migrants
	816	756	162
Average:	6,162 TL	4,205 TL	4,175 TL

A pattern similar to the one between educational attainment and household incomes of Turkish participants discussed above is also apparent between the educational levels of Turkish citizen respondents and their personal incomes. For instance, 33.3% of the personal incomes of illiterate Turkish citizen participants is below 4,000 TL whereas 66.7% of them have personal incomes between 4,000 and 10,000 TL. Put differently, none of the illiterate Turkish citizen participants have personal incomes above 6,000 TL. Among Turkish participants who have higher educational degrees, more than half (57%) have personal incomes above 6,000 TL. But there is no similar pattern between the educational levels and personal incomes of Syrian and non-Syrian migrant participants. For both of the migrant samples, declared personal incomes cumulate in the below 4,000 TL and 4,000-6,000 TL ranges.

As a general observation, it can be stated that the group in which there was a clear distinction between the lowest and highest personal monthly incomes is Turkish-citizen respondents. The expected relationship between human capital (education) and economic capital (income) does not hold true for Syrians and non-Syrian migrant groups. This result also suggests that skilled migrant labour in the communities where the study was conducted is paid low wages. This finding is comparable to that of the International Labour Organization's examination of the social security and informal employment situation of Syrians, in which it was found that highly educated Syrians are also employed informally (Karadeniz, 2023).

Table 12. Distribution of educational attainment and personal monthly income (%)


Turkish citizens					
Educational Attainment	3,999 TL or less	4,000 - 5,999 TL	6,000 - 7,999 TL	8,000 - 9,999 TL	10,000 TL or more
Illiterate	33.3	66.7	0.0	0.0	0.0
Literate	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0
Primary school	21.5	29.2	33.8	6.2	9.2
Middle school	12.7	36.1	34.2	9.5	7.6
High school	6.7	53.0	29.2	5.0	6.0
University or above	7.5	35.4	26.1	15.0	15.9

Syrians					
Educational Attainment	3,999 TL or less	4,000 - 5,999 TL	6,000 - 7,999 TL	8,000 - 9,999 TL	10,000 TL or more
Illiterate	55.6	38.9	5.6	0.0	0.0
Literate	50.0	42.9	7.1	0.0	0.0
Primary school	44.8	46.4	6.4	2.0	0.4
Middle school	41.7	48.9	5.7	2.3	1.5
High school	37.3	46.0	10.7	3.3	2.7
University or above	55.0	35.0	8.3	0.0	1.7

Non-Syrian migrants					
Educational Attainment	3,999 TL or less	4,000 - 5,999 TL	6,000 - 7,999 TL	8,000 - 9,999 TL	10,000 TL or more
Illiterate	43.8	56.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
Literate	31.0	69.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Primary school	24.3	62.2	13.5	0.0	0.0
Middle school	20.0	71.1	8.9	0.0	0.0
High school	14.3	71.4	10.7	3.6	0.0
University or above	28.6	57.1	14.3	0.0	0.0

Economic situation


Respondents were asked “If an unexpected obligatory expense (such as related to an accident, illness, or home damage) arises in your life, how much could you afford to pay for that expense?” Given the high number of participants who did not wish to provide information about their household income and personal income, this query can provide valuable insight into the economic situation of the respondents. It can also indicate whether respondents have the capacity to make savings as well as their monthly income-to-expense ratio. As shown in the graph below (Figure 32), one-quarter of Turkish-citizen respondents and roughly one-third of Syrian and non-Syrian migrant respondents indicated that they could not afford an unexpected expense. Alternatively, approximately half of Turkish-citizen respondents (45.5%) stated that they would be unable to pay for any unexpected expense or would only be able to afford a cost up to 500 TL. The sum of these two responses for Syrians was 78.5%, which represents approximately three-quarters of the participants. Among non-Syrian migrants, these two options were selected by 63.6%, or roughly two-thirds, of the respondents. In conclusion, for the majority of the three sample groups, the ability to cover unexpected necessary expenses is extremely limited, and they lack the means to save from their incomes. Only one-third of Turkish-citizen respondents (32.1%) appear to be able to afford unexpected expenses of more than 2,000 TL.



As a significant proportion of the respondents did not answer questions regarding household and personal income, responses to the question “Are you satisfied with your current economic situation?” have significance for determining the economic status of participants. More than half of Turkish-citizen respondents (58.6%) were dissatisfied with their current economic situation, compared to 35.1% of Syrians and 38.8% of non-Syrian migrants. However, 39.2% of Syrians responded “neither satisfied nor dissatisfied,” compared to approximately a quarter of Turkish citizens (24.7%) and non-Syrian migrants (25.5%). In comparison to

the Syrian and natives samples, a greater proportion of non-Syrian migrants (36.4%) were content with their economic situation. When interpreting these responses, it is possible to consider that, according to research conducted in other countries, migrants and refugees tend to provide more affirmative responses to questions of this nature (e.g. Lareiro et al, 2020). On the other side, it may be claimed that the greater economic expectations in Turkey contributed to the negative comments from the Turkish-citizen respondents.

Figure 33. Satisfaction with economic situation (%)



When the responses to the question about economic situation satisfaction were analysed in relation to household income, a more nuanced picture emerges. More than two-thirds (67.6%) of the Turkish-citizen respondents with the lowest household incomes (below 4,000 TL) were dissatisfied with their economic situation. Nearly half (45.9%) of the Syrian respondents with the lowest household income responded, “neither satisfied nor dissatisfied,” whereas the majority of non-Syrian migrants in this income category (70.7%) reported being dissatisfied. In the overall analysis, the proportion of respondents in all three groups who responded “I am not satisfied” decreases as the reported income bracket rises. However, this decrease in the proportion of Turkish-citizen respondents who were dissatisfied with their economic situation is not as significant as it is for Syrians and non-Syrian migrants.

The relationship between personal income and satisfaction with the economic situation follows a similar pattern. Examining the subgroups, more than one-third (35.7%) of the Turkish-citizen respondents who reported having the highest personal income reported being dissatisfied. Among Syrian and non-Syrian migrants in the greatest income bracket, on the other hand, there were no dissatisfied respondents.

Table 13. Distribution of household income and satisfaction with economic situation (%)

Income	Turkish Citizens			Syrians			Non-Syrian migrants		
	Dissatis- fied	Neither satisfied nor dis- satisfied	Satisfied	Dissatis- fied	Neither satisfied nor dis- satisfied	Satisfied	Dissatis- fied	Neither satisfied nor dis- satisfied	Satisfied
3,999 TL or less	67.6	23.5	8.8	37.1	45.9	17.0	70.7	17.1	12.2
4,000 - 5,999 TL	59.8	17.2	23.0	33.2	36.8	30.0	57.4	16.9	25.7
6,000 - 7,999 TL	72.3	18.0	9.8	41.8	34.4	23.8	43.2	25.0	31.8
8,000 - 9,999 TL	59.8	25.5	14.7	20.7	20.7	58.6	38.5	30.8	30.8
10,000 TL or more	53.5	26.6	19.9	13.9	13.9	72.2	44.4	0.0	55.6

Table 14. Distribution of personal monthly income and satisfaction with economic situation (%)

Income	Turkish Citizens			Syrians			Non-Syrian migrants		
	Dissatis- fied	Neither satisfied nor dis- satisfied	Satis- fied	Dissatis- fied	Neither satisfied nor dis- satisfied	Satis- fied	Dissatis- fied	Neither satisfied nor dis- satisfied	Satis- fied
3,999 TL or less	75.6	17.4	7.0	36.3	47.9	15.9	57.5	20.0	22.5
4,000 - 5,999 TL	60.0	20.0	20.0	25.9	40.2	33.9	71.3	12.0	16.7
6,000 - 7,999 TL	71.7	16.0	12.3	50.0	27.8	22.2	38.5	30.8	30.8
8,000 - 9,999 TL	49.3	32.9	17.8	18.8	12.5	68.8	100.0	0.0	0.0
10,000 TL or more	35.9	34.6	29.5	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0


Satisfaction with Life in Turkey and Perceptions of Discrimination

As part of this research, participants were asked several questions about life satisfaction and feeling safe in the place where they live. The research design favoured a limited number of questions on these issues, which are deemed to be 'soft' aspects of social integration. On the one hand, questions on attitudes and perceptions are not very well suited for the comparison of individuals and groups from different social positions. On the other hand, the present research is not a study on social cohesion. Rather, it is designed as a study of the social participation of individuals and households with different legal and migration statuses who live in similar neighbourhoods. Nevertheless, examining the participants' answers on life satisfaction also provides significant findings regarding the research objectives. All participants were also asked questions about their perceptions and experiences of injustice in different areas of life, with the aim of collecting data on discrimination.

Satisfaction with life in Turkey and in the neighbourhood and feeling safe

In response to the question "How satisfied are you with life in Turkey?" the group in which the largest proportion of respondents answered "not satisfied" were Turkish citizens, with 35.7%, more than a third of the total. The rate of dissatisfaction was 14.2% among Syrians and 18.8% among non-Syrian migrants. However, within each group it can be observed that most of the respondents expressed satisfaction with life in Turkey. The rate of satisfaction among non-Syrian migrant respondents was close to two-thirds (64%), while more than half of Syrians (52%) and 42% of Turkish-citizen respondents answered "I am satisfied" to this question. Surveys of Syrians in Turkey show that they tend to have a positive attitude towards the host country (e.g., Erdoğan, 2022). However, it is worth noting that the percentage of Turkish-citizen respondents who answered "not satisfied" or "neither satisfied nor dissatisfied" is higher (58%) than for the other groups. The high level of dissatisfaction among Turkish citizens may be an indication of unfulfilled expectations regarding life in the country. Moreover, these results serve to remind that the concept of social cohesion, which refers to multiple social conflicts and widespread social exclusion along various axes, may not be an appropriate conceptual framework for understanding contemporary societies.

Figure 34. Satisfaction with living in Turkey (%)



How satisfied are you with living in Turkey?

Base:	Turkish citizens 1,933	Syrians 1,427	Non-Syrian migrants 506
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Several variables were analysed to explore their distribution and correlation with answers to the question about how satisfied respondents were with their lives in Turkey. The percentage of Turkish-citizen and non-Syrian migrant women respondents who indicated “I am satisfied” (43.9% and 78.2%, respectively) was higher than the percentage of men (39.9% and 53.9%, respectively). However, a smaller proportion of Syrian women (48.7%) than Syrian men (54.3%) responded “I am satisfied.” In a similar vein, a higher proportion of Syrian women (16.7%) than Syrian men (12.5%) responded “I am not satisfied.” The intersectional challenges Syrian women encounter, who more often struggle with being both women and refugees, are likely the driving force for these answers. Additionally, Syrian households, which normally have an average of 5 members, put the responsibility of household care on the women without assistance from the public, which would explain why they are less satisfied.

Table 15. Distribution of gender and level of satisfaction with living in Turkey (%)

Gender	Turkish Citizens			Syrians			Non-Syrian migrants		
	Dissatisfied	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	Satisfied
Male	36.1	24.0	39.9	12.5	33.2	54.3	27.5	18.6	53.9
Female	35.3	20.7	43.9	16.7	34.6	48.7	6.6	15.2	78.2

When investigating satisfaction with life in Turkey across age groups among Turkish-citizen respondents, an intriguing pattern emerges. The majority of those who responded “I am not satisfied” were young adults between the ages of 18 and 24. Nearly half of young Turkish citizens in this age bracket (48.8%) were unhappy with their country of residence. The age group with the highest percentage of “I am satisfied” responses, on the other hand, was between 45 and 49 years old (53.9%). Multiple studies have observed that the distribution of satisfaction is shaped by the uncertainty, anxiety, and hopelessness that young Turkish citizens feel about the future. However, among both Syrians and non-Syrian migrants, the

18-24 age groups had the highest percentage of “I am satisfied” responses (62.5% and 72.4% respectively). Young refugees and migrants have a more optimistic perspective on life in Turkey than previous generations and feel glad to be living here.

Table 16. Distribution of age and level of satisfaction with living in Turkey (%)

Age	Turkish Citizens			Syrians			Non-Syrian migrants		
	Dissatisfied	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	Satisfied
18 – 24	48.8	19.0	32.3	11.8	25.7	62.5	17.1	10.5	72.4
25 – 29	32.9	26.3	40.8	16.7	32.4	50.9	20.0	15.2	64.8
30 – 34	31.7	30.4	37.8	16.7	33.8	49.5	26.6	21.3	52.1
35 – 39	33.3	20.0	46.7	12.9	40.7	46.4	18.2	18.2	63.6
40 – 44	37.6	18.3	44.1	14.9	34.8	50.3	7.1	21.4	71.4
45 – 49	26.3	19.9	53.9	11.2	37.6	51.1	19.1	21.3	59.6

When examining the overall distribution between satisfaction with living in Turkey and respondents’ educational levels, it can be seen that as the educational level of Turkish-citizen respondents increases, the rate of “I am not satisfied” responses decreases and the rate of “I am satisfied” responses increases marginally. For other groups, no distinct correlation between educational level and satisfaction was observed.

Table 17. Distribution of educational attainment and level of satisfaction with living in Turkey (%)


Educational Attainment	Turkish Citizens			Syrians			Non-Syrian migrants		
	Dissatisfied	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	Satisfied
Illiterate	66.7	11.1	22.2	20.5	15.4	64.1	11.1	11.1	77.8
Literate	44.4	33.3	22.2	6.1	38.8	55.1	34.0	7.5	58.5
Primary school	39.9	13.5	46.6	20.0	30.2	49.8	10.7	15.6	73.8
Middle school	31.1	17.3	51.6	8.9	39.3	51.8	18.9	21.7	59.4
High school	36.6	20.4	43.0	15.1	37.8	47.1	22.9	20.8	56.3
University or above	33.9	33.9	32.1	6.2	25.7	68.1	17.9	7.1	75.0

In the relation between the length of migrants’ sojourn in Turkey and their satisfaction with life in the country, it is noteworthy that both Syrians and non-Syrian migrants exhibit an increase in the proportion of those indicating “I am not satisfied” as the length of their sojourn increases.

Table 18. Distribution of length of sojourn and level of satisfaction with living in Turkey (%)

Length	Syrians			Non-Syrian migrants		
	Dissatisfied	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	Satisfied
3 years or less	9.8	32.4	57.8	19.3	16.2	64.5
4-8 years	14.1	35.4	50.5	15.4	19.0	65.6
9 years or more	16.2	28.7	55.1	41.7	8.3	50.0

In accordance with the research design, questions whose answers depend on a variety of determinants or which probed into the feelings and attitudes of participants such as “feeling a sense of belonging to Turkey” were avoided as much as possible. Instead, it was considered more appropriate to ask about the sense of belonging to the neighbourhood, which is the spatial unit where daily life is lived and social relationships are formed. In response to this question, approximately one-third of the Turkish-citizen respondents (32.3%) indicated that they did not feel a sense of belonging to their neighbourhood or district, and it is notable that the largest proportion of respondents who provided negative responses were in the Turkish citizens group. This response bolsters the previously analysed evidence of dissatisfaction with life in Turkey. Despite this, however, nearly half of Turkish citizens and Syrians (47.3% and 47.4%, respectively) as well as more than half of non-Syrian migrants (53.8%) stated that they experience a sense of belonging in their neighbourhood. This finding can be interpreted as indicating that all three groups have significant ties to the social space in which they reside.

Figure 35. Sense of belonging to the neighbourhood (%)

When the sense of belonging to neighbourhood was examined based on gender, a difference emerged in the sample of non-Syrian migrants. The extent to which Turkish-citizen and Syrian respondents felt a sense of belonging in their community remains similar across genders. However, the percentage of women in the non-Syrian migrant group who responded “I feel a sense of belonging” was 65.4%, while the percentage of men was 45.5%. Similarly, only 9%


of non-Syrian migrant women responded, “I do not feel a sense of belonging,” while 28.1% of men responded the same. In other words, male participants in the non-Syrian migrant sample had a lower sense of belonging to neighbourhoods than women. This may be because migrant men who work temporary or seasonal jobs and reside in bachelor accommodations may have a weaker connection to their local environment.

Table 19. Distribution of gender and level of belonging to the neighbourhood (%)

Gender	Turkish Citizens			Syrians			Non-Syrian migrants		
	I don't feel a sense of belonging	I feel somewhat connected	I feel a sense of belonging	I don't feel a sense of belonging	I feel somewhat connected	I feel a sense of belonging	I don't feel a sense of belonging	I feel somewhat connected	I feel a sense of belonging
Male	32.0	18.8	49.2	22.4	30.3	47.2	28.1	26.4	45.4
Female	32.6	22.0	45.4	26.0	26.3	47.7	9.0	25.6	65.4


The question “How safe do you feel in your neighbourhood?” was posed as another inquiry into the relationship between the living environment and its inhabitants. A notable element of the responses to this question was that the percentage of Turkish-citizen respondents who did not feel safe (43.8%) is close to the percentage of respondents who did feel safe (56.2%). Approximately one-third of Syrian and non-Syrian migrant respondents indicated that they did not feel secure (28.4% and 34.1% respectively), whereas approximately two-thirds of them indicated that they felt safe (71.6% and 65.8% respectively). One of the reasons why Syrian respondents may feel relatively safe in their neighbourhoods is that they reside alongside other Syrians. Compared to the other two groups, a greater proportion of Turkish-citizen respondents provided extreme responses to this question. On the other hand, the majority of responses from Syrians and non-Syrian migrants were more moderate.

Figure 36. Feeling safe in the neighbourhood (%)



How safe do you feel in your neighbourhood?			
Base:	Turkish citizens	Syrians	Non-Syrian migrants
	1,933	1,427	506

Figure 37. Feeling safe in the neighbourhood (%)



When reviewing the relationship between educational attainment and neighbourhood safety, a generalization can be made. As the education level of Turkish-citizen respondents increases, so does the rate of feeling secure in the neighbourhood, and, presumably, the socioeconomic status of the neighbourhood improves. In contrast, among Syrian respondents, the percentage of those who do not feel secure in their neighbourhood increases as their level of education increases. Although less pronounced among non-Syrian migrants, it is still possible to observe that as education level increases, so does the rate of feeling insecure. Based on these findings, it can be argued that migrants with a higher level of education are more observant of the communities in which they reside, as well as a greater awareness of negative attitudes towards migrants.¹⁶ Another reason could be that the migrants who previously resided in countries with better socioeconomic conditions than Turkey have particular concerns about the neighbourhoods in which they now reside. Middle-class Syrian participants in a study conducted in the Beyoğlu district of Istanbul expressed similar concerns (Kurtuluş et al., 2022). Recent increases in xenophobia and racism may have influenced the responses to this question, as educated migrants and refugees closely monitor these issues in their communities.

¹⁶ Some studies in Germany show that as migrants' level of educational attainment increases, their awareness or perceptions of negative aspects of their living conditions, including racism, also increases (see for instance, Riegel, 2007; Terkessidis, 2004; Gomolla, 2017).

Table 20. Distribution of education level and feeling safe in the neighbourhood (%)

Educational Attainment	Turkish Citizens		Syrians		Non-Syrian migrants	
	I don't feel safe	I feel safe	I don't feel safe	I feel safe	I don't feel safe	I feel safe
Illiterate	66.7	33.3	12.8	87.2	22.2	77.8
Literate	70.4	29.6	28.6	71.4	35.8	64.2
Primary school	46.9	53.1	19.3	80.7	22.1	77.9
Middle school	37.2	62.8	35.8	64.2	40.6	59.4
High school	41.7	58.3	37.0	63.0	41.7	58.3
University or above	47.8	52.2	31.9	68.1	28.6	71.4

Another noteworthy finding regarding this question is that the percentage of Syrians who felt safe in their neighbourhood increases as the length of their sojourn in Turkey increases. The absence of this trend among non-Syrian migrants is likely attributable to the small proportion of non-Syrian migrants who have lived in Turkey for nine years or longer (see Figure 13: 7.1%).

Table 21. Distribution of length of sojourn in Turkey and feeling safe in the neighbourhood (%)

Length	Syrians		Non-Syrian migrants	
	I don't feel safe	I feel safe	I don't feel safe	I feel safe
3 years or less	40.2	59.8	38.6	61.4
4-8 years	30.9	69.1	29.3	70.7
9 years or more	16.2	83.8	47.2	52.8

The percentage of respondents from the three groups who reported feeling secure in their neighbourhood increases with the length of their residence there. The only exception to this trend is among Syrians who had been residing in the same neighbourhood for seven to ten years (37.8%) and especially those who had been residing in the same neighbourhood for eleven years or more (75%). However, it should be noted that the number of Syrians who had been living in the same neighbourhood and in Turkey for at least 11 years is exceptionally small.

Table 22. Distribution of length of sojourn in the neighbourhood and feeling safe (%)

Length	Turkish Citizens		Syrians		Non-Syrian migrants	
	I don't feel safe	I feel safe	I don't feel safe	I feel safe	I don't feel safe	I feel safe
1 year or less	61.1	38.9	40.9	59.1	41.2	58.8
2-3 years	57.3	42.7	20.6	79.4	34.0	66.0
4-6 years	45.0	55.0	26.0	74.0	30.1	69.9
7-10 years	37.3	62.7	37.8	62.2	21.7	78.3
11 years or more	36.2	63.8	75.0	25.0	0.0	100.0


More than two-thirds of Turkish-citizen participants (71.5%) who reported feeling secure in their neighbourhood, as well as approximately two-thirds of Syrian (61.4%) and non-Syrian migrant participants (63.1%), expressed a sense of belonging in their neighbourhood.

Table 23. Distribution of feeling safe in the neighbourhood and sense of belonging (%)

Response	Turkish Citizens			Syrians			Non-Syrian migrants		
	I don't feel a sense of belonging	I feel somewhat connected	I feel a sense of belonging	I don't feel a sense of belonging	I feel somewhat connected	I feel a sense of belonging	I don't feel a sense of belonging	I feel somewhat connected	I feel a sense of belonging
I don't feel safe	58.6	25.1	16.3	43.8	43.8	12.3	43.9	20.2	35.8
I feel safe	11.8	16.8	71.5	16.0	22.6	61.4	7.8	29.1	63.1

Aspirations about living in Turkey or another country

Participants were asked if they wished to remain in Turkey in the future. Half of those who took part in all three sample groups responded affirmatively to this question, stating “I can continue living in Turkey” or “I definitely want to live in Turkey” (Figure 38). The other half of those surveyed were uncertain about residing in Turkey or were contemplating moving to another country. When the negative responses to this question are analysed in depth, it is notable that the percentage of Turkish citizens who answered “I definitely want to live in another country” or “I can consider living in another country” (35.5%) is higher than that



of Syrians (22.8%) and non-Syrian migrants (21%). However, the percentage of Turkish-citizen respondents who stated “I will definitely live in Turkey in the future” (27%) is also higher than that of Syrian and other migrant participants (13.1% and 18.8%, respectively). Syrians are the largest group of those who were uncertain about residing in Turkey or migrating to another country (26.4%). Following them are non-Syrian migrants (23.7%) and Turkish citizens (16.4%).

Table 24. Age and willingness to continue living in Turkey (%)

Turkish citizens					
Age	I definitely want to live in another country	I can consider living in another country	I don't know if I want to stay in Turkey or emigrate	I can continue living in Turkey	I definitely want to live in Turkey
18 – 24	20.5	23.3	18.5	12.3	25.5
25 – 29	15.0	23.7	14.2	20.2	26.9
30 – 34	13.5	23.1	19.2	19.6	24.7
35 – 39	16.8	15.6	15.2	20.3	32.1
40 – 44	14.8	17.5	17.9	22.1	27.8
45 – 49	10.1	15.8	13.1	35.7	25.3

Syrians					
Age	I definitely want to live in another country	I can consider living in another country	I don't know if I want to stay in Turkey or emigrate	I can continue living in Turkey	I definitely want to live in Turkey
18 – 24	10.3	7.0	21.3	41.2	20.2
25 – 29	13.3	13.3	24.2	35.5	13.7
30 – 34	10.2	12.0	28.0	40.0	9.8
35 – 39	12.1	12.1	26.2	35.9	13.7
40 – 44	13.7	17.4	29.8	30.4	8.7
45 – 49	10.7	6.2	32.6	41.0	9.6

Non-Syrian migrants					
Age	I definitely want to live in another country	I can consider living in another country	I don't know if I want to stay in Turkey or emigrate	I can continue living in Turkey	I definitely want to live in Turkey
18 – 24	16.2	3.8	19.0	36.2	24.8
25 – 29	19.0	4.8	21.0	34.3	21.0
30 – 34	21.3	6.4	25.5	35.1	11.7
35 – 39	11.1	9.1	26.3	35.4	18.2
40 – 44	3.6	5.4	37.5	46.4	7.1
45 – 49	14.9	6.4	14.9	34.0	29.8

When examining aspirations about living in Turkey or some other country based on the age brackets of the respondents, it was found that 43.8% of Turkish-citizen respondents aged 18 to 24 expressed a wish to live in another country. Similarly, 25.9% of Turkish citizens in the oldest age bracket, 45-49, expressed an intention to reside in a foreign country. In terms of age categories, the most significant result among Syrians is the strong desire of young people aged 18 to 24 to remain in Turkey. 61.3% of Syrian respondents between the ages of 18 and 24 indicated “I definitely want to live in Turkey” (20.2%) or “I can continue living in Turkey” (41.2%). There is no discernible pattern in the distribution of responses across age groups provided by the non-Syrian migrants to the same query.

When assessing the relationship between the willingness to continue living in Turkey and satisfaction with living in Turkey, it is evident in all three samples that dissatisfaction with living in Turkey correlates with desires or thoughts of living in another country.


Table 25. Distribution of satisfaction level with living in Turkey and willingness to continue living in Turkey (%)

Turkish citizens					
Satisfaction Status	I definitely want to live in another country	I can consider living in another country	I don't know if I want to stay in Turkey or emigrate	I can continue living in Turkey	I definitely want to live in Turkey
Dissatisfied	35.8	37.4	19.3	3.8	3.8
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	8.3	25.0	32.6	18.1	16.0
Satisfied	1.8	2.8	5.3	37.5	52.5
Syrians					
Satisfaction Status	I definitely want to live in another country	I can consider living in another country	I don't know if I want to stay in Turkey or emigrate	I can continue living in Turkey	I definitely want to live in Turkey
Dissatisfied	46.8	28.6	15.8	7.4	1.5
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	8.3	10.8	58.5	19.5	2.9
Satisfied	4.2	6.7	8.5	57.7	22.9
Non-Syrian migrants					
Satisfaction Status	I definitely want to live in another country	I can consider living in another country	I don't know if I want to stay in Turkey or emigrate	I can continue living in Turkey	I definitely want to live in Turkey
Dissatisfied	76.8	4.2	14.7	3.2	1.1
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	3.4	10.3	67.8	17.2	1.1
Satisfied	0.3	5.2	14.5	51.2	28.7

Experiences and perceptions of unfair treatment

One of the key components of studies on social integration and social inclusion of migrants is the experience of discrimination. In line with the research design of this study, both Turkish citizens and migrants who are in similar socio-spatial positions were asked questions on discrimination. The issue of discrimination was examined through three different questions about unfair treatment experiences. In response to the first question, “Have you experienced any unfair treatment during your time in Turkey?,” four-fifths of those questioned answered “no.” This rate was 88.0% for Turkish-citizen respondents, 79.9% for Syrians, and 83.6% for all non-Syrian migrants. Syrians (20.1%) and non-Syrian migrants (16.4%) reported experiencing the most instances of unfair treatment. It was observed that there were no gender-based differences in the responses to instances of unfair treatment.

Figure 39. Experiences of unfair treatment in Turkey (%)



Base:	Turkish citizens 1,933	Syrians 1,427	Non-Syrian migrants 506
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Figure 40. Distribution of gender and experience of unfair treatment in Turkey (%)

Gender	Turkish Citizens		Syrians		Non-Syrian migrants	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Male	12.0	88.0	20.3	79.7	20.3	79.7
Female	11.9	88.1	19.9	80.1	10.9	89.1

The respondents' self-reported personal incomes were examined in relation to the question about unfair treatment. It is noteworthy that as the personal incomes of native participants decrease, the proportion of those who claim to have gone through unfair treatment increases significantly. However, there was no such differentiation among Syrians and non-Syrian migrants in relation to variations in income levels.


Table 26. Distribution of personal monthly income and experience of unfair treatment in Turkey (%)

Income	Turkish Citizens		Syrians		Non-Syrian migrants	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
3,999 TL or below	20.9	79.1	33.2	66.8	15.0	85.0
4,000 - 5,999 TL	14.9	85.1	14.9	85.1	38.0	62.0
6,000 - 7,999 TL	9.8	90.2	0.0	100.0	7.7	92.3
8,000 - 9,999 TL	2.7	97.3	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0
10,000 TL or above	5.1	94.9	20.0	80.0	0.0	0.0

The respondents who indicated they had experienced unfair treatment were asked about the causes of their unfair treatment. Language, nationality, economic status, ethnic identity, foreigner status, gender, appearance/clothing, political views, religious views, age, sexual orientation, and disability status were among the choices that were available. This question was constructed so that respondents could provide multiple responses. Among the options, Turkish citizens most frequently cited economic status (27.4%), gender (15.5%), and ethnic identity (12.2%). The frequently cited responses from Syrians included language (36.6%), nationality (28.3%), and economic status (21.4%). The most common responses from non-Syrian migrants included foreignness (34.9%), nationality (28.6%), and ethnicity (15.9%). In addition, 11.9% of responses from non-Syrian migrants cited language as the reason for unfair treatment.

Other reasons mentioned by Syrians were ethnic identity and being a foreigner, while gender and appearance/clothing accounted for a very small percentage. Non-Syrian migrants also cited gender, economic status, and appearance/clothing. Considering the responses of migrants to this question, we can conclude that they perceive unfair treatment in relation to their own status-related issues, including language, nationality, foreignness, and ethnic identity. On the other hand, although the proportions may be very low, at least some Turkish-citizen respondents stated that they had experienced unfair treatment in almost every aspect mentioned.

Figure 41. Reasons given by individuals who reported an experience of unfair treatment in Turkey (%)



For which of the following reasons have you been unfairly treated?

Base:	Turkish citizens 412	Syrians 636	Non-Syrian migrants 126
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Table 27. Distribution of unfair treatment in Turkey and willingness to continue living in Turkey (%)

Turkish citizens					
Yes/No	I definitely want to live in another country	I can consider living in another country	I don't know if I want to stay in Turkey or emigrate	I can continue living in Turkey	I definitely want to live in Turkey
Yes	27.7	37.7	10.4	18.6	5.6
No	13.7	17.7	17.2	21.4	29.8


Syrians					
Yes/No	I definitely want to live in another country	I can consider living in another country	I don't know if I want to stay in Turkey or emigrate	I can continue living in Turkey	I definitely want to live in Turkey
Yes	8.0	2.8	72.1	11.8	5.2
No	12.5	13.3	14.9	44.1	15.1

Non-Syrian migrants					
Yes/No	I definitely want to live in another country	I can consider living in another country	I don't know if I want to stay in Turkey or emigrate	I can continue living in Turkey	I definitely want to live in Turkey
Yes	45.8	9.6	20.5	18.1	6.0
No	9.2	5.2	24.3	40.0	21.3

The analysis suggests that the experience of unfair treatment in Turkey may affect the aspirations to stay in Turkey. Among native respondents who reported experiencing unfair treatment, 65.4% made statements such as “I definitely want to live in another country” or “I may consider living in another country.” Among Syrian participants, those who reported not being treated unfairly were more likely to say, “I can continue living in Turkey” (44.1%), or “I definitely want to live in Turkey” (15%). Notable is the fact that approximately three-quarters of Syrians who reported unfair treatment (72,1%) did not express a distinct preference, stating, “I am unsure whether to continue my life in Turkey or migrate to another country.” Among non-Syrian migrant respondents who reported experiencing unfair treatment, 45.8% expressed a desire to live in a different country, while 9.6% said they may contemplate doing so.

In the survey, respondents who reported experiencing unfair treatment were also asked, “In which situations did you experience unfair treatment?” The top three responses to this query from Turkish-citizen respondents were “on the street/public transportation” (24.8%), “at school” (19.4%), and “at the workplace” (15.8%). “While receiving healthcare services” (23.4%), “while searching for housing” (22.1%), and “at the workplace” (20%) were the top three responses among Syrians. For non-Syrian migrants, “at the workplace” (28.3%), “applying for employment” (27.6%), and “the street/public transportation” (23%) ranked highest. When evaluating the top three areas where respondents most frequently encountered unfair treatment, the most frequently reported option common to all groups was “at the workplace” (15% and above for all three groups) (Figure 42). The fact that Syrian respondents reported experiencing unfair treatment while receiving healthcare services more frequently than non-Syrian migrants can be attributed to the fact that Syrians have the right to access healthcare services while non-Syrian migrants have very limited access to healthcare. These issues are discussed in a different section of the report. There may be a correlation between the stricter requirements for obtaining work permits and the high incidence of discriminatory treatment reported by non-Syrian migrants regarding workplace options and job applications. It is plausible that the weaker institutional relationship between the other two groups and the school system accounts for the higher rate of native participants reporting unfair treatment at educational institutions. In addition, the fact that “searching for housing” was the second most frequently reported site of unfair treatment for Syrians can be interpreted as a reflection of the challenges faced by Syrian households, 97.5% of which are tenants (Figure 26) and have a larger average household size (5 people) than other groups when renting housing.

Figure 42. Places of unfair treatment in Turkey (%)



Migrants' Turkish language skills and use of their native language in daily life

In the study, Syrians and non-Syrian migrants were asked questions regarding their proficiency in speaking, reading, and writing the Turkish language. In addition, the respondents were asked about their ability to use their native language in various aspects of daily life.

Migrants' Turkish language skills

In the present research, the language proficiency of 1,427 Syrians and 506 other migrants in Turkey since 2010, and with registered residences, was evaluated. In terms of comprehension of a Turkish document, understanding the spoken language, and deciphering media content, approximately 40% of Syrians claim to have a sufficient level of proficiency with the Turkish language. However, this percentage falls below 30% when it comes to writing Turkish texts that express emotions and thoughts or formal correspondence. Approximately 20% of Syrian respondents claimed to have a high level of proficiency in understanding, speaking, reading, and writing Turkish. The average percentage of individuals reporting outstanding Turkish proficiency across all levels is 8.6%. However, when queried about more advanced language skills, such as the ability to write official correspondence, the percentage of those claiming to have an excellent command of Turkish drops to 2.5%. As for non-Syrian migrants, approximately 30.8% believed they had a high level of proficiency in reading and comprehending Turkish documents, and between 41.4 and 44.0% believed that they could understand spoken language and media content. 38.7% of non-Syrian migrants claimed to be proficient enough in writing Turkish texts to convey their emotions and thoughts or to compose an official letter. Approximately 20% of respondents claimed to have a high level of proficiency in comprehending, speaking, reading, and writing Turkish. The average rate of individuals reporting excellent proficiency in Turkish across all proficiency levels was in the range of 6 to 7%. However, when it comes to more advanced language skills, such as undertaking official correspondence, the percentage of respondents claiming to have an outstanding command of Turkish drops to 4.9% (Figure 44).

Figure 43. Syrians' Turkish language skills (%)





Figure 44. Non-Syrian migrants' Turkish language skills (%)



Proficiency in the Turkish language varies by gender among Syrian and non-Syrian participants. Across all categories, male Syrian participants reported a higher level of Turkish language proficiency than females (Table 28). This difference arises from the fact that Syrian women in Turkey are disproportionately occupied as housewives, as indicated by our research findings, at a rate of at least 80% (Table 5), and that they are less likely to participate in public life, where they might be exposed to language acquisition opportunities. Furthermore, given that education in one's native language is critical for developing literacy abilities, the lower educational attainment of women compared to men can be viewed as a factor that reduces their language learning proficiency. In the non-Syrian migrant group, while the overall proficiency in using Turkish language is generally lower among women compared to men, the percentage of females who consider themselves to have a good level of proficiency in reading and understanding a Turkish document is slightly higher among non-Syrian migrant groups (41.2%) than among males (39.7%) (Table 29).

Table 28. Distribution of gender and Turkish language skills (Syrians) (%)

Proficiencies	Male			Female		
	Poor	Fair	Good	Poor	Fair	Good
When you read a document in Turkish, how well do you understand the subject?	24.1	42.7	33.2	43.7	37.1	19.2
How would you rate your ability to express yourself in spoken and written Turkish?	13.3	45.3	41.4	32.0	38.6	29.3
How well do you understand TV, radio and social media content in Turkish?	19.3	46.4	34.3	41.0	30.5	28.5
How would you rate your ability to write messages about your feelings and opinions?	33.3	28.8	37.9	48.2	23.9	27.8
If you had to write a formal letter, how confident would you be in your ability to do so?	46.5	30.8	22.7	59.4	27.2	13.5


Table 29. Distribution of gender and Turkish language skills (non-Syrian migrants) (%)

Proficiencies	Male			Female		
	Poor	Fair	Good	Poor	Fair	Good
When you read a document in Turkish, how well do you understand the subject?	29.5	30.8	39.7	38.4	20.4	41.2
How would you rate your ability to express yourself in spoken and written Turkish?	22.7	45.1	32.2	37.9	35.5	26.5
How well do you understand TV, radio and social media content in Turkish?	30.8	47.8	21.4	46.4	38.4	15.2
How would you rate your ability to write messages about your feelings and opinions?	38.0	43.7	18.3	52.6	31.8	15.6
If you had to write a formal letter, how confident would you be in your ability to do so?	56.6	28.5	14.9	63.0	24.6	12.3

Migrants' level of use of their native language in daily life


When Syrians and non-Syrian migrants were asked about the extent to which they can use their native languages in their daily lives in Turkey, it was found that 81.9% of Syrian migrants were communicating in their native language with household members, relatives, and fellow compatriots. The fact that 37.8% of Syrians were using their native language while shopping is also noteworthy. In areas and neighbourhoods with a high concentration of Syrians, there is a preponderance of Arabic-speaking salespeople, as well as a concentration of shops owned and operated by Syrians, where migrants frequently make purchases. The proportion of Syrians who communicate with colleagues and employers in their native language at work was 25.4%, which can be attributed to factors such as the presence of many Syrians in their workplaces or working in businesses owned by Syrians, which favours the use of their native language. Similarly, 26.1% of Syrians were communicating with their neighbours in their native language, which is related to the density of the Syrian population formed by migration networks in those communities. In addition, the availability of Kurdish language communication with the local Kurdish communities in neighbourhoods where Syrian Kurds and Roma reside increases opportunities for social communication in migrants' native tongues. In contrast, Syrians have the least opportunity to use their native language when receiving services from official/public institutions. Figure 45 indicates that 12.3% of migrants can communicate in their native language in official institutions, which is not negligible given that Syrian migration is a recent phenomenon. This rate may be attributed in part to the presence of interpreters in municipal and social service institutions. Despite more than

Figure 45. Instances where Syrians use their native language in daily life (%)



Please rate how much you use your native language in your daily life according to the statements below.
 Base: 1,427

Figure 46. Instances where non-Syrian migrants use their native language in daily life (%)



six decades having passed since post-World War II labour migrations to Western Europe, the provision of services in languages other than national language(s) in European Union countries remains extremely limited. However, some public institutions may offer translation services in the languages of migrants.

Compared to Syrians, non-Syrian migrants have fewer opportunities to use their native languages in daily life. Like Syrians, 84% of them speak their native language within their households and when communicating with relatives/countrymen. Some migrants from former British and French colonies in Africa and South Asia may speak English or French. These groups use English as if it were their native language while shopping, resulting in up to 25.1% of them being able to communicate in their native language whilst shopping. However, when it comes to using their native language in the workplace, the percentage of Iraqis is substantially lower than that of Syrians, at 9.3%. Comparatively, the percentage of non-Syrian migrants using their native language to communicate with their neighbours is 16.2%, also lower than that of Syrians. On the other hand, the proportion of non-Syrian migrants who can communicate with public institutions in their native language is marginally higher than among Syrians (14.8%) (Figure 46). The fact that some non-Syrian migrants speak English contributes to this minor variation.


Social Participation

In the quantitative study, questions were posed to both natives and migrants regarding how they socialized with different nationalities, their frequency of communication via phone and social media, participation in various types of social activities, and the extent to which different nationalities were involved in these activities. Additionally, this question set examined practices of mutual assistance between natives and migrants.

Home visits and digital communication with different nationalities

During the field research, both native and migrant participants' social participation and level of interaction with one another were assessed. The frequency with which Turkish-citizen, Syrian, and non-Syrian migrant respondents visited the homes of neighbours or acquaintances of different nationalities was found to be exceptionally low. 67% of Turkish-citizen respondents, 37.6% of Syrian migrants, and 52.8% of non-Syrian migrants have never been to the homes of acquaintances or neighbours who were not from the same country. Compared to the Turkish respondents and non-Syrian migrants, Syrians were more likely to visit the homes of different-nationality neighbours or acquaintances (Figure 47). These responses indicate that Syrian participants are more likely than Turkish-citizen respondents to visit households with different nationalities.

Figure 47. Frequency of home visits to neighbours or acquaintances of different nationalities (%)




How often do you visit your neighbours or friends who live in this city and are from a different country than you?

Base:	Turkish citizens	Syrians	Non-Syrian migrants
	1,933	1,427	506

Similar data emerged when Turkish-citizen and migrant respondents were asked about the frequency with which they invited neighbours and acquaintances of different nationalities to their homes. While 68.5% natives stated that they have not invited foreign neighbours or acquaintances to their homes, this rate was 53% among non-Syrian migrants and 24.9% among Syrians (Figure 48). Thus, Syrian respondents were more likely to invite people of different nationalities to their homes than both non-Syrian migrants and natives. These rates indicate that Syrians are more active than non-Syrian migrants in establishing social relationships within their host society. The fact that most Syrians have been living in the country for a longer period and have more social interactions through institutions like education and healthcare might have contributed to this result. On the other hand, natives are not making efforts to develop social relationships with migrants of different nationalities.

Figure 48. Frequency of inviting neighbours or acquaintances of different nationalities to homes (%)




Base:	Turkish citizens	Syrians	Non-Syrian migrants
	1,933	1,427	506

The fieldwork followed the end of the two-year pandemic. The pandemic heavily constrained social relations spatially and relations between natives and migrants, as well as among themselves, were therefore equally restricted. Yet, when respondents were questioned about their level of social participation via phone communication or digital channels such as WhatsApp, Facebook, Instagram, etc. during this period, a pattern parallel to the preceding table has emerged. That is, when respondents were asked about the frequency of such communication with neighbours or acquaintances of different nationalities, 67.8% of Turkish-citizen respondents stated they had no contact with people of different nationalities. This percentage was 34.3% among Syrians and 51.2% among non-Syrian migrants. Again, it can be observed that Syrians were more active in communicating with individuals of other nationalities. While only 3.6% of Turkish-citizen respondents reported having frequently communicated with people of different nationalities via phone or digital channels, 15.5% Syrians did so frequently (Figure 49). The percentage of native participants who reported having rarely or occasionally communicated with people of different nationalities was 27.4%. This rate was 43.1% among Syrians and 44.5% among non-Syrian migrants.

The fact that migrants have a greater desire to establish social relationships with Turkish citizens or non-Syrian migrant groups of different nationalities is highly related to the nature of migration. In their quest to build a new life in the host country, migrants require social connections to meet their fundamental needs and sustain their lives. As migrants may have lost all previous social bonds and public and social support mechanisms, they seek to re-establish these institutions and the intensity of such an effort is proportional to the migrants' wish to permanently settle in the country to which they have migrated. Thus, there is a certain correlation between the efforts of Syrians under TP status in Turkey and their desire to continue living in Turkey, as more than half of them expressed positive sentiments (Figure 38). In the case of non-Syrian migrants, however, as their primary motive of migration to Turkey are either for employment or transit to another country, their efforts to pursue social ties with Turkish citizens or with migrants of different nationalities remain at a lower level.

Figure 49. Frequency of communication/chatting with neighbours or acquaintances of different nationalities by phone or digital means (%)



Base:	Turkish citizens	Syrians	Non-Syrian migrants
	1,933	1,427	506

Participation in social activities

Several questions concerned participation in various social activities and the frequency of such participation. All three groups were least likely to attend union and professional organisation-sponsored events relative to other social activities. On the one hand, the low level of union or professional organisation engagement among migrants may be ascribed to legal and institutional obstacles. Nonetheless, on the other, it is notable that native participants also reported a low level of engagement with unions and professional organisations, indicating a broader problem that extends beyond access barriers. That is, this result indicates there is both a lack of organisation and a weakness in labour and profession-based relationships.

Figure 50. Frequency of Turkish citizens' participation in social activities (%)






Figure 51. Syrians' participation in social activities (%)





Yet it was also found that both Turkish-citizen and migrant respondents participated in activities such as attending places of worship or gathering in public spaces such as park, gardens, and cafes at least once a week. While 32.3% of Turkish-citizen respondents indicated that they participated in collective worship or similar ceremonies at least once a week, 38.1% reported participation in activities such as meeting acquaintances in parks, gardens, or cafes at least as often (Figure 50). 41.3% of Syrians also expressed that they attend collective worship or similar ceremonies at least once a week, whereas 52.3% of this group stated that they meet with acquaintances in parks, gardens, or cafes (Figure 51) just as often. Finally, 31.4% non-Syrian migrant respondents indicated that they participate in worship activities at least once week and 38.1% that they meet with acquaintances in parks, gardens, or cafes with the same frequency (Figure 52). Thus, the fact that a significant number of migrants frequently attend a place of worship (mosque, church, etc.) or attend events organised by civic actors related to religion is indicative of the cultural nature of the most recent wave of migration to Turkey.




Participants' encounters with different nationalities in social activities was also queried. It emerged that events such as weddings and engagement ceremonies that take place within the family and relatives' social circles attracted the least number of individuals from different nationalities, with 67.2% of native participants reporting that people of different nationalities do not participate in those they attend. This was followed by social activities in public spaces such as parks, gardens, or cafes, with 56.2% reporting that foreigners do not participate in such activities (Figure 53). By contrast, 17.3% of Turkish-citizen participants reported that a majority of participants at worship activities they attended were of different nationalities.

An examination into the percentages of other nationalities who participated in events attended by Syrians revealed a different picture. While in training courses, activities such as sports, entertainment or cultural events, or activities organised by volunteer organisations in which Syrians participate, the number of persons from other nationalities was nearly equal





or close to 50%¹⁷, whereas this percentage decreases in events involving closer social circles such as weddings and engagements (Figure 54). The levels of participation of individuals of other nationalities in activities attended by Syrians are higher than the levels of participation of people of other nationalities in activities attended by natives, but they do not constitute a majority in any category. The fact that worship is the only activity where individuals from other nationalities constitute more than half of the participants among activities attended by Syrian immigrants (Figure 54) is indicative of the fact that religious activities and places of worship represent the strongest area of shared social participation between the natives and Syrian migrants.



¹⁷ Social cohesion activities organised by civil society organisations providing services to refugees tend to target the participation of both natives and Syrians. This finding demonstrates the importance of civil society projects for social cohesion.

Apart from family-related events such as engagements and weddings, people of nationalities other than their own constituted the majority of participants in all activities attended by non-Syrian migrants (Figure 55). Unlike the Syrian sample, the sample of non-Syrian migrants consists of a more diverse group in terms of countries of origin. The opportunities for socialisation with people of their own nationality are much fewer than they are for natives and Syrians, who arrived in Turkey in large numbers. Thus, in all activity categories, non-Syrian migrants reported having more interactions with persons of different nationalities.

Solidarity

The questionnaire also examined the extent to which native and migrant participants seek assistance from neighbours, local shopkeepers, colleagues, and other acquaintances of different nationalities in situations where they need assistance (such as borrowing money, shopping on credit, getting a ride somewhere, caring for children or the elderly, home repairs, and other material needs). 3.1% of native participants reported having sought assistance from acquaintances of other nationalities. The percentage of migrants who seek assistance from individuals of different nationalities was higher, at 9.9% for non-Syrian migrants and 13.3% for Syrians (Figure 56). These data indicate that the frequency of mutual aid in daily life is very low between natives and migrants, as well as between migrant groups.

As Syrians and non-Syrian migrant groups remain in Turkey for an extended period, they are more likely to seek assistance from the surrounding community, regardless of their nationality. 7.8% of Syrians who had lived in Turkey for less than three years had looked for assistance from people of different nationalities, compared to 9.2% of those who had lived there for 4-8 years and 15.2% of those who had lived there for more than nine years. Non-Syrian migrant groups had a rate of around 10% for up to and including eight years of sojourn and 13.9% for more than nine years.





Figure 57. Distribution of length of sojourn in Turkey and receiving assistance from different nationalities (%)

Length	Syrians		Non-Syrian migrants	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
3 years or less	7.8	92.2	10.2	89.8
4-8 years	13.3	86.7	9.2	90.8
9 years or more	15.2	84.8	13.9	86.1

for more than nine years (Figure 57). Adaptation to the living environment and increased social contact, as the length of sojourn increases, increase the likelihood and opportunity for migrants to seek assistance from the surrounding community, regardless of their nationality.

In a question regarding the responses of native and migrant participants to potential scenarios such as attacks or harassment, most native participants, approximately 78.2%, indicated that they would contact the police. This figure was 71.7% for Syrians and 67.8% for all non-Syrian migrants. Among migrants, the rate of seeking assistance from family and relatives (those of the same nationality) ranged from 21% (Syrians) to 23% (non-Syrians), while it fell to around 10% among the native participants. Both natives and migrants are considerably less likely to seek assistance from their neighbours, with rates hovering around 5% and 3%, respectively. Non-Syrian migrants stood out as being more likely to say they would contemplate leaving the neighbourhood or do nothing in such a situation. The greater sense of insecurity among non-Syrian migrant groups compared to Syrians in such situations may be attributable to their perceived vulnerability as well as their lack of legal status compared to Syrians.

Figure 58. Attitudes when confronted with an attack or assault (%)




Base:	Turkish citizens 1,933	Syrians 1,427	Non-Syrian migrants 506
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Interest in Turkish Politics

The quantitative study also explored native and migrant participants' interest in Turkey's political agenda. 40.5% of Turkish-citizen respondents, 46.1% of Syrian migrants, and 54% of non-Syrian migrants reported that they seldom or never follow the political agenda in Turkey. Given that the neighbourhoods in which the surveys were conducted were typically migrant areas where low-wage workers reside, it is noteworthy that both the natives and migrants share a lack of interest in political developments. The percentage of Turkish citizens who closely follow political developments was 25.3%, while the percentages of Syrians and non-Syrian migrants were 16.7% and 12.2%, respectively.

Figure 59. Frequency of following political developments in Turkey (%)



Base:	Turkish citizens	Syrians	Non-Syrian migrants
	1,933	1,427	506

When examining the relationship between migrants' interests in Turkish politics and the duration of their sojourn in the country, it can be observed that migrants' interest in politics increases in tandem with their length of stay. Among Syrian migrants, 8.8% of those in Turkey for three years or less often or always followed the political agenda, while it was 15.7% of those in the country for 4-8 years, and 22.8% for those who have been in Turkey for nine years or more. A similar trend is observed among the non-Syrian migrants. The percentages of those showing an interest in politics often or always and who have been in the country for

Table 30. Length of sojourn in Turkey and interest in politics (%)

Length	Syrians			Non-Syrian migrants		
	Rarely or never	Sometimes	Frequently or always	Rarely or never	Sometimes	Frequently or always
3 years or less	56.9	34.3	8.8	59.9	29.9	10.2
4-8 years	44.8	39.5	15.7	49.1	37.4	13.6
9 years or more	46.9	30.4	22.8	58.3	22.2	19.4

less than three years, for 4-8 years, and for nine years or more were 10.2%, 13.6%, and 19.4%, respectively. As the length of stay in the country increases, along with language acquisition, it brings about more participation in work life and social activities, which in turn increases interest in political matters concerning daily life in Turkey.

Through a question about Turkey's capital city, migrants' knowledge of the administrative structure of Turkey was assessed. 1.9% of Turkish-citizen respondents, 2.2% of Syrians, and 3.8% of non-Syrian migrants incorrectly named Istanbul as the capital of Turkey. Among Syrian migrants, 79.5% correctly said that Istanbul is not the capital of Turkey, while 18.4% said they did not know. The non-Syrian migrant group displayed similar rates (Figure 60). As anticipated, the proportion of individuals who recognise that Istanbul is not the capital of Turkey increases as education level rises (Table 31).





Table 31. Distribution of responses to the statement “Istanbul is the capital of Turkey” and educational attainment (%)

Educational Attainment	Turkish Citizens			Syrians			Non-Syrian migrants		
	Cor-rect	Incor-rect	I don't know	Cor-rect	Incor-rect	I don't know	Cor-rect	Incor-rect	I don't know
Illiterate	22.2	66.7	11.1	15.4	48.7	35.9	18.5	51.9	29.6
Literate	3.7	96.3	0.0	2.0	81.6	16.3	3.8	86.8	9.4
Primary School	1.6	97.7	0.6	2.0	74.5	23.5	1.6	68.9	29.5
Middle School	2.3	97.1	0.6	2.3	82.9	14.8	2.8	85.0	12.2
High School	1.9	97.0	1.1	1.3	83.6	15.1	2.1	94.8	3.1
University or above	1.2	96.4	2.4	0.0	91.2	8.8	10.7	67.9	21.4


Figure 61. Distribution of responses to the statement “Presidential elections in Turkey will be held in 2024.” (%)



The percentage of migrants who identified incorrect information about the date of the next Turkish presidential elections to be “correct” was very low. While Syrians may not have a strong interest in Turkey’s general political agenda (Figure 61), they are more interested in political issues and developments that influence their future in Turkey. Due to the importance of the current president’s stance on immigration issues, they follow election-related news. More than 52% of Syrian respondents were aware that the statement “Presidential elections will be held in 2024” was false. This rate fell to 36.2% among non-Syrian migrants. The percentage of migrants who did not know the election date was 46% among Syrians and 59.1% among non-Syrian migrants. Again, these percentages indicate that Syrians are more engaged in Turkey’s political life than other migrant groups. In addition, this variation can be directly attributed to the fact that Syrians are more likely than non-Syrian migrants to want to remain in Turkey. Notable also is the relatively high percentage of native respondents (20.8%) who either did not know or had incorrect information about the date of the presidential elections.

Migrants were less likely to correctly identify the political party affiliation of their city’s mayor than they were to correctly identify the date of the presidential election when asked about their administrative/political knowledge of their city. 27.5% of Syrian respondents and 34.6% of non-Syrian migrants recognised the correct political affiliation of their city’s mayor. These percentages are especially striking because they suggest that Syrian respondents have a greater understanding of local political issues that more directly affect them than of the general political agenda. The correct response rate of only 63.5% of Turkish citizen participants indicates that even natives have a lack of interest in local governance.

Figure 62. Knowledge of the political party of the mayor of the city of residence (%)




Ability to Act Independently in Daily Life

One of the aspects of social integration discussed in the literature is individuals' ability to act independently¹⁸ in daily life to meet various needs without needing the help of others. Having knowledge about the operation of institutional systems of the society and establishing relations with these institutions are important in terms of social participation. However, from another perspective, this issue is also connected to the question of whether these institutions are inclusive and accessible to all segments of society. In the quantitative study, both native and migrant participants were surveyed about the level of ease or difficulty they experienced in independently navigating through institutions and systems in their daily lives. The findings show that native participants also encounter difficulties in certain areas, indicating that the ability to navigate independently in daily life is dependent not only on knowledge and skills, but also on the inclusiveness of institutions and structural factors.

18 Article 96 of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection is on "harmonisation." As per this article, integration activities can be organised for foreigners in Turkey with a view to "provide them with knowledge and skills that will facilitate their ability to act independently in all areas without the mediation of third parties." Similarly, the Harmonisation Strategy Document also identifies the strengthening of information services for migrants as a strategic priority (GİB, 2020). Under the coordination of GİB, civil society organisations offer "social cohesion and life skills" trainings to migrants. Topics covered in these trainings include Turkey's history and culture as well as others such as public services, emergency health services, legal aid, education, and banking. In the international literature on migrant integration, such knowledge and skills are discussed under the term "navigation" (e.g. Harder et al. 2018). As this study seeks to examine the social participation of both locals and migrants, questions on this topic were asked to all respondents.


Difficulty-ease of meeting basic and social needs

In response to a question regarding one's ability to meet their basic and social needs, Turkish-citizen participants listed the following options in descending frequency as very difficult-difficult: "searching for a job" (53.2%), "searching for a place to rent" (49.4%), "seeing a doctor" (43.1%), "interacting with official institutions" (42.2%), and "commuting within the city" (39.0%). The areas which native participants reported more as being very easy-easy (compared to being very difficult-difficult) were "registering their place of residence" (36.6%), "enrolling in school" (36.6%), "enrolling in vocational courses" (34.4%), and "joining a sports club" (33.6%).




In response to the same question, Syrian respondents most frequently identified the following areas as being very difficult-difficult (in descending order): "searching for a place to rent" (66.2%), "registering their place of residence" (56.9%), "dealing with official institutions" (56.7%), "searching for a job" (55.7%), and "enrolling in vocational courses" (43%). Syrian respondents were more likely to identify only two areas as very easy-easy (as opposed to very difficult-difficult): these were "doctor visits" (52%) and "local transportation" (40.5%). For all other areas, the activities were more frequently identified as very difficult-difficult.

Figure 64. Difficulty-ease of meeting basic and social needs – Syrian respondents (%)



Non-Syrian migrant respondents were likely to identify the following as very difficult-difficult: “searching for a job” (71.5%), “searching for a place to rent” (62.8%), “interacting with official institutions” (54.2%), “enrolling in vocational courses” (46.8%), and “commuting within the city” (46.8%). Non-Syrian migrant respondents were more likely to identify only three areas as very easy-easy options (as opposed to very difficult-difficult). These were “seeing a doctor” (46.4%), “registering their place of residence” (41.1%), and “applying for electricity, water, and internet services” (41.5%). For all other areas, more respondents identified them as very difficult-difficult.

Figure 65. Difficulty-Ease of meeting basic and social needs – Non-Syrian migrant respondents (%)



Comparing the responses of natives, Syrians, and non-Syrian migrants to this question indicates that the three groups face the greatest challenges in similar areas. The top three areas perceived as “very difficult-difficult” by Turkish, Syrian, and non-Syrian migrant respondents were “searching for a job,” “searching for a place to rent,” and “interacting with offi-

cial institutions.” The year of the study, 2022, was a time in Turkey when the unemployment rate was increasing and housing rental costs were on the rise. All three groups gave their responses in the context of these types of pressures. In addition, the percentages of the very difficult-difficult and very easy-easy responses for Syrian and non-Syrian migrant respondents in each area differ significantly. The margin between the very difficult-difficult and very easy-easy responses was narrower for the Turkish-citizen respondents. In other words, compared to natives, most migrants have more difficulty completing tasks and navigating procedures while trying to meet their basic needs. In summary, the major areas of difficulty for all three groups are comparable, but migrants face greater challenges in these and almost all other areas.

The study also probed whether the difficulties encountered in these ten areas varied by household income level. As the income levels of the Syrian respondents rise from the lowest to the highest categories, the reported difficulty (very difficult-difficult responses) tended to decrease in nearly every domain. This trend is not observed, however, when comparing the household income brackets of Turkish citizens and non-Syrian migrant respondents.

Table 32. Household income and ability to meet basic and social needs – Turkish-citizen respondents (%)

Instances	3,999 TL or below			4,000 - 5,999 TL			6,000 - 7,999 TL			8,000 - 9,999 TL			10,000 TL or above		
	Very Difficult–Difficult	Neither Easy nor Difficult	Very Easy–Easy	Very Difficult–Difficult	Neither Easy nor Difficult	Very Easy–Easy	Very Difficult–Difficult	Neither Easy nor Difficult	Very Easy–Easy	Very Difficult–Difficult	Neither Easy nor Difficult	Very Easy–Easy	Very Difficult–Difficult	Neither Easy nor Difficult	Very Easy–Easy
Seeing a doctor	64.7	17.6	17.6	31.6	16.0	52.4	48.1	15.7	36.1	47.1	15.2	37.7	40.1	20.9	39.0
Commuting within the city	51.5	35.3	13.2	25.8	21.5	52.6	45.5	18.8	35.7	44.1	22.1	33.8	36.9	27.0	36.2
Searching for a job	57.4	33.8	8.8	44.3	19.4	36.4	47.9	24.2	27.9	58.8	17.2	24.0	58.5	14.9	26.6
Registering for electricity, water and the internet	42.6	35.3	22.1	24.4	26.3	49.3	38.4	29.5	32.2	34.3	28.9	36.8	38.3	28.0	33.7
Registering place of residence	36.8	38.2	25.0	20.8	29.9	49.3	36.1	26.8	37.0	30.4	28.4	41.2	33.0	34.0	33.0
Searching for a place to rent	48.5	30.9	20.6	37.1	28.5	34.4	48.1	25.1	26.8	53.4	20.6	26.0	57.4	15.2	27.3
Enrolling in school	41.2	33.8	25.0	22.0	30.1	47.8	34.6	30.8	34.6	32.4	26.5	41.2	30.5	31.2	38.3
Enrolling in vocational courses	36.8	32.4	30.9	19.4	32.3	48.3	36.6	29.9	33.5	30.4	32.4	37.3	31.2	34.0	34.8
Joining a sports club	42.6	30.9	26.5	23.2	30.4	46.4	39.7	28.2	32.2	39.2	30.9	29.9	39.0	24.8	36.2
Interacting with official institutions	48.5	30.9	20.6	33.5	27.5	39.0	46.6	27.3	26.2	46.1	24.5	29.4	53.2	18.8	28.0

Table 33. Household income and ability to meet basic and social needs – Syrian respondents (%)

Instances	3,999 TL or below			4,000 - 5,999 TL			6,000 - 7,999 TL			8,000 - 9,999 TL			10,000 TL or above		
	Very Difficult–Difficult	Neither Easy nor Difficult	Very Easy–Easy	Very Difficult–Difficult	Neither Easy nor Difficult	Very Easy–Easy	Very Difficult–Difficult	Neither Easy nor Difficult	Very Easy–Easy	Very Difficult–Difficult	Neither Easy nor Difficult	Very Easy–Easy	Very Difficult–Difficult	Neither Easy nor Difficult	Very Easy–Easy
Seeing a doctor	32.6	10.0	57.4	34.1	25.0	40.9	14.8	21.3	63.9	0.0	3.4	96.6	0.0	5.6	94.4
Commuting within the city	45.5	17.5	37.0	28.5	29.5	42.0	17.2	31.1	51.6	3.4	13.8	82.8	0.0	19.4	80.6
Searching for a job	60.9	12.3	26.8	53.2	26.3	20.5	37.7	40.2	22.1	41.4	20.7	37.9	36.1	33.3	30.6
Registering for electricity, water and the internet	44.8	30.3	24.9	37.7	36.6	25.7	19.7	47.5	32.8	10.3	44.8	44.8	2.8	61.1	36.1
Registering place of residence	75.3	16.1	8.6	47.0	32.3	20.7	37.7	36.9	25.4	13.8	55.2	31.0	5.6	66.7	27.8
Searching for a place to rent	83.0	10.0	7.0	58.6	24.1	17.4	48.4	31.1	20.5	34.5	31.0	34.5	36.1	47.2	16.7
Enrolling in school	45.7	14.7	39.6	38.8	33.4	27.8	29.5	41.0	29.5	6.9	48.3	44.8	2.8	55.6	41.7
Enrolling in vocational courses	47.8	15.4	36.8	44.4	29.9	25.7	36.1	33.6	30.3	3.4	69.0	27.6	8.3	66.7	25.0
Joining a sports club	44.7	16.1	39.2	46.8	28.2	25.0	32.0	41.0	27.0	13.8	48.3	37.9	5.6	66.7	27.8
Interacting with official institutions	66.7	21.7	11.6	56.9	26.5	16.6	38.5	41.8	19.7	13.8	48.3	37.9	2.8	44.4	52.8

A review of the relationship between the length of sojourn in Turkey for Syrians and non-Syrian migrants and the difficulties encountered in these ten areas, shows that a prolonged period of residence in the country has no positive effect. In fact, migrants who have lived in Turkey for an extended period may perceive tasks such as registering their residence as more challenging than those who have lived there a shorter time. A potential reason for this may be that in recent years, some neighbourhoods have been closed to temporary protection or residency registration by foreigners, in addition to the increasing difficulty of obtaining short-term residency permits. The percentage of non-Syrian migrants who view registering their place of residence as “very difficult-difficult” as nearly twice as high among those who have lived in Turkey for nine years or more (72.2%) compared to those who have lived for three years or less (38.6%) or 4-8 years (35.5%). The proportion of Syrians who say registering their place of residence is very difficult-difficult increases marginally with the length of their sojourn (3 years or less: 47.1%; 4-8 years: 56.4%; 9 years or more: 62%). Similarly, the proportion of Syrians who find it difficult to find a rental property increases with the length of their sojourn in Turkey (3 years or less: 62.7%; 4-8 years: 65.4%; 9 years or more: 70%). These findings imply that the difficulties migrants face do not diminish over time as their knowledge and navigational skills increase. In other words, these challenges may also be the result of structural issues or the inaccessibility of institutions.

Table 34. Household income and ability to meet basic and social needs – Non-Syrian migrant respondents (%)

Instances	3,999 TL or below			4,000 - 5,999 TL			6,000 - 7,999 TL			8,000 - 9,999 TL			10,000 TL or above		
	Very Difficult–Difficult	Neither Easy nor Difficult	Very Easy–Easy	Very Difficult–Difficult	Neither Easy nor Difficult	Very Easy–Easy	Very Difficult–Difficult	Neither Easy nor Difficult	Very Easy–Easy	Very Difficult–Difficult	Neither Easy nor Difficult	Very Easy–Easy	Very Difficult–Difficult	Neither Easy nor Difficult	Very Easy–Easy
Seeing a doctor	29.3	9.8	61.0	53.6	12.0	34.4	27.3	15.9	56.8	53.8	0.0	46.2	11.1	11.1	77.8
Commuting within the city	39.0	22.0	39.0	50.8	19.7	29.5	29.5	22.7	47.7	46.2	7.7	46.2	0.0	44.4	55.6
Searching for a job	53.7	12.2	34.1	75.4	10.4	14.2	59.1	22.7	18.2	84.6	15.4	0.0	33.3	11.1	55.6
Registering for electricity, water and the internet	36.6	24.4	39.0	44.8	29.0	26.2	45.5	22.7	31.8	38.5	38.5	23.1	11.1	22.2	66.7
Registering place of residence	46.3	12.2	41.5	56.3	19.7	24.0	40.9	29.5	29.5	46.2	23.1	30.8	11.1	33.3	55.6
Searching for a place to rent	46.3	14.6	39.0	57.4	21.3	21.3	50.0	29.5	20.5	76.9	15.4	7.7	44.4	11.1	44.4
Enrolling in school	31.7	22.0	46.3	50.3	23.5	26.2	40.9	34.1	25.0	30.8	46.2	23.1	22.2	44.4	33.3
Enrolling in vocational courses	36.6	24.4	39.0	51.9	21.9	26.2	45.5	34.1	20.5	46.2	38.5	15.4	33.3	44.4	22.2
Joining a sports club	36.6	22.0	41.5	47.0	26.2	26.8	38.6	34.1	27.3	38.5	38.5	23.1	22.2	44.4	33.3
Interacting with official institutions	41.5	19.5	39.0	55.7	17.5	26.8	36.4	31.8	31.8	46.2	23.1	30.8	11.1	66.7	22.2

Table 35. Length of sojourn in Turkey and ability to meet basic and social needs – Syrian respondents (%)

Instances	3 years or less			4-8 years			9 years or more		
	Very Difficult–Difficult	Neither Easy nor Difficult	Very Easy–Easy	Very Difficult–Difficult	Neither Easy nor Difficult	Very Easy–Easy	Very Difficult–Difficult	Neither Easy nor Difficult	Very Easy–Easy
Seeing a doctor	32.4	21.6	46.1	31.5	19.5	49.0	23.8	12.2	64.0
Commuting within the city	33.3	32.4	34.3	34.9	24.8	40.3	34.7	22.1	43.2
Searching for a job	53.9	24.5	21.6	56.1	22.5	21.4	55.8	18.8	25.4
Registering for electricity, water and the internet	34.3	42.2	23.5	38.7	36.1	25.1	35.3	34.3	30.4
Registering place of residence	47.1	31.4	21.6	56.4	27.8	15.9	62.0	24.1	13.9
Searching for a place to rent	62.7	21.6	15.7	65.4	20.6	14.0	70.3	19.8	9.9
Enrolling in school	43.1	29.4	27.5	40.4	28.1	31.5	32.3	24.8	42.9
Enrolling in vocational courses	45.1	31.4	23.5	45.0	26.0	29.0	35.6	25.4	38.9
Joining a sports club	39.2	35.3	25.5	43.5	26.7	29.7	38.0	22.4	39.6
Interacting with official institutions	51.0	31.4	17.6	56.8	27.5	15.7	58.1	27.7	14.2

Table 36. Length of sojourn in Turkey and ability to meet basic and social needs – Non-Syrian migrant respondents (%)

Instances	3 years or less			4-8 years			9 years or more		
	Very Difficult– Difficult	Neither Easy nor Difficult	Very Easy–Easy	Very Difficult– Difficult	Neither Easy nor Difficult	Very Easy–Easy	Very Difficult– Difficult	Neither Easy nor Difficult	Very Easy–Easy
Seeing a doctor	45.7	13.7	40.6	31.1	16.5	52.4	50.0	16.7	33.3
Commuting within the city	47.7	28.9	23.4	44.7	25.3	30.0	52.8	19.4	27.8
Searching for a job	68.5	16.8	14.7	74.4	13.6	12.1	66.7	16.7	16.7
Registering for electricity, water and the internet	39.1	17.8	43.1	31.1	25.3	43.6	41.7	41.7	16.7
Registering place of residence	38.6	19.8	41.6	35.9	20.5	43.6	72.2	8.3	19.4
Searching for a place to rent	64.5	18.3	17.3	60.8	22.0	17.2	69.4	16.7	13.9
Enrolling in school	47.7	31.5	20.8	41.8	35.2	23.1	47.2	27.8	25.0
Enrolling in vocational courses	50.8	30.5	18.8	42.9	38.1	19.0	55.6	19.4	25.0
Joining a sports club	44.7	34.5	20.8	42.5	36.3	21.2	38.9	33.3	27.8
Interacting with official institutions	55.3	27.4	17.3	53.1	30.0	16.8	55.6	25.0	19.4

Knowledge of social life

In the study, respondents' knowledge of social life in Turkey was assessed as well. To this end, the question "Is it legally forbidden to consume alcoholic beverages in Turkey during the month of Ramadan?" was asked. Approximately four out of five native participants (78.5%) answered this question correctly, indicating "No." By contrast, 66.8% of non-Syrian migrants and 34.3% of Syrians gave this response. In other words, approximately two-thirds of Syrians either did not know (30%) or gave an incorrect answer (35.7%). One-third of non-Syrian migrants either lacked knowledge on this topic (22.1%) or had incorrect information (11.1%). The Syrians' responses could be interpreted as a lack of familiarity with Turkish legal norms and a belief that the laws of their home society also apply in Turkey.

Examining the distribution of responses to this question by level of education revealed that illiterate respondents were substantially more likely to respond "I don't know" compared to other educational levels in all three groups. As the educational level of natives and non-Syrian migrants increases, the percentage of correct responses also climbs. However, the Syrian responses don't display the same pattern.

Figure 66. Responses to “Is it [legally] forbidden to consume alcoholic beverages in Turkey during the month of Ramadan?” (%)




Table 37. Educational attainment and responses to “Is it [legally] forbidden to consume alcoholic beverages in Turkey during the month of Ramadan?” (%)


Educational Attainment	Turkish Citizens			Syrians			Non-Syrian migrants		
	Yes	No	I don't know	Yes	No	I don't know	Yes	No	I don't know
Illiterate	11.1	44.4	44.4	38.5	10.3	51.3	37.0	18.5	44.4
Literate	0.0	81.5	18.5	10.2	59.2	30.6	13.2	58.5	28.3
Primary School	6.8	76.5	16.7	40.5	34.7	24.7	11.5	64.8	23.8
Middle School	4.3	86.7	8.9	26.5	37.7	35.8	10.6	72.8	16.7
High School	2.2	82.2	15.7	31.9	37.4	30.7	5.2	76.0	18.8
University or above	1.8	68.9	29.3	65.5	10.6	23.9	3.6	67.9	28.6

Household Profile

A dataset pertaining to 12,164 individuals was obtained through a final set of questions aimed at exploring the profiles of respondents' household members. This dataset was used to identify similarities and differences in the characteristics of both migrant and native households. This question package included questions on the age, gender, education and employment status, and citizenship of household members.


Gender, age, place of birth and citizenship of household members

In terms of gender distribution within households, the percentage of women and men in native households (48.1% and 51.9%, respectively) is comparable to that of Syrian migrant households (48.7% and 51.3%, respectively). However, it is important to note that the male population within households is higher among the non-Syrian migrant group (57%) compared to the two other groups (42%). As stated previously, the higher proportion of men in the households of non-Syrian migrants is attributable to the higher percentage of male workers who come to Turkey without their families. Syrians typically arrive in Turkey with their families, while non-Syrian migrants are present in Turkey often through irregular migration movements, either to work or as a means of transit to another country.



The age distribution within households varies significantly between the native and migrant populations. The percentage of 0-17-year-olds in Syrian households was notably higher (31.9%) than in the native (20.9%) and non-Syrian migrant households (19%). 18-44-year-olds made up 57.1% of non-Syrian migrant households. This age group also comprised 46.9% of Turkish-citizen households and 44.5% of Syrian households.


Figure 68. Age distribution of household members (%)



The high number of children, particularly in the 0 to 12 age categories, was one of the most striking characteristics of the age distribution of household members in Syrian households. In Syrian households, the 0-6 age group accounted for 16.6% of the household population, compared to 9.8% in Turkish-citizen households and 11.1% in non-Syrian migrant households. Another significant difference appears for households with members aged over 40. Native households (30.8%) and non-Syrian migrant households (27.2%) had a larger proportion of members aged over 40 compared to Syrian migrant households (18.2%).

In terms of the distribution of place of birth within households, the Turkish citizen population consisted predominantly of persons born in Turkey, with a share of 97%. However, the percentage of Syrians who were born in Turkey was also considerably high, at 18.6%. The fact that


Figure 69. Place of birth of household members (%)



about one in five persons in Syrian migrant households was born in Turkey gives an indication of the number of babies born in migrant households since 2010. The percentage of household members born in Turkey is also significant for non-Syrian migrant households, reaching 10.9%.

Regarding the citizenship of household members, 97.5% of Turkish-citizen households were made up of individuals who were born in the Republic of Turkey. 99.9% of the members of Syrian households were Syrian citizens. In households with non-Syrian migrants, the most common citizenships were: Afghanistan, at 37.5% of all household members, the Islamic Republic of Iran with 18.4%, and citizens of Iraq with 12.5%. The proportion of citizens of other nations ranged between 7.5% and 1.0%.


Figure 70. Citizenship status of household members (%)



Household members and educational attainment

The main difference in the distribution of educational levels between the household members in the three samples is that migrant household members are more likely to have an education level below high school, whereas native household members have higher percentages at the high school level and above. In native households, 24.4% of members have graduated from high school, whereas in migrant households this falls to 9-10% respectively for Syrians and non-Syrian migrants. Even more pronounced is the trend in higher education. In Turkish-citizen households, 10.7% of members hold a bachelor's degree or higher, compared to only 3.6% in Syrian households and 2.2% in non-Syrian migrant households. The share of household members currently in education also tends to be higher in households with a higher proportion of children and young people. In Syrian households, the percentage of household members currently in education is 34.8%, compared to 32.8% in Turkish-citizen households and 18.2% in non-Syrian migrant households. The fact that one in three people in Syrian households is in education is an important piece of information regarding Syrian children's access to education. On the other hand, the significantly lower percentage of individuals in education in non-Syrian migrant households compared to the Turkish-citizen and Syrian households is due to the higher proportion of irregular migrants, who are predominantly male workers, and the lower number of children and young people at school age in the family.

Figure 71. Educational attainment of household members (%)



May I ask what school this person last graduated from?

Base:	Turkish citizens 5,471	Syrians 5,514	Non-Syrian migrants 1,179
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When analysing the educational attainment of household members in relation to age groups, for the younger age group (7-17 years) still in primary and secondary education, we observe that native households (99.5%), Syrian households (0-7 years, 96%) and non-Syrian migrant households (96.3%) have similarly high ratios. However, access to education in migrant households decreases for household members aged 18 and above (Table 38).

Table 38. Distribution of household members' ages and educational attainment (%)

Age	Turkish Citizens					
	Literate	Primary	Middle	High	University or above	Student
0-6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
7-17	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.0	99.5
18-34	1.4	4.8	11.7	36.2	20.5	25.3
35-49	1.9	27.1	26.4	33.2	11.3	0.1
50-64	2.1	48.4	25.7	18.9	4.8	0.0
65 or above	8.7	50.4	11.3	27.8	1.7	0.0

Age	Syrians					
	Literate	Primary School	Middle School	High School	University or above	Student
0-6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
7-17	0.2	2.0	1.6	0.2	0.0	96.0
18-34	4.0	40.0	23.9	16.5	6.5	9.0
35-49	6.7	47.1	29.5	11.9	4.6	0.3
50-64	22.5	50.7	19.5	5.7	1.3	0.3
65 or above	35.0	41.7	16.7	6.7	0.0	0.0

Age	Non-Syrian migrants					
	Literate	Primary school	Middle school	High school	University or above	Student
0-6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
7-17	0.6	1.9	0.6	0.6	0.0	96.3
18-34	15.6	33.6	26.9	15.9	3.4	4.6
35-49	18.1	42.9	26.1	10.8	2.1	0.0
50-64	41.0	43.4	12.0	2.4	1.2	0.0
65 or above	34.5	58.6	6.9	0.0	0.0	0.0

In all three groups, there was a general trend in favour of men in the distribution of household members' educational attainment by gender, despite some exceptions at some educational levels (Table 39).


Table 39. Distribution of households members' gender and educational attainment (%)

Gender	Turkish Citizens					
	Literate	Primary School	Middle School	High School	University or above	Student
Male	1.3	16.7	15.0	23.9	11.5	31.6
Female	1.7	15.3	14.1	25.0	9.9	34.0

Gender	Syrians					
	Literate	Primary School	Middle School	High School	University or above	Student
Male	4.4	29.6	18.5	10.9	3.7	32.9
Female	5.7	30.3	16.3	7.6	3.4	36.8

Gender	Non-Syrian migrants					
	Literate	Primary school	Middle school	High school	University or above	Student
Male	15.7	35.8	24.2	9.3	1.9	13.1
Female	17.5	28.0	15.4	11.6	2.6	24.9


When asked about the level of education at which household members are continuing their education, the percentage of Syrians (66.3%) and non-Syrian migrants (66.5%) attending primary and secondary school was higher than that of Turkish citizens (47.4%). Compared to Syrian (30.2%) and non-Syrian migrants (31.9%), a greater percentage of individuals in Turkish-citizen households (50.6%) were continuing their education after completing high school (Figure 72). These percentages must be related with the higher proportion of children under high school age in migrant households as well as the fact that many migrant children enter the labour force before completing compulsory education.



Labour force participation of household members

The survey inquired about the labour force participation of household members, finding that the overall participation rate for Syrian households was 27.7%, while it was 36.3% for Turkish-citizen households and 47.0% for non-Syrian migrant households. There are a trio of reasons why Syrian households have a lower labour force participation rate than non-Syrian migrant groups. First, Syrian refugees who fled the conflict came to Turkey as families, resulting in a greater percentage of non-working people (especially children) in the household compared to non-Syrian migrant households who came to Turkey primarily for economic reasons. Second, Syrian households on average have larger number of children than native households. Finally, women in Syrian households are less likely to participate in the labour force than women in native households. We should note that these figures pertain all household members regardless of age. Therefore, it is necessary to look at the age breakdown of household members labour force participation rates.

Figure 73. Labour force participation of household members (%)



Does this person have any regular or irregular employment?			
Base:	Turkish citizens	Syrians	Non-Syrian migrants
	5,471	5,514	1,179

When the breakdown of household members' labour force participation rate according to age groups is examined, we observe that the participation rate in native households was comparable to that of Syrian households, with the 18-34 age group having participation rates of 46.9% for Turkish citizens and 47.1% for Syrians. In the same age cohort, however, the labour force participation rate for non-Syrian migrants significantly rises to 63.3%. This increase is primarily attributable to the male-dominated households of irregular migrants within the non-Syrian migrant category. In contrast, in the age group of 35-49, the labour force participation rate for native households increases to 65.5%, while it reaches 74.5% for non-Syrian migrant households and remains at 53.7% for Syrian migrant households. The lower labour force participation of women in Syrian households is associated with the overall lower labour force participation of this age category in Syrian households. In the 50-64 age group, both Syrian migrant households (25.9%) and non-Syrian migrant households (37.4%) had lower labour force participation rates than native households (44%; Table 40). In addition, the labour force participation rate of individuals aged 65 and older in the households

decreases to between 5 and 7% for Turkish citizens and Syrians but was zero for non-Syrian migrants (Table 40). On the other hand, according to this table, the proportion of 7-17-year-olds who are employed is higher among Syrian and non-Syrian migrant households than among native households (1.6%). This suggests that Syrians and non-Syrian migrants tend to begin working at a younger age than Turkish citizens, resulting in a younger labour force.

Table 40. Distribution of household age groups by labour force participation (%)

Age	Turkish Citizens		Syrians		Non-Syrian migrants	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
0-6	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0
7-17	1.7	98.3	4.0	96.0	3.0	97.0
18-34	46.9	53.1	47.1	52.9	63.3	36.7
35-49	65.5	34.5	53.7	46.3	74.5	25.5
50-64	44.0	56.0	25.9	74.1	37.4	62.6
65 or above	5.4	94.6	6.6	93.4	0.0	100.0


Examining labour force participation of household members according to gender, men participated in the labour force at a rate of 50.8% in native households, 46.1% in Syrian households, and 65.5% in non-Syrian migrant households (Figure 74). However, these percentages differ substantially when it comes to women's participation in the labour force. The participation rate of women in the labour force was 20.7% in native households and 8.2% in Syrian households. In the non-Syrian migrant group, women's participation in the labour force climbs to 22.5%. These percentages clearly illustrate that only a very small proportion of women in Syrian households participate in the labour force. Among the causes of this disparity are cultural barriers to women's employment in Syrian families and the challenges Syrian women face in gaining access to social support mechanisms that could assist them in delegating family caregiving responsibilities. We should however note that these figures pertain to labour force participation of all household members regardless of age.

Figure 74. Distribution of household labour force participation by gender (%)

Gender	Turkish Citizens		Syrians		Non-Syrian migrants	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Male	50.8	49.2	46.1	53.9	65.5	34.5
Female	20.7	79.3	8.3	91.7	22.5	77.5


Wage work comprised the majority of labour force participation for employed household members, similar to the participants. 89.6% of employed individuals in native households had wage work; this ratio was 92.7% in Syrian households, and 95.1% in the non-Syrian migrant group. Within the Turkish citizen households, 10.4% of members were self-employed, which is a relatively low rate. This percentage falls to 7.3% among Syrian migrants and 4.9% among all non-Syrian migrant groups. A finding of the qualitative study was that in neighbourhoods where Syrians live, some of them engage in small-scale shopkeeping.

Figure 75. Paid and self-employment status of household members (%)



When examining the reasons for non-participation in the labour force among native household members, 7.4% do not work because they are retired, 45.5% because they are students, and 26.4% because they are caregivers. These percentages differ, however, among migrant populations. In Syrian households, 36.6% of members do not work because they are students, compared to 26.4% in non-Syrian migrant households. The percentage of non-working members who are caregivers rises to 32.8% among Syrians and 35.5% among non-Syrian migrants. With a rate of 13.8%, the non-Syrian migrant group has the highest proportion of unemployed household members, regardless of their job-searching status.

Figure 76. Reasons for not participating in the labour force in the household (%)



Breakdown of Findings by Province

In the concluding section of the quantitative report, we discuss the differences between provinces where the survey was conducted. First, the language used to conduct the survey with migrants in each province is specified. Following this, an evaluation of the differences between native, Syrian, and non-Syrian migrant participants in terms of satisfaction with living in Turkey, perception of discrimination (experience of unfair treatment), household income, and satisfaction with economic conditions within each province is presented.

Breakdown of survey language by province

As described in the methodology of the quantitative study, the questionnaire for Syrian and non-Syrian migrant samples was administered in Arabic, Farsi or in Turkish with the assistance of interpreters. The breakdown of the language of the questionnaire forms by province (Figures 77 and 78) can also be seen as an indicator of migrants' Turkish language proficiency. In provinces such as Bursa (99.2%), Tekirdağ (100%), Istanbul (100%), Nevşehir (96.4%), and Yalova (100%), the questionnaire form was primarily administered in Turkish for the Syrian sample. The survey was also administered in Turkish, with high participation rates, in Ankara (40.2%), Izmir (57.5%), and Muğla (60%). However, the questionnaire was administered predominantly in Arabic in provinces such as Hatay (93.4%), Gaziantep (100%), Mardin (100%), Mersin (98.0%), Konya (100%), Diyarbakır (100%), and Denizli (81.8%). Non-Syrian migrants made up the remainder of the migrant sample population, which exhibited comparable patterns. In localities such as Bursa (87.8%), Istanbul (98.8%), and Muğla (60%) the majority of questionnaires were completed in Turkish. However, they were largely administered in Farsi in localities such as Gaziantep (96.8%), Mersin (96.2%), Konya (86%), and Van (100%).





Figure 78. Distribution of language by province – Non-Syrian migrants sample (%)



Breakdown of migrant and native respondents' satisfaction with living in turkey by province

Table 41. Distribution of satisfaction with living in Turkey by province (%)

Province	Turkish citizens				
	I definitely want to live in another country	I can consider living in another country	I don't know if I want to stay in Turkey or emigrate	I can continue living in Turkey	I definitely want to live in Turkey
Ankara	4.2	12.6	8.4	45.5	29.3
Bursa	29.1	20.3	20.3	3.5	26.7
Tekirdağ	0.0	0.0	1.9	0.0	98.1
Istanbul	8.7	22.1	23.7	28.4	17.1
Izmir	0.0	0.0	2.1	22.9	75.0
Hatay	23.2	36.7	12.4	11.9	15.8
Gaziantep	15.1	27.5	26.6	28.4	2.3
Mardin	70.9	21.8	7.3	0.0	0.0
Mersin	13.7	50.4	28.2	5.3	2.3
Kahramanmaraş	33.3	31.4	5.9	21.6	7.8
Konya	6.8	2.9	8.7	38.8	42.7
Denizli	1.8	0.0	0.0	5.5	92.7
Diyarbakır	74.6	25.4	0.0	0.0	0.0
Nevşehir	3.6	18.2	69.1	7.3	1.8
Yalova	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
Van	0.0	0.0	20.0	80.0	0.0
Muğla	0.0	0.0	0.0	41.3	58.7

According to the findings of the survey conducted in 17 provinces, native and migrant participants' satisfaction with living in Turkey varies across provinces. Diyarbakır, with 74.6%, Mardin, with 70.9%, Kahramanmaraş, with 33.3%, Bursa, with 29.1%, Hatay, with 23.2%, Gaziantep, with 15.1%, and Mersin, with 13.1%, were the provinces where Turkish citizens were most likely to desire to live in another country. In terms of being satisfied with life in Turkey and wanting to remain there, Yalova ranks first, with 100% of those surveyed wanting to stay, followed by Tekirdağ with 98.1%, Denizli with 92.7%, İzmir with 75%, Muğla with 58.7%, and Konya with 42.1%.

The level of satisfaction among Syrian participants was less clear cut than that of natives. 53.4% of Syrian participants in Gaziantep and 25.8% of Syrians in Diyarbakır expressed a strong desire to live in another country. In contrast, Denizli ranks first with satisfaction with Turkey, with 47.3% wanting to continue living in Turkey, followed by Ankara (34.5%), Bursa (32.2%), İzmir (30.1%), and Konya (29%). The responses of Syrian migrants regarding their desire to live in Turkey tend toward the less definitive option "I can continue living in Turkey from now on." Over 40% of Syrian migrants in nine of the 16 provinces where Syrians were surveyed said they could carry on living in Turkey. In contrast to the native sample, Syrian participants were reluctant to give definitive answers probably because they

Province	Syrians				
	I definitely want to live in another country	I can consider living in another country	I don't know if I want to stay in Turkey or emigrate	I can continue living in Turkey	I definitely want to live in Turkey
Ankara	3.4	2.3	9.2	50.6	34.5
Bursa	3.0	1.5	5.3	57.9	32.3
Tekirdağ	0.0	0.0	9.6	90.4	0.0
Istanbul	7.1	33.7	26.6	21.9	10.7
İzmir	6.3	8.8	25.0	30.0	30.0
Hatay	11.0	13.8	5.5	63.5	6.1
Gaziantep	53.4	12.2	10.6	21.7	2.1
Mardin	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0
Mersin	1.0	0.0	99.0	0.0	0.0
Kahramanmaraş	3.7	5.6	70.4	14.8	5.6
Konya	1.4	5.8	23.2	40.6	29.0
Denizli	0.0	0.0	9.1	43.6	47.3
Diyarbakır	25.8	0.0	12.1	54.5	7.6
Nevşehir	0.0	67.3	29.1	1.8	1.8
Yalova	0.0	0.0	6.3	93.8	0.0
Van	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Muğla	0.0	0.0	43.8	52.1	4.2

are aware that their continued residence in Turkey is not exclusively dependent on their own desires. They are aware that their temporary protection status in Turkey is contingent on political factors. Therefore, their responses regarding a desire to spend the rest of their lives in Turkey or another nation were more reticent.

In the 10 provinces where non-Syrian migrants were surveyed, the level of satisfaction with life in Turkey differed from both the natives and Syrians. In provinces where irregular migration is most prevalent, such as Van, Mersin, and Gaziantep, the desire to reside in another country was close to 100% among non-Syrian migrant participants. As there is extensive irregular migration in these regions, the prevalence of the desire to live in another country is to be expected. Bursa ranks first in satisfaction with life Turkey, with 68.3% of non-Syrian migrants intending to continue living there, followed by Ankara (46.3%), and Konya (31%). Non-Syrian migrants in provinces such as Istanbul and Izmir, where the labour market is larger but the living conditions are difficult, tended to be unsure of whether they wanted to continue living in Turkey.

Province	Non-Syrian migrants				
	I definitely want to live in another country	I can consider living in another country	I don't know if I want to stay in Turkey or emigrate	I can continue living in Turkey	I definitely want to live in Turkey
Ankara	1.3	0.0	2.5	50.0	46.3
Bursa	9.8	0.0	2.4	19.5	68.3
Tekirdağ	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Istanbul	0.0	11.0	38.3	46.9	3.8
Izmir	1.7	3.3	33.3	40.0	21.7
Hatay	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Gaziantep	96.7	3.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
Mardin	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Mersin	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Kahramanmaraş	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0
Konya	3.4	10.3	20.7	34.5	31.0
Denizli	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Diyarbakır	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Nevşehir	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Yalova	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Van	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Muğla	0.0	6.7	73.3	20.0	0.0

Breakdown of migrant and native respondents' experiences of unfair treatment in Turkey by province

There are clear variations in the regional distribution of migrant and native respondents who have perceptions of been subjected to unfair treatment for ethnic, religious, linguistic, economic, or national background reasons. Only in Hatay, Kahramanmaraş, and Diyarbakır did the percentage of native participants who believed they had been subjected to unjust treatment exceed 20%. In contrast, the percentage of Syrians who had perceptions of unfair treatment for the mentioned reasons were 100% in Mersin, 96.4% in Mardin, and 74.4% in Kahramanmaraş. It is important to note, however, that among the Syrian migrants surveyed in the remaining provinces (excluding the three mentioned plus Van) the percentage who indicated they had not encountered any unfair treatment exceeded 80% (Table 42). For non-Syrian migrants, Kahramanmaraş stands out with 100% of those surveyed believing that they had been subjected to unfair treatment, followed by Gaziantep (63.3%), Van (53.3%), and Mersin (42.3%). For both the Syrian and non-Syrian migrant groups, it is noteworthy that the provinces where they were most likely to report unjust treatment are also provinces in which there is a relatively high proportion of migrants in the provincial population.

Table 42. Distribution of experiencing unfair treatment in Turkey, by provinces (%)

	Turkish citizens		Syrians		Non-Syrian migrants	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Ankara	19.8	80.2	16.1	83.9	12.5	87.5
Bursa	5.2	94.8	3.8	96.2	0.0	100.0
Tekirdağ	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0
Istanbul	3.4	96.6	10.1	89.9	9.6	90.4
Izmir	0.0	100.0	20.0	80.0	16.7	83.3
Hatay	33.9	66.1	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0
Gaziantep	18.3	81.7	9.0	91.0	63.3	36.7
Mardin	7.3	92.7	96.4	3.6	0.0	0.0
Mersin	16.0	84.0	100.0	0.0	42.3	57.7
Kahramanmaraş	27.5	72.5	70.4	29.6	100.0	0.0
Konya	16.5	83.5	5.8	94.2	10.3	89.7
Denizli	0.0	100.0	16.4	83.6	0.0	0.0
Diyarbakır	22.4	77.6	6.1	93.9	0.0	0.0
Nevşehir	9.1	90.9	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0
Yalova	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0
Van	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	53.3	46.7
Muğla	0.0	100.0	16.7	83.3	6.7	93.3

Distribution of household income by province

Household incomes of the native participants who responded to the relevant question in the survey were on average somewhat above the minimum wage. However, when examined at the provincial level, Mersin was the province with the highest percentage of native participants declaring household incomes with 27.3%. Istanbul (50.4%), Bursa (46.8%), and Hatay (23.3%) were the provinces where native respondents were more likely to report household incomes above 10,000 TL. As the survey was conducted in the neighbourhoods densely populated by migrants, low-wage workers and small traders, relatively low levels of household income were to be expected (Table 43).

When analysing the household incomes of Syrian participants, we observe that 88.4% of Syrian respondents in Gaziantep reported household incomes less than the minimum wage; the same ratio was 83% in Mersin, 79.4% in Hatay, 74.5% in Mardin, 54.9% in Kahramanmaraş, and 52.2% in Diyarbakır. 23.3% of Syrian respondents reported household incomes above 10,000 TL in Bursa. The other provinces where Syrian respondents declared household incomes above 10,000 TL were Ankara (1.2%), Hatay (1.9%) and Konya (1.5%); all other provinces had no Syrian households in this income bracket. It is notable that Syrian respondents, especially in provinces with a high concentration of migrants, have declared household incomes below the minimum wage, while in other provinces there is a clustering around or just above the minimum wage level in the range of 4,000 to 5,999 TL. The household income levels declared by non-Syrian migrant respondents are comparable to those of Syrian migrants (Table 43).

Table 43. Distribution of household income by province (%)

Province	Turkish Citizens				
	3,999 TL or below	4,000 - 5,999 TL	6,000 - 7,999 TL	8,000 - 9,999 TL	10,000 TL or above
Ankara	11.8	34.2	23.0	13.0	18.0
Bursa	0.0	15.8	15.8	21.6	46.8
Tekirdağ	0.0	70.6	15.7	9.8	3.9
Istanbul	0.8	24.8	9.9	14.0	50.4
Izmir	0.0	27.8	39.8	21.1	11.3
Hatay	10.6	8.1	28.5	29.3	23.6
Gaziantep	4.5	29.1	44.5	10.9	10.9
Mardin	0.0	12.7	76.4	5.5	5.5
Mersin	27.3	31.2	23.4	7.8	10.4
Kahramanmaraş	4.1	40.8	28.6	8.2	18.4
Konya	5.8	41.7	15.5	17.5	19.4
Denizli	0.0	69.1	27.3	3.6	0.0
Diyarbakır	0.0	7.5	59.7	16.4	16.4
Nevşehir	1.9	18.5	72.2	3.7	3.7
Yalova	0.0	83.9	9.7	6.5	0.0
Van	0.0	66.7	33.3	0.0	0.0
Muğla	0.0	17.0	80.9	0.0	2.1

Province	Syrians				
	3,999 TL or below	4,000 - 5,999 TL	6,000 - 7,999 TL	8,000 - 9,999 TL	10,000 TL or above
Ankara	30.6	60.0	5.9	2.4	1.2
Bursa	5.3	39.1	17.3	15.0	23.3
Tekirdağ	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
İstanbul	8.8	63.2	27.2	0.9	0.0
İzmir	39.1	46.4	13.0	1.4	0.0
Hatay	79.4	10.0	6.9	1.9	1.9
Gaziantep	88.4	11.6	0.0	0.0	0.0
Mardin	74.5	25.5	0.0	0.0	0.0
Mersin	83.0	17.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Kahramanmaraş	54.9	43.1	2.0	0.0	0.0
Konya	28.4	61.2	7.5	1.5	1.5
Denizli	9.1	89.1	1.8	0.0	0.0
Diyarbakır	52.5	36.1	9.8	1.6	0.0
Nevşehir	1.9	71.2	26.9	0.0	0.0
Yalova	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Van	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Muğla	3.8	34.6	61.5	0.0	0.0

Province	Non-Syrian migrants				
	3,999 TL or below	4,000 - 5,999 TL	6,000 - 7,999 TL	8,000 - 9,999 TL	10,000 TL or above
Ankara	14.1	65.4	12.8	5.1	2.6
Bursa	4.9	65.9	14.6	12.2	2.4
Tekirdağ	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
İstanbul	10.3	44.8	24.1	10.3	10.3
İzmir	8.5	48.9	34.0	2.1	6.4
Hatay	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Gaziantep	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Mardin	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Mersin	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Kahramanmaraş	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Konya	58.6	37.9	3.4	0.0	0.0
Denizli	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Diyarbakır	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Nevşehir	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Yalova	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Van	42.9	57.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
Muğla	0.0	42.9	57.1	0.0	0.0

Satisfaction with the economic situation

Of the 17 provinces, Yalova and Tekirdağ were the only localities where more than 50% of the native respondents were satisfied with their economic conditions, while this rate is below 30% in the other 15 provinces. Turkish citizens were most likely to be dissatisfied with their economic conditions in Diyarbakır (100%), Mardin (100%), Van (100%), Denizli (85.5%), Kahramanmaraş (76.5%), Nevşehir (76.4%), İzmir (74.3%), and Konya (61.2%). Among the Syrian sample, more than 30% of respondents were satisfied in only six provinces: Bursa, Tekirdağ, Gaziantep, Konya, Diyarbakır, and Yalova. The provinces with the highest rates of dissatisfaction were Denizli (89.1%), Ankara (63.2%), İzmir (60%), and Nevşehir (50%). Among non-Syrian migrants, the highest rates of satisfaction with the economic situation were found in Istanbul (56.9%), Bursa (56.1%), and Ankara (32.1%). It is noteworthy that natives in general are more dissatisfied with their economic conditions compared to migrants.

Figure 79. Distribution of satisfaction with economic situation by province (%)

Province	Turkish Citizens			Syrians			Non-Syrian migrants		
	Dissat- isfied	Neither dissatis- fied nor satisfied	Satis- fied	Dissat- isfied	Neither dissatis- fied nor satisfied	Satis- fied	Dissat- isfied	Neither dissatis- fied nor satisfied	Satis- fied
Ankara	56.9	30.5	12.6	63.2	21.8	14.9	40.0	27.5	32.5
Bursa	75.6	16.9	7.6	30.1	16.5	53.4	22.0	22.0	56.1
Tekirdağ	13.5	32.7	53.8	0.0	36.5	63.5	0.0	0.0	0.0
Istanbul	50.3	27.9	21.8	40.8	30.8	28.4	11.0	32.1	56.9
İzmir	74.3	12.1	13.6	60.0	30.0	10.0	56.7	30.0	13.3
Hatay	47.5	31.1	21.5	29.3	52.5	18.2	0.0	0.0	0.0
Gaziantep	53.7	28.0	18.3	48.7	12.2	39.2	100.0	0.0	0.0
Mardin	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Mersin	35.9	59.5	4.6	0.0	100.0	0.0	96.2	3.8	0.0
Kahramanmaraş	76.5	19.6	3.9	11.1	79.6	9.3	100.0	0.0	0.0
Konya	61.2	8.7	30.1	39.1	29.0	31.9	51.7	20.7	27.6
Denizli	85.5	3.6	10.9	89.1	1.8	9.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
Diyarbakır	100.0	0.0	0.0	27.3	39.4	33.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
Nevşehir	76.4	20.0	3.6	50.9	47.3	1.8	0.0	0.0	0.0
Yalova	0.0	25.0	75.0	0.0	6.3	93.8	0.0	0.0	0.0
Van	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0
Muğla	46.0	38.1	15.9	33.3	62.5	4.2	60.0	40.0	0.0

QUALITATIVE STUDY

Introduction

Methodology of the qualitative study and data collection and analysis

In the previous part of this study, we analysed the extensive data obtained from a sample of 3,866 individuals using fully structured questionnaires. In the second phase of the project, we collected intensive research data through institutional interviews conducted in four cities selected from among the 17 provinces.¹⁹ Representatives from institutions with knowledge, experience, and observations regarding the economic and social life of migrants were interviewed in Gaziantep and Mardin (from the first cluster), Konya (from the second cluster), and Izmir (from the third cluster). The interviewees were asked about migrants' and refugees' employment, housing, education, healthcare, access to services through civil society and local governments, and experiences of discrimination in their daily lives. The four cities²⁰ chosen for qualitative data collection were selected based on their representation of different migrant concentrations and the potential variations in urban dynamics that could impact migrants' social participation. We conducted a series of interviews with representatives of institutions in Istanbul specialising in work-life, healthcare, and education. These interviews were conducted to contribute to the thematic structure of the qualitative study. As the metropolitan area that accounts for the highest value added produced in the Turkish economy, Istanbul also has the largest labour market. The demand for labour in the city makes the labour market an attractive destination for migrants. As a result, the area is home to a wide range of migrant and refugee communities with varying residence statuses and countries of origin. Although Istanbul was not one of the "cases" selected for the qualitative research, we conducted seven interviews with representatives from various institutions to explore specific themes.

This qualitative research involved 72 interviews with a diverse range of individuals. These included neighbourhood muhtars, representatives of civil society organisations, and representatives of public democratic organisations such as trade unions, professional chambers (e.g., of doctors), chambers of commerce, and trade associations. The interviews took place in the four selected cities (plus Istanbul) and were conducted using four different semi-structured questionnaires. Each interview lasted between 30 and 120 minutes. Of the total number of interviews, 68 were conducted in person, while the remaining four were conducted online using the Zoom application. A total of 2,731 minutes of audio recordings were obtained from the interviews conducted in four different cities: 11 interviews in Gaziantep, 19 interviews in Mardin, 14 interviews in Konya, 20 interviews in Izmir and 8 interviews in Istanbul. 59 interviews were transcribed in full. Written informed consent was obtained from participants prior to the interviews, and extensive notes were taken from those who did not consent to being recorded (Table 44).²¹

¹⁹ Ethics Committee approval for the research was granted by the Istanbul Kent University Ethics Committee Decision No. 6 dated 2/6/2022.

²⁰ The qualitative research was carried out only in provincial centers, hence the use of the term city rather than province.

²¹ To maintain confidentiality and anonymity, participants' names and the names of their organizations are not shared. In direct quotations from the interviews, only participants' sectors of employment or their professions are indicated.

Table 44. Qualitative research interview table (%)

1	GAZIANTEP	1	CSO	Manager	M
2		2	Muhtar		M
3		3	Professional Chamber	Doctor	F
4		4	Muhtar		F
5		5	School	Teacher	M
6		6	Trade Union	Manager	M
7		7	University	Academic	M
8		8	CSO	Specialist	F
9		9	Employers' Organisation	Manager	F
10		10	Employers' Organisation	Specialist	M
11		11	Metropolitan Municipality	Manager	M
12	KONYA	1	Muhtar		M
13		2	School	Teacher	M
14		3	School	Teacher	M
15		4	Muhtar		M
16		5	CSO	Manager	M
17		6	Karatay Municipality	Specialist	F
18		7	Metropolitan Municipality	Specialist	F
19		8	Health Centre	Healthcare Worker	F
20		9	CSO	Manager	F
21		10	Trade Union	Manager	M
22		11	Employers' Organisation	Manager	M
23		12	CSO	Specialist	F
24		13	CSO	Manager	F
25		14	Employers' Organisation	Specialist	M
26	IZMIR	1	School	Teacher	M
27		2	School	Teacher	M
28		3	Metropolitan Municipality	Manager	F
29		4	CSO	Manager	F
30		5	CSO	Former Manager	M
31		6	CSO	Manager	M
32		7	CSO	Volunteer	M
33		8	Muhtar		M
34		9	CSO	Manager	F
35		10	CSO	Volunteer	M
36		11	CSO	Manager	M

Table 44. Qualitative research interview table (%) (cont.)

37		12	CSO	Manager	M
38		13	CSO	Specialist	M
39		14	CSO	Manager	F
40		15	CSO	Manager	M
41		16	Muhtar		M
42		17	CSO	Volunteer	F
43		18	CSO	Manager	F
44		19	CSO	Specialist	F
45		20	CSO	Healthcare Worker	M
46	ISTANBUL	1	CSO	Manager	F
47		2	School	Teacher	M
48		3	School	Teacher	F
49		4	CSO	Manager	M
50		5	Health Centre	Doctor	M
51		6	Employers' Organisation	Manager	M
52		7	Employers' Organisation	Manager	M
53		8	Employers' Organisation	Manager	M
54	MARDIN	1	CSO	Specialist	F
55		2	CSO	Volunteer	F
56		3	CSO	Teacher	F
57		4	Professional Chamber	Doctor	M
58		5	CSO	Specialist	F
59		6	Professional Chamber	Doctor	F
60		7	CSO	Specialist	F
61		8	CSO	Manager	F
62		9	Employers' Organisation	Manager	F
63		10	Employers' Organisation	Manager	M
64		11	CSO	Manager	F
65		12	Trade Union	Teacher	F
66		13	Health Centre	Social Worker	M
67		14	CSO	Specialist	M
68		15	CSO	Manager	F
69		16	Muhtar		M
70		17	Trade Union	Teacher	M
71		18	Trade Union	Specialist	M
72		19	Muhtar		M

One set of interviews involved the muhtars of two neighbourhoods in each city (a total of eight interviews). These neighbourhoods were selected based on the density of migrant and refugee settlement in the four cities. We explored the muhtars' knowledge, observations, and testimonies about the migrant and refugee populations living in their neighbourhoods. These interviews focused specifically on the participation, integration, levels of segregation, and exclusion experienced by both the migrant and native populations in the economic, social, cultural, and political aspects of the neighbourhoods.

The second source of information consisted of CSOs specialised in the field of migration. Interviews were conducted with representatives of CSOs actively involved in support and solidarity activities for migrants and refugees in the five cities. These activities cover various areas such as language, education, health, housing, social integration, and economic and social participation. During the interviews, we spoke to both national and local CSOs working in the field of migration. Our aim was to gain insights into the processes of migrants' social participation, their ability to meet basic needs, and their access to urban public spaces and services. A total of 24 CSOs were interviewed.

The third source of information included institutions with extensive experience of migrant and refugee participation in the labour market and employment patterns. The purpose of these interviews was to collect data on the number and location of workplaces employing migrant workers. We also conducted interviews with representatives of trade unions or workers' associations to collect data on the wages and working conditions of migrant workers. A total of nine interviews were conducted with representatives of these workers' organisations in the respective cities.

The fourth source of information was the institutional knowledge and experience of the provincial medical chambers and education unions regarding access to health and education by migrants and refugees. 12 interviews were conducted with representatives of medical chambers, health professionals working in the field of migration, family doctors and social workers working in hospitals. In addition, we conducted interviews with representatives of the Education and Science Workers' Union ("Eğitim-Sen"), as well as with school principals and classroom teachers who have migrant and refugee pupils in their schools.

As the fifth source of information, five interviews were conducted with local government migration units and social service units in the four cities. We conducted four interviews with different solidarity initiatives that are actively involved in the field of migration, despite not having official institutional personas.

We obtained a comprehensive qualitative dataset on migrants' social participation in these cities. This dataset was collected through interviews with civil society organisations, democratic political movements, professional organisations, local administrative units, and the aforementioned initiatives. The qualitative study was structured around several themes, including employment, housing, education, healthcare, support mechanisms (such as civil society organisations and local governments), and discrimination. These themes were used to code the dataset and form the overall framework of the report.

Limitations of the qualitative research

The limitations of the qualitative research, as in the case of the quantitative one, stemmed from the complex nature of migration in Turkey, the changing political and administrative and the fact that public agencies do not share data on many topics.

Turkey not only hosts the largest number of refugees in the world, but also experiences a variety of different population movements. Some examples include Afghan migration, consisting mainly of young men; Afghan refugees; transit and irregular labour migration from various African countries; female migrants from former Soviet countries working in domestic services; an increase in young male labour migration from Central Asian republics; people fleeing the conflict in Ukraine; people choosing to settle in Turkey due to sanctions against Russia; Iranian refugees, impoverished labour migrants from Iran; affluent Iranians relocating their investments to Turkey; labour migration from Southeast Asia; and various other movements with different routes and objectives. The boundaries between asylum-seeking, irregular labour migration and transit migration are often blurred. Capturing such a complex migration structure was empirically not possible with our research design. It is therefore important to recognise the importance of studies that focus on specific groups of migrants and use qualitative methods to collect data. Our qualitative study inevitably focused more on Syrian refugees, as they are the most extensively studied community in terms of their access to public and urban services, as well as their involvement in civil society activities.

The research was also constrained by the inadequate and unreliable information provided by public institutions on the number of migrants, their legal status, places of residence, and socio-economic conditions. When discussing sampling design in the quantitative research, we highlighted the difficulties arising from the lack of available data. For the qualitative research, the limited availability of data posed a challenge in deciding which regions, institutions, and topics to prioritise.

The final constraint in the second set of limitations is that the qualitative research findings, conducted between the summer and autumn months of 2022, only partially reflect the administrative practices that were relevant to migrants and refugees during this period. These practices included the suspension of new registrations for migrants and refugees in certain districts and neighbourhoods, intensified administrative surveillance, and an increase in the number of referrals to removal centres and subsequent deportations. Administrative practices towards migrants can often change due to fluctuations in political discourse. In the run-up to the presidential and parliamentary elections in May 2023, there was a noticeable increase in anti-migrant rhetoric. There were also reports of an uptick in deportation practices. In addition, conflicting information began to circulate about the number of migrants, refugees, and people who had been granted citizenship. For example, the official number of Syrians with temporary protection status fell by several hundred thousand in just a few months. The qualitative research conducted during a specific period does not provide insights into the situation of the earthquake-affected citizens and migrants in the regions affected by the Kahramanmaraş earthquakes on 6 February.

Background on the four cities

The four cities were selected based on several factors. These factors included ensuring regional representation within the 17 provinces where the quantitative research was conducted, representing different migrant groups, and considering contextual factors that facilitated migrants' settlement in the cities. Two cities, Gaziantep and Mardin, located on the border with Syria, were selected as they host the highest concentrations of migrants in Turkey. Izmir was chosen for its metropolitan area, which offers a sizable labour market, and its maritime border with the EU. This border has been made use of by irregular and transit migrants attempting to enter the EU since the early 2000s. Additionally, Izmir has become a preferred destination for Syrian refugees since 2011. Konya, a city known for its conservative and religious public life, was selected as a location to investigate the impact it has on both Syrian refugees and Muslim migrants from Central Asia and Afghanistan. It is also one of the satellite cities²² where international protection applicants live. Before moving on to the thematic analysis, we'll first discuss some of the urban contingencies that facilitate migrants' participation in the labour market, social life, and space in these four cities.

Gaziantep

The population of Gaziantep was 2,154,000 in 2022. According to the GİB's data, there were 442,426 Syrians living in Gaziantep under temporary protection status.²³ According to the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat, 2023), in 2021 there were 18,020 persons with short-term residence permits, international protection identity cards, or work permits. According to official data, Gaziantep is second only to Istanbul in terms of the number of Syrian refugees registered under temporary protection. Gaziantep is second only to Kilis in terms of the proportion of Syrians in the city's total population. Syrians make up approximately 17.4% of Gaziantep's total population, including those with temporary protection status. During the research, representatives from various institutions were interviewed and they indicated that the percentage of residents, including those who are not registered, is around 25%. This exceeds the official data. The numbers alone clearly show that Syrians have become an integral part of Gaziantep's daily life and economic structure. What are the contingencies that make Gaziantep a "liveable city" for migrants on such a large scale?

²² Satellite cities are the specified provinces and/or towns where applicants for international protection should reside during the evaluation process of their applications, until they are placed in a third country. Today, it is stated that there are more than 60 satellite cities within Turkey (Kahya Nizam and Sallan Gül, 2017).

²³ The figures used in this section on Syrians with temporary protection status in the four provinces are based on data published on the website of the Presidency for Migration Management (GİB) in early 2022. The GİB presents historical data on TP holders only in the form of graphs. The figures cited in this section can be found in the tables provided in the Methodology section of the qualitative study.

Since the 1990s, Gaziantep has emerged as a thriving city and centre of capital accumulation, characterised by the search of national and global capital for new spaces. It is one of the “Anatolian Tigers” (Eraydın, 2002; Başak and Saraçoğlu, 2011). Gaziantep has historically been an integral part of regional economic networks as a production and trade hub. After his visits to Gaziantep (Ayıntab) in 1648 and 1672, Evliya Çelebi described how the city had expanded in the intervening 24 years with the establishment of new markets, caravanserais, mosques, and foundations. As an indication of the city’s prosperity, Çelebi noted in 1672 that the city had 32 communities with well-maintained houses resembling high palaces, embellished with clay and lime. The presence of a large market with 3,900 shops, two covered bazaars, a leatherworkers’ market, well-built and decorated shops in a row, and markets for auction sales are further evidence of Gaziantep’s wealth as a prospering production centre and trading city in the 17th century (Gemici, 2014, citing *Seyahatname*).

During the 19th and early 20th centuries, Gaziantep, along with Aleppo and Damascus, became important textile centres within the Ottoman Empire. In the early years of the Republic, cotton and silk weaving factories were established in the city. These factories largely capitalised on the *Teşvik-i Sanayi Kanunu* (Law on the Encouragement of Industry), and the textile industry underwent significant expansion as a result of higher tariffs (Eraydın, 2002). In the 1970s, Gaziantep experienced a major expansion in the textile and garment sector. In addition, the city emerged as a regional centre due to advances in food and other industries. After the 1980s, the manufacturing sector contributed more to Turkey’s employment and value added, and in the 1990s Gaziantep became one of the “Anatolian Tigers,” known for its successful production and employment. However, during this period of growth, the informal nature of the labour market emerged as a crucial factor in the employment of migrant workers. Gaziantep’s manufacturing sector has become a major regional industrial hub. This growth has been driven primarily by the use of unorganised, uninsured, and unskilled labour available at low cost. As a result, Gaziantep has gained a competitive advantage by offering affordable labour and products (Ayata, 1999). The informal labour market has grown considerably and now includes Syrians with temporary protection status in Turkey. This expansion has led to lower production costs and has played a crucial role in helping Gaziantep maintain its competitive advantage. As a result, Gaziantep quickly began to employ Syrians in both the formal and informal labour markets as a source of cheap labour.

Furthermore, Gaziantep has a rich historical trade relationship with Aleppo and Damascus. The city’s historical connection with Aleppo, in particular, plays a significant role in facilitating the integration of Syrians into Gaziantep. In 1830, Gaziantep became a district centre under the administration of the Aleppo Province. This connection remained in place until the British occupation of Aleppo in 1918.

In his column entitled “The Fate of Two Cities: Aleppo and Gaziantep,” Güven Sak characterises these two cities as separated twin cities, noting that during the imperial period, Antep was an important peripheral city of Aleppo. Sak notes in his 2012 article that Gaziantep and Aleppo are 100 kilometres apart, and before the start of the Syrian civil war, taxis with Aleppo licence plates used to wait at Gaziantep airport to take passengers to Aleppo. He also mentions that merchants from Aleppo used Gaziantep airport for international travel. Fur-

thermore, he states that the number of Syrians entering Turkey increased significantly after the visa requirement between Syria and Turkey was lifted in 2009, with a 76-fold increase between 2009 and 2010, and that one million Syrians entered Turkey through the border in 2011, when the war began (Sak, 2012).

This strong historical relationship between Gaziantep and Aleppo is an important element of attachment for Syrian refugees. Interviews with Syrian migrants living in Gaziantep, published in *Hürriyet* newspaper in 2017, are significant in terms of demonstrating how the similarities between the two cities have affected migrants:

The fortress area of Gaziantep is like that of Aleppo. We feel unfamiliar in other places when we travel from Gaziantep. There are many similarities between Gaziantep and Aleppo. I often take leisurely walks in the fortress area because it brings back memories of my hometown, Aleppo, and the place where I was born. (Hasan Kasap)

This place is just like the Aleppo Citadel. The structure and architecture of the two are nearly identical. Every time I visit this place, it evokes strong memories of sitting in front of Aleppo Citadel. In the past, we would often gather at that spot, enjoying the experience of smoking hookah and savouring cups of coffee. It takes us back to those days and makes us feel nostalgic. I am longing for the war to come to an end as I deeply miss my country. (Abdullah Mustafa) (Hürriyet, 2017)

One of the contingencies beyond why Gaziantep is considered liveable for Syrians is the existence of a large urban decay area that includes abandoned houses. Located in the historical centre of the city, specifically in Akyol neighbourhood, there is an area known as the “Antep Houses” among the locals. This place served as a unique incubator for the first wave of migrants who arrived in the city. Although there are some Antep houses that have been registered as historical buildings, a considerable portion of the neighbourhood is comprised of abandoned houses, most of which are one or two stories high and have additional structures. The city’s multicultural fabric, which included Muslim, Armenian, and Jewish neighbourhoods in its historical centre, started to unravel as Turkey was being established as an independent nation-state. The Armenian and Jewish communities were the first to leave the city, and they were followed by the migration of the Muslim population to the newly developing modern neighbourhoods. As a result, these neighbourhoods were eventually abandoned. Families with limited financial resources who were unable to relocate to more modern neighbourhoods remained in their current areas. Thus, working-class individuals who migrated internally, as well as Syrian refugees, later settled in the unoccupied buildings either by renting or occupying them. According to the neighbourhood muhtar interviewed in 2022, Syrian families, as well as Syrian tradesmen and craftsmen, comprised over 80% of the population in the Akyol neighbourhood.

Furthermore, Gaziantep’s historical ties with Syria go beyond just the city of Aleppo. These connections also encompass nomadic communities, such as the Abdals and Doms, that exist on both sides of the border. Thanks to the shared cultural ties of the nomadic communities, Abdals and Doms from Syria are able to reside in the same neighbourhoods and rural areas as the settled Abdal and Dom populations of Gaziantep.

Mardin

In 2022, the population of Mardin was 870,374. According to the GİB's data, there were 85,615 Syrians with temporary protection status in Mardin. According to the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat) data, there were 2,794 foreigners with temporary residence permits, work permits or international protection status in Mardin in 2021 (TurkStat, 2023). Mardin ranks sixth in terms of the proportion of Syrians in the provincial population, behind Kilis, Gaziantep, Hatay, Şanlıurfa, and Mersin. The share of Syrians with temporary protection status in the official population of Mardin is 8.96%. Beyond the official data, some participants during the fieldwork in Mardin stated that the real proportion, including unregistered Syrians, is around 10% and that around 100,000 Syrians live in Mardin. These figures suggest that Syrians have become an important structural component of Mardin's daily life and economy. What are the contingencies that make Mardin a "liveable city" for migrants on such a large scale?

The settlement of Syrians in Mardin is supported by several facilitating contingencies, including strong historical links with Syria, cross-border kinship ties, and formal and informal trade relations. In 1928, when the Syrian border was formally demarcated, some localities in Mardin had all their inhabitants and land on the Syrian side, while others had all or part of their land inside Syrian territory. Villages chose to remain within the borders of a particular country according to their preferences. Thus, daily border crossings continued until 1936, allowing people to cultivate their lands on the other side of the border and graze large flocks of sheep. The major tribes in Mardin and surrounding areas that practised animal husbandry were able to maintain their economic resources and local influence across the border (Özgen, 2005; Karahan, 2018). During this period, various activities such as agriculture, animal husbandry, and cross-border trade were prevalent. This trade involved essential goods such as gas, salt, light bulbs, and tobacco, which were transported through "carriers." Cross-border economic interactions began to degenerate into smuggling, particularly of livestock, from 1954 onwards, as increased security measures and barbed wire impeded cross-border mobility. Passages for the sale of smuggled goods were established in Mardin at this time. After the establishment of a customs gate at the border in 1975, smuggling underwent a significant change and developed into the so-called "suitcase trade" for specific goods. The region between Mardin and Syria had not only economic links but also strong social and cultural ties, rooted in tribal and kinship ties. These ties remained strong until the outbreak of the Syrian civil war. As a result, when the war broke out in Syria, the rural settlements near the Mardin-Syria border experienced a migration movement influenced by tribal, kinship, and commercial ties. Thanks to the opening of the border, the majority of Syrians who sought refuge in Mardin found it much easier to settle and find employment in the city. This was made possible by pre-existing networks of relationships, shared language, and cultural affinity. Neşe Özgen describes the border relationship that played a crucial role in facilitating the settlement of Syrian migrants in Mardin via Nusaybin:

For Nusaybin, the border is life itself. Almost every house has, does, or will have some kind of contact with the "border." All economic trends, accumulations, the opening and closing of stores and workplaces, and their profits and losses are connected in some way to the "border." Property prices or the cost of getting married fluctuate as well according to the opportunities offered by the "border" (Özgen, 2005).

Research conducted by Apak (2014) on the integration of Syrian migrants in Mardin has shown that most Syrians in Mardin come from Sunni Muslim Arab and Kurdish communities in Hasekeh province, as well as from the surrounding towns and villages in Syria. Apak's research highlights the profound influence of spatial connections, kinship ties, religion, and language on the decision-making processes of individuals migrating to Mardin. According to Apak's research, the majority of Syrians surveyed (54.5%) have relatives living in Mardin.

The demand for affordable labour in agricultural production and the rapidly expanding construction sector is another important contingency contributing to the settlement of Syrians in Mardin. Most of the workers living in temporary housing near irrigation wells in agricultural areas in Mardin, particularly those involved in cotton production, are Syrians. Large land-owners prefer to hire them because they are willing to accept lower wages and work without job security, which ultimately helps to reduce labour costs in agriculture compared to hiring from the local population. In addition, the construction sector in central Mardin, and particularly in neighbouring districts such as Kızıltepe, has experienced a surge in growth over the past decade, employing unskilled and semi-skilled Syrian workers on a temporary and precarious basis.

Konya

In 2022, the population of Konya exceeded 2,296,347. According to the official data, 118,549 people from Syria were living in Konya under temporary protection status. According to Turk-Stat, the number of foreigners registered in Konya in 2021 was 25,636. Given that Konya is a satellite city, it is reasonable to assume that a significant percentage of this population is composed of applicants for international protection and persons with refugee or asylum status. Konya ranks ninth in terms of the number of Syrians registered under temporary protection. It ranks eleventh in terms of the proportion of Syrians to the official provincial population. Approximately 4.91% of the total population of Konya are Syrians. However, representatives of various institutions involved in the research have stated that if unregistered residences are considered, the proportion is estimated to be around 7-8%. This suggests that there are approximately 150,000 Syrians living in Konya. The figures clearly show that Syrians have become an integral part of daily life and economic activity in Konya. What are the contingencies that make Konya a "liveable city" for migrants on such a large scale?

From the late imperial period through to the Republic, the city of Konya has been involved in significant regional migration movements. It has functioned as both a point of origin and destination for mass migratory movements, such as the Tartars, and migrants and refugees from the Balkans, the Caucasus and Greece. At the end of the 19th century, Konya was a diverse city, with different communities living there, including Greeks, Armenians, Catholics, Protestants, and Jews. However, because of the tense and conflict-ridden processes that took place from the late 19th century to the first quarter of the 20th century, these populations had to flee their neighbourhoods (Ünver, 1967; Kurtulgan, 2010; Candeğer, 2019).

During the Republican era, the city attracted internal migration, becoming a destination for Bulgarian Turks who fled in 1989-90, as well as forcibly displaced Kurds in the 1990s. Before the arrival of the Syrians, people from Iraq, Somalia, Sudan, and Afghanistan had also migrated

to the area. The city is one of the satellite towns where applicants for international protection reside. These include refugees who have either applied for international protection or already have refugee status. However, it should be noted that some of them are irregular migrants. The population fleeing conflicts, civil wars, and regime changes in their respective countries, as well as students seeking employment or higher education, have settled in neighbourhoods such as Şemsitebrizi and Sahibiata, where migrants are still concentrated. The city has experienced its largest and most massive wave of migration since the mid-2010s, mainly due to Syrian refugees.

Konya, where conservative-religious business people are concentrated, is considered a “model city” in terms of the development objectives of conservative religious business and political circles. Following the adoption of the liberal economic model in the 1980s, Konya became a city in which the manufacturing sector was reorganised, and export-oriented manufacturing grew rather than agricultural production and the food industry (Genç et al., 2021). The 1990s marked a period of progress for conservative business people in Konya, similar to cities such as Gaziantep and Kayseri (Durak, 2012; Doğan and Durak, 2018). These business circles have achieved significant growth and capital accumulation since the turn of the 21st century through flexible production and employment systems, developed locally and regionally through subcontracting and working with SMEs concentrated in organised industrial zones.

There are eleven organised industrial zones in Konya. According to the Istanbul Chamber of Industry, 22 of the top 1,000 companies in the country are based in Konya (Konya Valiliği, 2023). The city is known for its intensive production and exports in a variety of industries, including machinery, automotive and spare parts, vehicle-mounted equipment, metal, food, plastic packaging, agricultural products and machinery, furniture, and textiles (Konya Valiliği, 2023). Undocumented migrant labour, particularly Syrian refugees, is used extensively in this structure, which includes flexible subcontracting and piecework companies. Some migrants bring their craft skills, such as tailoring or carpentry, from their places of origin and find employment in sectors such as textiles and furniture. Meanwhile, other migrants fill gaps in production by taking on jobs that are either unfilled or unattractive to the local workforce. It is also important to mention the growing export activities and supply chains that are developing in Konya towards the Middle East region. One of the contributing elements is the presence of migrants who are native Arabic speakers, who understand the geography of the Middle East, and who are partnering with local entrepreneurs in Konya.

Konya is also recognised as a major agricultural and livestock producer. It produces a wide range of commodities, including grains, milk, eggs, sugar beet, carrots, and maize. According to the Konya Governor’s Office in 2023, it is one of the country’s leading regions for both large and small livestock farming and the production of animal products (Konya Governors’ Office, 2023). In the rural areas of Konya and its surrounding regions, Afghan migrants are often seen working as herders and animal caretakers, as well as playing some role in agricultural production. Several factors contribute to the use of Afghan labour in agriculture and animal husbandry in Konya, as in other cities. These factors include the declining number of young locals in rural areas, the reluctance of young locals to engage in labour-intensive activities such as animal husbandry, and the previous experience of Afghans in animal husbandry in their home countries. In addition, the concentration of many young Afghan men, most of whom are undocumented,

in these sectors can be attributed to the availability of free, makeshift accommodation, such as barns, in rural areas. The relative lack of policing in rural areas also plays a role in their decision to concentrate in these sectors.

The research focuses on the Meram and Karatay districts, which, along with the Selçuklu district, are considered three of the most important districts in Konya's urban development (Topçu, 2011). The Sahibiata neighbourhood in Meram and the Şemsitebrizi neighbourhood in Karatay are both located in the old city centre. Sahibiata was once a neighbourhood where non-Muslim populations lived until the early period of the Republic. Later it became home to migrants through population exchange. The Şemsitebrizi neighbourhood, on the other hand, is located at the end of the city centre's main commercial and tourist axis. In both neighbourhoods, the departure of the city's old middle class led to the settlement of disadvantaged and impoverished people from the surrounding area. In the 2000s, Konya received smaller groups of migrants who settled in these neighbourhoods. As a result of recent large waves of migration, it appears that some of the Roma population now resides in the Sahibiata neighbourhood, while the aforementioned disadvantaged residents have also left the area. The population structure in the Şemsitebrizi neighbourhood appears to be fairly balanced. Some migrant families live in dilapidated and abandoned houses that are included in conservation plans. The migrant population has occupied these abandoned houses left behind by the local population. These properties are attractive to migrants because of their low rents, their proximity to the city centre, and their ability to accommodate large migrant families. Over the years, as the migrant population in these neighbourhoods has grown, so has the number of businesses catering to their needs. In addition, part of the migrant population has become entrepreneurial.

Local coalitions in Konya are robust and cooperative. Conservative elements dominate the political and social fabric of the city, which has led to a structure based on partnership and cooperation in the governance of the city and its relationship with the central government. In the field of urban governance, different actors such as local authorities, employers' organisations, political parties, universities, associations, city councils, and government institutions can cooperate in different areas (Genç et al., 2021). Practices such as promoting unity, collective action, and establishing cooperation between institutions are also effective in managing migration in the city.

The local networks and structures that have historically and traditionally existed in the city, especially religious organisations, are the most important factor in the settlement of migrants in Konya. The influence of CSOs, humanitarian aid associations, and other local organisations, which form an important part of the urban coalition mentioned above, also distinguishes Konya from other cities in terms of migrants' attachments to the city. Formal and informal organisations, including associations, platforms, and communities, are numerous and prominent in the city. Many associations, both large and small, have been involved in migration-related activities, either by including migrants in their scope of work in response to recent waves of migration, or by being established specifically to work in the field of migration.

Finally, it can be argued that the discourse around "the unity of the ummah and being ensar/muhajir" (helpers/migrants) and religious concepts such as "the brotherhood of Muslims, the belief in Allah as the provider of sustenance and the notion that the earth belongs to Allah" to some extent significantly influence the perspective towards migrants.

Izmir

In 2022, the population of Izmir was 4,462,056. According to official data from the GİB, the number of Syrians living in Izmir with temporary protection status was 138,599. According to TurkStat figures, there were 34,733 foreigners with international protection status, short-term residence permits, or work permits in Izmir in 2021 (TurkStat, 2023). Field study participants in Izmir reported that there are Syrians with temporary protection status registered in other provinces residing in the city, suggesting that the total number of Syrians is higher than the official figure. In addition, the city is home to an unknown number of transit and irregular migrants who stay for periods ranging from a few months to a few years. The proportion of Syrians under temporary protection to the total population of Izmir (including Syrians under TP registered in the city) is 3%. Izmir ranks eighth among all provinces in terms of the number of Syrians registered under temporary protection status. What are the contingencies that make Izmir a “liveable city” or a “waiting room” for migrants on such a large scale?

A city renowned for its services, agriculture, and industrial sectors, as well as its status as a significant port, Izmir is a confluence of numerous migration patterns. Transit migrants from various nations awaiting passage to the Greek islands by boat, undocumented migrants, Syrians with temporary protection status who work in the small manufacturing sector, and Syrian agricultural workers who are based in the rural areas of Izmir, either permanently or seasonally, are the most visible migrant groups in the city.

It offers a spatial structure that allows migrants to establish themselves. Izmir has been a port city since the 16th century and was the most significant port of the Ottoman Empire in the Mediterranean during the 19th century. It was a bustling trading city with a diverse population, including Muslims, Jews, Levantines, Armenians, and Greeks (Kolluoğlu, 2013). Throughout the course of the War of Independence, the Great Fire of 1922, and the subsequent population exchange with Greece in 1923, the city experienced a notable decline in its Greek population. Before that, the deportation of Armenians and the departure of many Levantines from the city after the establishment of the Republic, along with the migration of numerous Jews to Israel after 1948, resulted in Izmir losing its cosmopolitan population structure. The Great Fire also destroyed neighbourhoods inhabited by Armenians, Greeks, and Levantines, resulting in the loss of most of the city’s original urban and architectural framework (Kolluoğlu Kirli, 2005). Izmir’s population, which had reached over 200,000 in the early 1900s, was wiped in half as a result of the War of Independence (Kolluoğlu, 2013), and it was only through rural-to-urban migration that it was able to recover in the 1950s (Peker, 2015). Former Izmir residents who left the city throughout the 20th century continued to inhabit areas within the central district of Konak, such as Basmane and Agora. Nowadays, these neighbourhoods, with their abandoned homes and tiny, inexpensive hotels where migrants and merchants from Anatolia once stayed, serve as a contingency factor that enables transit and irregular migrants to find housing in the city.

Another characteristic of Izmir and a reason why some migrants use it as a “waiting room” is its proximity to the Aegean Islands, which makes it a transit route to Europe. For this reason, a distinct group of migrants stand out in Izmir compared to other cities. Some individuals are transit migrants who enter Turkey using tourist visas and remain in the city, hoping to eventually cross into Europe. There are also irregular migrants in Turkey who have entered the country through irregular means or have arrived with a tourist visa but were unable to obtain a residence permit or any other legal status. Furthermore, Syrians who currently hold temporary protection status in other provinces and are seeking to migrate to Europe due to deteriorating living conditions in Turkey also utilise Izmir as a transit point. Based on the findings of field research conducted in the city, it was observed that transit and irregular migrants consist of individuals hailing from North African and Sub-Saharan African countries, as well as Afghans, South Asians, and countries in the Middle East.

Also in the Konak district, the area named Kadifekale, after the historic Kadifekale Castle, sitting on a hill overlooking the Bay of Izmir, is a shantytown area that has developed as a result of internal migration caused by the lure of industrialisation in Izmir since the 1960s. In the 1980s and especially the 1990s, the height of the conflict in Southeast Turkey, Kadifekale witnessed an influx of Kurdish migrants and internally displaced persons (Demirtaş-Milz and Saracoğlu, 2015). A notable feature of the area was the lack of formal title deeds for a significant portion of the housing stock and for that reason, in the 2010s, Kadifekale was subjected to urban transformation projects. The presence of dense informal settlements in the area created a favourable environment for Syrians to settle. Descending from Kadifekale towards the city centre, the neighbourhoods along the route (such as Birinci Kadriye and İkinci Kadriye) have hosted Syrians since 2011. A significant proportion of Syrians in this area are reportedly Syrian Kurds.

After the 1980s, the formerly rural settlements and agricultural land in the Bornova district of Izmir were transformed into urban communities as a result of internal migration. Due to their proximity to the Işıkkent Industrial Zone, which is home to Izmir’s shoe and textile industries and is also located in Bornova, these neighbourhoods, which also have some informal housing stock, became popular places for workers to live. In addition to Işıkkent, there are several other industrial zones in Izmir. Since 2011, Syrians have been settling in Izmir, and some neighbourhoods in Bornova (e.g., Mevlâna and Doğanlar) have proven to be a suitable place for them to live (Saraçoğlu and Belanger, 2019). Finally, rural districts such as Torbalı have become areas where Syrian migrants engaged in seasonal agricultural work have settled, mainly due to the continued intensive agricultural production in these regions. The qualitative research in Izmir focus on Konak and Bornova.

Migrants' and Refugees' Participation in the Labour Market and Employment Relations

In the five cities where the qualitative research was carried out, interviews were conducted with employers and professional organisations (chambers of commerce and industry, chambers of craftsmen and tradesmen), workers' organisations (trade unions, associations, and initiatives), local administrators, and representatives of civil society organisations working in the fields of vocational training, skills development and social assistance. The interviews were conducted using three different semi-structured question forms to gather comprehensive qualitative data on the participation of migrants and refugees in the labour markets in these cities. The analysis of the coding of interview transcripts identified four key factors that shape the participation of migrants and refugees in the labour market. The factors can be expressed as follows:

1. The participation of migrants and refugees in the labour market, as well as the sectors and conditions of employment, are determined by factors such as their nationality, reasons for migration, entry methods to Turkey, and residence statuses.
2. The possession of material, cultural, and social capitals by migrants and refugees in their home countries significantly influences their labour force participation in their arrival areas.
3. Migrants make valuable contributions to the creation of wealth and the accumulation of capital at various levels within the cities where they choose to settle.
4. Migrants participate in the labour market as unskilled/semi-skilled labourers, skilled labour and professionals, small business owners and craftsmen, and as employers/business owners in the manufacturing, foreign trade, and services sectors, demonstrating diversity.

In this section, based on the four aforementioned factors, the positions of migrants within the Turkish employment regime and their processes and forms of labour force participation will be analysed under four main headings.

Migration reasons and residency status directly affect working conditions and employment

The reasons for migrants' and refugees' arrival in Turkey, as well as their residence statuses, play an integral part in determining their participation in the labour market. Additionally, these factors also influence employment areas and conditions.

Since 2011, Syrians fleeing the civil war have arrived in Turkey in addition to the irregular labour migrants and asylum seekers whose numbers have been gradually rising in the past 30 years. The temporary protection status that was granted to Syrians in 2014 has had a notable impact on their social participation. Employers can apply for work permits on behalf of Syrians with temporary protection status under specific conditions, as outlined in a regulation issued in 2016 (ÇSGB, 2021). But,, the majority of Syrians are employed in informally (Karadeniz, 2023). The ILO estimates that 900,000 Syrians are employed in the informal sector (Pinedo Caro, 2020); however, as of 2021, only 91,500 Syrians had obtained work permits (ÇSGB, 2021). Syrians in Turkey have settled in various provinces and have been able to access certain

social rights, which gives them a relatively more advantageous position in the labour market compared to some other migrants. The implementation of skill development, vocational training, and employment programs for Syrians, with the support of international organizations, may have contributed to this advantageous position.²⁴

For example, a representative of an association formed by Syrians in Izmir emphasised that Syrians have integrated into the community, emphasising that they enjoy a wage advantage compared to African migrants in the city. Similarly, a representative of an employers' organisation in Istanbul shared a similar perspective:

workers. If there is any difference, it is negligible. They have become a part of society. (...) (Syrians) are no longer willing to accept low wages. Perhaps they work an additional half hour or hour, but the wages remain approximately the same. (Izmir, 11, CSO)

Initially, they were favoured because they worked for lower wages, but now that the wages are roughly the same, they actually surpass them. Moreover, Turks do not have the same accumulation of wealth as Syrians. Syrians work alongside other Syrians. (Istanbul, 6, Employers' Organisation)

Currently, the wages of Syrian employees, but not those of African workers, are comparable to those of local Interviews with representatives of a trade union and a CSO in Konya revealed that irregular Afghan migrants and applicants for international protection often have less favourable working conditions and are paid less than Syrians:

The migration of Afghans is characterised by distinct preferences and differences. They prefer rural areas, such as villages, fields, vineyards, orchards, and forests. (...) This is because the primary reason they come for is work purposes. Their pay is typically lower than that of Turks. Two factors are at play here. Firstly, the availability of cheap labour. Also, it is important to note that Afghans generally lack access to social security or comparable benefits. On the other hand, we find a greater concentration of Syrians in the industrial sector. Syrians and Afghans have different living arrangements, with Syrians mainly residing in urban areas and Afghans predominantly living in rural areas. Yet, in places such as Konya, there is a noticeable presence of Syrians who are actively engaged in the industrial sector, establishing their own markets, and running their own clothing stores. (Konya, 10, Trade Union)

There are Afghans who work without papers. There are also individuals with deportation orders and Iraqis. Those whose application has been denied and who have been issued a deportation order stand out in particular. International protection is a bit different. What's the best way to put it? Those with temporary protection have health insurance coverage. After a year, however, health insurance coverage for those seeking international protection is interrupted. And if the individual has a chronic illness or requires regular medication and can provide documentation of their condition, their health insurance may be restored. Afghans believe that if they have a work permit, at least their share of health insurance could be covered, allowing them to access health services. There is no such consideration

²⁴ For example, since 2019, a "Formal Employment Transition Programme" (KİGEP) has been implemented in cooperation with the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the Social Security Institution (SGK), and the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (ÇSGB), targeting both Turkish nationals and Syrians with temporary protection status (Karadeniz, 2023).

for temporary protection beneficiaries. Because they have health insurance already. And I can vouch for Konya, perhaps 90% of Afghans work irregularly. (Konya, 12, CSO)

A representative of the Mardin Chamber of Commerce described an ILO-supported project aimed at legalising and securing employment for migrants in the city. However, she noted that this initiative only covered Syrian migrants and was being implemented in thirteen provinces. The representative of an employers' organisation in Konya mentioned a similar situation:

Currently, our ILO project is being implemented in thirteen provinces of Turkey, specifically in regions with a significant concentration of Syrians. We identify the professional profiles of Syrians, including their prior work experiences, through surveys. If their professions require occupational health and safety, we guide them toward certification exams based on their professional profiles. We do not charge them for exam fees or certification costs; those expenses are covered by our project funds. We provide them with certification at no cost. After obtaining the certification, we approach employers and say, "Through our initiative, we have certified successful Syrians. If we offer you a six-month employment incentive, are you able to pay for their health insurance for six months? Can you also compensate them at the minimum wage?" With the consent of the employers, we seek to facilitate their formal employment. (Mardin, 9, Employers' Organisation)

Of course, there are a lot of projects in the EU concerning Syrian workers. The Red Crescent, our projects, we create jobs. Without paying the minimum wage and without insurance, employers cannot benefit from incentives. Currently, most projects are going in that direction. I mean, good jobs, vocational training, employment, but it is official, all the projects now encourage people to work in an official way. (Konya, 14, Employers' Organisation)

On the other hand, it can be observed that as Syrian migrants' length of stay in Turkey increases, they become more courageous in joining the struggle for improved working conditions and wages, especially in relation to irregular migrant groups. A representative of an organisation in Işıkkent, Izmir, that advocates for the rights of workers against precarious, flexible (piece-rate), and uninsured working conditions, said that Syrian employees participated in protests and actions in 2013 and 2014. The representative noted that initially, the involvement of Syrian workers in these activities was lower compared to that of Turkish workers. However, there has been an apparent spike in the involvement of Syrian workers in subsequent actions as their numbers in the sector have increased:

This is what happened here. (...) Our association had the most influence within the textile industry. Also, there was employment in Işıkkent. Due to organisational issues, we frequently returned to that location. (...) After a month or month and a half had elapsed, a second protest took place. Nearly 600 individuals took to the streets, including approximately 500 Syrian employees. (...) About 500-600 individuals marched, including 500 Syrians. Approximately 100 locals were also present. (...) They were also uneasy with the current circumstance. (...) Some of them were store proprietors. According to reports, migrant labourers now outnumber local workers. They even put their own children to work because natives do not want their children to be shoe industry apprentices. Due to their conditions, (Syrians) put them (children) to work as additional labour. In the shoe industry, more Syrian Turks, Turkmens, and Kurds are employed. (Izmir, 5, CSO)

However, while the involvement of Syrian workers in fighting for rights in an industrial zone is present in Izmir, it is missing in Konya, where many migrant workers are employed in industry and agriculture. It is critical to recognise that the political/cultural structure of cities and the capacity for class struggle play a decisive role in migrant workers' participation in the struggle for their rights. In an interview with a trade union representative in Konya, when asked about the organisational status of migrant employees in the union, it emerged that they are hardly organised:

Unions have a separate budget for organising workers. (...) But it does not improve their training or their prospects. Frankly, we have none. The Ministry of Labour has a system to coordinate them. People who are not covered by social security cannot be organised within the system. We have not even been able to organise Turkish workers. In Turkey, only 8% of the workforce is unionised. (Konya, 10, Trade Union)

Residence status also plays a critical role in determining the participation of various migrant groups in labour and employment processes. Longer periods of sojourn enable migrants to build social networks, integrate into the labour market, and engage in processes of claiming rights and benefits to secure a future in the country. While irregular economic migrants do not have a residence permit, the duration of stay for those who do have such a permit is limited to 6-12 months, and in some cases these permits are not renewed. Refugees also find themselves in an irregular situation if their application for international protection is rejected. Although the status granted to Syrians is temporary, it is nonetheless indefinite. Thus, compared to other migrants, Syrians are integrated into social and labour life not only through their individual efforts, but also through the networks of relationships they have established among themselves and with the local community over time.

Effects of migrants' different capitals on labour market participation and employment

Waves of migration involve not only the movement of people from one place to another, but also the transfer of different actors or groups of actors with different forms of capital.²⁵ Migrants bring with them their economic, cultural, and social capital, which plays a vital role in shaping their participation in the social fabric of both their home countries and the countries to which they migrate. When they enter the labour market in another country, these capital assets are influential, but their ability to use them depends heavily on the value system, market conditions, and nature of labour demand in that country. For migrant groups with limited economic capital, cultural capital, which consists of education, knowledge, and skills, can only be used to a limited extent, whilst migrants' social capital, which consists of social networks, can be advantageous when participating in the labour force in their home country but may not be of much use in a foreign country. However, the presence of migrant networks can be seen as a valuable form of social capital that gives individuals an advantage in terms of labour market participation. Among migrant groups, those with temporary protection sta-

²⁵ In his work "Forms of Capital," Bourdieu (1986) provides a definition of capital as accumulated labour, which can either exist in material or embodied form. Social actors and groups possess different forms of capital, either as a result of their inherent power or the systems into which they are born. The different forms of capital include economic (material) capital, social capital, and cultural capital.

tus, specifically Syrians, are the most able to use their material, cultural, and social capital in the Turkish labour market. Syrians have a unique advantage over other migrant groups due to their residence status and their possession of material, cultural, and social capital. This advantage allows them to effectively fill gaps in the labour market. Comparing Afghans and Syrians, a trade union leader in Konya described the current situation as follows:

Each one of them had a profession [meslek] in the place where they have come from. (...) I mean, all Syrians in fact have a profession. They are not like Afghans. Afghans don't have a real profession. There are some exceptions, but most Syrians who come from there have a profession. (...) You can find them in all sectors of industry. In electricity, in repair work, in technical jobs. For example, with machines, turning. You can find them in every sector. (...) Let's say that among the first arrivals we had educated young adults, not minors, but young adults, and about 80% of them were already professionals. As I said, some were repairmen, some were electricians, some were computer technicians. In every field and industry, about 80% of the people had a specific occupation. (Konya, 10, Trade Union)

The representative of the Konya branch of an international CSO that provides vocational training to disadvantaged migrant groups reported that they were receiving a higher number of skilled Syrian migrants than they anticipated.

Because of the help we offer, underprivileged communities will inevitably seek us out. (...) But even highly educated people enrol in our courses. We have lawyers, doctors, teachers, and other professionals who can take Turkish language or crafts classes. Although it may not seem like there are many of them, it is evident from our participants that there is such a group. As their level of education increases, so will their awareness, and they will naturally want to learn Turkish and integrate into social life. (Konya, 9, CSO)

However, it is worth noting that within migrant communities, a significant proportion of Syrians are engaged in various forms of employment beyond skilled and semi-skilled labour-intensive jobs. Syrians have a relatively greater advantage than other migrants in using their financial and professional capital, particularly in the craft sector. A representative of an association of Syrian origin expressed their perspective on the Izmir Işıkent Industrial Zone as follows:

They have become employers, like Turkish citizens. They have set up their own businesses. They are taxpayers. They have permits both to open and to work. They have both insured and undocumented employees... (...) For example, if you visit a shoe market, you will notice that several vendors specialising in accessories and shoe materials who have set up spacious shops are Syrians. (...) They are like the Turks. Eleven years is a long time. (...) There are some who have opened bakeries. In fact, the number of Syrian bakeries has increased considerably. (...) And they employ both Turkish and Syrian workers. (Izmir, 11, CSO)

Alongside Syrians, Afghans are the most likely to be employed in agriculture and animal husbandry, where they can perform the same tasks as in their home countries. According to a representative of an employers' organisation, the concentration of migrants and refugees in certain sectors, particularly in Konya, is closely connected to the skills they have acquired in their home countries:

Migrants such as Afghans are mainly employed in agriculture, shepherding, and related sectors. I have not seen Syrians working as shepherds or in agricultural areas. It is extremely rare. They are mostly employed in the industrial sector. CNC [machines with

computer numerical control], welding, and construction. There are also tradesmen. For example, there are foreign trade companies. Foreign trade companies employ a significant number of Syrians. Obviously, the most influential businessmen are not in Konya, but in Istanbul and Gaziantep. They are scarce in Konya. There are few large companies and investors in the area. (Konya, 14, Employers' Organisation)

However, the distribution of sectors in Gaziantep and Mardin is different from that in Konya. The agricultural sector employs a large number of Syrians in these cities. The employment patterns of urban and rural migrants in their home countries are determined by the skills and experience they have acquired. In Gaziantep, there is a notable prevalence of undocumented migrant labour not only in the industrial sector but also, to a similar extent, in the construction and agricultural sectors. In Mardin, migrant labour is mainly exploited in agriculture, particularly in irrigation work known as *kuyubaşılık*²⁶, which the natives are unwilling to do. They are then used in the construction and industrial sectors. Discussions with civil society organisations and employers' organisations in Gaziantep and Mardin shed light on the division of labour among migrants and provided valuable insights and detailed information.

According to a representative of an CSO in Gaziantep, the material, cultural, and social capital of people involved in Syrian migration is undergoing qualitative changes as migration progresses. It is stated that migrants differentiate themselves socio-economically according to the time of their arrival and that this differentiation has a significant impact on their participation in the city's labour market. According to the account of one interviewee, who is also a researcher working on the border, the first influx of Syrian refugees entered Turkey through Yayladağ in 2011. They were people fleeing the war, army deserters, or political refugees affiliated with the opposition. The first group of around 250,000 people were housed in camps set up on the border. Later, between 2012 and 2014, arrivals consisted of middle-class Syrians fleeing the conflict. The interlocutor elaborated as follows:

When conflict breaks out, it is the middle class that has the most to lose and the most to worry about. Between 2012 and 2014, there were around 700,000 refugees from the middle class, and we were the first to encounter them. If you weren't working at the border at that particular time, you wouldn't have had any encounters with refugees from Syria until about mid-2012. (...) (Syrian) middle-class people arrived with the attitude: "Anyway, this regime is going to be overthrown, it's going to collapse, let's stay away from this conflict process, let's keep our children away too," and they started renting houses in neighbourhoods close to the city centre, usually with two or three families. (Gaziantep, 1, CSO)

According to the interviewee, since 2012, when the war in Syria began to affect urban areas, approximately 1.3 million people living on the outskirts of conflict-ridden cities entered Turkey. The interviewee went on to elaborate that this group dispersed and settled in different cities:

These individuals from the Syrian lower classes dispersed to numerous cities; each new wave pushed the previous ones further inland. The first arrivals from the middle classes gradually moved to the interior regions of Anatolia, particularly Mersin, Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara, and Adana. In addition, a significant number of them migrated to Europe. (Gaziantep, 1, CSO)

²⁶ *Kuyubaşıs* are the workers who stay in huts next to water wells and tend to the watering of large tracts of agricultural land where irrigated farming takes place in Southeastern Anatolia.

The interviewee highlighted that in 2015, as the war escalated, around 1.5 million people from extremely impoverished rural areas began to migrate, describing this period as follows:

Since 2015, there has been a significant influx of rural migrants living in extreme poverty. During my time working at the border, I observed that middle-class people passed through the border gates, while lower-class individuals crossed through mined areas. There were masses of people who walked from Kilis to Gaziantep because they had no money and were among the last groups to arrive. Among them are some 50,000 Dom and Abdal families, the most vulnerable segment of the Syrian population. (Gaziantep, 1, CSO)

Due to their varying levels of financial, cultural, and social capital, the integration of different Syrian ethnic and class groups into the social and labour life of Gaziantep has occurred in different ways at different stages of the war. Contrary to conventional assumptions, Syrians do not experience displacement as a single, homogeneous group, but rather as individuals with distinct class identities and capital resources. Consequently, their relationships with cities are shaped by this framework. One example of class-based integration is a project in Gaziantep that aims to unite Syrian women with local Gaziantep women.

Starting in 2012, we began to function as an institution, transforming our own spaces into open spaces where Syrian artists, women's rights activists and human rights activists could hold meetings, create artworks, and exhibit their work. This is how we got to know Syrians from the middle and upper classes. In particular, our culinary programme has been adopted as a women's workspace, where Turkish and Syrian middle-class women work together on projects based on their shared life experiences. (Gaziantep, 1, CSO)

Syrian migrants and refugees engage in the labour market in three primary modes, leveraging their diverse capitals. The first group consists of business owners and professionals with extensive financial capital who bring their trade, service, and production activities from their home country to the host community. These individuals work in a variety of sectors, including tourism, trade, industry, finance, information technology, customs, and more. The second group consists of small entrepreneurs and artisans who, despite having limited financial capital, are able to start their own businesses by using their professional skills and experience. The third category consists of salaried menial or semi-skilled workers. These three groups come from diverse class backgrounds, but they all share contextual relationships in their involvement in the labour force. One of the most notable manifestations of these contextual relationships can be seen in areas densely populated by Syrian refugees, where local businesses and artisans set up shops and most of their customers are Syrians from various social classes. This contextual interaction was described by a representative of an CSO working in the Gaziantep refugee area as follows:

Strolling through the streets of Gaziantep, you will notice many grocery stores, markets, and shops run by Syrians. (...) However, all these businesses are part of the informal economy. (...) As such, Syrian markets and grocery stores have their own parallel supply system. Coca-Cola, for example, can supply as much as it pleases to large supermarket chains such as BIM or Turkish-owned grocery stores. They may receive weekly payments by cheque or credit card. However, because Syrian grocery stores do not have these payment options, Coca-Cola does not supply them directly. Instead, they are supplied by affluent Syrian merchants with extensive warehouses. They pay for the products upfront and then distribute them to grocery stores across the city. (...) The number of neighbourhood grocery stores in Turkey has decreased significantly as many have closed. However, many of these

local grocery stores can be found in Syrian neighbourhoods. As Syrian families do not have credit cards, they often offer credit to their customers. (...) As a result, people end up paying up to two or three times the original price for products in Syrian grocery stores because they must pay in cash or get credit. (Gaziantep, 1, CSO)

In cities with a high concentration of Syrians, there is a parallel market and supply chain consisting of large wholesalers, distributors, small retail outlets, and customers who buy on credit or cash from them. A notable example of this is the existence of Syrian traders who own large wholesale warehouses. In addition, there has been an increase in the number of companies selling second-hand goods at the Gaziantep Wholesale Traders' Market, which has created a sense of competition with local wholesalers. It is also worth noting that around 15% of the members of the Gaziantep Chamber of Commerce are traders from Syria. As noted above, this parallel market also functions as a supply line for products across the border:

This supply chain also supplies products to Syria. If you visit the Kilis border gate, you will notice a road that stretches about 4-5 kilometres between the border gate and the town of Kilis. This road is often filled with hundreds of trucks waiting in queues as it serves as an extremely important supply route for various goods and commodities. Depending on how you look at it, they have developed a supply chain for a population of between 7-8 million people in Turkey and around 4-5 million people inside Syria. (Gaziantep, 1, CSO)

The primary distinction between Syrians and other migrant groups is not only their employment as cheap labourers in labour-intensive jobs, but also their increasing participation in the labour force as capitalists, entrepreneurs, or designers deploying various forms of capital:

Ünaldı, once home to thousands of workers in carpet factories, has been completely transformed into a textile and knitwear industry. In 2014 and 2015, Syrians worked alongside Turks in the workshops located there. Today, almost 30% of the workforce in Ünaldı is made up of Syrians who have set up their own workshops. They continue to hire Syrians as employees, but now the Syrians have become the bosses themselves. Gaziantep has a thriving plastics and shoe industry, which has grown considerably since the Syrians arrived. (...) Several businesses now have Syrian partners. (Gaziantep, 1, CSO)

Our registration processes are currently experiencing a considerable volume of work. Last month, out of a total of thirty new registrations, about sixteen to seventeen were from Syrian nationals. In the industrial zones, obtaining a work permit requires an operating licence. As they cannot obtain a permit without this licence, they must register with the Chamber of Craftsmen. (Istanbul, 6, Employers' Organisation)

Migrants' native languages do not necessarily confer an advantage in terms of cultural capital when they move to a country where that language is not commonly spoken. In Turkey, proficiency in the Turkish language gives several migrant groups an advantage in the labour market. However, extensive literacy skills in Arabic and Kurdish, as well as knowledge of Middle Eastern countries, can translate into cultural and social capital advantages in certain sectors of foreign trade with the Middle East. Local companies exporting goods to the Middle East are forming partnerships and new ventures with migrants who are fluent in Arabic and have extensive trade networks and relationships in the region. The Gaziantep Chamber of Commerce, for example, has set up a Syrian Desk, employing Syrians with language skills, knowledge, and experience to strengthen trade links with Syria and the Middle East.

In Turkey, the presence of migrants and refugees is often viewed through the lens of vulnerable migrant groups working in labour-intensive jobs under precarious and harsh conditions, living in the poorest neighbourhoods, and struggling with poverty. The extent to which migrant groups participate in the labour force varies according to a number of factors, such as the reasons for their migration, migration patterns, residency status, and the material, cultural, and social capital they possess. The ability of individuals to take advantage of these resources and opportunities is also influenced by the economic, cultural, and social framework of the settlements in which they are forced or choose to live upon arrival. In Gaziantep and Konya, for example, economic participation takes a variety of forms, including industrial and agricultural workers, manufacturing industrialists, international trade specialists, small traders, and skilled craftsmen. In Izmir, migrants and refugees work mainly in the industrial and service sectors, where they own small workshops and shops. In Mardin, on the other hand, their main occupations are in agriculture and construction. In Istanbul, migrants play an important role in the labour force, especially in certain sectors. They are also active as entrepreneurs in various industries, including clothing, jewellery, footwear, and tourism. However, the most visible migrants and refugees in everyday life are not necessarily these entrepreneurs, but rather the impoverished migrants in the informal labour market and the growing number of small traders and artisans in migrant-dense neighbourhoods. A representative of an employers' organisation in Konya explained the situation as follows:

Syrians run shops including bakeries, markets, groceries, butchers, and restaurants. Most of the new businesses set up by Syrians are also involved in international trade, especially exports. (...) They export goods to several Arab countries, including Syria, Libya, Qatar, Morocco, Algeria, Lebanon, and Iraq. (...) The most exported products are kitchenware, construction materials, prefabricated houses, and ceramics. (...) Recently, there has been a noticeable increase in demand for medical equipment. While most of the production takes place in Istanbul and Gaziantep, there is also some manufacturing activity here. (Konya, 14, Employers' Organisation)

Among the migrants who arrived with economic capital, there are individuals who have successfully established themselves as business owners in the foreign trade and manufacturing sectors. This group consists mainly of Syrians with temporary protection status, although there are also Iraqis who have been granted citizenship. The representative of an employers' organisation in Konya explained that Iraqis have mainly set up manufacturing workshops producing construction materials and are also involved in the production of medical doors used in hospitals.

Some migrants possess economic capital directly from their home countries, while others have amassed economic capital during their years of residence in Turkey to start their own businesses. This is related to their level of education, knowledge, and expertise, as well as the nature of their social capital. A member of an employers' organisation in Konya recounted the experience of a Syrian entrepreneur:

He arrived in 2012 and initially worked as a foreign trade manager for a company. In 2015, after becoming a Turkish citizen, he left this position and started his own foreign trade business. In 2012, Syrians did not have the opportunity to set up their own businesses. It started around 2015. After that, the number of Syrians living in Konya increased. (...) More than a hundred Syrian companies in Konya are involved in exports, and some of them are even operating domestically. (Konya, 14, Employers' Organisation)

Here is another example that highlights how a sizeable number of successful Syrian entrepreneurs who have set up businesses in Gaziantep have specific professional expertise or economic capital. It includes the testimony of a representative of an CSO working on the education of migrant children in Gaziantep:

We were helping children to learn to read and write. (...) There was a little girl whose father was involved in knitting. He had previous experience in Syria. When he arrived, he first worked in one factory before moving to another because of his exceptional skills in the field. As a result, he quickly advanced to the position of foreman in his new workplace. Later, a Syrian individual hired him to manage his established workshop. Eventually he was able to purchase machinery, set up his own workshop and start exporting after becoming a partner in the original workshop. (...) He produced denim, including denim breeches, which he sold to the Egyptian, Iraqi, and Syrian markets. (Gaziantep, 1, CSO)

After the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, migration to Turkey took place in three distinct waves, based on the characteristics of migrants mentioned above. According to the interviews, the second phase of migration, which occurred after 2012, consisted of migrants who were able to actively participate in the labour market as professionals, entrepreneurs, and investors due to their economic, cultural, and social capital. The businesses set up by Syrians, or the positions they obtained in local companies, acted as magnets for subsequent waves of less-skilled workers who would enter Turkey in greater numbers. In the cities where the second wave of Syrians settled and joined the labour force, there was a significant increase in the number of Syrians working in manufacturing. Subsequent waves of migrants led to the emergence of neighbourhoods of artisans and craftsmen. Participants from Konya and Gaziantep explained this situation as follows:

After 2015, the number of migrant neighbourhoods increased dramatically, and these communities are now firmly established. (...) One example is the Aykent industrial area, where Syrians make up a significant proportion of the workforce. They are employed as shoemakers and factory workers. I know about 400 workers there. Some of them are skilled craftsmen who have set up their own small shops or manufacturing companies. They are employers themselves. (...) Those who work as shoemakers, for example, are undoubtedly highly skilled. They had already practised this trade in Syria. (...) Similarly, tailors (who work in the garment industry) and shoemakers are also highly skilled professionals. When they arrived from Syria, they were already seasoned professionals. Some of them arrived at a tender age and developed their skills by working in factories. (Konya, 14, Employers' Organisation)

Historically, Antep and Aleppo have been closely connected. In the past, Gaziantep was part of the province ruled by Aleppo. Many of the refugees in Gaziantep are from northern Aleppo. As Aleppo was known for its textile industry in Syria, the newcomers were highly skilled textile and knitting specialists. They were therefore very quickly integrated into the labour force. (...) They were skilled in the trade, so they quickly set up their businesses. (Gaziantep, 1, CSO)

In Turkey, migrants can leverage social capital such as kinship, hometown ties, and business partnerships to gain access to the labour market. The historical trade links between Gaziantep and Aleppo in Syria offer a valuable opportunity for people from Aleppo to join the labour force and engage in foreign trade in Gaziantep. In Mardin, on the other hand, kinship ties between former villages and towns separated by the border play an important role in helping Syrian migrants integrate into the labour market. A representative of an CSO in Mardin shared this observation based on her personal experience:

The hardworking Syrians continue in the same jobs they had in Syria once they arrived here. Language is not a hurdle for them, and they have relatives here. When my uncles arrived, they immediately set up a butcher's shop because they were butchers in Syria. One of their daughters is a hairdresser, so she immediately opened a hairdressing salon (...). There is a woman in Syria who had a hairdressing salon and a beauty centre. She opened a salon as soon as she arrived. (...) She is now renting out evening dresses. The local shop owners in Mardin don't earn as much as she does. She works as a hairdresser and also rents out dresses. (...) There is a market for evening dresses here. The dress rental business is prosperous because people do not want to wear the same dress to more than one wedding. Also, everyone in Mardin has family in Syria. To relieve themselves of having to look after these newcomers, those who are already here immediately tell the newcomers to open a shop and sell goods or help them to start a business. (Mardin, 1, CSO)

Gaziantep and Mardin share a border with Syria and had family and trade links with Syria prior to the conflict. However, the two cities have distinct economic dynamics that also affect the ways in which migrants are engaged in the labour market. For example, around 15% of registered entrepreneurs in Gaziantep's Chamber of Commerce are Syrians, compared to fewer than 1% in Mardin. In Mardin, Syrian migrants are mainly involved in the labour force through various means such as small businesses, handicrafts, agriculture, low-cost labour in the textile industry, and construction. This is how a representative of an employers' organisation in Mardin put it:

There are currently only a handful of Syrians in the region who have established substantial businesses. However, there are many small businesses and SMEs run by Syrian migrants. During our project's surveys, we found that they are mainly opening small shops, although these tend to be in less visible areas of the city, such as side streets. Their businesses focus mainly on the food industry, specialising in well-known Syrian dishes and pastries. These shops are not luxurious restaurants, but small establishments selling items such as falafel, various pastries, and traditional Assyrian pastries. (...) There are typically no more than ten Syrian migrants registered with the Chamber of Commerce in the area. (...) They concentrate on the culinary industry rather than tourism. Small electrical repair shops, furniture stores, hairdressers, and other similar businesses are also observed. (...) Compared to the Syrians in Hatay, for example, the structure of their businesses is different. Some Syrian migrants in Hatay have even set up plazas (office structures). In Mardin, the majority of Syrian-owned businesses are small enterprises. (Mardin, 9, Employers' Organisation)

As discussed earlier, vocational training projects supported by the United Nations, the ILO, and the EU and facilitated by public or quasi-public professional organisations are an important factor distinguishing Syrian refugees' labour market participation from that of other migrants. However, it has been observed that these vocational training projects fall far short of their employment goals, mainly due to the discontinuation of the Turkish Red Crescent's (Kızılay) support to families. When Kızılay's support ceases, refugees are forced to adopt different work patterns to sustain their livelihoods. Working from home is one of the possible alternatives. Some Syrians who have been certified through vocational training projects have chosen to practise their trade from home. In this way, individuals can avoid the requirement to register as formal employees and still earn an income from their profession without jeopardising their eligibility for Kızılay assistance:

The Turkish Red Crescent (Kızılay) occasionally offers hairdressing courses. In addition, the Ministry of National Education offers courses through the Public Education Centres,

also known as Halk Eğitim Merkezleri. (...) Most of the people who have received certificates from our project are currently practising hairdressing from home. (Konya, 14, Employers' Organisation)

Migrants' contribution to capital accumulation

During the qualitative research conducted in the four cities, including interviews with workers, employers, professional organisations, representatives from relevant government agencies and CSOs, and a meeting with the representative of an employers' organisation in Istanbul, the contribution of migrants to urban and agricultural economic activities was inquired about. All interviewees, including those who used anti-migrant rhetoric, emphasised the economic benefits of migrant and refugee labour, regardless of their views on migration. It was acknowledged that Syrian traders, producers, and professionals bring economic capital, professional experience, and trade links from Syria to Turkey, which has a positive impact on the economy. These discussions highlighted that in certain labour-intensive industries, the local population no longer tolerates working for minimum wages and in precarious conditions, while migrants are more receptive to informal employment. However, it was noted that the persistent problem of a shortage of middle-skilled workers in Turkey has been somewhat mitigated by the arrival of migrant workers:

There is a shortage of available labour in Mardin. Even in the textile industry, which pays above the minimum wage, many locals are not interested in working because of the difficult conditions. (...) The presence of strict discipline and challenging working conditions discourages Mardin locals from seeking employment in these industries. (...) However, Syrians are a cheaper labour force. One can significantly reduce costs by hiring Syrians as they can do the same work for almost half the price. There is a perception that the departure of Syrians will lead to significant problems in these industries. (...) A similar situation exists in the construction industry. Very few Turkish people are interested in working in the construction industry. The traditional idea of becoming a craftsman, such as inheriting one's father's trade, is slowly disappearing. Nowadays, no one is interested in taking up trades such as butchery or furniture making. (...) A common criticism is that we are unemployed because of the arrival of Syrian refugees. (...) When it is suggested to them that they should consider employment opportunities in the construction sector, their response is often "I have a university degree. What's the point of working in there?" (Mardin, 9, Employers' Organisation)

I was recently unable to find someone to work in the well for me. My employee who was working with me decided to move to Germany. So, we called Syrians. I brought a whole family with me. They are in the village now, tending the land. They are responsible for maintaining the wells and the wheat fields. (Mardin, 10, Employers' Organisation)

Indeed, their contributions have been substantial. They have integrated into sectors where Turks are either not employed or do not prefer to work. They have settled in industries such as foundry, shepherding, agriculture, and shoemaking, where Turks typically avoid or dislike working. Migrants often work in demanding jobs. (...) After the Afghans arrived in my village of Meram, the livestock industry, which had been in decline, was revived. About 50 households have started raising sheep. (Konya, 11, Employers' Organisation)

Family businesses (in agriculture) have been severely hampered, and no locals remain in the area as they are unable to expand their operations to an enterprise level. There is no youth in the rural areas. (...) Because we live in a time when they don't even give a girl to a young man who lives in the village. Now, everyone is being funnelled into the cities. (...) The same phenomenon is happening in our industry. Konya has a huge potential in terms of organised industry. Today, however, everyone is pursuing a university degree. (...) If you visit industry, you will see that it is populated by Syrians. Why is that? Because there are no workers with intermediate skills. According to our industrialists, it is difficult to convince young people to take a job. These kids are university graduates. And then we tell them: "Go and work in industry." The industrialists say they don't like jobs. (Konya, 10, Trade Union)

Take the case of the scrap dealers. There is a scrap yard here that is also dominated by Syrians. Why is that? Because it is physically demanding. Our local youth do not want to do it. Our youth, bless their souls, are more used to comfort now. They want Saturdays and Sundays off, no overtime, so they can socialise and hang out with their mates. But Syrians do not have this luxury. They work. (Izmir, 8, Muhtar)

In the meeting held with a representative of an employers' organisation in Mardin, when we asked the question, "Have Syrians contributed to Mardin's economy and economic development?" the executives responded as follows:

I certainly think so. In certain industries, people are already jostling for employees. So, it has happened, whether we like it or not! (...) Currently, almost ninety percent of our agricultural exports go to northern Iraq. That means we export about a billion dollars a year. About 800 to 900 million dollars go to northern Iraq. We have a significant number of Syrian workers in this area, particularly in the Kızıltepe region. As a family, they are accustomed to the business. They can operate tractors and deal with irrigation. They have more experience from their home country than we do. (Mardin, 9, Employers' Organisation)

Migrants have also become a structural component of the labour force in Istanbul, the city with the highest capital accumulation in Turkey. Representatives of the footwear, textile, and jewellery industries also emphasise this point:

Obviously, we now must recruit migrant workers. It also benefits the employers. For example, they can hire a person who used to earn ten liras and pay him only six liras. (...) There is no financial burden. They also adapt well to the position. Employers of Syrians in our sector are satisfied with their work. (...) For example, Syrians currently make up forty percent of the workforce in the shoe industry. In addition to working as labourers, they have also set up their own production facilities. (...) At the moment, the market has shifted exclusively to Syrians. (Istanbul, 6, Employers' Organisation)

A representative of an employers' organisation in Konya stated that migrants with specific skills who enter the labour market make a valuable contribution to the city's economy. They help to fill the gap of intermediate labour in production and also play a role in increasing the capacity of foreign trade:

Among the new generation of Turks, there is a widespread desire to work in an office environment and to pursue higher education. There is a lack of interest in a career in the construction industry. In my opinion, the gap is being filled by foreigners. For example, many Turkish companies are facing challenges in finding welders. Turkish welders are currently

in short supply, but Syrians have stepped in to fill the gap. They have taken up welding jobs to a considerable extent. Welders are also often found in the industrial sector. (...) Employers in the trade sector are very satisfied. They end up exporting goods that they do not produce themselves and rely on Syrians to handle the export process and attract foreign customers. (Konya, 14, Employers' Organisation)

According to an CSO representative who is both a farmer and working in the field of migration, the presence of migrants and refugees in Gaziantep has led to growth of the informal sector. This informal sector acts as a protective barrier for the city, shielding it from both global and local economic crises:

Antep has a significant and extensive informal sector, and a large influx of cheap labour into the labour market is one of the reasons why Antep has been less affected by the current economic crisis. (...) This situation has created significant added value for these border cities. (Gaziantep, 1, CSO)

Syrians are successfully integrating into the workforce, leveraging their diverse skills and assets. In these cities, on the one hand, they serve as a labour force, particularly in manufacturing and other labour-intensive industries, and on the other hand, their presence as entrepreneurs engaged in exports to Syria and other Middle Eastern countries has become a structural element of the city's economy.

Due to the prevalence of informal work, informal production, and informal trade activities, it is rather difficult to analyse the structural integration described above in its entirety. The responses of the institutional actors involved in the labour market and capital accumulation processes in the cities included in the study allow us to draw conclusions about the role of migrants in the economies of specific cities. The first question, which has already been answered, concerned the contribution of migrants to the city's economy and the extent of their impact. The second question asks about the potential consequences for cities if Syrian refugees were to be repatriated, and whether the public and employers have any plans to adapt to this situation. The answers to this question are significant because they highlight the lack of a practical response in terms of the Turkish economy and labour regime to the ever-growing populist discourse of "they should go" and "we will send them back." There are no extant scenarios for dealing with the labour shortages that would result from the return of refugees, because the reality is so evident:

If the Syrians were to leave, we wouldn't be able to find people to work for us. That is what will happen. (Izmir, 8, Muhtar)

If they are sent back, it will obviously have a negative effect. There will be no workers in some sectors. Especially in the footwear, textile, construction, iron casting and heavy labour sectors. (...) And, as I said, they are cheap labour, and it will be more expensive. It will certainly have a big impact on production, international trade, and exports. After all, they have brought their customers with them. If you speak the same language, it is easier to build trust. (Konya, 14, Employers' Organisation)

If they are gone, we will be ruined. We won't be able to find anyone to do the irrigation or the construction work. (Mardin, 10, Employers' Organisation)

Frankly, we need migrant labour because our citizens don't want to work and everyone, including our family members, elders, and kids, want our children to have white-collar jobs. (Istanbul, 6, Employers' Organisation)

The impact will be negative. For example, Konya has always been known for its shoe production, but branding was a problem. After the arrival of migrants, the footwear sector has grown exponentially. (Konya, 11, Employers' Organisation)

On the other hand, the impact on employment of EU and UN funds flowing into Turkey, especially for Syrians under temporary protection, is evident. In addition, project grants received by public professional associations and CSOs for the cohesion of Syrians have created new jobs. In the cities where the qualitative research was conducted, it was found that chambers of commerce and professional associations are involved in large-scale projects funded by foreign grants, which include the provision of vocational skills and certification programmes. At the same time, projects funded by Turkish Red Crescent "community centres" and local authorities such as municipalities, governorates, and district governorates that fund CSOs on the ground are creating a specialised employment sector known as "project professionals":

Of course, there are incentives. (...) Our project focuses on the provision of vocational qualification certificates. For example, people who have expertise in construction, CNC, or any other trade, and who prove themselves to be masters, are eligible to enrol directly in free exams. Upon successful completion of the exam, we provide the individual with an internationally recognised certificate. We then offer direct employment opportunities to those seeking work. The project is currently being implemented by chambers of commerce in 21 cities. (Konya, 14, Employers' Organisation)

During discussions with representatives of the Gaziantep Chamber of Commerce Project Unit, it was pointed out that the number of Syrian member companies in Gaziantep has increased from only 11 before 2011 to 3,200 in 2022. Due to this significant increase, the Chamber established the "Syria Desk" in 2016, which led to the acquisition of several externally funded projects. Some of the externally funded projects targeting Syrians include the following: the Occupational Health Training Project (supported by UNHCR), Gaziantep Vocational Training and Entrepreneurship Skills Development Resilience Programme (1-2-3) (supported by UNHCR), Resilience and Capacity Building Programme for Social Cooperatives in Gaziantep (supported by UNHCR), GTO Capacity Building Project for Syrian Members (supported by GIZ – Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit), Capacity Building and Awareness Raising Programme for Syrian Members (supported by GIZ), Gaziantep Business Start-Up Acceleration Project (supported by GIZ), Time for Change and Transformation Project (supported by GIZ), How to be an International Project (supported by GIZ), Capacity Building Project (supported by EBRD – European Bank of Reconstruction and Development), Covid-19 Post-Recovery Consultancy Project for SMEs (supported by SPARK – Büyüme Odaklı KOBİ'lere Şirkete Özel Eğitim ve Danışmanlık Desteği), and Food and Gastronomy Entrepreneurship Centre Project (supported by ICMPD – International Center for Migration Policy Development). Furthermore, in 2019, the Gaziantep Chamber of Commerce consolidated its strong position in the project market by winning the first prize in the "Most Unconventional Projects" category for the Syria Desk Project at the 11th World Chambers Congress in Rio, Brazil. It was also observed that there are several CSO projects in Konya and Izmir that aim to enable Syrians and other refugees to acquire vocational skills and find work.

The research findings show that migrants and refugees have an important role in the labour market and a dual contribution to the economy. On the one hand, the factors of cheap labour, the development of new trade networks, and the expansion of foreign trade play a role in the accumulation of capital. On the other hand, it can be argued that international funds partially cover the social costs of impoverished migrants, thus reducing the financial burden on employers and the

government. A representative of an CSO working in the field of migration highlighted the impact of migration on cities as follows:

(The arrival of migrants) has had a positive impact on the city, contributing to its revitalisation to some extent. There does not appear to be much competition between locals and migrants in the labour market. There are currently no significant labour disputes in the city because of the widespread benefits of economic growth, which has created employment opportunities for most of the population. (...) The informal sector is very important. (...) Nearly 150,000 new workers have entered the labour force in Gaziantep. The question is whether the unemployment rate in Gaziantep will increase because of these 150,000 people entering the labour force. Will there be additional layoffs and an increase in unemployment? No, our analysis is that there is no increase in the unemployment rate. (Gaziantep, 1, CSO)

Forms, pathways, and strategies of migrants' participation in working life

Different migrant groups participate in the labour force for different reasons, depending on their economic, cultural, and social capital, as well as their residency status. In Turkey, it is common in the popular discourse to portray migrants as a homogeneous mass who consume national resources and who, as cheap labour, are the cause of unemployment and lower wages in the country. However, migrants are ethnically and socially heterogeneous groups who participate in the labour force in different ways depending on their residency status and length of sojourn in Turkey.

Migrants participate in the labour force in four main categories: as unskilled/semi-skilled workers (in industry, services, agriculture, and seasonal work); skilled workers and professionals; small entrepreneurs and artisans; and owners/employers in manufacturing, international trade, and services. The participation of individuals is influenced by several factors, including their own resources, their residency status, the industrial structure of their cities, the demands of the labour markets, and Turkish labour laws. Therefore, when migrants and refugees enter the labour market, they face numerous challenges and obstacles and must develop different strategies and explore opportunities in order to earn a living (or at least enough to survive). The following subsections analyse the integration of migrants and refugees into working life in terms of unskilled, semi-skilled workers; agricultural labourers; professionals and skilled employees; and craftspeople, artisans and businesspeople.

Unskilled/semi-skilled migrants, informal labour and "Kızılaykart"

Most employers' organisations, professional associations, and CSOs active in the field of migration have stated that the share of secure and registered employment among migrant groups participating in the labour force as unskilled or semi-skilled workers is less than 10%:

In Mardin, the percentage of registered workers among migrants is no more than 10%. (Mardin, 9, Employers' Organisation).

About 95% of migrants work in the informal sector. As soon as they enter the formal system, they are cut off from other social benefits. Child benefits are no longer paid, and they lose access to free and priority health care. Consequently, about 95% of them work informally. (Konya, 10, Trade Union)

There is a constant circulation within their own community. Some of them are insured in the leather sector, very few in the shoe and textile industries, and they even work below the minimum wage. Because their employers deposit their salaries in ATMs, they must withdraw money from them. The employers use their own cards to withdraw the money they have deposited. For example, if the minimum wage is, let's say, 5,500 Turkish liras, they only get 4,000 liras. Employers deduct 1,000 to 1,500 TL from their wages. This practice mainly affects unskilled workers, while skilled workers are not affected. Many of them work without any security. (Izmir, 5, CSO)

Speaking about my own sector, the shoe industry, employers find it more attractive not to insure foreigners, including Syrians. Even if there are no more cheap Syrian workers, the advantage of working without insurance remains, even if their wages are on a par with others in the sector. (Istanbul, 6, Employers' Organisation)

Although the informal employment of migrant workers is often associated with working for less than the minimum wage, there was not always a direct link between the two in this research. Certain migrant groups may choose informal work as a survival strategy if it offers an advantage in terms of generating sufficient income. Informal work may allow them to secure their livelihoods temporarily, particularly in the face of uncertainty about their residence status and the absence of prospects in the host country. However, informal, and low-paid employment is widespread among irregular migrants. The constant availability of jobs in the labour market for those willing to accept the lowest wages forces the most vulnerable migrants, who cannot tolerate unemployment, to accept these low wages. In Konya, a representative of an organised CSO working in solidarity with migrants described the situation as follows:

This is what we observe, and this is the information we have received. (...) There is information that Afghan men in particular are working unregistered as seasonal workers in the countryside. (Konya, 9, CSO)

Informal work for low wages may be a necessity for irregular migrants in migrant groups. However, for those from Syria with temporary protection status, it may serve as a livelihood strategy to increase the overall income of their families. Although temporary protection offers a relatively more secure residence status compared to other migrant groups, it still entails considerable uncertainty about the future. Syrian individuals are constantly grappling with the uncertainty of deciding whether to remain in their country or seek refuge elsewhere, with the ever-present threat of forcible return. In such a situation of uncertainty and lack of control over their future, Syrians tend to pursue work strategies that increase their families' means of subsistence, rather than saving for the future. The insecurity of an unpredictable and uncontrollable future is clearly visible among migrants and refugees. A representative of an CSO specialising in humanitarian aid and solidarity in Konya expressed this sentiment as follows:

The main problem these people face is the lack of clarity about their political status. They are uncertain about the future. (...) In practically every household, one or two people do not have proper identification. They live in fear that their homes will be raided by the police. They live in constant fear. Fathers are sent away, leaving their families behind. Why were they sent away? They were intercepted on their way to Antalya to look for work. This has been going on for the last two or three years. They call it 'voluntary return', but in fact it is not voluntary. To return, they must pay around \$2,000 to \$3,000, but they have

no rights or privileges. They live in a state of fear. They cannot work in industry because they are required to show identification. They cannot go to the hospital if they fall ill. Even when they return, we continue to treat them as if they do not exist. For example, when we provide aid, we sometimes ignore them, even if they have husbands, if they do not have proper identification. (...) Someone may employ them out of desperation. Everyone wants to work with their own sweat and toil. This desire is a great challenge and a heavy burden on human dignity. (...) Our country is blessed with abundant resources that could easily support a population ten times the present one. All that is needed for these people to know what their future holds is accurate documentation and a clear status. Then they can plan their actions, make investments, and hope for a better future. None of them are dreaming at the moment. (Konya, 5, CSO)

Interviews revealed that both irregular migrants and Syrians without temporary protection status or who were registered in provinces other than where they were working are willing to accept lower wages compared to other Syrians. However, even among Syrians with proper identification and residence status, there is still a high prevalence of informal employment. One reason for this is that informal employment has become a structural feature of the Turkish labour system. Another reason for Syrians with temporary protection status to choose informal work as a livelihood strategy is the uncertainty about their future. This strategy allows individuals to maintain access to EU assistance through the Turkish Red Crescent, while giving them the flexibility to easily switch jobs in search of better wages and working conditions. Through this strategy, they aim to increase their current sources of income for their families.

In Turkey, persons with temporary protection status or who have applied for international protection and who meet certain criteria are entitled to social integration assistance (SIA). This assistance is funded by the EU through the “Kızılay Card” system. The assistance is available to specific groups of individuals, including women aged 18-59 who live alone and have no relatives, elderly persons aged 60 and above who are alone and have no relatives, single parents with at least one child under the age of 18, families with one or more disabled persons with a rated degree of disability of 40% or more, families with four or more children (per child), and families with several persons to support (per disabled person). The monthly support provided to Syrians by SIA is crucial to their livelihoods. It is calculated on the basis of the number of children, disabled, or dependent persons and single mothers or women in the household. Interviewees often emphasised the importance of SIA assistance²⁷ and the Kızılay Card, which are primarily provided to Syrians:

They (the Syrians) are receiving a lot of help. They receive support for each child, (...) and they already have many children. Once they get formal employment and are officially registered, the aid they were receiving will be stopped. As a result, they do not want to register themselves. Because if they receive a certain amount per child and they have five or six children, they will benefit. They also receive other forms of social assistance. They already benefit from the hospital health system. Once they are registered, they are considered as any other citizen. That is why they do not want to register formally. (Konya, 10, Trade Union)

²⁷ In the context of the SIA, during the fieldwork conducted in the summer of 2022, the payments made through the “Kızılaykart” were 226 TL per eligible person. However, by June 2023, this figure had risen to 300 TL.

To prevent the Kızılay Card from being revoked, this is a common practice. (...) Suppose a family of five or six members receives conditional education support, and if the children are enrolled in school, so are they. If there is a disabled person living at home, he or she may also receive a disability allowance. In such a family, the Kızılay Card provides between 2,500 and 3,000 Turkish Liras in addition to the disability benefit. (...) If they work in an informal sector, they already earn a wage close to the minimum wage. Although they may not receive the full minimum wage, their earnings are typically between 3,500 and 4,000 Turkish Liras, while the minimum wage is set at 5,260 TL. The calculation is clear. Yes, they will be insured if they are registered, but they will be paid the minimum wage of 5,260 Turkish Liras. (...) If they are not registered but still have the Kızılay card, the total is around 7,000 TL. They ask themselves, "Will insurance add anything to my current situation?" It will not. They look at the amount of money that goes into their pockets. (...) There are health centres for migrants. In a country where you are a citizen, insurance is understandably regarded as important when you think about your retirement or the potential additional benefits it can provide. But in a country where you are not a citizen, you do not know when you will be sent back, you do not know how long you will stay, you focus on survival every day. (...) The uncertainty of their future and their inability to foresee what lies ahead has led them to prioritise short-term survival. (Konya, 12, CSO)

One of the most challenging issues we face in our ILO project is the reluctance of Syrians to work in registered jobs. (...) This is a problem we often encounter. Even when employers are willing to hire Syrians through our initiative, it is important to convince Syrians to accept formal employment. (...) In one case, we had discussions with a company that employed fifteen Syrians, but only three of them were willing to work in registered jobs. (Mardin, 9, Employers' Organisation)

On the other hand, the informality of migrant workers' employment, which is also prevalent in certain sectors with local populations, has led to tensions over wage cuts among workers in Işıkkent, the centre of shoe production in Izmir. In Işıkkent, there are both registered and unregistered companies involved in the production and trade of shoes. According to representatives of an CSO working in the leather and shoe industry and providing assistance to refugees, both registered companies and underground workshops engage in informal employment:

The natives are the same. When there is an inspection (by the Ministry of Labour), you can see it in the shoe and textile factories; all the workers are in the streets. (...) How many people come to the workshop? Four or five people. Twenty people stay outside. After the operation is over. Of course, these are not only refugees, but also Turkish workers. (Izmir, 11, CSO)

Another representative of an CSO working with refugees in Izmir also highlighted the fact that Syrians often work for lower wages and have worse working conditions than the local population. They noted that Turkish citizens perceive the precarious working conditions of Syrians as unfair competition:

Işıkkent is home to many Syrians. (...) The native workers were distraught at one point, claiming: "We are losing our jobs." But I asked them: "Have you ever received social security? How many years have you been working in the same conditions without social security?" So, it's not because refugees have entered the market, it's because of the current circumstances. People must work, and refugees have no choice but to accept whatever they are offered. Of course, there are differences between the local population and the refugees,

especially in terms of the huge differences in wages and working conditions. For example, refugees often have to change jobs frequently and face problems such as not being paid in full or being paid less than they were initially promised. (Izmir, 4, CSO)

In the context of informal employment, native workers often see the wage gap between migrants and themselves, as well as migrants' willingness to accept lower wages and more difficult working conditions, as factors that reduce their bargaining power with employers. When wages in informal employment are comparable, native workers perceive that migrants earn more because of the social integration allowance (SIA) they receive. This perspective is openly expressed by neighbourhood muhtars who have knowledge and observations about both migrant and local households, especially in impoverished neighbourhoods where migrants are densely concentrated in the cities where the research was conducted:

Compared to the Turkish Roma in the neighbourhood, the migrants have better living conditions because they receive a lot of support. They receive social integration aid (SIA) from the Governor's Office. They receive a monthly per capita allowance from the EU and a per child allowance if they send their children to school. (...) Almost everyone in their households works for a wage. (...) Even the children work. Their household income is higher than anyone else's in the neighbourhood. (Konya, 1, Muhtar)

An CSO representative pointed out that informal employment within the same workplace not only hampers labour relations and class solidarity between migrants and the local population, but also leads to the development of separate lives in different aspects of daily life outside of work:

A parallel competition was set up because we both work in the workshop. I am Syrian and you are Turkish. We do not receive the same wages at the end of each month. So, in reality, we are always rivals and competitors with each other. The current informal sector fosters a sense of competition and rivalry among its participants. (Gaziantep, 1, CSO)

The director of a Konya-based CSO specialising in helping migrants explained the gravity of exploitation and abuse in the informal sector from an Islamic perspective:

Everything in the industrial sector revolves around the denial of rights, the use of cheap labour, prolonged working hours, and the inability to receive payment. Most of them have no valid identity papers and have no recourse to any legitimate authority. They also exploit legal loopholes. I often intervene in different cases. They say, "Sir, he damaged my machine, so I will not pay his salary." In a more optimistic scenario, they say, "Sir, I trusted him and helped him get a job, but he quit halfway through. As a result, I am quite angry with him and have decided to deduct his salary for the last 15 days he worked." In this environment, informality has reached a high level. These are all unfair and excessive profits. (Konya, 5, CSO)

Informal and seasonal labour in agriculture

The research findings indicate that the informal employment of unskilled and semi-skilled migrant labour is widespread, both in urban sectors and in agricultural production. Undocumented migrant labour plays a crucial role in animal husbandry (herding and tending to livestock animals) and agricultural production (seasonal farm labour). As noted previously, the declining number of young people of working age in rural areas of Turkey has led to a marked shortage of labour in the agricultural and livestock sectors. Most of these gaps are filled by irregular migrant labourers, mainly Afghans and Syrians.

It is challenging to measure the numerical, spatial, and sectoral distribution of migrant labour in Turkey, as a significant proportion of migrants are employed in the informal sector. However, based on interviews with employers' associations, professional chambers, trade unions, neighbourhood muhtars, and representatives of CSOs working in the field of migration, it was expressed that migrant groups, including both Afghans and Syrians, working in agriculture and animal husbandry are considered to be among the most disadvantaged segments. Migrant workers are currently the main source of seasonal labour in the agricultural sector. A representative of an CSO specialising in agricultural studies, seasonal labour, and Dom groups in the Çukurova region described the process by which migrants become seasonal workers:

In the past, seasonal agricultural work was the main form of employment for Kurds in the Çukurova region. (...) However, there has been a noticeable shift in the last six years. Initially, between 2013 and 2014, Syrian refugees entered the seasonal agricultural labour market, but the people who found them work, known as "çavuşlar" [labour recruiters], were predominantly Kurds or Turks. However, in the last three to four years there has been a shift in this mechanism, with Syrian refugees now taking on the role of "çavuşlar." As a result, some of these "çavuşlar" are also Syrians. (...) Due to the increased availability of cheap migrant labour, some Kurdish workers who were previously engaged in seasonal agricultural work have moved to the western regions. (...) In addition, in places like Islahiye, I know that workers are paid per kilo for harvesting red peppers. Every year, "çavuşlar," local authorities, and employers meet to set the price of labour. Since the arrival of Syrian workers, there has been little or no increase in labour prices. (...) This situation has increased the field's susceptibility to exploitation. (Gaziantep, 1, CSO)

In the rural areas of Konya province, informal seasonal employment of migrants is very common, according to interviews conducted in the city. During the summer months, groups of migrants from neighbouring provinces come to Konya to work as seasonal labourers:

People travel to Konya from Adana and other provinces throughout the summer, often bringing their families – including young children – with them. They live in certain districts of Konya. (...) The majority of people who come to Konya through the proper channels, such as notifying the migration authorities and obtaining travel permits, are mainly Syrian migrants. I have noticed that not many people with international protection status engage in this activity due to their additional obligations, such as the requirement to report to the Migration Directorate every two weeks. Such obligations are not imposed on Syrians. As a result, there tends to be a higher number of Syrians who come to Konya during the summer for seasonal agricultural work and stay in tent areas with their families. (Konya, 12, CSO)

Migrant labour is widely used in seasonal agriculture, not only in the southern and south-eastern regions of Anatolia, but also in the Aegean region. Research conducted with CSOs working in the field of migration in Izmir revealed that during the harvest season, a camp in the Torbalı district of Izmir is used by seasonal agricultural workers, including Dom people, who move from one harvest to the next in a constant state of mobility alongside Kurdish workers. The Dom people are nomadic communities in Syria who speak mainly Kurdish. They are part of the same seasonal agricultural workforce as the Turkish Kurds, who work intensively in the sector, because they speak the same language, and due to their nomadic lifestyle:

There is already a camp where the Dom people live. During the agricultural season, this camp is used extensively. During the grape harvest season in Manisa, there is a noticeable increase in movement and activity, not only in Torbalı but also in the whole region. Meanwhile, seasonal agricultural workers also migrate to other parts of İzmir, including Bergama and Soma, which are on the opposite side of the city. (İzmir, 11, CSO)

The seasonal agricultural work stretches throughout the Menderes basin. The extension of the area is from Selçuk to Menderes. The neighbouring districts must also be taken into account. In Aydın, it is also important to consider the geographically adjacent areas. Similarly, in Manisa, the practice is expected to continue in areas with high agricultural activity and busy harvest seasons, such as Turgutlu, Sarıhanlı, and Akhisar. (İzmir, 20, CSO)

In the Dom camp in Torbalı, most of the seasonal labourers from other provinces or other migrants from Syria do not have temporary protection status or are registered in other provinces. The regulation on work permits for those with temporary protection status exempts seasonal agricultural labour from the work permit requirement and delegates the regulation of working conditions and rules in seasonal agriculture to local governorates on an annual basis, making it easier for Syrians to work as seasonal labourers. Nevertheless, for Syrians, seasonal agricultural work, which is already characterised by harsh conditions, involves working in even more difficult circumstances. A member of a solidarity movement said of the situation:

The population of Torbalı is becoming increasingly Syrian due to seasonal agricultural workers. They have no access to health care, antenatal care, postnatal care and so on (because their temporary protection documents are in other provinces). The poverty is excruciating. (İzmir, 17, Initiative)

In the cities where the research was carried out, it was found that the Doms work as seasonal labourers during certain periods, and in the off-season, they work as scavengers or refuse collectors in their hometowns:

We observe that Dom families are involved in scrap collection. Since they are already in agricultural areas, these families are involved in scavenging during periods when there is no agricultural activity, such as heavy rains or winter, or during periods when there is no agricultural work for labourers, such as planting and sowing. (İzmir, 12, CSO)

The interviews also mentioned that, in addition to seasonal agricultural labour, irregular Afghan migrants also work in the livestock sector, where informal employment is almost universal. While some families are involved in seasonal agricultural work, single men dominate the livestock sector:

Ninety percent of them are single men. Few are accompanied by their families. They come here as lone travellers. (...) They can secure a stable income here. Because of their living conditions, they have almost no expenses in Turkey. The people who employ them pay for all their expenses, including food and even cigarettes, because they live in villages all the time. They say, for example, "I would pay them 5,000 liras a month." These people are diligent savers of their money. The wages they receive as shepherds are much lower than those of Turkish workers (Konya, 10, Trade Union).

Professionals and skilled migrants in the labour market I

Migrants and refugees in Turkey include educated professionals, qualified/experienced workers, craftsmen, and artisans with temporary protection status, those with short-term residence permits, applicants or beneficiaries of international protection, and irregular migrants. The possibility of obtaining a work permit for Syrian refugees with temporary protection status and migrants with residence permits facilitates their employment in their respective fields, but language barriers and professional equivalence requirements in specialised occupations hinder their participation in the labour market. Skilled workers can integrate into the labour market and have access to relatively more job opportunities. However, professionals in fields such as medicine, law, education, and pharmacy often face lengthy procedures to practise in their respective fields. Nevertheless, individuals with expertise in sectors that do not require professional equivalence, such as services, trade, and IT, could secure employment in the private sector. Highly qualified professionals who are unable to find employment in their respective fields have a few options. They can either take unskilled jobs, practice their profession unofficially, or consider the possibility of migrating to Europe:

So, you can see lawyers working in car washes. Or even lawyers working as dishwashers in some places. (...) There was a heart surgeon who worked here as a labourer in the textile industry. But most of them end up in the textile and shoe industries. They are involved in underground jobs, service jobs. Now some of them are working in construction. (Izmir, 11, CSO).

Sometimes a patient (Syrian) comes with a prescription. They ask: "Can you prescribe this medicine?" They got it from a Syrian doctor; there are underground doctors. When they get sick, they go to those doctors. They face language barriers and possible discrimination when they come here. (...) They come here to get the prescription because they have to get it here to get the medicine for free. (Gaziantep, 3, Doctor).

In the beginning, Syrian teachers and educated people came, professionals, knowledgeable people, but they didn't stay here, most of them emigrated to Europe. (Mardin, 7, Employers' Organisation).

In Turkey's sectoral structure, workers with the necessary skills and qualifications may initially enter the labour force at lower wages than the local population. Over time, however, these workers could participate in wage negotiations or explore job opportunities in other companies that offer higher wages. The representative of the shoemakers' union in Istanbul stated that the shoe industry sees the entry of both unskilled workers and skilled workers with professional experience. Similarly, in Konya and Gaziantep, certain heavy industries, textiles, and footwear sectors employ not only unskilled migrant workers but also highly skilled workers, according to professional organisations, employers' organisations, and CSOs in these cities:

There was a certain infrastructure within the shoe industry. Some unskilled people learnt the trade here, but there are also those who came with a background and expertise and are now running businesses. They came with a specific talent. They had a craft. (Istanbul, 7, Trade Union)

On the other hand, unskilled migrants entering the labour market can acquire skills over time through sector-specific work experience. In addition, the labour market's need for workers with specific skills and semi-skilled workers contributes to migrants in certain sectors earning wages comparable to those of the local population:

Recently there has been a wage equilibrium. (...) However, employers continue to hire migrants without offering them adequate insurance coverage, thereby reducing their costs. (...) In spite of this, the wage balance has now been achieved. The trend started in 2022. Before 2022, there was no wage balance. Some people received 2,000 Turkish Liras as compensation. Some were employed at the minimum wage and earned around 4,000 liras, while others were compensated with as little as 2,000 liras. Families were compelled to employ as many family members at home as possible, even if it meant employing five children in a family of five. Now the minimum wage has been standardised. Even children aged 16-17 are now paid at least the minimum wage. Those born between 2006 and 2005 are now receiving the minimum wage, but this is a very recent development (Konya, 12, CSO).

They used to work for lower wages, but that's no longer the case. You can no longer hire them for cheap labour. At first, they were favoured because of their willingness to work for lower wages. Now they have acquired the necessary skills for the job and their wages have become more or less the same and, in some cases, even higher than before. (Istanbul, 6, Trade Union)

As a result of their long-term protection status, Syrian refugees have become a structural component of the Turkish labour force, especially in skilled and professional occupations. The same cannot be said for other migrant groups. For irregular migrants, the second largest migrant group after Syrians, including Afghans, Turkmen, Georgians, Uzbeks from the former Soviet territories, as well as Africans and Asians, their residence status does not allow them to negotiate their wages and bargaining power on the basis of their qualifications and expertise.

Migrant and refugee crafts people, artisans and businesspeople

In the two decades prior to the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, migration to Turkey's consisted mainly of irregular labour migrants as well as asylum seekers (Afghans, Iranian regime opponents, Iraqi Kurds, etc.). The majority of these migrants and refugees were poor men and women who entered the Turkish labour market through various forms of informal employment. Therefore, migrant artisans, craftsmen, industrialists, and traders were not among the actors of work and daily life in urban and rural settlements until 2014-2015, when Syrians entered the labour market in different ways.

Unlike other migrant groups, Syrian refugees had the relative advantage of migrating with their family members and relatives, which enabled them to settle and live in their destination regions. They also had access to financial and material support, education, and health services within a few years of their arrival, which gave them an edge over other migrant groups. Most importantly, they were given assurances that they would not be sent back as long as the war continued in their home country. Initially, they entered the labour market as unskilled or semi-skilled workers, but as the temporary protection period became prolonged, they used their economic, cultural, and social capital from their home country to fill certain gaps in the Turkish labour market and enter these sectors of work.

In areas with a high concentration of Syrians, many individuals have started small businesses, such as running shops that cater specifically to Syrians, or working as barbers, tailors, and other skilled tradespeople who primarily serve the Syrian community. Beginning in 2015, Syrians who had previously worked in low-paying, labour-intensive jobs and shared cramped, substandard housing with other poor Syrians began to stand out more by opening small supermarkets, bar-

bershops, or fruit stands in neighbourhoods. On the other hand, in metropolitan areas where economic development was concentrated, as well as in cities with historical trade networks with Syria and other Middle Eastern countries, Syrians set up commercial businesses or merged with local businesses, capitalising on their knowledge of trade and industry. In this way, Syrians entered the workforce not only as cheap labour on the labour market, but also as entrepreneurs with their own capital. The following are views and testimonies from representatives of employers' organisations and professional associations who have witnessed this process at the sectoral level:

You can't make that kind of money in a short time here. They came with their own infrastructure. They brought something with them from Syria. Even if they work here for two or three years and save all the money without spending it, they still won't reach that amount of capital, at least in my profession, I can say that for my own field. So, they came with a foundation already laid. (Istanbul, 6, Employers' Organisation)

About 15% of the companies registered in our chamber are Syrian-owned. We have set up a Syria desk to support them. (Gaziantep, 9, Employers' Organisation)

There are many migrant shopkeepers in Sahibiata. (...) In this neighbourhood you can find three to five Turkish shopkeepers, (...) but there are many Syrian-owned shops, such as kebab restaurants, fruit and vegetable shops, hairdressers, and other shops selling everything from mobile phones to hookahs and clothes. They dominate this street. You won't see many Turkish shops there. (Konya, 9, CSO)

They have started businesses here. Of course, they can't get licences directly. The Karatay municipality, for example, doesn't give licences to foreigners. So, what do they do? They go through Turkish citizens (Syrians who have obtained Turkish citizenship). They pay them money and open the licence in their name. Many hairdressers do this. (...) Most of the businesses run by Syrians are for Syrians. For example, shops selling clothes, restaurants, sweets, bakeries. Syrian bread is separate. Most of their customers are Syrians. (Konya, 14, Employers' Organisation)

Syrians who enter the Turkish labour market as entrepreneurs, whether in small or large enterprises, licensed or unlicensed, formal or informal sectors, using family labour or paid labour, are confronted with a number of obstacles within the Turkish labour regime. Despite these obstacles, they have adapted many strategies to circumvent them:

Here (in Gaziantep) there are so many new rich (Syrians). The Turks have defrauded some of these old rich Syrians. Because the previous law had some requirements. If Syrians wanted to start businesses, they had to partner with Turkish nationals. But these Turkish partners cheated them. All these jewellery shop owners were swindled. (Gaziantep, 1, CSO)

It was reported that a significant number of Syrians in the service sector or who are proprietors work informally. Regarding the working conditions in the footwear industry in İzmir, Işıkkent, an CSO representative have made the following comments:

If there are 100 workshops, 70 of them are already working informally. The employers themselves are not registered with the tax authorities. There are workshops operating with approximately 20 employees, as well as others with around 30 employees. (...) Approximately 3,000 underground, small-scale, and large-scale enterprises are located in the shoemakers' district. With approximately 30,000 people, it's a really major location. (İzmir, 5, CSO)

The muhtars' statements about Syrian-owned small businesses and artisans in cities and neighbourhoods with a significant Syrian population are strongly influenced by prevailing public opinion and are often critical. During the research, it was observed that muhtars in Istanbul, Izmir, Konya, and Gaziantep were critical of Syrian entrepreneurs and artisans. However, in Mardin, the muhtars were found to be generally more supportive and welcoming of Syrian small businesses and artisans, although there was some criticism:

If you were to visit the shoemakers' area today, you would notice that it is mainly populated by Syrians rather than locals. At present, the workforce is mainly Syrian, as they have both rented and bought shops in the area. (Izmir, 8, Muhtar)

They do not pay taxes or other fees because they opened these shops without proper authorisation and registration. They have started trading and taking over businesses in the neighbourhood. They have the means to pay 100 thousand Turkish Liras hava parası [upfront payment to secure a lease] for a single barbershop. They do all their shopping in their own shops. They have all kinds of shops. The goods they sell are smuggled. Since they only sell the goods they use themselves, they only buy from these stores to support each other. In addition, because they operate illegally, they sell any product without permission. For example, I cannot sell gas cylinders in my grocery store without the proper permits. Because they are illegal, they sell everything without appropriate safety precautions. No one inspects anything. (...) There is a change of ownership of the shops. They pay hava parası and take over Turkish owned shops. Rents have increased from 500 to 1,500 Turkish Liras. (Konya, 1, Muhtar)

There are hardly any long-time Gaziantep residents left in this neighbourhood. About 90% of the population is Syrian. They have opened old, closed shops. There are grocery stores, fruit stands, and various other shops. Hairdressers, mobile phone shops – you name it. They don't pay taxes; they don't have tax certificates. (Gaziantep, 2, Muhtar)

They use their skills. There are kebabs, pastries, and a hairdressing salon. They earn their living and are no threat to anyone; most of them are relatives of the locals. (Mardin, 16, Muhtar)

However, the manager of an CSO working with migrants in Konya felt that the critical approach of the neighbourhood leaders was exaggerated and drew attention to various forms of exploitation behind the scenes.

Yes, there may be two or three people working in one house. But even if you added up their incomes, they wouldn't be the same as mine, and they might not even be regular. (...) Unlike us, they do not invest their earnings in property, land, or buildings. Instead, they spend all their money on their daily expenses. Are there any Syrians who own businesses? Yes, there are a few individuals who have regular residence permits, although their numbers are quite limited. Some have become Turkish citizens, but their numbers are also very small. (...) What muhtars call "informal" is another bitter truth. Their claim is not entirely accurate. They all set up these companies by employing a Syrian who has acquired Turkish citizenship as their representative. They secretly pay this person a substantial amount of money. Alternatively, individuals trust a Turkish citizen and set up companies in their name. Turkish citizens are automatically covered by insurance, which also gives them access to retirement benefits. If the tax is 100 liras, they will receive 200 liras. If the insurance costs 100 lira, they take 200 liras. There is also exploitation. No Syrian business is illegal or tax-free. (Konya, 5, CSO)

Gender and child labour in working life

The quantitative findings and qualitative research conducted with labour market actors and CSOs working in the field of migration in cities confirm that the participation of migrant women in the Turkish labour force, excluding live-in domestic and care workers, is extremely low. Keeping in mind that domestic work is an unpaid obligation, we shall draw some conclusions from the qualitative data on the participation of migrant women in the non-household labour force.

Representatives of women's CSOs operating in Mardin and involved in activities specifically for women, as well as those in solidarity with migrant women, asserted that the participation of migrant women in the labour force is minimal. They are primarily engaged in cleaning tasks:

They work in informal, daily wage jobs; for example, many women are involved in cleaning work. We have one woman, Kadriye, who comes once a week. On these days she also works in a hotel, in the cleaning department. (Mardin, 1, CSO)

The coordinator of the vocational training and certification programme run by an employers' organisation in Mardin with the support of the ILO shared her own experiences of the challenges facing women in employment in Mardin as follows:

Syrian women are a little... Allow me to share my thoughts with you openly. Only a handful of Syrian women have been able to obtain the required documents. In one company in Kızıltepe there are two or three of them. But here is the situation. Due to their patriarchal social structure, they would not travel long distances even for work. When we were preparing for an exam, the company in Kızıltepe asked, "Can they take the exam at our company?" My reply was "It is crucial that the conditions for them to take the exam at your company are appropriate and that there is an approval process." Their response was "I will do my best to get all the necessary approvals because they would not be able to take the exam if they had to travel to Mardin. It is already difficult for me to bring them to work every day and their spouses are constantly checking on them and controlling what they do." They added: "It's not easy for them to leave Kızıltepe for Mardin. Their spouses cause problems." (Mardin, 9, Employers' Organisation)

Some participants who observe the daily lives of Syrian families in areas with a significant concentration of Syrians, have noted that Syrian refugee families tend to have a pattern where women do not work outside the home and the average age of marriage is also relatively young:

(Women) are housebound. I have not seen any of them. I mean, I have never come across or observed any Syrian girls or women who work in a grocery store or in a small shop. I've never heard or seen Syrian girls or women working. But there is one thing. In government circles there is a project called "PIKTES" where university graduates are given jobs. Of course, this is also very limited. What is important for us, however, is that the willingness of local girls to work is low, and I must also mention that the average age of marriage is young. (Konya, 3, Teacher)

Women do not work in their community; we also have a low rate of women working in the industry. I heard once that some women work in a Turkish delight factory, but I don't have much information about it. (Konya, 1, Muhtar)

In Konya, a well-established CSO working in solidarity with migrants has a member of its expert team who emphasises that the main obstacle to employment for Syrian migrant women is

the family control imposed by gender inequality in society. She noted that the prevalence of this control is somewhat lower among Afghan refugee women:

Based on my observations of Syrian women, as well as men, there seems to be a widespread belief that women shouldn't have jobs. I think the patriarchal system is to blame for this. The dominant belief is that men should provide for the home and the family, while women should stay at home and look after the children. The presence of women in the public sphere is often seen as culturally inappropriate. I have heard this from my own clients. For example, they may say, "How can I send my wife out to work?" or "She doesn't even speak the language." They believe that women are incapable of managing on their own when they go out. This perception is widely held. However, I have noticed a clear difference when it comes to Afghan women, especially my clients who are single parents or divorced. They can participate in the labour market. Of course, many of them work in the informal sector. The number of people with formal employment contracts and work permits is relatively small. However, they are able to find employment and adapt to their new environment more quickly. (Konya, 12, CSO)

Konya's efforts to integrate migrant women into the workforce through government-sponsored projects also include providing them with skills that conform to traditional gender roles and enable them to work from home. The director of the Konya Turkish Red Crescent (Kızılay) Community Centre describes her work in this area as follows:

There were disadvantaged women in the region. A course was designed specifically to meet the needs of these disadvantaged women. The necessary training materials were provided for fifteen ladies. We will then provide support for five of these women, who own sewing machines or overlockers, to produce their own items. We will also provide materials. The participants will also receive a daily allowance during the course. (...) We provide digitisation training specifically for women involved in home production. We provide training on how to sell products on social media, how to take photos, etc. After that, we continue to support them. We monitor whether they have been able to implement what they have learned and whether they have been successful in making sales. We also help individuals to obtain a tax exemption certificate for selling products online. (Konya, 13, CSO)

Gender roles are also evident in child labour. Child labourers are predominantly male children. Boys start working in industry from the age of 12, while girls participate in domestic work according to traditional gender roles. A Syrian interviewee working as a coordinator in an employment and vocational training project expressed that Syrian women's employment is not considered appropriate within their own cultural structure:

(Women) stay at home. They are not employed. Our culture is a bit conservative in this respect. They prefer not to employ girls, especially in factories. We have also heard of incidents in this area where a girl went and was harassed either by the employer or by other workers. Being a foreigner and not knowing the language makes it even easier for such things to happen. It becomes difficult for them to defend their rights. We have heard of such cases. (...) Some women work as tailors and hairdressers from home. (Konya, 14, Employers' Organisation)

Migrant women tend to enter the workforce in highly disadvantaged sectors, often taking up seasonal agricultural work and other physically demanding jobs. Syrian migrants, including the vulnerable and marginalised Roma (Doms), are also present in this context. An CSO rep-

representative from Izmir raised the issue of the difficult living conditions in the tent camps where seasonal workers live, and highlighted the difficulties faced by women there:

Women in these camps already face a lack of access to adequate hygiene facilities. In some cases, children are also denied access to education. Inadequate and inappropriate conditions for basic needs, such as toilets and bathing facilities, can create opportunities for exploitation and harassment. This situation is even more problematic for girls and women in these camp conditions. (Izmir, 11, CSO)

The group with the highest incidence of child labour among migrant communities are Syrian refugees who have migrated as families and have temporary protection status. Child labour starts at a very young age in all cities with significant Syrian migrant populations and in rural areas where they work in agriculture. A representative of an CSO working with disadvantaged migrant groups shared her observations on child labour:

Child labour is a very serious issue. (...) It has even started to involve children at a much younger age. Children as young as ten are now joining the workforce. The situation worsened during the pandemic, especially when children were out of school. Families felt that their children were already struggling to understand, facing bullying and racism. As children were reluctant to go to school because of these problems, the mentality became "my child is like this anyway. At least he would learn a skill." They also pay the children, even though they are child labourers, some significant amounts like the minimum wage. Of course, they don't employ ten-year-old children, but even giving them a thousand liras a month means a lot to them in the current economic situation. This is a significant financial incentive for the families, especially for the boys. They employ the boys in various trades such as industrial work, tailoring, shoemaking, automotive, carpentry, and blacksmithing in places like the Karatay Industrial Zone. (Konya, 12, CSO)

As discussed in the education section of this report, there is an unambiguous relationship between the education of migrant children and the problems associated with child labour. An expert working in the children's department of an CSO dealing with migration expressed this relationship as follows:

Here is the situation with children: I refer the child to vocational training. I tell them about the conditions, the benefits, and how they will finish school and get a diploma. I tell them: "You can even open your own shop one day. You will be paid at least thirty percent of the minimum wage, or whatever the workplace offers, you will continue to receive that amount. But one day a week you will go to school and the other days you will work. And this work will be legal, meaning it will be lawful. So, you will be allowed to work by the school. No police officer will come and ask why you are working here." We explain to the parents that their children have to obey the law. We come across a situation like this: "What should we do if the place where my child works doesn't accept?" "Then he should find another job." "No, that's not possible. My child loves that place and wants to work there." (Konya, 12, CSO)

This section analysed the participation of migrants and refugees in the labour market and working life. One of the main findings is that participation in the labour market is contingent upon several factors, including legal status, length of stay in Turkey, and forms of capital possessed by individuals. While many Syrians and irregular migrants are informally employed at low wages, some Syrians participate in the labour market as artisans or entrepreneurs. Either way, it is clear that migrants and refugees have become structural elements of the labour market in the cities where the qualitative research was conducted, and that they contribute to production with their labour and capital in these cities.

Housing and the Construction of “Being” in Space

While the data shared by GİB and TurkStat reveal certain areas where migrants and refugees tend to concentrate in terms of their spatial distribution, they do not provide information on other mobile groups, such as migrants and refugees registered in other provinces and irregular migrants. Thus, in selecting the cities for this section, we have considered both the official data and the specific conditions that facilitate the housing of migrants.

It is widely recognised that there are three key factors that determine the settlement of migrants in a place: the availability of housing, the opportunities to earn a livelihood, and the presence of social resilience networks or factors.²⁸ Demographic studies have shown that when the first two elements cannot be met simultaneously, spatial mobility increases for both migrants and the local population. However, during periods of intense xenophobia, the presence of a social resilience element that is important but not essential to the local population may be a decisive factor for migrants in deciding where to settle. Social relations, shared language, religion, ethnicity, or hometown affiliations that were previously established play a crucial role in providing social support when it comes to finding housing and developing strategies for livelihood. Therefore, these factors have a significant impact on the ability of Syrian refugees who arrived after 2011 (and who were registered under temporary protection in certain provinces or who live in provinces other than where they were registered) as well as irregular migrants to settle in a particular place. In this context, the qualitative research questioned the presence of these three elements in four locations where Syrian refugees with temporary protection status have settled and become a structural component of the population, especially since 2015. Based on the qualitative data obtained during the research, this section analyses the housing alternatives, forms, and processes of migrants and refugees in these cities, taking into account these factors.

Dynamics of migrant settlement in arrival areas: spatial/social/economic contingencies

Due to its vast geographical size, Istanbul is the province with the largest number of migrants and refugees in Turkey, despite not having the highest proportion of migrants in the total population. A recent study conducted in the Beyoğlu district analysed the role of spatial adversities in migrants' location preferences (Kurtuluş et al., 2022). This study highlighted the importance of vacant housing units, low rents, proximity to the labour market, and migrant networks based on kinship or ethnicity in these areas as factors influencing migrants' settlement in impoverished neighbourhoods or urban decay areas with neglected environmental conditions. In this way, it has been stated that neighbourhoods such as Tarlabaşı are a kind of incubator that allows migrants to get to grips with the city when they first arrive. Similar to Istanbul, migrants in Izmir, Konya, Gaziantep, and Mardin tended to settle in ar-

²⁸ The settlement and housing of Syrian refugees in urban and rural areas have emerged as an important and controversial topic in the field of urban studies. The autumn 2020 issue of *Urban Planning*, a prominent journal in urban sociology and planning, was dedicated to the topic of “Urban Arrival Spaces: Coexistence in Changing Mobilities and Local Diversities.” The article “The Role of Arrival Areas for Migrant Integration and Resource Access,” authored by Hanhörster and Wessendorf (2020), provides a comprehensive analysis of how arrival areas play a crucial role in the integration of migrants and their access to resources.

eas of urban decay or poor squatter settlements already abandoned by the local population, or in areas under pressure from urban transformation. In Gaziantep, a representative of an CSO working in the field of immigration spoke about the housing conditions of migrants in the historic centre of Kilis, which has become an area of urban decay:

I think it was in 2013. We went to Kilis, it was seven in the morning and there were already Syrian men in the streets. Many of them were just sitting there. Because there weren't many places open yet, they weren't going to cafes or anything like that, they were just sitting on the street. So, we went and asked them, "What are you doing out at this hour? Why are you out?" One of the men explained: "We live in a yard-type house in Gaziantep. There's already a family in each room, and the women don't feel comfortable. That's why we take to the streets as soon as we wake up." As they tend to live in dilapidated neighbourhoods, the houses are very small, old, and extremely damp and poorly ventilated. Because of these conditions, people tend to spend a lot of time on the streets. (Gaziantep, 1, CSO)

In Gaziantep, "Antep Evi" is a specific architectural description of two-storey houses with courtyards, built side by side on narrow streets in the historic city centre, based on the pre-modern ethno-religious structure. In today's popular urban culture, however, the term has come to symbolise urban poverty. Before the start of recent gentrification projects in the historic centre, living in an "Antep Evi" was commonly associated with urban poverty. Before 2011, the area was home to low-income locals who couldn't afford to move to more affluent areas of the city, students who came for educational purposes, workers from the Kurdish regions who came to work in the city's manufacturing, construction, and service industries, irregular migrants, and the city's poorest and most dispossessed neighbourhoods. With the arrival of Syrian refugees, the neighbourhood has been transformed into a migrant community. An CSO representative, who has been a muhtar for 25 years and has renovated a dilapidated "Antep Evi" in the area for community events, recounted the following story of transformation:

All these houses were inherited from their ancestors, passed down from generation to generation, and inhabited by them. (...) However, the "Antep Evleri" did not have access to natural gas. They eventually decided to move to houses with natural gas. When many of them moved out, they started renting the houses to Syrians. (...) As the number of Syrians increased, the last remaining Turkish families decided to leave and started renting out their houses as well. (...). In the past, these houses were sold for a hundred [thousand] or two hundred liras, but they had been sold for five hundred or even a million liras. (...) Syrians now own every business in the area. They started by opening grocery stores, then expanded to butcher shops and finally ventured even into the transport industry. (...) Because the shops in the area are small, they all started their own businesses. The traditional neighbourhood grocers were on the brink of extinction as Turkish locals preferred to shop in supermarkets such as 101 and BIM, but the Syrians arrived and started new businesses. They do business with each other. (...) They all pay in cash; no one uses credit cards. (Gaziantep, 2, Muhtar)

Several of our neighbourhoods have become refugee enclaves – what we call "neighbourhoods of urban decay," or the older neighbourhoods of the city. Old Antep had five neighbourhoods: Armenian, Jewish, Kurdish-Sunni, Kurdish-Alevi, and Turkmen. Today, between 60 and 70 per cent of the people living in these areas are refugees. These neighbourhoods were abandoned in the early 2000s, which is why this has happened. Many people have

moved to residential areas outside the city. By 2011, these neighbourhoods were essentially deserted; most of the houses were extremely old and uninhabitable. When the migrants arrived, these empty neighbourhoods were quickly populated. I know that some people have occupied houses; they found empty houses and moved in. Others were rented out by the owners who saw it as a source of income. (Gaziantep, 1, CSO)

Due to the preservation of historic city centres as heritage sites, there has been difficulty in the renovation of housing stock in these areas. As a result, migrant neighbourhoods have sprung up. Residents of the historic centres of these cities choose, depending on their financial possibilities, to move to modern apartment complexes in newly developed neighbourhoods outside the historic area. At the same time, the housing stock in the historic core has lost value and has become an area of urban deprivation. Like Gaziantep, Mardin's Yukarı Mardin ("Upper Mardin") urban conservation area, where the ancient "Mardin Houses" are located, was a decrepit, abandoned, and water-scarce neighbourhood before 2011. Some Syrian refugees have chosen to settle in the vacant spaces in Mardin's city centre, while others have opted to move to the agricultural production villages in Mardin's Kızıltepe district. Mardin's historic conservation area is of great importance as a historical tourist destination and is currently undergoing rapid gentrification. Dilapidated buildings bought on the cheap are being restored and repurposed as accommodation, restaurants, and entertainment venues. Despite this, "Yukarı Mardin" continues to function as a refuge for migrants and is characterised by numerous abandoned buildings. Below, a muhtar from "Yukarı Mardin" and an CSO worker from a cultural initiative based in a Mardin House in Yukarı Mahalle ("Upper District") described how Syrian migrants have settled in the area:

They typically settle here because there are virtually no locals left in Mardin, especially in "Yukarı Mardin." They have all moved to the new city and are now renting out their houses to the newcomers, making it a more affordable option. Rental prices in the new city are much higher. (...) Yes, this area is a popular tourist destination, but the houses are not particularly good; they are in poor condition. (...) There are many dilapidated houses among the lodging establishments and eateries. (...) But even in this area, rents have risen dramatically. In "Yukarı Mardin," you used to be able to find a place to rent for around 200 Liras, but now it costs 800 Liras. (Mardin, 1, CSO)

Our neighbourhoods became deserted after the new city was built. It used to be difficult to find a house because there were none. But now there are many abandoned and dilapidated houses. The homeowners just leave them as is rather than making any repairs. The Syrians were in a very precarious situation when they first arrived. They would quickly rent and move into a little one-room flat if they spotted one. (Mardin, 19, Muhtar)

A representative of another CSO that had institutionalised its women's empowerment work in Mardin and moved into the impoverished neighbourhoods where it had worked before the influx of Syrians, described its first interactions with the Syrian community as follows:

We are an association that has been in existence since 2007. We have been working with individuals living in underprivileged communities in "Yukarı Mardin." As a result, the neighbourhoods in which we already work are the preferred destinations for most Syrians seeking to settle. The rents were lower and the living conditions more manageable. Because of this, Syrians migrated to the poor neighbourhoods where we were already working, (...) and we immediately had such a large migrant population. (Mardin, 11, CSO)

It was also reported that some of the Syrians who settled in “Yukarı Mardin” by renting vacant houses had bought houses after acquiring Turkish citizenship. Below is the account of an CSO representative who also sold her house in “Yukarı Mardin” to a Syrian national, explaining how Syrians circumvented legal barriers before buying a house in Turkey:

For example, we sold the house (in “Yukarı Mardin”) last year. We had rented it to Syrians before, but the rent was very cheap. We sold it again to a Syrian. But he was already settled here, working in the construction sector, and had obtained citizenship. (...) I mean, if a Syrian is able to get an ID, if he or she has a civil record here – for example, my uncle (who came from Syria) had one. (...) He managed to buy an apartment in the neighbourhood down there, in a new apartment. Because he had a civil record and he could show his kinship with us, he was able to do that. (Mardin, 1, CSO).

As previously stated, during the process of border demarcation between Turkey and Syria, there were individuals from Mardin who chose to remain on the other side of the border as their lands fell within the administrative boundaries of Syria. Thus, continuing kinship ties, historical and spatial connections, as well as a shared language, proved to be an advantage for Syrians arriving in Mardin to secure housing and to rebuild themselves in the area. The same is true of the Kızıltepe district of Mardin. In Kızıltepe, in the context of historical tribal relations, both rural communities living on different sides of the border are relatives belonging to the same tribe (Karahan, 2018). For this reason, kinship and tribal ties are crucial factors in the settlement of Syrians in the centre of Mardin, in Kızıltepe, or in rural areas. An CSO representative, who also has kinship ties with Syria, explained that these kinship and tribal connections are rural, and therefore most of the Syrians who arrived in Mardin came from rural communities in Syria, belonging to different tribes:

The Syrians who arrived in Mardin came from the rural areas of Syria, mainly from Qamishli, Hasekeh and Deir ez-Zor. (...) I mean, only a few families from Aleppo or Damascus came to Mardin. They mainly went to the major cities. Because their cultural level is much higher, but those who come to Mardin are poor segments with less cultural capital. There are no rich people among them. If you look at Antep, for example, you will see that there has been an influx from Aleppo. Wealthy Syrians went there, but those who come here are really poor. Their level of literacy is also low. (Mardin, 11, CSO)

Due to the war, the majority of the Syrians who came to Mardin were rural people who had worked as farmers in Syria, and some of them lived in field houses and worked as “kuyubaşı” in the rural district of Kızıltepe. The village is connected to Kızıltepe and its 23-year-old muhtar, who is also a landowner, expressed it as follows:

Our community abuts the Syrian boundary. (...) Syrians used to cross into Syria to shop before the landmines were planted. When people fleeing the Syrian civil war sought refuge in Turkey, they crossed the mined area with wire fences and entered the country. (...) In Kızıltepe, there are probably more than ten thousand Syrians who live in the field houses and earn their living by irrigating the wells and fields. (...) As landowners, we pay for the electricity in the field huts where they live. While they work there, they do not have to pay rent, utility bills, or other expenses. Consider a rural house with a well. The minimum rent in Kızıltepe (the district centre) is 500 Turkish Liras per month. In addition, they must pay between 500 and 600 Turkish Liras or 1,000 Turkish Liras for electricity and water. The

costs in Kızıltepe are different. But at least in our village there are transformers and water and electricity are free. So, this is a benefit to them. Today it is impossible to find local labour. Syrians come to work in cotton, maize, and pruning. They would rather live in the countryside than in the city. There are about 20-22 households in our village. At the moment, 6-7 and sometimes up to 10 of them are Syrian households. (Mardin, 16, Muhtar)

It is notable that the integration of Syrians who have settled in rural areas of Mardin is more harmonious than that of those who have settled in urban areas. Urban centres often highlight the visible cultural and social differences between the origin and destination of migration. In contrast, the fact that newcomers from rural areas also live in rural areas seems to reduce the local population's exclusionary behaviour towards migrants based on their differences:

No, nothing like that would happen. Everyone in the village has their own plot of land and their own well. If people have a youngster or someone who could help, they mind their own business, those who need help hire someone, and no one interferes in other people's affairs. As I said, we have built up a relationship with the Syrian families living in the village. They attend our weddings, and we attend theirs. When we organise a memorial service, we invite them, and they invite us. Most of them are already our relatives. (Mardin, 16, Muhtar)

Living in huts in fields with irrigation wells or in village houses owned by the landowner is not a permanent form of housing for migrant families. Due to problems of access to basic services such as education and health care, families with school-age children in particular seek employment opportunities in the city, settling for lower incomes. Both a muhtar who also employs kuyubaşı and a representative of an CSO that provides support to this community had the following to say about the challenges of the system:

Of course, the children in the village go to school there. If there is a mobile education programme in place, they are informed about it. We have often seen an ambulance come to a call. I mean, an ambulance does come to the village. We have seen that. Or if there is an emergency, they go to the hospital in the village's or their boss's vehicle. But it is much more difficult when it comes to education. In winter, our roads are a bit problematic. They are rural roads. In many places there is no public transport. They also do not have vehicles. At the end of the day, it is a simple motor. If there is mud, no vehicle can go. We have this problem in winter when it rains. (...) However, those with children who are enrolled in secondary or high schools move to the district. We have also seen, in many cases, people taking up daily work here (in the city centre), renting a place, trying to make ends meet, just for the sake of their children. (Mardin, 16, Muhtar)

We call it kuyubaşı. A tiny room with no toilet. No hygiene, no bathroom. No kitchen either. I mean, there is no access to education because there is no road because it gets muddy in winter. What they try to do is to take the children to school on motorbikes. And after a while they can no longer do that and there you have the problem of access to education. But then their support is cut off. Because if the children drop out, the support given per child (i.e., the conditional cash transfer) is withdrawn. (...) The locals, the local kuyubaşı, can go back to their homes when it is winter. But the refugees are always there. They have nowhere else to go. Winter conditions are harsh. Because in winter there are power cuts. The electricity of the kuyubaşı may be cut because it is winter. In such cases, the wells do not function, and they cannot get water. (...) So no water, no electricity. They cannot take a bath. In fact, those who live in the rural areas have to endure many severe challenges. (...)

In winter it is also a challenge to find a house, and it is much more difficult for a refugee. Housing is one of the biggest problems. (...) But there is something I have observed in the last two months. Refugees who were working in the centre have started to move to the villages to work. When I asked why, the answer was the rents. Increased rent and electricity costs. If you work as a kuyubaşı, you do not have to pay rent or electricity. Therefore, many people would like to go there because of the soaring costs [in the city]. (Mardin, 15, CSO)

The fact that both Gaziantep and Mardin are border provinces and the deeply rooted relations between the communities living on both sides of the border made these provinces a destination for Syrians. As Gaziantep and Mardin meet their urban and rural labour needs with Syrians, they are no longer an attractive target for other irregular migrants. However, Istanbul, as well as Izmir and Konya, remain appealing destinations for those who have been travelling to Turkey for over two decades for work, for transit migrants seeking to cross to another country, and finally for applicants for international protection. One of the key characteristics of Konya is that it is a satellite city where applicants for international protection are registered and expected to reside. Thus, as the migrant labour market expands in these cities, different migrant groups, including Syrians, are settling together in overcrowded households, sharing the same houses or roommates in neighbourhoods populated by the local impoverished working class. As a result, certain poverty-stricken neighbourhoods in these cities have transformed into what are now referred to as "migrant neighbourhoods." In these spaces, different migrant groups coexist, including those that are officially "invisible," forming proximity to the sectors in which they work, migrant networks, ethnic ties, and a process influenced by the affordability of rents. Therefore, even those who appear to be "non-existent" on paper are present in these areas.

Migrants in Konya and Izmir also tend to settle in the ageing city centres with dilapidated structures and unfavourable environmental conditions, similar to Gaziantep and Mardin. The Sahibiata and Şemsitebrizi neighbourhoods in the historic centre of Konya and the Aziziye neighbourhood in the Karatay district provide accommodation for migrants and refugees in this particular context. Below are the views of a school principal, a neighbourhood muhtar, and a representative of an employers' organisation.

We have an area here known as "Old Konya," where the city was originally founded, so the houses are very historic. Can you believe it, there are even century-old houses in the narrow streets and neighbourhoods here. The houses are ancient. Because of their age, the people of Konya have gradually moved away from here. So, who has come here? Low-income families. In our neighbourhood, which we call "Şems," there are both Turkish and foreign families, and they generally have similar working conditions. Their financial situation is also similar, and they are not wealthy. (Konya, 3, Principal)

These are the earliest settlement areas in Konya and the houses here are also quite old. These two neighbourhoods are home to our Roma population. For this reason, locals and those in the city for work prefer not to rent houses in these areas unless they have no other choice. There were many vacant houses here. They had almost no monetary value. (Konya, 5, CSO)

The affluent class, civil servants, and well-paid workers have moved out of this area. They relocated to the Meram neighbourhood. (Konya, 4, Muhtar)

The first arrivals, the Syrians, settled in Selçuklu, but when the main migration began (after 2015), they moved to the old neighbourhoods where there were no Turks left. They established their homes in places that had been abandoned by the locals many years ago. The neighbourhoods were empty before. The rents for houses, which used to be 500 liras, have risen to 1,500 lira. It suited locals' interests. (Konya, 14, Employers' Organisation)

For example, the Sahibiata or Şemsitebrizi neighbourhoods are not preferred places for Turks to live. A native would be reluctant to live there because of the presence of vagrants and gypsies, declaring: "I cannot live in this neighbourhood." But who came here? Syrians populated these areas. (Konya, 14, Employers' Organisation)

Even before the Syrian refugees arrived, Izmir had a long history of hosting numerous migrant populations, similar to Konya. Due to its extensive labour market, the city, which is situated on the Aegean Sea's borders, attracts economic migrants with a variety of skills in addition to those seeking entry into EU territory. However, since the arrival of Syrians, irregular attempts to enter the EU have increased, and the presence of migrants in the city has become entrenched.

Migrants and refugees are concentrated in three zones of Izmir. One of them is the Basmane and Agora areas and their vicinities in Konak district. This area is in the city centre and historically has always been a migration area due to Izmir being a port city and the first arrival area for newcomers. Also in Konak is the Kadifekale area, whose neighbourhoods have attracted internal migration since the 1960s and now host Syrians, too. The second zone where migrants live are various neighbourhoods of the Bornova district, which provide modest housing alternatives and are close to manufacturing workshops where migrants and refugees can find work. The third zone are rural districts of Izmir, foremost Torbalı, which is home to a camp where Syrian Dom seasonal migrant workers as well as native agricultural labourers live.

In the Basmane-Agora area, which is one of the main arrival points for migrants in Izmir, an CSO representative and a municipal official described the presence of migrants in the area as follows:

For a very long time, this region has been characterised by continuous migration. Here once lived Greeks, Armenians, and Izmir's native population. Obviously, because of so much migration to Basmane, these populations have diminished over time. Basmane is the heart of Izmir, with affordable hotels, gathering places, and the train station and the fair. Also present is Konak. It is an area where everyone can readily find themselves and obtain what they desire, so it is natural that migration, both internal and external, heads primarily here. It has evolved into something internationalist and a mosaic of individuals. (Izmir, 6, CSO).

This is Çeşmelik, immediately beneath Kadifekale. Here is the Jewish "Kortejo" (old Jewish stone house). It is a region in which Jews and Levantines once resided. The core of old Izmir, where Izmir's natives reside. Then, in the 1960s, people from Mardin immigrated, followed by Kurds in the 1990s. In the back is a Roma neighbourhood. Since 2015, there have been refugees, and there are now African inhabitants. (Izmir, 3 Metropolitan Municipality)

The Basmane-Agora district provides daily temporary employment opportunities for migrants in transit, and the prevalence of small textile workshops provides employment opportunities for Syrians. Two CSO representatives described the local labour force as follows:

In the early hours of the morning, people of African descent are picked up in front of the Basmane mosque. They are hired to haul loads and do construction work for very little compensation. They are somehow selected. Basmane is a kind of meeting place for them. It's kind of like the hiring of day labourers. (Izmir, 6, CSO)

Basmane has no factories. There are only a few modest textile workshops, most of them what we would call "underground." They employ both natives and migrants. There are also leather workshops. There used to be tanneries in Yeşildere, but when they closed, both the tanneries and the garment production moved to other areas of Izmir. There are also small restaurants and hotels in the area. In addition to the garment industry, residents are employed in the construction industry. Particularly the poorest people earn their living by collecting scraps. (Izmir, 5, CSO).

Another settlement pattern that provides housing choices for migrants in Izmir are the "gecekondu" (informal housing) neighbourhoods in the central region, which are currently beginning to decay and are under pressure for urban transformation. Similar to the situation in Istanbul, these "gecekondu" neighbourhoods in Izmir function as incubators for migrant communities. Kadifekale, whose neighbourhoods constitute the oldest gecekondu area in Izmir, currently hosts migrant and refugee communities. Cultural and social capital influences the spatial distribution of these migrant groups within Kadifekale. This distribution is also influenced by language and ethno-cultural affiliations.

In this process, Kadifekale offered the migrants a significant advantage. Syrian Turkmen speak Turkish, while Syrian Arabs speak Arabic. There are many Arabic speakers from Urfa and Mardin in the city. There are Kurds, and Syrian Kurds also speak Kurdish. This made matters somewhat easier for them. (Izmir, 6, CSO)

Torbalı is another district of Izmir where migrants can settle and is inhabited by migrant groups engaged in agricultural work. Unlike Konya, where agricultural labour is mostly provided by migrants from other regions, Torbalı, like Gaziantep and Mardin, is dominated by Syrian migrants. During the agricultural harvest season in the region, the Torbalı camp is home not only to Syrian agricultural workers, but also to Dom and other Syrians who travel from different provinces as seasonal agricultural workers. The labour and employment section of this study discusses seasonal workers in detail, highlighting the challenges of meeting basic human needs such as hygiene and care due to overcrowding in the camp. This situation exacerbates poverty in the area. The visibility of Syrian agricultural workers increases during the summer months, particularly in the Torbalı district. In addition to Izmir, this dynamic agricultural labour force extends to other agriculturally intensive districts in Aydın and Manisa. During the winter, part of this population go back to the provinces where they are registered for temporary protection, while others remain in Torbalı and eke out a living through scavenging and waste collection.

Large households in small houses: a class/spatial survival strategy in destination areas

Compared to the conventional labour movement from the global South to the global North that occurred after the Second World War, the challenges faced by irregular migrants and refugees in their destination places in the 1980s were mounting and of a different nature. One of the major obstacles they faced was the inability to secure their own livelihoods and shelter because they lacked the legal basis and access to employment and housing that regular labour migrants had. The lack of legal and administrative regulations governing the employment and housing of migrants in urban and rural settlements, the absence of institutional social support mechanisms for migrants, and the shortage of affordable rental housing all contributed to the development of diverse survival and housing strategies by migrants. Migrants and refugees often developed coping mechanisms by establishing large households in impoverished neighbourhoods with dilapidated housing in urban cores. They sought out abandoned, low-cost, and modest dwellings where they could simultaneously meet their housing and economic needs.

The historical phenomena of “*bekar amele evleri*”²⁹ (bachelor workers’ houses) and shared houses, mainly occupied by single male irregular migrants, were prevalent before the arrival of Syrians. However, the phenomenon of multiple families cohabiting as a means of coping is a relatively recent development. Housing multiple migrant families together as a coping mechanism was known to most institutional and CSO representatives, muhtars, and those interviewed for the qualitative study. The following quotes reflect the interviewees’ views on this much-discussed living arrangement:

A single house currently houses three Syrian families. There are at least ten members of the household, and they all contribute to the household income. (Konya, 4, Muhtar)

Their households are two or three times larger than ours. Our houses can accommodate three or four people, but they share the living space with at least two other families. The biggest problem is the housing situation of single migrants. They’re the most overcrowded. Afghan single men live together. (Konya, 1, Muhtar)

I’ve seen several families living in one place. (...) Sometimes when we look at a place we think “nobody must live here,” but I’ve seen situations where numerous families live. (...) Some owners have built one-room flats in their gardens and rent each unit to a different family. They only have one room to live in. The toilets are outside. This is what I have seen happening to the tenants. (Konya, 6, Karatay Municipality)

For example, in one place there are three people living together, I mean three men from three families, and they all work. If they earn 500 TL today, their daily income is 1,500 TL. Their children also work. Guess what their total income is. They earn comfortably, but in Turkey only one man works. Many members of their household work, but our citizens claim that the state helps them and get jealous. (Gaziantep, 2, Muhtar)

²⁹ Large cities have had a variety of housing possibilities for single individuals or migrant workers. Examples include bachelors’ rooms, lodgings for male workers who migrated to urban areas for employment during the Ottoman and Republican periods and workers’ dormitories for male and female guest workers during post-World War II labour migration in Germany.

Settling and empowerment

The history of the modern city is also the history of the migration of unrestricted labour from rural areas to urban centres; consequently, the spatial geography of cities is also shaped by spatial competition and social class struggle. When a capitalist accumulation regime gains access to a massive influx of new, often low-cost labour into the labour market, wages can drop. If this new labour force is deprived of legal labour rights, as is often the case with migrant workers, it can exert additional pressure on wages. In such circumstances, when a common ground of struggle and solidarity cannot be established between migrant and native workers due to the precarious position of migrants, they become the most vulnerable and weakest segment of the working class. This precarious position as labourers is exacerbated by a local anti-migrant discourse, which further marginalises migrants in the neighbourhoods where they live. It is therefore essential for migrants to strengthen their position by consolidating their identity in the neighbourhoods where they live, making themselves visible, and gaining community acceptance. Mechanisms of empowerment involve holding onto a place, becoming visible there, and asserting one's presence in the local community.

The lack of registered employment opportunities for irregular migrant groups hampers their ability to acquire class and spatial empowerment. Syrian refugees, however, seem to have a greater chance of spatial empowerment, supported by specific spatial circumstances, despite the fact that their class-based avenues of empowerment are currently closed.

The impact of the closure of neighbourhoods to migrant registration on housing / settlement

As was mentioned in the previous section, when a larger number of refugees entered Turkey on a massive scale after 2015, most of them originated from war-ravaged, impoverished regions of Syria. Therefore, the devalued urban decay areas were the most favourable locations for these migrants to afford housing costs in urban areas, leading to their concentration and settlement in these areas. In addition to providing refugee housing, these areas also offered refugees the opportunity to rent abandoned local shops and warehouses, allowing them to set up their own businesses. In some cases, they even occupied and restored abandoned, dilapidated shops, transforming them into functioning businesses. Along with the migrants, this became the most influential factor in the socio-spatial restructuring of these neighbourhoods. In these neighbourhoods, certain streets and avenues have emerged with a concentration of Syrian vendors, prompting the local population to coin critical terms such as "Aleppo Avenue" and "Little Syria" for these areas. The interviewees' emphasis on this phenomenon reveals an important indicator that migrants are becoming more "settled" and moving towards a more "permanent" state. A representative of an employers' organisation in Konya put it this way:

They lease the stores beneath their own homes and sell their own goods. They also produce their own bread and other goods. Syrians also prefer to shop with their fellow countrymen. This trend has increased in the last year or two. They primarily serve their local community and rarely venture beyond their neighbourhoods. These neighbourhoods have evolved into their own communities. They have isolated themselves within their own com-

munities. Already, 19 neighbourhoods are effectively restricted to new residents. Within these neighbourhoods, they act independently. (Konya 11, Employers' Organisation)

As one interviewee openly stated, many neighbourhoods are no longer just temporary settlements for migrants looking for a place to live. Instead, they have developed their own cultures, languages, daily routines, and social networks. To prevent a further increase in the proportion of Syrians in these neighbourhoods, the GİB has halted the registration of migrants and refugees in neighbourhoods where migrants make up more than 25% of the resident population (including neighbourhoods which were previously classed as villages). This decision, known as the "neighbourhood closure," was implemented in May 2022 and extended to 1,169 neighbourhoods in July 2022 (see, GİB, 2022). This decision had the greatest impact on Syrian refugees, as they were specifically targeted. During the research, the participants identified several startling effects of closing neighbourhoods to new migrant registrations. In certain agricultural areas, where migrant workers are the main source of labour, one of the most significant problems has arisen. One muhtar, who has experienced this dilemma in his own community, explained it as follows:

The GİB no longer issues residence permits for several localities. If a Syrian wants to work on the irrigation system in my village and travels from the centre of Kızıltepe to the village of Sevimli, he will not be given a [registered] address. Without an address they cannot get a residence permit. Within the community, we are obligated to inform the gendarmerie. When Syrians come to our village, we must record information such as their names and family members. If we do not record this information and their address in Kızıltepe is blank, their monthly aid from the Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundation will be suspended during their update, which takes place every one, two, or three months. Both our District Governor and the Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundation have been informed of this matter. I told them that if they take this action, the Syrians will stop coming to the villages because their aid will be cut off. As landowners, we will also face difficulties with irrigation due to the lack of available labour. These people live there and do our business. These are the problems we are facing right now. (Mardin, 16, Muhtar)

Field research showed that the closure of neighbourhoods to new migrant registrations affects not only Syrians, but also other groups with short-term residence permits or applicants for international protection. A school principal in Konya, whose school has Afghan pupils, described the process as follows:

The number of Afghans in our area has increased over the past year. Look, last year or the year before, I had about five or six people registered. This year I have registered up to fifty people. We estimate that between fifty and one hundred Afghan families have settled in our region. The population growth has been checked. They have already prohibited foreigners from obtaining residence permits in our neighbourhood of Şems. In Sahibiata, migrants will no longer be able to obtain residence permits. This decision was taken to prevent the ghettoization of the area. (...) In the past, when a family left the neighbourhood, their relatives would come and say: "Come, there's a house here that's vacant." A house might have been vacated by an Afghan or a Syrian. They would immediately inform

a Syrian who needed a place to stay. But now it is restricted and there is no mobility between these nine communities. (Konya, 3, Teacher)

The closure of certain neighbourhoods to residence reduces the frequency with which Syrians living in urban areas change their dwellings, thus limiting their spatial mobility. The proportion of Syrians living in cities who can move to non-restricted middle-class neighbourhoods within the city is exceptionally low. Therefore, even before the closure, they could only move to certain neighbourhoods. However, because of the closure, this option is no longer available, and they are now restricted to moving within the same neighbourhood. Previously, instead of living in a very poor house when their financial situation improved, they could move to a better house in a neighbourhood where other Syrians lived. But this option has now been taken away from them. A muhtar in Konya described the frequency of house moving among Afghans and Syrians before the closure as follows:

Both groups used to move from house to house quite frequently. In the beginning, they were forced to live in slums, but over time their living conditions were no longer to their liking. They started to relocate. They were able to move because addresses and registrations were available. (Konya, 1, Muhtar)

Similarly, the principal of a primary school in a neighbourhood that was closed to new registrations in Konya had this to say about these closures:

For the integration of these refugees, there must be a dispersal of refugees in different neighbourhoods. Everyone is aware of this, but they are unable to do so because people in other neighbourhoods refuse to accept them, and their economic circumstances prevent them from paying the rent, so they end up returning. The first step towards Turkish citizenship would be for Turkish and international students to socialise, learn Turkish fluently and integrate with the local population. That is my understanding. We are trying to achieve this, but our efforts alone are not enough. (Konya, 2, Teacher)

Urban transformation and migrants

In the four cities where the qualitative research was conducted, the majority of migrants settled in areas of urban decay and poor gecekondu neighbourhoods within the historic city centres. Most of these neighbourhoods are under pressure from urban transformation and gentrification schemes. These urban areas provide a safe haven for migrant groups to establish themselves in the city. In addition, the presence of migrants causes these devalued, dilapidated, and decaying neighbourhoods to be revived and brought back to life. Despite their central location and historical significance, these neighbourhoods have a low built environment value relative to their high land value, a phenomenon known in the literature as the “rent gap.” This makes them attractive to both international and domestic real estate investment firms. In addition, the precarious residency status of migrants further weakens the already tenuous resistance to urban transformation on the part of the native residents who lived in these areas before and alongside the migrants. The urban developers know that it is much easier to remove migrants from these areas of urban decay than it is to relocate the poor native residents. Consequently, migrants will soon be forced to leave these areas. A representative of an CSO specialised in assisting migrants in Konya, where the neighbourhood is also populated by the

Roma, describes the urban transformation process of these old central neighbourhoods, which have come to house migrant communities:

The municipality has been planning urban transformation in this area for a long time. In fact, one of the neighbourhoods called Şükran was completely demolished. Currently, there are no houses left in the Şükran neighbourhood. There was supposed to be an urban transformation or some other special urban plan. But six years have passed and not a single nail has been hammered. Delays have been caused by official obstacles, the discovery of historical artefacts underground, and other factors. These factors have naturally led to people settling in these areas. However, a recent decision has closed nine neighbourhoods in Konya to new registrations. (Konya, 5, CSO)

A representative of a Konya-based CSO working with the migrants expressed the concerns of their beneficiaries, who will soon be forced to leave their homes due to urban transformation as follows:

A lot of things have changed in the last few years, and now the beneficiaries often ask: "They have come from the municipality, they are going to demolish our houses, where are we going to go?" (...) In addition, address verification has recently started. Normally they try to limit the percentage of migrants to no more than 25% per district. This has been reduced to 20%. This information was presented at a meeting with the migration authorities last week. As a result, refugees face significant challenges in finding housing, both due to urban transformation and the address verification process. Currently, the cost of renting a house is already quite high. When individuals move to a new location, they are required to sign a contract that is typically two or three times the current rent of their current home. This is a big problem. (Konya, 12, CSO)

Due to urban transformation, migrants who are about to leave their homes are unable to relocate to other neighbourhoods with comparably lower rents and a significant migrant population, as these neighbourhoods are closed to new registrations. On the other hand, they are unable to pay the rent in the neighbourhoods that are open to new residents. Consequently, migrants who receive notices of urban transformation apply to the migration authorities for permission to move to residential areas that are closed to new registrations.

They try to get permission from the Provincial Directorate of Migration to say: "I have found a new home in this neighbourhood; would it be possible?" (Konya, 12, CSO)

A representative of a community centre in Konya expressed her views on the consequences of the urban transformation process, which has resulted in migrants returning to their home countries.

The urban transformation process is having a huge impact, particularly in terms of voluntary returns to their home countries, because of the creation of safe zones there. I still believe that safe returns will continue. Perhaps the population density will decrease even further. But as I said, it has been eleven years since 2011 and we are now approaching the twelfth. These people have grown up here, they were born here, and their families have established roots here. What will happen during this process? We also must consider the psychological element of this situation. Individuals who have experienced significant

trauma while migrating may not want to relive those same traumas when they return to their countries of origin. It is important that we take this into account. Again, this is my personal view. (Konya, 13, CSO)

In Izmir, as in Konya, urban transformation projects are taking place in core migrant neighbourhoods and in central areas that have become urban decay zones, formerly occupied by squatter settlements. The following is how the muhtar of a Bornova neighbourhood, known for its sizeable Syrian population, described this process:

(...) It has undergone urban transformation. After the last earthquake in Bornova there was a movement in this direction. (...) The contractors are also active in the urban transformation process supported by the government. On the upper side, which we call the local neighbourhood, they are transitioning to apartment buildings by reaching agreements with landowners and property owners in the area. This means evacuating the tenants. Eventually (the Syrians) will move to more rural areas. (Izmir, 8, Muhtar)

(...) They live, albeit in small numbers, in houses that are undergoing urban transformation. They move to new places through interactions with each other. For example, if a Syrian relative lives in Işıkkent and their current residence is undergoing urban transformation or they can't come to an agreement with the landlord, they might suggest "come, we'll find a new place here" and move to Naldöken or explore a neighbourhood in Yeşilçam. They are very organised within their group. They are excellent at it. They have a rare sense of unity that is not often seen among the natives (Izmir, 8, Muhtar)

The muhtar's account suggests that Syrians who have lost access to affordable housing due to urban transformation or the formation of lucrative areas tend to move to the outskirts of the city. It also points to the critical role of kinship and family networks in identifying housing opportunities.

The historic city centres of Gaziantep and Mardin, the other two cities where the qualitative research was conducted, are currently undergoing large-scale gentrification projects. The historic centres of both cities are important destinations for global urban history tourism. For example, there are two notable areas in Turkey that are undergoing rapid transformation into tourist accommodation and dining areas. The first is "Yukarı Mardin," a historical conservation area in Mardin. The second is the neighbourhoods of historic Antep houses in Gaziantep, which beautifully illustrate the multicultural structure of the city. It is important to consider how migrants in these areas will be able to sustain their lives within the city, as this raises significant questions and uncertainties.

This section of the study focused on analysing the dynamics of the settlement of migrants and refugees in urban and rural areas, as well as their living conditions. It has highlighted three key factors that play an important role in the ability of migrants to adapt and thrive in these areas. These factors include access to housing, economic opportunities for self-sufficiency, and the availability of social support networks.

Participation of Migrant and Refugee Children in Education: Institutional, Structural and Socio-Economic Conditions

This section discusses the issues surrounding refugee and migrant children's access to education. The discussion is based on interviews with teachers, trade union members, and CSO representatives in five cities. After an overview of the institutional framework in this area, the discussion will focus on the challenges arising from the structural situation within the education system. These include difficulties in enrolling migrant and refugee children in schools, high rates of absenteeism and early dropouts, and cases of prejudice and discrimination against these students. There are additional issues to consider, such as migrant and refugee children's insufficient knowledge of Turkish and the challenge they face in receiving support from parents who do not speak Turkish. We will also discuss the challenges of implementing EU-funded programmes aimed at supporting migrant and refugee children.

Institutional arrangements for the education of foreigners

According to Article 34 of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection, foreign children under the age of 18 who have a residence permit in Turkey and have applied for international protection or have been granted secondary protection status are entitled to education in primary and secondary schools (LFIP, 2013). However, children of irregular migrants do not have access to formal education. Until 2016, Syrian children under temporary protection (TP) status had the possibility to receive education in Temporary Education Centres (TECs). In 2016, regulations were introduced to gradually integrate Syrian children into formal education institutions, resulting in the closure of TECs. Individuals from Syria with TP status are eligible to take the Foreign Student Examination (YÖS) and have the opportunity to pursue higher education in Turkey. This section will only focus on the participation of students in compulsory education. The discussion largely excludes migrant students in higher education.

Access to school for Syrians with temporary protection status, as well as other refugee and migrant children, continues to face significant obstacles despite the existence of legislation. In January 2022, the Migration and Emergency Education Department of the Ministry of National Education published a report stating that there were 1,124,353 school-age Syrian children (aged 5-17) under temporary protection status in the 2021-2022 academic year. Of these children, a total of 730,806 were enrolled in education, while the remaining 393,547 were out of school. In other words, one third of Syrian school-age children with temporary protection status were not enrolled in school. According to the report, in January 2022, the enrolment rate for Syrian children of primary school age was 75.1%, while the enrolment rate for secondary school was 80%. According to T24 (2022), the enrolment rate for pre-primary education was 34.3%, while the enrolment rate for secondary education was 42.6%. According to the Turkish Council of Higher Education (YÖK) in 2023, a total of 58,213 Syrian students were enrolled in Turkish universities for the academic year 2022-2023.³⁰

³⁰ According to data from the Higher Education Council (YÖK) website, a total of 301,549 foreign students were enrolled in Turkish universities for the 2022-2023 academic year. These figures include students enrolled in associate degree, undergraduate, graduate, and doctoral programmes. See <https://istatistik.yok.gov.tr/> (accessed on 1.07.2023).

In October 2016, a project was launched with the support of the EU. The main objective of this project is to support the education of migrant children, with a special focus on Syrian children. The project is entitled “Project on Promoting Integration of Syrian Kids into the Turkish Education System” (PIKTES+). The main objectives of this initiative are to contribute to the access to education and social integration of foreign children in Turkey. It also aims to support the Ministry of National Education’s efforts to increase enrolment, school attendance, and transitions to the next level of education for foreign children in 29 project cities (PIKTES, 2023a). The project is funded by grants from the EU’s Financial Assistance for Refugees in Turkey (FRIT) programme. The project was implemented as PIKTES I and PIKTES II from 2016 to 2022. While PIKTES+ has similar objectives, it also includes wording such as “maintaining the quality of education for the host community” and “ensuring the accessibility of the formal education system (from pre-school education to the end of secondary education) for foreign and socio-economically disadvantaged children of the host community” (PIKTES, 2023a).

In the schools where the project is being implemented, catch-up classes are opened with the aim of “providing educational opportunities to all foreign students who do not speak Turkish or who need to improve their Turkish language skills, and thus preparing them for academic education covering other branch courses at the end of their education.” Turkish language instructors are defined as “teachers of Turkish / Turkish language and literature, classroom teachers and foreign language teachers (permanent or contract) who are in excess of the norms, or those who have not yet fulfilled their salary quota, or those who can be assigned to extra classes or for a remuneration.” (PIKTES, 2023b).

Discussions with educators, education union leaders, and CSO representatives revealed that the legal framework influences the ease with which migrant and refugee children can access education. The qualitative fieldwork provided an overview of the problems faced by migrant and refugee children in various education-related areas, including enrolment, attendance, dropouts, language learning, and curriculum. It also shed light on the difficulties encountered in the Turkish education system. The problems faced by Syrian children, who make up the largest group, in the education system are discussed first, followed by the challenges faced by other migrant and refugee children in accessing education.

School attendance problems and dropouts

A prominent concern in the five locations where qualitative interviews were conducted was the difficulties Syrian pupils have in attending school. Family poverty, which encourages early work, particularly for male children, was a major factor in attendance problems. Early marriage of girls was another factor. It was also found that for both boys and girls, the problem of poor attendance was most acute at the secondary school level.

In densely populated Syrian neighbourhoods in Istanbul where textile and shoe workshops are located, both boys and girls start working at a young age. This situation, which has been observed in previous research (e.g., Yüксеker et al., 2021; Yüксеker et al., 2022), was also mentioned by the teachers we interviewed:

The children work in factories. They don’t have homes or families. Their mothers and fathers are both absent. Let’s imagine that there are 15 boys living here. They migrated to

Turkey to find work. But they must go to school. Or they do not send their daughters to school. Some refuse to send them because of their religious beliefs. Others cannot go because they must help their mothers. (Istanbul, 3, Teacher)

The parents earn very meagre wages. (...) Even in Bağcılar, where rents do not fall below 5,000 to 6,000 liras a month, children are employed underground without security to support their fathers. This is the basic predicament of people who do not go to school. (Are there also working girls?) Of course, all these 13-14-year-old girls learn a skill while working in textile workshops, like how to use an overlock machine or different trades. They are employed. In the back neighbourhoods of Esenler and Bağcılar, almost a third and almost half of the minors working underground there are under 15 years old and female or male (Istanbul, 2, Teacher).

You get money for every child you send to school, so there is an incentive to send children to school (...) The attendance rate is about 50 percent. The children work, they work. (Konya, 1, Muhtar)

However, the deputy head of the primary school we spoke to in Konya said that in her school, which has a majority of Syrian pupils, attendance is higher and those who miss school because of work are visited at home.

About 80% of them are still enrolled in school. Their continued attendance shows that their motivation remains high. (...) Due to the fragmented family structure and inadequate economic conditions, most of the remaining ones (...) are engaged in selling tissues or water. We bring them to school through home visits and meetings with parents. (Konya, 2, Teacher)

The headteacher of an “Imam Hatip” middle school in Konya, where more than half of the students are foreigners, reported that a quarter of the total student population is absent, the majority of whom are Syrian (Konya, 3, Teacher). The interviewed teacher also mentioned that it is difficult to communicate with parents and students about absenteeism because Syrian families often change their addresses and phone numbers. In general, there is a high level of attendance at primary school level. However, according to several interviewees, absenteeism tends to increase from middle school onwards. By the time students reach high school, dropping out or not enrolling at all becomes more common.

As refugee families receiving social integration assistance (SIA) are required to send their school-age children to school, there is a monitoring system for school attendance. An CSO representative in Konya explained as follows:

Children who attend school are entitled to conditional education grants. (...) The Ministry of Education reports to us when a child is absent from school for more than four days. (...) Our social workers conduct home and household investigations. (...) We go in and investigate, make a social assessment and report. These reports are then submitted to the Provincial Migration Management Directorate. (Konya, 13, CSO)

However, interviews conducted in different cities revealed that attendance monitoring is not implemented consistently. The impact of student absenteeism is influenced by the lack of attendance tracking and monitoring, as well as the failure to repeat a grade in accordance with regulations.

There is, of course, no follow-up. Typically, there should be a disciplinary consequence for a child's absence from school. However, I have not yet seen any parents punished for this. (Istanbul, 2, Teacher)

Why is attendance monitoring so poor? Because there are too many students not attending. (Izmir, 2, Teacher)

Among the 150 pupils, there is a group of about 20 Syrian students who are consistently absent. (...) We send invitations to inform them that they must attend school. We try to explain to them that there are financial penalties. The Provincial Ministry of Education has assigned a branch manager to this issue. The Provincial Directorate of Education makes efforts to ensure that children attend and enrol in school. Most of the Turkish students who do not attend school are mainly from the eastern and south-eastern regions. (Istanbul, 2, Teacher).

When we talk to Syrian parents, we see that they place a high priority on education. They want their kids to go to school. (...) They make a tremendous effort to ensure that their children stay in school. But some students choose to skip classes. As you may know, primary and secondary schools do not require students to repeat a grade just because of absenteeism. That is why we have students who are absent. (Gaziantep, 12, Teacher)

The early employment of boys in workshops in Mardin, Gaziantep, and Izmir is a significant factor contributing to school absenteeism:

The children work in the carpentry workshops. Most of them work in bakeries. They also work in the smithy. Some of the jobs are strenuous and demanding. Bakery work can be particularly demanding for children. (Mardin, 5, CSO)

For my students, it is either constant absenteeism or constant attendance. Suppose a boy attends school for one year, there is no way he will not attend the second year. (...) Or they are consistently absent. There are also some who work (...). This could be one of the reasons for their absence. In fact, there are no expectations at school. They don't even have an expectation of success. Their only focus is to complete the educational process and obtain the diploma. They typically use that time to work outside. (Mardin, 12, Teacher)

Similarly, it was reported that among the children of Syrian families living in Gaziantep and working in agriculture, there is a higher prevalence of child labour, leading to a lower tendency to continue basic education:

At elementary level, the employment rate is typically negligible. However, the situation remains the same for families of seasonal agricultural workers, regardless of whether their children are in primary school, middle school, or high school. This means that very few students, at least in the area where I used to work, finish high school (Gaziantep, 5, Teacher).

It was noted above that school enrolment is the fundamental requirement for receiving social integration support. However, a teacher in Mardin claimed that some families enrolled their children in school for this reason and that those who worked were absent despite being enrolled:

Today, the government provides financial support for students. To be honest, there are some families who take advantage of this support. As soon as their child finishes school, the par-

ents immediately arrange for him or her to work in various establishments such as shops, factories, and the like. The purpose is not to acquire basic education or to reach a certain level of education, but to ensure that the support continues uninterrupted. This obviously has a negative impact on education. Children usually do not have such concerns. The terrible thing is that the parents do not have these worries either. Rarely do parents who are highly educated and have achieved a certain standard in their own lives continue to strive for the same for their children. Or they get special financial support. (Mardin, 17, Teacher)

A representative from a child protection CSO in Mardin also emphasised the difficulties in eliminating child labour among Syrians:

When we come across a child who is forced to work at a young age, it is important to have a mechanism in place to address this issue. However, implementing this mechanism has the downside of reducing the household income. The child may end up being the sole member of the family able to work. In essence, we are pushing the child directly towards the poverty line. (...) By withholding both the household's income and the child's earnings, you are essentially removing a vital source of income. (...) If you interfere in this process and remove the child from the work environment, it may cause the child to lose trust in you. (Mardin, 5, CSO).

On the other hand, while there are more Syrian pupils in schools in poor neighbourhoods, local students are also trying to support their families. The following is what a teacher from Gaziantep had to say about it:

School is all day. Until 3 o'clock. After three they start working because of the worsening economic crisis. (...) These children are forced to work. In the mornings I often see pupils who seem to be dozing off. Why is that? Because they work in bakeries. They work in hairdressing salons. They work at wedding venues. The number of these cases is increasing significantly. (...) It is obvious that there is a higher number of working students among the Syrian student population. But there are also local students from Antep who work while studying. (Gaziantep, 12, Teacher)

As with absenteeism, economic reasons are often the cause of dropping out of school. In some cases, girls may be withdrawn from school by their families when they reach puberty or prepare for marriage. All the teachers mentioned this situation.

There is a great danger awaiting girl students. They are married off as soon as they reach physical maturity in sixth or seventh grade. I have seen this painful experience with many of my students. I had seventh grade students who were very successful and intelligent, but unfortunately, they did not go on to eighth grade. (...) Male students can complete the second and third levels of their education all the way to high school (Izmir, 2, Teacher).

As for the male students, they are sent to work, but their jobs are not registered; they do informal work. The most common type of work they do is to collect paper from the rubbish. When they get a bit older, they start dropping out of school. Not because of academic failure, and that really saddens me. Most of the students leave school mainly because of economic reasons. But the rate is not very high, not more than 15-20 per cent. Compared to girls, who have a much lower continuation rate, about 80% of boys complete their education. For girls, it's around 50%. (Izmir, 2, Teacher)

Some of our female kids, like the Syrian girls, get married when they are 12 or 13. There were two sisters. The older sister moved up to the next grade last year. "Where is your sister?" I asked. "My sister got married," she explained. My question was, "Who did she marry?" "Teacher, you know we had a relative and we married her off to him," she said, adding: "She went to Esenyurt." I'm talking about a schoolgirl aged 12 or 13. Our very own student. We have got used to it. It's quite common, I might add. Because we experience it, we live it. (Istanbul, 2, Teacher)

In Konya, however, we encountered a different situation. In a neighbourhood with a high concentration of Syrians, where more than half of the pupils in the local primary school are Syrians and other migrants, the deputy headteacher mentioned absenteeism and dropping out among Syrian families due to their short stay in the neighbourhood:

For example, they may arrive this year, enrol in a nearby school and then transfer to another school six months later. The percentage of students who start and successfully complete grade four can drop to around 50 percent, or even as low as 40 percent. Sometimes it can even drop to around 30 per cent. (Konya, 2, Teacher)

Inability to attend school due to registration in another province or deportation order

Because their families' temporary protection status is listed in a different province, some Syrian kids are unable to attend school in the city where they reside or come to work. The same issue also affects other migrants and refugees who have their international protection registration or residence permit registration in a different province. Furthermore, if the international protection applications of children from refugee families are rejected, they may face the possibility of being deregistered from school. The problems have been worsened by the closure of neighbourhoods in 2022 that have a registered foreign population above 25%percentage, preventing new migrant registrations:

Last year, her younger brother was enrolled in a catch-up class. They refused to register his older sister. They are both registered in Malatya. The headmaster explained that "the one we accepted was a mistake. He was overlooked," adding: "If I accept this one too, I could face an investigation, and then they would take this child out of the school too." Because it is forbidden. Her father must get insurance and a residence permit in Istanbul. But because Istanbul is full at the moment, they are not issuing new permits. (...) And these children cannot go to school. (...) This is the major problem now. Because this child will never get a residence permit. The state, in turn, will not admit her to school. Because if she goes to school, it will be obvious that the family lives here. (...) But what the authorities should have done is to identify them and send them to Malatya. But they did not do that. On the other hand, they know that the family is here. But the child is not allowed to go to school. (Istanbul, 3, Teacher)

It was reported that school principals could take the initiative in such cases and enrol these children as guest students; however, it appears that most principals refrain from doing so as schools and classes in migrant neighbourhoods are already overcrowded.

Although the current reality is a little different, there is still a small margin of discretion that the head teachers can make use of. They may or may not accept the child as a guest student. This mostly depends on the capacity and attitude of the headmaster. (Izmir, 20, CSO)

However, the children of Syrian agricultural labourer families face the gravest problem when it comes to access to education, as they are registered in a different province. The situation has affected Dom families, particularly Syrian Dom families, who work as agricultural labourers in Torbalı and other districts of Izmir, which are known for their intensive agricultural activities:

There are two main reasons why these children do not have access to education. The first one is the nomadic lifestyle of their families, and the second one is that they don't have a registration in Izmir. (...) These are the two key reasons. It is not possible to integrate these children into the Turkish education system if these reasons are not addressed. They grow up in this country without even knowing Turkish. (Izmir, 12, CSO)

The same interviewee, who is a representative of a local initiative working with refugees, also explained that they have carried out several activities for Syrian Dom children in Torbalı who have never been to school:

Over the past six to seven years, we have been actively engaged in the field and have developed a school reintegration programme. We visit the area to teach the children the Latin alphabet, try to teach them Turkish, and offer basic mathematics lessons, along with various other activities. We also organise many social activities. (12 Izmir, CSO)

The representative of this initiative explained that he cannot classify their activities as “education” because they do not have established protocols with the Ministry of National Education or the Directorate of Public Education. He also explained that unregistered migrants cannot participate in courses offered by the Ministry of National Education and the Directorate of Public Education. Projects funded by international organisations can only reach registered refugees and migrants. As a result, this initiative, which does not work with international donors, has only been able to reach a small number of Dom children, and its activities have not been consistently sustainable because it relies on its own resources.

In the case of a refugee family from Afghanistan, Somalia, or another country whose application for international protection is rejected and for whom a deportation order is issued, their IP IDs become inactive or are revoked. In such situations, the children of these families face difficulties in enrolling in schools, or their existing school enrolments are cancelled. In these instances, child protection CSOs or lawyers can apply to the court for an “educational measure” on behalf of the children. However, CSOs in both Konya and Izmir noted that these applications do not always yield results and that many families are unable to make such applications at all.

Turkish language learning and communication at school

The lack of Turkish language skills is one of the factors affecting the academic performance, absenteeism, and dropout rates of refugee and migrant children. In particular, during the transition from temporary education centres (TECs) to public schools, a poor command of the Turkish language was one of the most important factors that negatively affected the performance of Syrian students (see, for example, Yüksek et al., 2022).

The interviews conducted as part of this research in the five cities highlighted the critical importance of Turkish language skills for academic success. The PIKTES project provides Turkish language education to migrant and refugee pupils through “adaptation” or “integration” classes (uyum sınıfı) offered in the schools they attend. However, in an interview in Istanbul, a teacher with six years’ experience of teaching adaptation classes expressed the view that these classes are inadequate and have been reduced in recent years:

In middle and high schools, Turkish is taught in courses like language classes. In primary school, adaptation classes were offered to students up to the third grade. Previously, we were able to engage with students ranging from second grade all the way up to twelfth grade. Now it is much more limited. (Istanbul, 3, Teacher)

According to this teacher, limiting adaptation classes to only third graders is insufficient and against the essence of their work for the following reasons:

Restricting adaptation classes to third graders only goes against the very nature of our work. We have no idea when or where these children come from, let alone what problems they might be facing. (...) More pupils can be reached by widening the scope of the adaptation classes. If it is strictly limited to third grade, we may have a student from Iraq who is actually in fourth grade. However, I will not be able to include this student in my class as he or she is likely to be in middle school next year. (...) In my opinion, the adaptation classes should include students from second to fourth grade. (Istanbul, 3, Teacher)

The vice principal of a primary school in Konya echoed this sentiment and added that they lack classrooms for adaptation classes:

For the third grade, there is an adaptation class programme. However, an adaptation class is also required in the first grade. A student who is enrolled in an adaptation class in the third grade may find it difficult to keep up with the other subjects. Unfortunately, we do not have extra classrooms to accommodate an adaptation class at the moment. Our physical facilities are quite limited. (Konya, 2, Teacher)

Restricting the adaptation classes only to third graders poses challenges for migrant and refugee children transitioning to middle school, especially in terms of their Turkish language skills and academic performance. The principal of an 'Imam Hatip' middle school in Konya explained that students are expected to have a good command of Turkish when they enter middle school:

We had adaptation classes two years ago and they were still there. (...) A year ago, they reopened the adaptation classes to teach Turkish. Was there any benefit to it? It was rather helpful. (...) But we can no longer teach Turkish in the middle school. Why, you may ask? Because the new children were born in Turkey and have completed the fourth year of primary school. We can assume that these children have already completed four years of primary school and have a good understanding of the Turkish language. This is the reason why we have stopped teaching Turkish in this place. (Konya, 3, Teacher)

An additional factor contributing to pupils' insufficient knowledge of Turkish is their lack of access to pre-school education. According to the vice principal of a school in Konya, preschool enrolment can at least help migrant and refugee pupils enter first grade with some knowledge of Turkish. "Is language education in preschool important? It can be very significant. Because in preschool they are undoubtedly exposed to Turkish to some extent, and this contributes a little bit more when they enter first grade" (Konya, 2, Teacher). However, as the interlocutor explained, this school had more pupils than it could accommodate and consequently many migrant and refugee pupils were not able to enrol in the preschool.

In Konya, however, many children were reported to attend religiously oriented kindergartens and courses set up by Syrians, some of which are supported by the Presidency of Religious Affairs, despite the low participation of Syrian children in pre-school education:

The association runs a kindergarten. There may be other kindergartens, but the ones we know (...) are there. There is one more location, which we won't refer to as a kindergarten but rather as a school or a course centre. (...) Most of the staff are Syrians. I think the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) supports it. I presume that it is established under Diyanet's umbrella. They provide religious education and Quran memorisation training for children who want to become hafız [one who can recite the Quran]. (...) Some children live in dormitories, while others attend school every day. Those pursuing 'hafızlık' are required to stay overnight. There are dormitories on the premises of the centre, but it is not considered a kindergarten. It is more like a course centre. (Konya, 7, Metropolitan Municipality)

They do have requests consistent with their religious convictions. But these are not their own Quran courses. The state provides Quran courses. Yes, they have their own Quran courses, but the Diyanet supervises and supports the control of these courses. (...) There might be some clandestine ones, but their number is extremely low. The Diyanet does an excellent job in this regard. (...) Of course they have their own places, that much is certain. But in terms of education, outside of religious education, there are institutions that are not part of the Ministry of Education, where Arabic, lessons from their home countries, mathematics, Turkish, etc. are taught. However, these institutions mainly serve pre-school and primary age children. They're more geared towards younger children (Konya, 12, CSO).

However, the use of Quran classes in early childhood education requires a broader analysis. The Ministry of National Education classifies Quran courses opened by the Presidency of Religious Affairs as early childhood care and education facilities, in addition to its own facilities and those run by private institutions and municipalities (see Dedeoğlu et al., 2021).

In addition to problems with the Turkish language skills of migrant and refugee children, the prolonged school closures during the COVID-19 pandemic led to a significant decline in the Turkish language skills of Syrian and migrant students. The headmaster of a middle school in Konya shared the following thoughts on this issue:

Had it not been for the pandemic, Turkish would not have been forgotten. Within a year and a half, the pandemic dealt the biggest blow to Turkish learning. Because the children were at home with their parents, the language spoken in the family was either Arabic or Afghan. (Konya, 3, Teacher)

Another factor that has a negative impact on the academic performance of migrant and refugee children is their delayed entry into school after several years of non-attendance. The following are the observations of the deputy headteacher in Konya:

We try to set up equivalency records for them from the second or third grade to integrate them into the education system, as most of them are typically older. However, this inevitably disturbs the peace and harmony of the current class and lowers the standard of teaching. When a student enters the fourth grade for the first time, we are obliged to enrol him, and we end up giving him only the basics of education and graduating him early... (Konya, 2, Teacher).

A teacher interviewed in Gaziantep commented that a lack of fluency in the Turkish language leads to a lack of self-confidence in students:

Because of their limited knowledge of Turkish, they face significant challenges, including a lack of self-confidence, difficulty expressing themselves, and an inability to respond to questions in class, despite knowing the correct answers. The same situation exists within their families. In fact, they face these problems on a societal scale. This causes parents to exert pressure on their children to speak and study Turkish. (Gaziantep, 12, Teacher)

Parents who do not speak Turkish can also pose communication challenges for teachers. According to an interview with a teacher in Mardin, when a Syrian mother sought support for her child's psychological problems at school, she was unable to communicate effectively because she lacked the ability to express herself:

Where are these people going to learn Turkish? (...) The people in the public education centres teach reading and writing. There is a big difference between learning how to read and write and learning Turkish. I think this problem should be addressed first. The schools urgently need a qualified interpreter. (...) Parents are not able to express their worries. (Mardin, 3, Teacher)

The problems caused by parents not speaking Turkish were also mentioned by the deputy headteacher of a primary school in Konya:

(...) Due to the lack of a proper language of communication here, (...) what we say and what they understand can lead to different things. Something that may seem normal to us may be perceived by them as something serious. (...) Consequently, this can lead to parents feeling alienated. (Konya, 2, Teacher)

The lack of Turkish language skills among students entering school not only hinders their ability to learn to read and write, but also has a negative impact on their overall success in other subjects. The deputy headteacher of a primary school in Konya explained the situation through the lens of mathematical skills, and a representative of an CSO supporting Syrians expressed similar sentiments:

(...) Let's say reading and comprehension. We move on to comprehension after the reading phase. However, during the comprehension stage, many students struggle to understand. For example, a child learns addition and subtraction, but when he comes across a word problem, he cannot translate it into operations. (Konya, 2, Teacher)

It is one thing to speak Turkish. They can speak Turkish. But understanding and writing in Turkish, expressing what they understand, that's a second or third level. Unfortunately, our perception of the knowledge of Turkish is that it is just a matter of being able to speak it. (Konya, 5, CSO)

On the other hand, during our fieldwork in Gaziantep and Mardin, we observed that some Syrian pupils are Kurdish, and the local community is also made up of Kurds and Arabs. This situation provides an opportunity for teachers to improve communication with their pupils. During an interview in Mardin, one teacher emphasised that the local students' knowledge of Kurdish and Arabic can have a positive impact:

The fact that the children in Mardin know Arabic and some of them know Kurdish, and the Syrian children who come from Syria also know Arabic and Kurdish, has strengthened integration. Politically, they may be foreigners, but if you think about it, how can a border

separate us? (...) They're not so foreign; we can somehow dissolve the language factor. (Mardin, 3, Teacher)

A teacher's knowledge of Arabic or Kurdish can also play an important role in communicating with Syrian pupils:

Some of the Syrian students speak Kurdish as well as Arabic. Of course, I can communicate a little with those who know Kurdish. But when it comes to Arabic, we're blocked from communicating with the children (...) I recently mentioned this to the headmaster, and I said: "I am trying to explain to the child what he has to do, but the child cannot understand me." We need a teacher who has knowledge of Arabic or different languages, someone who can speak Kurdish and Arabic in schools. (Mardin, 12, Teacher)

The teacher interviewee in Mardin expressed the view that the provision of Turkish lessons for Syrian pupils by teachers contracted under PIKTES was beneficial and believed that progress was being made in integrating Syrians into education. A similar opinion was expressed by the school headteacher interviewee in Gaziantep:

For a long time, there were no special programmes for them. Later, certain teaching posts were adapted to accommodate them. It was like a contractual agreement. During certain hours of the day, such as the last two hours or the first two hours, the students would meet with their teachers to receive lessons in Turkish or other subjects. They started to receive especially reading and writing lessons. However, looking at the current student profile, since the migration began in 2011, the majority of the students we are currently teaching have a good command of Turkish and have also successfully adapted to the Kurdish and Arabic languages. (Mardin, 12, Teacher)

But is everything perfect? No, it is not. It serves no purpose to present an overly optimistic picture. But things are not the same as they used to be. The integration process has improved. They are often exposed to the language. (Gaziantep, 5, Teacher)

The presence of a significant number of migrant and refugee pupils in a school can pose challenges, both in terms of developing their Turkish language skills and adapting to their new environment. This was the situation in one of the neighbourhoods in Konya where the field study was conducted. The interlocutor, who was the deputy headteacher of the neighbourhood's primary school, explained that of the more than 900 students in her school, only about 20 were Turkish citizens born in Turkey, while the rest were foreign students, mainly Syrians, or students who had later acquired Turkish citizenship. The high concentration of Syrians in the neighbourhood and the fact that the majority of students were Syrian prevented the children from learning Turkish through interaction with their environment. This is how the deputy head explained the situation:

It is as if we are a special school for migrants. I mean, we are not fully integrated. (...) Think of us as a place where Turkish teachers interact with foreign students. There is no peer-to-peer interaction. (Konya, 2, Teacher)

The deputy headteacher's description of the school he oversees, "we are a foreign Syrian school placed in Konya," was quite striking. This interviewee explained that, as the majority of foreign pupils start school without knowing Turkish, they try to provide a minimum level of education and teach Turkish as they go along:

In general, apart from the teachers, there are not many people who know Turkish. It's like Turkish teachers coming to a foreign country and teaching Turkish to the citizens of that foreign country. (...) Here we are like a foreign Syrian school placed inside Turkey, inside Konya. That's really our profile. (Konya, 2, Teacher)

During our interviews with school administrators in Konya's neighbourhoods with a high concentration of migrants and refugees and considerable poverty, it was noted that Afghan and Syrian students learn Turkish differently from their peers from other countries. It was noted that Afghan students found it easier to learn Turkish and that their families placed a higher value on education and learning Turkish. Socio-economic differences between households may explain this difference. Konya is one of the satellite cities where refugees who have applied for international protection are resettled. The difference in socio-economic background between Afghan students, who tend to come from relatively middle-class families, and Syrian students, who often live in the poorest neighbourhoods, could be attributed to their respective living situations. School administrators in Konya also noted that students from better-educated and middle-class Syrian families tended to perform better than students from lower-income families.

From bullying to discrimination

The issue of bullying of Syrian students in schools is a major concern as it can have a negative impact on their academic performance and attendance. Peer bullying and violence within school boundaries are not exclusive to migrants and refugees. They are also prevalent in neighbourhoods where Syrians and Turks live together, including working class areas. Previous research (Yükseker et al., 2021; 2022) has shown that locals are not the only perpetrators of peer abuse against refugees, but that it is a more widespread problem, particularly among male pupils. Educators and CSO workers whom we interviewed stressed that peer bullying is a serious problem that has worsened since the pandemic. However, some participants noted that in a society where anti-migrant sentiments are widespread, peer bullying can escalate into discrimination against Syrians.

According to teachers' observations, peer abuse is widespread in schools located in impoverished neighbourhoods, with overcrowded classrooms, and especially among male students. They maintained that after the Syrians had entered into formal education the focus of the bullying had shifted to them. For example, a deputy headteacher of a middle school in Istanbul pointed out that in disadvantaged neighbourhoods, male students sometimes resort to violence to establish their dominance:

Based on my observations, I have noticed that in the absence of Syrian students, Turkish students engage in peer bullying amongst themselves. However, as soon as Syrians are present, the negative attention swiftly shifts to them. They quickly become a visible target of hatred. (...) In my previous school, I had been working before the Syrians arrived, and even then, there was a problem with peer bullying. Young people in these neighbourhoods try to assert themselves violently. In addition, those who fail academically but are physically strong become dominant alpha figures who exert control over other students. (...) The most popular student in the school is the one who asserts: "I'm here too" and "You may not see me as successful, but I attract your attention in other ways." (...) As educators, it is our responsibility to establish good communication with them, work to minimise any potential damage, and find a solution to the problem so that they can graduate successfully. (Istanbul, 2, Teacher)

A primary school teacher we spoke to in Izmir made similar observations. According to the teacher, peer bullying often starts as a demonstration of power between male pupils, but can later develop into a situation where the power dynamic is influenced by nationality, particularly between Turkish and Syrian pupils. The participant noted that bullying can also sometimes be a problem among Syrian pupils. He described a scenario in which a 13-year-old who enrolled late (after several years out of school) could be in the same class as 8-year-olds. He reported that adolescent pupils sometimes cause physical harm to younger pupils. (Izmir, 1, Teacher).

A representative of a youth-focused CSO in Izmir said that reports of migrants being victimised by their peers had increased since the pandemic. One reason given was the decline in children's Turkish language and social skills:

The pandemic led to a notable increase in peer bullying, which can be attributed to several factors, including economic hardship and challenges within families, including instances of domestic violence. (...) We observed that younger children, especially those in primary school, who were already struggling to communicate, experienced even greater communication difficulties after returning from the pandemic. Psychologists and guidance counsellors received numerous reports of children who had experienced a significant decline in both their Turkish language skills and their social skills. They began to observe a decline in social relationships, resulting in a higher likelihood of being bullied by peers or showing signs of withdrawal and introversion. (Izmir, 14, CSO)

A representative of the Izmir metropolitan municipality was also of the opinion that discrimination was on the rise after the pandemic:

There has been a significant increase in the intensity of discrimination and hate speech in schools. During this time, children have been left largely unsupervised by their parents, while the economic crisis has continued to worsen. When the dominant narrative at home is that "all these hardships are caused by the refugees," even though the children are young, they internalise and repeat this negative information, as far as I can understand. (Izmir, 3, Metropolitan Municipality)

A teacher interlocutor from Gaziantep concurred that there had been an increase in violent tendencies among children after the outbreak. Especially during the outbreak, the teacher said, "there has been an increase in the number of children playing violent games. I think this is the case throughout Turkey, nationwide." The interviewee also mentioned that Syrian students, who live in overcrowded families and small houses, have shown an increase in violent tendencies at school:

We increased physical activities to help the children release their energy. (...) I said to my fellow colleagues: "These children don't live in 3+1 flats like you do. Look, they don't have two or three children at home like you do. They have six, seven, eight children at home. (...) Well, think about it, these children release the energy they can't use at home here, in the school area," I said. (Gaziantep, 5, Teacher)

Teachers also felt that tackling peer bullying and violence at school required more than superficial measures. During our interview with a primary school teacher in Izmir, they stressed the importance of closely monitoring students who display violent behaviour and taking the time to understand the underlying causes of their actions. However, it was noted that there are cases where the guidance counsellor has only one meeting with the student and the underlying causes of the issue may not be adequately addressed, resulting in the problem being ignored:

Unfortunately, the guidance counsellor failed to take appropriate action in an incident where a Turkish male student was violent towards a female student. The counsellor met with the student involved in the violent incident and offered him a lollipop. However, it is important to monitor these children. It is important to understand the reasons behind the violence. (Izmir, 1, Teacher)

Both the deputy headteacher of a primary school in Konya and the deputy headteacher of a secondary school in Istanbul emphasised that teachers do not have adequate training to prevent peer bullying:

We instruct counsellors to "minimise peer bullying." But they are grumbling about not knowing Arabic: "I don't speak Arabic. How can I explain it in Turkish?" We can't help them much either because none of us has any pedagogical training. (...) Consequently, these counsellors (...) are pushed into the background, and there is no counsellor at the provincial or district level who could manage this. (Konya, 2, Teacher)

When these kids arrive in areas like Şişli and Bakırköy, you can handle two or three of them. When entering the school fields in Bağcılar, Esenler, and Esenyurt, however, one's defence is somewhat lowered. Because the problem is big. (...) There are 45 pupils in each classroom. These children come from poor economic backgrounds and have no background or experience. They struggle academically. (...) They can become either introverted or aggressive. The problem escalates when they become aggressive. (...) A counsellor alone is not enough to deal with this problem. Neither the administrators nor the teachers are adequately prepared for this situation. We have not been trained for this. (Istanbul, 2, Teacher)

In Gaziantep, the teacher we interviewed was of the opinion that peer bullying is a "systemic problem" within the education system:

Peer bullying may occasionally occur among Turkish children, but it is much more common among Syrian pupils. Syrian pupils become more withdrawn as a result. They experience low self-esteem and struggle to express themselves. They are unable to express their concerns to the teacher. They are afraid of being laughed at or of making mistakes because of their limited knowledge of Turkish. This problem is not only the responsibility of the teachers; it is a systemic problem within the education system. (Gaziantep, 12, Teacher)

Students may not want to go to school because they are being bullied by their peers. One of those interviewed, who works in local government in Konya, commented on this as follows:

I have seen this a lot in schools. Children are excluded and they say they are made fun of because they don't speak Turkish. They are really being bullied by their peers. (Konya, 6, Karatay Municipality)

The distinction between peer bullying and prejudice against Syrian pupils is a fine one. Participants expressed that the bullying experienced by Syrian pupils is influenced by both the anti-migrant political climate in the country and the perspectives held by teachers. Prejudice and negative attitudes towards migrants and refugees can ultimately lead to discrimination.

In Gaziantep, for example, the teacher we interviewed said that the violence in the school was reflected in the parents of the pupils, and that this situation was linked to the political climate in the country:

Parents also get into fights when their children get into altercations at school entrances and exits. There have been incidents in Gaziantep where parents have stormed schools and similar events have taken place. These incidents are directly related to the political climate in the country. When the political climate is hostile, it has a direct impact on children. Teachers' political and ideological stances have an impact on the way they teach, which regrettably can have unfavourable consequences. (Gaziantep, 12, Teacher)

A similar view of the role of the political climate was expressed by a teacher interviewed in Mardin:

Because of the significant polarisation in society, the problem of what we call peer bullying cannot be solved within schools alone. You may recall recent attempts to marginalise or deport migrants from Syria or Afghanistan. This is the language of politics, the language of society. These children are watching us and learning from us. (Mardin, 12, Teacher)

Several participants raised concerns about migrant and refugee children being bullied or discriminated against by their own teachers. One interviewee, who worked as a teacher in an integration class in Istanbul, mentioned that the "world view" of teachers could influence the adaptation of Syrian pupils to school:

The teacher's professionalism, perspective, and social worldview have a significant impact on the achievement of each student. If a teacher is ideologically opposed to these students, wonders why they are here, and discriminates against them, the student will become reticent and may fail to learn to read and write, even by third grade. If, on the other hand, the teacher has a different point of view, the pupil will have learnt to read and write in addition to basic Turkish when he comes to my class. The children can express themselves easily, participate by raising their hands, and play with their classmates. (Istanbul, 3, Teacher)

According to the same teacher, "both Turkish pupils and teachers bully Syrian pupils." (...) "If teachers were to refrain from bullying, it might be possible for children to develop healthier relationships with their peers." An CSO representative who had volunteered in schools in Gaziantep gave an example of the discriminatory attitude of teachers:

On the first day of school, a child arrives, and the teacher sees that s/he is gypsy, and tells him/her to sit at the back of the classroom. Then a Kurdish child arrives, and the teacher tells him to go to the front. A Turkmen child arrives and is also told to sit at the front. In some classes there are Kurdish and Turkish students in the front, then there are a few empty seats, and then our (Dom) students sit behind [the empty seats]. The same thing is happening now with the Syrian children. (Gaziantep, 1, CSO)

In Konya, a representative of an CSO that assists migrants and refugees said something similar:

The children are excluded. They are constantly seen as traitors to the country. This is done not only by the teachers, but also by the staff and even by the pupils themselves. Because whatever they are hearing at home, they are applying it at school. (Konya, 5, CSO)

In Mardin, a teacher said that Syrian students are treated more harshly by the school administration because of what happens around the school. According to the teacher, the school administration called the police when two Syrian students were involved in a fight with their classmates outside the school, in which a sharp object was used:

I am currently in my eleventh year at school. I have never seen the school administration call the police for such incidents, especially at the middle school level. They handle it themselves. Because the children are young. Because they know each other's families and so on. Or through the teacher. However, was the ease with which the police were notified in this occasion because the child holding the dangerous object was a migrant? Honestly, I cannot help but ponder over it. It is an exceptional example. (Mardin, 12, Teacher)

When asked, the middle school principal in Konya stated that they are careful to avoid using discriminatory language against Syrian and other foreign students in their school:

There will be no discrimination of any kind. In the classroom we will refrain from making statements such as "You are Syrian." We are particularly careful not to make this statement. Our teachers are also aware of this... I am aware of that. I know it from the teachers. I am very careful myself. We never say things like "You're Syrian, that's why you behave like that." There is no belittling, no demeaning, nothing like that. The use of language is very important. We communicate with them in the same way we communicate with any other Turkish student. We do not mention their nationality. Nationality is the least important thing for us. (Konya, 3, Teacher)

As part of the PIKTES project, training sessions are provided for the teachers of integration classes. In addition, a handbook for teachers with foreign students is available (Aktekin, 2017). The above-mentioned Konya-based teacher was most likely sharing information gained from these training sessions.

It is important to consider more than just discrimination when addressing the attitudes of teachers towards migrant and refugee students. Teaching a curriculum and ensuring that all pupils in a class who have limited or no knowledge of Turkish reach the same level can be a challenging task for a teacher. Some participants also mentioned this aspect in their discussions:

Teachers often face many problems when working with Syrian pupils, mainly due to linguistic barriers. Some school administrators try to distribute the Syrian students evenly among the classrooms in order to reduce the extra workload for the teachers. (Gaziantep, 12, Teacher)

Teaching in a classroom with students who have diverse language skills can be very challenging. There are some students who are not proficient in any language, while others are Turkish citizens and speak Turkish. Maintaining a balance and giving equal attention to all students can be challenging. Some teachers may find it difficult to give adequate attention to Syrian pupils, leading to feelings of exclusion among these pupils. Parents of Turkish students, on the other hand, may be concerned that this will have a negative impact on their children's education. (Konya, 12, CSO)

Similarly, two teachers from Istanbul said that some teachers may not want Syrian students in their classrooms because they see their limited Turkish language skills and expectations of academic failure as an added burden:

Teachers often prioritise investing their time, positive energy, and attention on native pupils rather than migrant pupils because they may believe that migrants are destined to fail. This implicit bias or lack of recognition, I think, can have an impact on their success. We haven't had many successful Syrian students. Last year, one of our students successfully gained admission to an Anatolian high school. He was a Turkish-speaking Turkmen from Syria. He didn't have any language problems, either because he had mastered it at a young age or because he was better integrated. (Istanbul, 2, Teacher)

Teachers' behaviour can be somewhat problematic. Firstly, they don't want Syrian students in their classes just because they are Syrian. Secondly, they don't want them because they don't speak the language and it becomes an added burden for the teacher. In situations where there is a student in the class who doesn't speak the language or is a foreigner, the teacher may perceive them as an additional challenge and inadvertently exclude them. As a result, the student sits at the back of the class and feels unable to express him or herself. Even if they have a basic understanding of Turkish, they feel ashamed and unable to speak up because no one is paying attention to them. They are often made fun of by their classmates, with little or no intervention from the teacher. In these situations, the students' self-sufficiency, self-confidence, and anxiety levels are significantly compromised. (Istanbul, 3, Teacher)

Some interviewees expressed that local families are reluctant to allow their children to study in the same school or classroom as Syrian students. The comment from an CSO representative in Gaziantep may be based on impressions, but it is worth noting:

For example, Turkish families do not send their children to neighbourhoods with a high concentration of Syrian children. In some neighbourhoods, there has been a growing divide between the two communities, especially since the reopening of schools after the pandemic. In our discussions with teachers, they told us that before the pandemic, there were around four or five Syrian students in each class. Now the class is about 70% Syrian. This raises another concern: teachers in these schools may be reluctant to provide education because they do not want these children in their classrooms. Our main concern is education. (Gaziantep, 1, CSO)

Similarly, the deputy head of a primary school in Konya said that Turkish families do not want to enrol their children in the school where he works because of the high number of Syrians:

They do not wish to enrol. Cultural differences cause peer bullying, and these cultural and linguistic differences inevitably affect the quality of education. Because of this decline, parents in the neighbourhood want to move. Since they don't want to live in this area, they are selling their houses, renting them out and moving elsewhere. (Konya, 2, Teacher).

The perspective of the muhtar in an Izmir neighbourhood with a significant Syrian population serves to illustrate the reasons behind the reluctance of Turkish families to have their children educated alongside Syrians, as mentioned earlier:

Teaching Syrians is difficult. Our children are lagging. Consequently, the overall level of education is declining. (...) In my opinion, (...) I would like to see more schools established in this neighbourhood. Syrian students should continue their education under the guidance of Syrian teachers and their curriculum, so that our children do not fall behind. (Izmir, 8, Muhtar)

In Mardin, a teacher expressed the view that Turkish Arab families are unhappy about their children taking part in the same activities as Syrians because they are afraid that their Turkish accent will be affected:

There is sometimes fear among the Mardinli (local) people. When there is a joint children's activity with Syrians, they worry that it will be conducted in Arabic and that their children's Turkish will be affected. They are worried that their children's diction will be impacted and that their Mardin and Arabic-speaking backgrounds will come out. (Mardin, 3, Teacher)

Bullying by classmates and prejudice against migrants and refugees have an impact on students. While some students may develop coping strategies to deal with these situations, discrimination may lead others to drop out of school. Syrian students may resort to various coping mechanisms when faced with prejudice and discrimination on the street and at school. For example, one method is to speak Turkish in public to hide their Syrian identity, even while attending school. An assistant headmaster at a middle school in Istanbul gave an example of this. He mentioned the words he was told when he tried to help a girl who had fainted in the corridor:

"What is your Mum and Dad's phone?" I asked. "Well, here it is," the student replied. "Are you Syrian?" I asked. "No, no, no," the student said, "I'm not." (...) "Please, teacher, don't let anyone know," she said. "In primary school, no one wanted to be friends with me because I was Syrian." (...) This is a very serious thing; it is an oppression. If a child realises at a young age that being Syrian is considered bad and shouldn't be revealed to anyone... (Istanbul, 2, Teacher)

On the other hand, we heard from several interviewees that, as a result of increasing discrimination, the number of Syrian children dropping out of school is increasing and the number of families enrolling their children in school is decreasing. The director of an CSO founded by Syrians in Istanbul recently stated that discrimination against Syrian children in schools had increased:

We often ask Syrian families and parents: "Why don't you send your child to school?" Their response is: "Teacher, I have sent my child to school in previous years. But this year, in an environment where incidents of hatred and racism have spiked, I am afraid to send my child. If my child goes to school, he will be bullied." And unfortunately, some teachers are racist. So, parents are afraid. They tell us, "I will not send my child to school. He will stay at home. That's it." (...) The number of Syrian students enrolled or continuing their education in 2021-2022 has decreased significantly. (Istanbul, 4, CSO)

Despite the above negative observations, it is important to acknowledge that special integration classes have a positive impact in helping Syrian pupils, as well as migrant and refugee pupils in general, to deal with the effects of discrimination. During our interview with the teacher of an

integration class in Istanbul, it became clear that she strongly believes in the positive impact of integration classes. According to this teacher, these classes play a crucial role in addressing the discrimination that migrant and refugee children face both in the community and in the school environment:

They go to school with their Arab peers and communicate with each other in Arabic. Nearly every day they hear comments from adults such as "This is Turkey, speak Turkish." They often encounter similar comments. (...) Then they go to school and face discrimination even within their own class. They are seated at the back, not given the opportunity to communicate, and their classmates make fun of them. (...) It's a vicious circle. But the integration class breaks this cycle somewhat. In the integrated class, the children can express themselves and experience a strong sense of belonging. They realise that they do not have an intellectual disability or a low IQ. They begin to learn letters, reading, and writing. In this environment they develop a sense of self-confidence. (Istanbul, 3, Teacher)

Problem areas in PIKTES

During the fieldwork period, the PIKTES project included special adaptation classes for third-grade primary school pupils who were migrants or refugees with limited Turkish language skills. These classes focused specifically on language learning and literacy. The project also provided training programmes for teachers who had foreign pupils in their classes. It provided material support for Syrian students and equipment and budget support for schools with Syrian students. Interviews with primary and secondary school teachers in different cities revealed a range of evaluations, including both positive feedback and critical observations about these initiatives. A summary of these evaluations is presented below.

As mentioned above, the PIKTES project provided training for both teachers working in adaptation classes and Turkish teachers in schools with migrant and refugee pupils. These training programmes were considered useful by the participants. A teacher from a middle school in Izmir emphasised the importance of teacher training, adding that her school was recognised as a "project" school and that a delegation from the EU had visited her school as a good example. According to the interviewee, the success of this school, which had a significant number of Syrian pupils, was due to its emphasis on teacher training and the fact that a large number of teachers were members of the Eğitim-Sen union.

Almost everyone in the school took part in this activity. Many people have been trained. There has been training within the school and teachers have also attended other programmes to raise their awareness. Furthermore, I am not sure if it is appropriate to mention, but it is worth mentioning that almost half of the teachers in our school are members of the Eğitim-Sen union. This has to do with their view of the world. (...) We see these children as individuals and not through the lens of racism. We see the child in front of us as a child and we treat them as such, not letting government regulations influence our view. I believe we have made progress because of our approach. (...) The anti-bullying training we did in cooperation with Dokuz Eylül University proved to be very effective. (Izmir, 2, Teacher).

The interviewee, who is a teacher in an integration class in Istanbul, also received the training mentioned above and found it useful. In addition, online training is provided to teachers of integrated classes every year during the period when the teachers attend seminars:

I've been working since the beginning, in December 2016. (...) We joined the project through the Public Personnel Selection Examination (KPSS) and interviews in November. After that, we received a two-week training programme in Antalya, where our main focus was on teaching Turkish to people from different countries. (...) We then attended seminars and training sessions focusing on social and psychological approaches to children. Personally, I believe that these trainings have had a significant impact, at least on me (Istanbul, 3, Teacher).

In schools with a high proportion of Syrian pupils, Syrian teachers (who previously worked in TECs) are employed as interpreters to facilitate communication between Syrian pupils, their parents, and Turkish teachers. We met with a primary school principal in Gaziantep who informed us that many Syrian teachers are employed in Hatay, Gaziantep, Kilis, and Şanlıurfa and that they contribute significantly to the adaptation of Syrian pupils.

A representative of an CSO founded by Syrians in Istanbul said that she had previously worked as a teacher in a school. This interviewee believed that they were discriminated against and paid less compared to their Turkish colleagues:

In 2016, my starting salary as a teacher was 900 Turkish liras. The amount increased to 2,020 TL in 2021. When I had a salary of 2,020 TL, Turkish citizen teachers in the same school were earning 7,000 TL. Imagine, for example, that there is a Turkish citizen teacher, and I am also a teacher working in the same school under the same administration. The Turkish teacher received a higher salary and had his social security covered. As a Turkish citizen, I worked on this project for three years without social security. (Istanbul, 4, CSO)

Several interviews indicated that a significant number of the Syrian teachers recruited for the project were either dismissed or left after 2021. Several teachers who took part in the programme mentioned that Syrian pupils in larger classrooms helped to communicate with Syrian parents, as there was a shortage of interpreters in their schools.

Participants said that the Turkish language and literacy training provided in the adaptation classes for Syrian students was beneficial and recommended that this practice be further developed. The deputy headteacher of a secondary school in Istanbul shared her positive perspective on the adaptation classes previously offered at secondary school level:

We administer an exam to Syrian children who know Turkish and can read and write. In the past, students who passed the exam had the opportunity to continue their education in regular classes with Turkish students, while those who did not pass continued in their designated classes. Currently, this practice is not implemented at the secondary level, but only at the primary level. Has it been productive? I think it was. (...) The problems were clear: they could not read or write, and they were not familiar with the Turkish language. The teacher's effectiveness was increased by focusing on these problems. You know, the children didn't really get lost in the system. (Istanbul, 2, Teacher)

In the framework of PIKTES, efforts are being made to increase the enrolment rate of Syrian children, starting with pre-school education. These initiatives can have a positive impact on Syrian pupils' learning of Turkish, which in turn can improve their academic performance. A primary school administrator from Gaziantep said that the projects funded by PIKTES have increased the number of Syrian children attending preschool, which has greatly helped the children's acquisition of Turkish:

In pre-school projects, particularly in disadvantaged areas, extensive field research has been carried out with the support of EU funding to ensure that these children have access to pre-school education. Our teachers prioritise both the welfare of these children and the improvement of the pre-school enrolment rate in our local community. This focus is in line with the current priorities of the Ministry of Education. Their approach focuses on promoting integration through play and activities, with the aim of improving language development during the preschool years. (Gaziantep, 5, Teacher)

In addition to teacher training, enrolment promotion, and integration classes, PIKTES provides material and budgetary support to schools with Syrian and other international students. This can include stationery and other material support for refugee students, as well as equipment support for schools. Several teachers from different provinces have provided critical evaluations and expressed concerns about the unequal treatment of Syrian and local students. The initiative distributes stationery kits, school bags, shoes and coats several times a year in quantities proportional to the number of Syrian students enrolled, stressing that the aid should be given only to Syrian students. To ensure that local students do not feel discriminated against, teachers have developed specific strategies for the distribution of aid:

We encountered conflicts when we distributed aid exclusively to Syrian students, so we adapted our strategy. For example, our current practice is to reward students who answer questions correctly in class by giving them a pen from the stationery set. If there are Syrian students who are enrolled in the school but do not attend, we distribute the stationery sets to the whole class. (Izmir, 1, Teacher)

The same primary school teacher noted that giving teachers the responsibility of distributing help was problematic, saying: "You are burdening the teachers. The teacher has to deal with the crisis. After all, I'm in the thick of it."

Similarly, a middle school teacher in Izmir mentioned that they distribute the materials received for registered but non-attending Syrian students to Turkish students in need. They do this work outside school hours. The teacher described the provision of material aid specifically for Syrians as "positive discrimination":

In Mardin, a teacher respondent reported that they try to distribute aid such as bags and stationery for Syrian students "usually discreetly," but that poor local families react to this situation:

But the children talk about it among themselves. Let's leave the children aside, we get a lot of requests from parents. "Teacher, this pupil got a bag or that pupil got

something. Why didn't our child get it?" We also get requests like this from Turkish families. We explain to them that the items were sent as part of a project specifically for Syrian students and emphasise that they are not directly provided by us as aid. (Mardin, 12, Teacher)

The same teacher also noted that Turkish parents had reacted negatively to the separate lunches served to Syrian children in Turkish schools during the previous school year as part of the PIKTES programme:

Their food was served separately and was of a higher quality than the food served to other students. It was paid for by the fund. (...) Separate lunches had been brought in... And there was a difference in the quality and nutritional value of the meals... On hearing this, some parents reacted by saying: "This is their money and these meals are made with their money. They will eat it. Yours is already the Ministry's meal. You should eat it." (Mardin, 12, Teacher)

However, another interviewee took a different view. According to this person, who is a primary school teacher in an integration class in Istanbul, in some schools the support provided by PIKTES could be given only to Turkish pupils:

The project provides stationery to Syrian pupils, but some schools distribute it almost exclusively to Turkish pupils. (...) Materials such as computer printers are also provided to schools through PIKTES. (...) But we don't know how much foreign students benefit from them. (Istanbul, 3, Teacher)

Under PIKTES, EU funding can be used to provide equipment or a budget for the purchase of equipment to schools with a high proportion of Syrian students. Some interviewees mentioned that PIKTES provides equipment such as air conditioners, computers, and tablets specifically for Syrian students or their classes. However, others reported that these resources are occasionally used for the whole school:

Air conditioning and many computers and tablets have been provided. (...) They are meant for [Syrian students]. But since the air conditioners are installed in their classrooms, both they and the other students benefit from them. (Izmir, 2, Teacher)

It was noted that budgets derived from EU funds can be used to meet the general equipment needs of schools. The deputy headteacher of a secondary school in Istanbul explained that they had been able to equip their computer labs with the funds they had received:

The school receives a budget as part of the PIKTES programme. For example, we have used PIKTES to cover one of our janitors. (...) Some schools do not have fridges; others may not have computer labs. Whatever the case, you do a cost breakdown, and they cover those costs. At the moment we have 18 very good, high-quality computers in the school (Istanbul, 2, Teacher).

Some interviewees felt that there was a lack of transparency in the way EU funding was allocated and spent in schools. For example, a teacher in Mardin expressed this opinion during the discussions:

Last year, schools received a significant amount of funding. (...) The process wasn't transparent, so we weren't really able to understand how these funds were being used or what was happening with them. (...) Things are done that are purely cosmetic, like installing air conditioning in schools. (...) One of our colleagues who worked as a school administrator commented: "The money that came in was more than the canteen at our school's total income for five years." This is the high school I mentioned. As for the middle schools, we don't know whether they get that much money or not because the process is opaque. (Mardin, 12, Teacher)

In this section of the study, we have examined the key issues related to the accessibility of basic education for refugee and migrant pupils. Some of these problems stem from the current structure of the education system. These problems include inability to enrol, high dropout rates, and discrimination. One of the main challenges is that migrant pupils often lack knowledge of the Turkish language. The PIKTES scheme, implemented with EU funds to support the education of international students, contributes positively to migrants' access to education, but also has some drawbacks.

Migrants' and Refugees' Access to Healthcare

In this section, we will discuss the health-related issues faced by migrants and refugees, based on the findings of interviews with doctors and representatives of CSOs working in the health sector in the five provinces. After a summary of the institutional situation regarding migrants' access to health care, the discussion will focus on structural issues arising from the healthcare system. This will be followed by a discussion of the health risks and problems faced by migrants and refugees. It is important to recognise that structural issues and migrant health problems are interrelated, although for the sake of clarity we have chosen to separate them analytically.

In Turkey, persons with temporary protection status (TP) or who have applied for or been granted international protection (IP) are entitled to free primary health care services. These services include access to Family Health Centres (FHCs), Migrant Health Centres (MHCs), municipal polyclinics, and others. These groups also have access to secondary healthcare facilities, particularly state hospitals that do not have training and research facilities. If Syrians live in the province where their temporary protection is registered, the Provincial Directorate of Migration Management pays for their prescriptions. Due to the inability of secondary health facilities to perform certain procedures, access to tertiary health facilities (university hospitals, training and research hospitals) requires a referral from a secondary healthcare facility. In theory, all migrants and refugees have access to emergency healthcare. However, the provision of free healthcare to applicants and beneficiaries of international protection is limited to one year. After this period, individuals can only access these services if they pay premiums to the General Health Insurance Scheme (GSS). If an application for international protection is rejected, the individual loses access to public healthcare services. Migrants with short-term residence permits in Turkey do not have access to the public healthcare system. However, individuals are required to take out private health insurance when applying for a residence permit, which gives them access to private healthcare services. Foreign residents in Turkey with work permits have access to the health care system through the GSS programme, as they are registered with the Social Security Institution (SGK). Individuals who are irregular migrants and do not have legal status are generally denied access to public healthcare services, except for emergency services. In addition, their access to private healthcare services is also limited.

In the case of healthcare services for refugees in Turkey, the SIHHAT project, funded by the EU's FRIT funds and launched in 2016, is in its second phase (SIHHAT 2). Most of the healthcare professionals working under this project in migrant health centres (MHCs) and enhanced MHCs are Syrians with temporary protection status. The enhanced MHCs provide a wide range of health services, including primary care as well as specialised services in internal medicine, gynaecology and obstetrics, paediatrics, dentistry, and psychosocial support. There are currently a total of 190 MHCs and Enhanced MHCs operating in 32 provinces across the country. The SIHHAT project includes various programmes that provide support for community mental health centres, reproductive health, immunisation, health literacy, emergency health services, medical equipment support for public hospitals, and training for health workers. The

project, funded by the EU's FRIT programme, aims to improve and expand access to healthcare services for refugees in Turkey.³¹

Problems arising from the healthcare system

According to the qualitative research findings above, a system has been in place since 2016 to enable registered refugees and migrants to access public healthcare services. However, factors such as migrants' limited understanding of the Turkish language, institutional workload and legislative challenges prevent all TP and IP registrants from fully benefiting from healthcare services. Amongst the participants, some health professionals believe that the problems in the health system have become more apparent since the influx of Syrians, suggesting that the problems stem from the system itself and not from the migrants. Below is a summary of these issues, based on the qualitative research findings.

The importance of migrants' knowledge of Turkish language in accessing healthcare services

The healthcare system in Turkey is primarily designed to provide services in Turkish, which poses a major difficulty for migrants and refugees, including Turkish citizens, who do not speak Turkish as their first language. One of the first obstacles they face when navigating the healthcare system is the language barrier. Family health centres and public hospitals do not provide institutional translation services. Migrant health centres, on the other hand, are specifically set up to prioritise the provision of healthcare services in Arabic. A healthcare worker working at a medical facility in Konya has encountered challenges when trying to make appointments, mainly due to the language barrier:

First, there is the linguistic barrier. When individuals seek health services from institutions other than an MHC, they often face difficulties due to the language barrier. The availability of interpreters is limited. (...) In addition, they face significant challenges when trying to make appointments due to their lack of language skills. This problem is of the utmost importance. (Konya, 8, Healthcare Worker)

The representative of an CSO providing services to migrants in Konya explained that they sometimes help refugees with appointments and translation issues:

We observe that migrants are unable to access some basic rights because of the language barrier. Our social workers act as a bridge between the two sides. They sometimes help migrants to make hospital appointments. (...) Sometimes assistance with medical equipment is needed. Although we do not provide this equipment ourselves, through discussions with other institutions we are able to guide individuals and ensure that they receive the necessary assistance. For example, there is a great need for hearing aids. (Konya, 9, CSO)

In provinces where the qualitative fieldwork was conducted, such as Mardin and Gaziantep, with native Arab and Kurdish populations, some members of these communities can act as interpreters for Syrian Arab and Kurdish refugees:

³¹ According to the Ministry of Health's SIHHAT project website, there are more than 3,900 health professionals working in migrant health centres. These professionals include general practitioners, specialists, nurses, midwives, psychologists, social workers, laboratory and radiology technicians, interpreters, and support staff. It is worth noting that a significant number of the healthcare professionals working in these centres are migrants themselves. The project objectives state that the employment rate of migrant women is 38%. (SIHHAT project, 2023)

Here they interact with migrants through personal relationships. Depending on the situation, they may be able to overcome the language barrier with the help of Arab locals who are fluent in Arabic. However, it is important to note that language barriers are not only faced by migrants in the healthcare system, but also by natives. (Mardin, 6, Doctor)

It is not necessary to speak Turkish here. If you can speak Arabic or Kurdish, it's OK because most of the locals speak Kurdish, so newcomers don't have any problems. I mean, they feel a sense of belonging. (Mardin, 13, Social Worker)

In Turkey, family members who have been in the country for a long time often rely on their children, who have a better grasp of the Turkish language, to act as interpreters when accessing the healthcare system. However, the inability of doctors to communicate with their patients can result in a violation of the right to health and hinder the process of effective diagnosis and treatment:

It has been more than ten years and the children are now fluent in Turkish, so they can provide some assistance. In our view, it is a violation of the right to health when health care providers are unable to communicate and establish a relationship or dialogue with a patient in his or her native language. The right to health is a constitutional right that applies to everyone, regardless of citizenship status. This is how our legislation is structured. (Mardin, 6, Doctor)

In Gaziantep, a participant who is a family practitioner was also of the opinion that official health care institutions are not sensitive to the language issue:

We do not have a good relationship with the provincial health department on this issue. I raised the language problem in a meeting, and they cut me off and said, "You always bring this up." They claimed that there was no such problem and said, "We have already solved it." They even mentioned that they now have someone accompanying the patients as an interpreter or learning the language. They insisted that they had already taken care of it. (Gaziantep, 3, Doctor)

In contrast, private hospitals offer interpretation services in multiple languages to meet the specific demands of their patients. However, these services are only available to migrant and refugee families with sufficient financial resources. In city hospitals, it was noted that there are external individuals who provide interpretation services for a fee:

Of course, it is a different story for those who can afford it. They go to private hospitals because they have private health insurance. I mean those with jobs. (Gaziantep, 3, Doctor)

When they go to the city hospital, they pay 50-100 Turkish Liras to the interpreter for tasks that would only take one or two minutes. These interpreters are not hospital staff. They are outsiders. (Konya, 8, Healthcare Worker)

Conditions in family health centres

The way in which FHCs operate can be a challenge for migrants and refugees in accessing primary healthcare services. Individuals from Syria with TP status, as well as those with IP status or pending applications, can access FHC services, as noted earlier in this section. In provinces and districts where MHCs are not available, it is important for these groups to have access to primary health care services through FHCs. The performance system at FHCs can, however, pose challenges for migrants and refugees in terms of registration, treatment, and follow-up of their health needs:

FHCs, for instance, are available to Syrians. However, under the GP system, you are allocated a certain number of patients and your remuneration is based on this. If the vaccination rate among your patients falls below a certain threshold, such as 90%, this can lead to a reduction in your performance rating and salary. In such cases, it will be necessary to identify the reasons for this drop in performance. In family medicine, it is important to be more cautious. (...) The language barrier prevents you from talking to them or telling them on the phone to "come for the vaccination." You can't make appointments. Telephone numbers and addresses can change regularly. (...) As a result, family doctors are often reluctant to accept such cases, which means that they see fewer patients. (Gaziantep, 3, Doctor)

A family practitioner working in an FHC in Istanbul shared that for similar reasons, family practitioners may not want to register migrants and "mobile populations":

As long as possible, the doctor (...) examined them and provided services ex officio. However, they tried not to register these mobile populations, such as the Roma and Syrians. (Istanbul, 5, Doctor)

It appears that the child's vaccination is due for that month. However, you are unable to contact the patient at that time. Why not? They have left town. However, as you are responsible for this patient's vaccination under the performance system, this may result in a pay cut for you. You are also required to document your attempts to contact the patient, including obtaining a certificate of absence if necessary to confirm that the patient could not be found. (...) This is a significant bureaucratic burden. (Istanbul, 5, Doctor)

Two family practitioners working at FHCs in Istanbul and Gaziantep believed that many Syrian families do not register at FHCs, resulting in some children not being vaccinated. However, the respondent in Gaziantep also mentioned that some FHCs in the city have a significant number of registered Syrians among the registered population:

In Gaziantep, for example, there is currently a Migrant Health Centre, but at the same time there are Family Health Centres that have all Syrian patients. So even in our [FHC], of 40,000 registrants 10,000 are Syrians. (Gaziantep, 3, Doctor)

The availability of reproductive health knowledge and education is another problem. As mentioned above, the Ministry of Health is responsible for producing and distributing reproductive health education materials. Family health centres specialise in providing women with comprehensive information and written materials on reproductive health. However, it was pointed out that FHCs do not have written materials in Arabic and that free reproductive health information and education can be one of the first items to be sacrificed in times of budget constraints. Nonetheless, it was also stressed that reproductive health education and information is essential for migrant and refugee women, particularly in cases of miscarriage, unwanted pregnancy, and sexual assault.

If you were to ask me now, what is missing, I would say: "There is no Arabic material." In family planning counselling, we don't have materials to explain our family planning methods. (Gaziantep, 3, Doctor)

We have the PDF from the Turkish Family Planning Foundation, and we give [the patients] its printouts. We show videos from YouTube and similar sources to illustrate. But I think even they have some residual knowledge from Syria about contraceptive methods, which makes our job much easier. (Istanbul, 5, Doctor)

The interviewee from Istanbul suggested a link between the lack of Arabic resources and Turkey's inability to provide public services, particularly in the health sector, in Kurdish: "We can provide any kind of output in the family medicine information system software. Unfortunately, we are not able to provide bilingual outputs. The impact of Turkey's own past is also a significant burden."

In contrast, the participant in Konya working in an enhanced MHC mentioned that they regularly hold information sessions on reproductive health. She observed that many women expressed a desire to have fewer children, indicating a need to include men in these educational sessions. However, the same participant mentioned that there are Syrian women who are reluctant to use contraceptive methods because they believe that such methods are considered "sinful."

Concerns were also expressed about reproductive health, particularly in relation to child pregnancies. One interviewee expressed concern that doctors in FHCs may not report cases of gender-based violence and child pregnancy to the prosecutor's office, although they are legally required to do so. While it is not possible to confirm the accuracy of this claim, it is important to mention it. This family practitioner in Istanbul also expressed his concern that regulations on pregnancies under 18 are not enforced for Syrians. He expressed it as follows:

There is a sense of "we are not obliged to provide foreigners with the same health services as in Turkey." (...) Even in cases of pregnancies under the age of 18 where we are vigilant and always say "Oh God! Let's report it!," we have developed a sense of cultural norms and are hesitant to report to the prosecutor's office, based on those cultural norms. (Istanbul, 5, Doctor)

The same interviewee expressed concern that family practitioners may be reluctant to provide antenatal care to pregnant foreign nationals under the age of 18 and may therefore be in breach of their responsibilities in this regard. In addition, the normalisation of teenage pregnancies for Syrians may also have an impact on the native population. As a doctor working in an FHC in a poor area of Istanbul, which has both an internal migrant and Syrian population, this participant was of the opinion that there has been an increase in the number of child pregnancies in the area:

When it comes to Turkish girls under the age of 18 who become pregnant, (...) there is some awareness or perception of child abuse cases, even if legal proceedings are not always initiated. Among Syrians, however, child pregnancy has unfortunately become commonplace and is regrettably seen as more socially acceptable. As they say, "it can happen." The problem is that when social norms change, especially in our communities, when child pregnancy is normalised among Syrian girls, the same normalisation begins to apply to Turkish girls under the age of 18. (...) It is distressing to note that pregnancies among Syrian girls under the age of 18 are not limited to Syrian enclaves, but can also occur among Turkish citizens under the age of 18. (...) It is evident that social norms are changing. (...) Child pregnancy is becoming more common among middle-class families in our region. (...) The imposition of restrictions on abortion services, coupled with shifting social norms, is gradually lowering the average age of marriage and pregnancy. (Istanbul, 5, Doctor)

Conditions at migrant health centres

As mentioned earlier in this section, persons from Syria who have temporary protection status or those who have applied for or been granted international protection status are eligible for services at migrant health centres. These centres have been established in certain neighbourhoods of cities with significant migrant and refugee populations. These centres have Arabic-speaking doctors, including Syrian doctors.

During the fieldwork, some participants had very positive impressions of the migrant health centres, while others had considerable reservations about the services provided in these centres.

To begin with the positive perspectives, a health worker at the enhanced MHC in Konya highlighted the many benefits of these centres and advocated for their expansion. Firstly, the presence of many Syrian doctors and interpreters in the centres helps to overcome language barriers and improve access to health care. This participant noted that Syrians, particularly women, feel more comfortable visiting these centres than other hospitals. She also mentioned that the enhanced MHCs help to reduce the burden on secondary health facilities. Without them, government hospitals could potentially become even more overcrowded. Furthermore, she believed that these centres play a crucial role in providing employment opportunities for Syrian women.

We believe that the MHCs need to be further supported. (...) Personally, I think that if we could perform operations here (in an enhanced MHC), the demand for state hospitals would decrease significantly. (Konya, 8, Healthcare Worker)

However, some interviewees expressed concern about the delay in setting up these centres, their inability to adequately meet demand, and the lack of relief they provided to primary health care centres.

Another important observation about the migrant health centres concerned the doctors employed there. The SIHHAT project offers Syrian doctors the opportunity to work in Migrant Health Centres. However, some participants expressed concern about the practice of assigning doctors with specialities such as orthopaedics or surgery to work as general practitioners in the primary care units of the MHCs. This arrangement, which focuses primarily on women's and children's health, was seen as a significant loss of expertise. It was felt that persons with specialist skills were not adequately equipped to work in primary care and that their skills were not being used effectively because they were unable to practise in their specific areas. On the other hand, these interviewees felt that it would be more appropriate for Syrian specialists to be integrated into the Turkish healthcare system for a period, subject to certain conditions. They suggested that the doctors should first learn the Turkish language and then be allowed to practise in their respective fields:

Because it's a system that focuses primarily on family, maternal, and child health. (...) It doesn't really create an integrated system for doctors. You have forensic experts, senior gynaecologists, orthopaedists, ophthalmologists, and they don't really belong there. So, in a way you're not integrating them into the system, you're separating them. (Gaziantep, 3, Doctor)

A family practitioner in Istanbul had a similar view regarding the FHCs:

If we weren't just five doctors in this neighbourhood, but had ten doctors since 2010 when the Syrians arrived, one or two of those ten doctors could have been Syrian, (...) or maybe some of our colleagues would have learned Arabic, and in that way we could have provided orientation or assistance. (Istanbul, 5, Doctor)

A dual system in primary care

The underlying concern of the above complaints is the emergence of a dual system of primary health care. Several negative aspects of setting up a separate system for migrants and refugees were mentioned. One interviewee warned that the establishment of separate health centres for migrants could lead to an increase in social isolation. During the interview conducted in Mardin, a doctor shared the following perspectives on the issue:

We believe that it is not ideal for migrants to receive health care in a separate and isolated place, away from the native community. These factors contribute to perpetuating isolation by limiting interaction with the native community. Some migrants may favour this option because they share the same language or can easily overcome language barriers. In addition, they have had access to primary health care services for a long time. Like other citizens, individuals can register with family doctors, choose a family doctor, and receive health services from the chosen family doctor. (Mardin, 6, Doctor)

The family practitioner we interviewed in Istanbul described the dual system of MHCs and FHCs as a “structural crisis” and stressed that these two systems should be unified under the umbrella of SIHHAT. According to this participant, there are some Syrians who are not registered with any primary health care institution, and that these people do not usually consult a doctor unless they are in dire need:

While language is undoubtedly crucial, it is worth noting that even in well-established migrant health centres specifically for Syrians, there are still challenges related to accessibility. I believe that Turkey is currently experiencing a structural crisis. Syrians have not been effectively integrated into primary health centres or family health centres. (Istanbul, 5, Doctor)

According to this interlocutor, in Istanbul, especially in districts with a growing population, it is necessary to open more FHCs instead of increasing the number of MHCs:

FHCs are the geographical boundary. The FHC is the level below the hospital. In other words, it is in the district of the institution I suggest you visit when I make a referral. (...) Regions are therefore planned on the basis of the institution mentioned. Instead of establishing migrant health centres, the plan was to open new family health centres. (...) Despite the significant influx of Syrians to Esenyurt, there has been no corresponding increase in the number of health facilities for Turkish citizens. In fact, to put it on a larger scale, the family medicine practice implemented in Istanbul has not expanded proportionally from the 2010 population to the 2022 population, not even to dilute it. (...) So Turkey's crisis is not really the Syrians' crisis. Turkey has been unable to deal with the dilemma of its own citizens, and as a result the Syrian refugee situation has descended into chaos. (Istanbul, 5, Doctor)

In the provision of healthcare services, the resulting dualism has been identified and criticised in a study on migrants' access to public services and basic rights in the Beyoğlu district (Kurtuluş et al., 2022).

Another consequence of the dual system in primary health care is that doctors working in MHCs may be excluded from the mechanisms that protect and supervise them. This situation has the potential to increase the likelihood of coercion and violence against doctors, while also potentially enabling unethical practices. A GP interlocutor from Gaziantep shared the following impression on this issue:

Sometimes I worry about the situation with the migrant health centres... For example, I once had a conversation with a doctor. He mentioned that patients often pressure him to prescribe any medicine. In fact, there is violence there, a form of violence that doctors experience, but they are unable to speak out because there is no protection system in place. In reality, either they are not practicing medicine properly or those who want to practice medicine properly are not able to do so. It's a closed environment. It's like working in the shadows. (Gaziantep, 3, Doctor)

In Konya, a healthcare worker in an MHC mentioned that some patients who come to the MHCs have previously visited a doctor, but it is presumed that they have visited an unregistered or unofficial doctor because there is no record of the patient in the system:

For example, there was a situation with a young person who was under 18 but already 36 weeks pregnant, which meant that she had a limited amount of time left before giving birth. She claimed that she had never seen a doctor before. We are curious to know why you did not go until this week or this month. She said: "I went to a private clinic." These incidents are commonly referred to as "underground" incidents. That is how we hear about them. You know, where there's smoke, there's fire. Although we have not seen it personally, there must be some validity to the claim. (Konya, 8, Healthcare Worker)

In Mardin and Gaziantep, there were mentions of Syrian doctors working without proper authorisation. For example, a doctor interviewee in Mardin reported the presence of a Syrian physiotherapist in the city, but was unsure whether he was actually a licensed doctor. In Gaziantep, a family doctor working in an FHC also shared that some Syrians appeared to be seeking medical care from undocumented Syrian doctors working without authorisation.

I do not know if they are operating legally, but a Syrian doctor is offering physiotherapy services. (...) However, this area is very prone to abuse, and it is difficult to distinguish between real doctors and impostors. (Mardin, 6, Doctor)

There are also many people who claim to be doctors. For example, a woman who is eight months pregnant arrives at the hospital without any records in the system. However, she has undergone extensive ultrasound and other tests. She claims to be seeing a junior doctor but is actually seeing a Syrian doctor. (...) There is a huge gap in this area. Patients give us prescriptions. We think they might be doctors. But I am not the one who writes these prescriptions. (...) Occasionally we receive prescriptions that are highly inappropriate. We have doubts about whether they are truly a doctor. I'm not sure they are doctors. Not all of them can be doctors. (Gaziantep, 3, Doctor)

The same interviewee from Gaziantep said that some Syrian doctors who have completed their medical studies in Turkey are opening private clinics to provide health care to Syrian patients

The respondent commented on the presence of new graduates, specifically mentioning Syrian young people who graduated from Antep Medical School.

They are immediately opening private clinics. Surely, they are able to do so because they're licensed to practice. But why would a new graduate decide to open a private clinic right away?" she remarked (Gaziantep, 3, doctor).

The same respondent also mentioned that the number of doctors trained in Syria and living in the city had decreased in recent years after those who spoke English had migrated to Europe. "I think there are very few of them," she remarked. "They left. Those people who were able to migrate chose to go abroad."

Access to public hospitals

As previously noted, Syrians with TP status have access to public secondary hospitals. Interviewed healthcare professionals indicated that there are no problems specific to Syrians at this level; however, getting an appointment is difficult in general due to shortages of specialised doctors in proportion to the population of a city or district. The quantitative component of the study included responses to the question "How easy or difficult is it for you to do each of the following in Turkey?" When asked about their experience of "going to the doctor," Turkish citizens were more likely than all migrants to say it was "difficult" or "very difficult." A healthcare worker in an MHC in Konya explained this issue as follows:

Challenges include scheduling appointments and finding available waiting lists. This is true for all people, including Turkish citizens and migrants. Otherwise, the only notable difference is the presence of a significant language barrier. For example, there is a shortage of obstetricians relative to the population of Konya. It is also quite difficult to make an appointment with them. This puts an extra burden on public hospitals. Unfortunately, we are not able to make appointments at the moment. There is a shortage of doctors at present. (Konya, 8, Healthcare Worker)

However, there were reports that public hospitals at the secondary level tended not to refer patients with TP and IP status to private hospitals and university hospitals at the tertiary level. It was reported that the Provincial Directorates of Migration Management pay for healthcare services received at the tertiary level; therefore, it was being requested that expenditures be kept to a minimum at this stage:

There is considerable pressure from administrators. They advise against referring these patients to private hospitals or medical faculties, as this can lead to increased financing, as the bills from universities and private hospitals tend to be more expensive. They prefer to keep patients in primary and secondary public hospitals as much as possible. The number of secondary level hospitals in Istanbul has decreased significantly. Most of the public hospitals in Istanbul are classified as tertiary level hospitals, which means that they are specialised facilities. (Istanbul, 5, Doctor)

In the border provinces of Mardin and Gaziantep, participants reported a significant influx of Syrians into the public healthcare system, particularly at times when they arrived in large numbers, leading to overcrowding. The natives in these two cities also reacted to this situation. During this period, it was noted that Mardin and Gaziantep's capacity to provide healthcare services sometimes proved inadequate due to the overwhelming number of patients. In Gaziantep, the increase in the Syrian population has led to negative reactions from the natives regarding the use of secondary health facilities:

Although the population has increased, the number of specialists and buildings has remained the same. As such, tensions are escalating. (...) Access to health care is a challenge

for many people, as hospital beds are always full and access to medical examinations can be quite difficult. (...) Of course, transportation can also be a challenge. Public hospitals were already overcrowded, but now the problem of overcrowding has escalated significantly. As a result, the presence of Syrians in this place is becoming more visible. (...) As their visibility grows, a common sentiment emerges among some people: "Syrian patients receive preferential treatment, which causes delays in access to services for others." I think this is also a result of the government's own policies. (Gaziantep, 3, Doctor)

A healthcare worker at an MHC in Konya reported that the presence of MHCs provokes reactions from the natives:

Sometimes Turks react to this situation by asking, "Why don't we have our own private hospital while they have theirs?" But I think they have a private hospital too. City hospitals, or to be more precise, all these facilities, are built to serve the Turkish population. Sometimes we get criticism about this, for example. (Konya, 8, Healthcare Worker)

According to the family practitioner we spoke to in Gaziantep, during the period of intense conflict in the town of Azez just across the border, there was a significant increase in the number of injured people brought to the emergency departments of state hospitals every day. This influx of patients caused a "change in social perception." The doctor argued that during the early years of the Syrian civil war, when the conflict was particularly intense, certain health facilities were violating the law. For example, ambulances were dispatched across the border to pick up the injured, which was unlawful because it required sending civilian medical personnel into a conflict zone. Similarly, the Health Directorate set up container cities right at the border where Syrian fighters could reside and cross to the other side. The doctors working in these container cities found themselves in the middle of the conflict:

In my opinion, violations were committed in the early stages of this war because of a lack of transparency. (...) I know the border province of Kilis. They thought it would be easy to take the ambulance across the border. But there was a problem because you cannot take it out. It's not a civilian area and it's a different country. (...) You are taking civilians into a dangerous war zone. (...) What happened then? They went on and on, because it became a big problem. For example, they set up a container city right on the border. Conflicts broke out right at the border, so the doctors were trapped inside the container city. (Gaziantep, 3, Doctor)

Access to health care for refugees and irregular migrants registered in another province

As noted earlier in this section, irregular migrants are unable to benefit from the public health system. A study of migrants' access to public services in Beyoğlu found that irregular migrants tend to seek health care only when they have serious health problems. They choose private hospitals for childbirth, surgery, and related procedures. However, because private hospitals are expensive, many irregular migrants do not have access to healthcare at all. Some migrant aid initiatives in Beyoğlu have been reported to cover the cost of operations for irregular migrants with serious health problems through donations. In this study, several interviewees also discussed the situation of irregular migrants. A health worker employed at the MHC in Konya shared that they sometimes show tolerance by conducting examinations for migrants who do not have legal status in Turkey. However, they are unable to provide treatment in such cases. A family practitioner from Istanbul also mentioned that doctors have the discretion to examine undocumented or irregular migrants:

For example, an undocumented patient could come to us, and we could diagnose their problem by telling them they need to do this, have that operation, have that illness, have their hormones checked, etc. Unfortunately, we are not able to provide the treatment they need here. Patients have the option of seeking medical care at higher level hospitals, public hospitals, or private hospitals. However, due to their undocumented status, they cannot be examined there either. (Konya, 8, Healthcare Worker)

The real crisis lies with undocumented migrants who do not have a Turkish ID number. These people can be either Syrians or migrants from other countries. They have no connections or interactions with any public institution in Turkey. However, even if individuals are not officially registered, they can still receive medical services if they are accepted by migrant health centres or family health centres. (Istanbul, 5, Doctor)

In both Konya and Istanbul, it was reported that irregular migrants seek medical care when they are completely helpless or in an unbearable situation. In Konya, there are CSOs that support migrants by covering their expenses:

Now, when conditions become intolerable, they (come) of their own accord. Recently a patient of Afghan origin arrived. He had a broken arm. He mentioned that it happened about five or six months ago. However, the pain has become unbearable for him, so he found a way to come here. (...) When necessary, we often work with associations. For example, there might be a cost for this procedure, and we will cover part of it through the association. (Konya, 8, Healthcare Worker)

Representatives of certain CSOs operating in Konya have stated that they provide assistance to migrant and refugee patients with serious health problems, particularly those related to medical devices or procedures:

Especialy in hospitals, it is common to hear "this patient needs this or that medical device." They bring us their medical reports. I have just received a message from one of the doctors. The association provides health support. We pass it on to them immediately. (...) We compile the necessary documentation for their request here. We have been able to cover some of the costs through the project until it is completed. (Konya, 5, CSO)

The same CSO representative also noted that they often send certain refugee patients to the Konya Governorate Social Solidarity and Assistance Foundation for their basic medical needs.

However, Syrians registered under temporary protection in one province may face certain restrictions when trying to access the public health system in another. Syrians in this situation are responsible for paying for their own medication. A participant working in the enhanced MHC in Konya shared the following example in this regard:

Because they are registered in Hatay, they do not have full access to the health system in the area. In other words, they still have to pay for their prescriptions. Free coverage only applies to Hatay. In reality, individuals should be able to access and use all available facilities in the province where they are registered. (Konya, 8, Healthcare Worker)

The interlocutor also stated that Syrians with temporary protection status in another province sometimes receive support from an association to cover the cost of medicines:

Civil society, for example, is an important financial supporter for them. Most of the time we work with [the association X]. For example, we don't have a separate project budget to pay for a medicine prescription. We cover it from the budget that (the association X) gives us. (...) We do it through phone calls or personal contacts and we guide them in the right direction. (Konya, 8, Healthcare Worker)

Critiques of the SIHHAT project

In addition to the establishment of a dual system of primary health care, some of the health professionals we spoke to had other criticisms of the SIHHAT project. As noted in the context of the PIKTES project in the education-related section of the study, GP respondents from Gaziantep and Istanbul also mentioned that project money had been used to buy materials:

The SIHHAT project is used by the Ministry to fund all the necessary items on their procurement list. We bought a fridge through the SIHHAT project. (...) There is a budget. They deliver it to the Syrian centres (MHCs). The family health centres don't have a budget. But when there is a significant increase in the population as a result of integration needs, they say, "Let's give them some money so that the health centres don't feel neglected and don't mistreat them (Syrians)." After observing this, we submitted a petition. (...) But what they should normally be doing is providing funding for integration. For example, some of the services we provide are printing materials in two languages and software integration. (Istanbul, 5, Doctor)

They take on big projects. The MHC is now an important project for them. For example, they did something like providing fridges. We used to go and family health centres with a certain number of Syrian patients would get refrigerators from the EU project, for example. (Gaziantep, 3, Doctor)

During our interview in Istanbul, the GP was positive about the purchase of materials and equipment, attributing it to the increase in the number of patients. However, they believed that the real need was to establish an integrated health system:

Unfortunately, due to our already demanding and busy routine, we do not have the opportunity to allocate resources to the implementation of a specialised system for disadvantaged groups. The Ministry also mentioned that if we are unable to set this up, the SIHHAT project has been proposed by the EU. They are the ones providing the funding. The emblem of the SIHHAT project can be seen everywhere – on X-ray machines, freezers, and ambulances. There is a reason for this. Why is that? The growth of the country's health services has also put a strain on all institutions. (...) Looking at the situation, it is clear that the ambulance provides help by transporting both Syrians and Turks. However, it would have been more beneficial if the funds had been used directly for integration efforts. It would have made more sense. (Istanbul, 5, Doctor)

Migrants' health problems

This section provides a summary of the health risks and challenges faced by migrants and refugees, as identified in the qualitative field research. The health and disease status of migrant and refugee populations is not substantially different from that of the natives in the cities where they live. However, access to healthcare, living conditions, gender inequality, and exposure to conflict prior to arriving in Turkey have different impacts on the health of migrants and refu-

gees. In this context, a representative of an CSO in Izmir, which assists migrants without access to healthcare for “urgent but not emergency” health problems, made the following comments:

In medical terms, the health problems of one group are not fundamentally different from those of another. However, a key factor to consider is whether individuals have access to healthcare. By looking at whether they have access to healthcare, we can evaluate individuals. (Izmir, 20, CSO)

Below, we will discuss health problems frequently encountered among migrants and refugees based on information gathered from participants in the qualitative research.³²

Irregular/transit migrants and seasonal agricultural workers

As mentioned in other sections of the study, a notable feature of Izmir compared to other research areas is the significant presence of migrants awaiting the opportunity to cross the Aegean Sea to Greece. Another characteristic observed among migrants in districts with intensive agricultural activities is the presence of seasonal agricultural workers. Many migrants originate from different African countries, Afghanistan, and other Asian countries. It is important to note that the majority of them do not have applications for international protection. During the summer months of 2022, when the fieldwork was conducted in Izmir, no applications were being processed. It should also be noted that some transit migrants may choose not to apply for international protection. Some transit migrants opt to work in labour-intensive sectors, such as portage or shoemaking, while waiting for an opportunity to board a boat or after unsuccessful attempts to remain in Izmir. This population, which lives as lodgers in old houses in Izmir, has some health problems that need to be highlighted:

As you may be aware, only persons who are unable to work due to a medical condition, such as a hernia or a work-related injury, have access to paid treatment. Among these people, especially in Izmir, are those who do not wish to be registered by the government. They are either waiting for passage to the Greek islands or are trying to register but have no access to registration services. (Izmir, 20, CSO)

The CSO representative working in Izmir mentioned that her organisation provides assistance to irregular migrants facing urgent health problems. They also highlighted the health problems caused by the poor conditions of the hostels and rooms where migrants live. A representative of an CSO in the Konak district mentioned that they provide health education to young migrants and refugees. They also highlighted the issues arising from the poor hygienic conditions in the places where these people live:

Indeed, hygiene is a major issue, especially in the back streets where 15-20 people live together in the same house, including men, women, and children. They share the same toilet and bathroom facilities. (...) There are regular outbreaks of scabies in this area. (Izmir, 14, CSO)

³² As there were no medical professionals in the research team, it is important to take the information we summarize below as a general impression rather than an expert medical perspective. Some respondents' accounts were evaluated and analysed in consultation with other healthcare professionals. It is also critical to emphasise that many of the health problems reported by migrants may affect native communities as well.

The same participants also reported that serious sexual assaults had occurred among migrant women in transit, particularly those travelling from Africa via the route from Libya. However, while these CSOs were able to provide information on gender-based violence, sexual health, and reproductive health to Syrian and other registered refugees as part of their projects, they were unable to carry out formal activities specifically targeting irregular migrants. The CSO representative highlighted significant concerns about the neglect and abuse of children and the urgency of addressing these issues.

According to a psychologist employed by an CSO in the Konak district, mood disorders are common among the African migrants who participate in the association's activities:

Because they feel very lonely. Other groups can talk to each other and find companionship. They are a tad more accepted by society. But the African group, who are discriminated against, feel isolated. Some of them leave their families and come alone. (...) Many people come and say: "I feel very bad, I'm in a terrible state," "I can't sleep," "I can't eat, I have no appetite," "I have no friends, I can't socialise." Or they say: "I'm very afraid of the police, they might ask for identification and deport me?" (Izmir, 9, CSO)

The same interviewee reported that migrants who had tried and failed to reach the Greek islands by boat, and who had been traumatised by the severity of the Greek coastguard and the sinking of their boats, had turned to their associations for help.

We should also mention the health conditions of Syrian seasonal agricultural workers living outside the towns where they are registered under TP. A representative of a CSO in Izmir highlighted the health problems caused by poor hygiene, lack of heating and cooling, and limited access to clean water in the tents where Syrian seasonal agricultural workers live (Izmir, 20, CSO). The interviewee also mentioned that the Izmir Provincial Directorate of Public Health is actively addressing these concerns by conducting health screenings for seasonal agricultural workers, ensuring that children are vaccinated, and regularly monitoring pregnant women.

Trauma and psychological problems

Migrants and refugees, regardless of age or gender, are universally affected by the effects of war, the hardships of fleeing their home countries, and the trauma they experience during their migration journey. The participants highlighted that both Syrians and Afghans experience significant mental health problems because of trauma:

People fleeing Syria typically arrive traumatised. Some of them have seen the war first hand. (...) The Syrian clients have also made a new life for themselves here. However, they face discrimination, and their financial resources are often insufficient. (...) All of our incoming clients have been through traumatic experiences. Even if the individual is not aware of it at first, the reason for seeking help may not be immediately apparent, but becomes clear later. Individuals arriving from Afghanistan are typically those who have sought refuge from the Taliban. They often have a high prevalence of post-trau-

matic stress disorder, acute stress disorder, and anxiety disorders. Panic disorder and trauma-related disorders are both widespread in society. "I can't sleep; every time I close my eyes, horrible images and ominous sounds pop into my head. I feel like everyone is following me." Many people have experienced the horrors of torture. (...) Many people have been abused. Many people feel inadequate and despondent because they have been hurt or physically harmed. (Izmir, 9, CSO)

The representative of a CSO working with migrants in Konya made similar observations regarding refugees from Syria and Afghanistan. The interviewee emphasised that the public reaction to the arrival of Afghan migrants in Turkey has also had a negative impact on this group:

They have arrived with these burdens as a result of the significant trauma they have experienced during their migration journey. In my view, Syrians carry significant psychological burdens. But Afghans are known for their resilience, which is deeply rooted in their warrior culture. (...) They arrive in a psychologically shattered state, having experienced trauma as a collective. At the same time, they face the challenge of being accepted by the native population, which exacerbates their trauma. (Konya, 13, CSO)

Child health

It was mentioned that some of the health problems experienced by migrant and refugee children were due to trauma:

For example, bedwetting in children is a common occurrence. This can be considered a form of trauma. Families often find it difficult to understand. (...) When they crossed the border, they began a journey that lasted for days, filled with constant conflict, the sound of bombs, and the reverberations of gunfire. It is possible that someone close to the child has died or that a bomb has exploded. The family may not notice or anticipate that the child is expected to cope with the situation in the same way they do. (Izmir, 9, CSO)

There may also be sibling rivalry, bedwetting, and speech problems. In some cases, there may be excessive attachment between the child and the mother. (Konya, 8, Healthcare Worker)

The healthcare professionals we interviewed also highlighted that migrant and refugee children face various health problems, including malnutrition, developmental problems, and disabilities. It was noted that limited access to healthcare services for families, as well as a shortage of paediatric specialists in certain provinces, led to delays in diagnosing children's illnesses in public hospitals:

Children living in poverty may have higher rates of malnutrition and developmental delays. There are also cases of delayed diagnosis, often due to language barriers. There are not only language barriers, but also access barriers. (Gaziantep, 3, Health Worker)

For example, there is only one paediatric endocrinologist, despite the high demand for her services. A significant number of Syrian children have developmental problems, given the large child population in the country. (...) In fact, this area is considered metropolitan. However, the presence of only one doctor leads to shortcomings, which unfortunately means that some children do not receive the necessary medical examinations they need. (Konya, 8, Healthcare Worker)

Women's health problems

Some of the health issues identified in the field research with migrant and refugee women are related to reproductive health, while gender-based violence is also a significant issue.

A health worker working in an MHC spoke about the health problems associated with adolescent motherhood and early pregnancy among Syrian refugees. According to a health worker in Konya, gynaecologists in MHCs often encounter such cases. In addition, it was observed that Syrian women with large numbers of children often seek medical attention for reproductive health problems (Konya, 9, CSO).

Another major concern is the incidence of violence against women by their spouses or male relatives and the practice of polygamous marriages. Although not directly linked to health problems, participants noted that some women seeking help had experienced various forms of violence and were dealing with related issues:

The prevalence of violence, including psychological and physical abuse, as well as pressure from husbands, fathers, or brothers, is significantly high among women in Afghanistan and Syria. (...) Clients come to us with different concerns, and during our counselling sessions we often uncover a history of violence. (...) We then provide them with clarification on specific aspects related to their situation. The situation of Afghan women is somewhat different. They come with a specific and explicit request. They are aware that they are experiencing violence and they ask, "I am facing violence, what should I do? I would like to know the procedure for getting a divorce from my husband. Could you please explain the process to me?" (...) Polygamous marriages, for example, are quite common among Syrian women. They often live in the same household with another wife and a concubine. (Konya, 12, CSO)

This section of the study focused on migrants' and refugees' access to health services. While legal status generally determines access to healthcare, the EU has funded a scheme for Syrians under temporary protection and applicants for international protection. However, the qualitative research has shown that migrants face significant challenges in accessing healthcare due to structural problems within the healthcare system. In addition, there are health problems among migrants and refugees due to the conditions of their arrival and residence in Turkey, as well as social and gender inequalities.

Civil Society Organisations' and Municipalities' Services and Activities For Migrants and Refugees

Civil society organisations (CSOs) and solidarity initiatives are actively involved in various activities in support of refugees and migrants. They employ a variety of methods to address the needs and challenges faced by these people. The main activities include protection, registration, legal assistance, referrals to public services, psychosocial support, education, livelihood training, youth and child work, Turkish language courses, healthcare services, food distribution, humanitarian aid distribution, and organising solidarity events. CSOs collaborate with international organisations, public institutions, and local governments through cooperation protocols. Local governments, that is, municipalities, also play a crucial role in migration management and the provision of services to migrants and refugees. In this part of the study, we will address CSOs' and municipalities' activities and services.

There are three distinct groups of CSOs that can be identified on the basis of their organisation and working methods. One group consists of local CSOs and initiatives that fund their activities through their members and independent donors. The second group consists of institutions that operate with funding from the EU and other international organisations. The third group consists of self-organisations of migrants and refugees which serve their own communities.

In the five cities where the qualitative research was carried out, there are local associations providing support to refugees, as well as international and national CSOs. We will provide information on the activities of civil society in relation to migrants and refugees, how these activities are carried out and what challenges CSOs face.³³

We will first discuss initiatives and associations that operate independently with their own resources. Then we turn to CSOs that operate based on projects. Next, we will mention associations that have been established by Syrians. Finally, we will provide a brief summary of municipalities' initiatives in relation to migrants, based on conversations with local government representatives.

Voluntary associations and initiatives

One group of civil society organisations providing assistance to migrants are local associations and voluntary initiatives. Some of these organisations have substantial financial resources based on donations, whereas others have extremely limited resources. These two contrasting situations can be illustrated with examples from Konya and Izmir.

In Konya, there are several large associations that operate on the basis of "individual volunteering." They derive their legitimacy not only from the urban connections of their leaders, but also from their ability to respond quickly to emergency situations. During our fieldwork in the city, we

³³ However, the aim of this section is not to categorise or provide an exhaustive list of CSOs in the five provinces. For a recent study that examines CSOs involved in helping Syrians, see Akbaş et al. (2022).

observed that public institutions and other associations often turn to these types of organisations for help when they are unable to intervene directly due to legal regulations, project limitations, or budget constraints. It is also worth noting that this prominent association has gained considerable influence in the city by establishing protocols with public institutions. The founders and leaders of these associations play a crucial role because of their local recognition and personal relationships. These associations also have an advantage in collecting and distributing donations for religious purposes, such as alms and sacrifices. Their organisation, which is voluntary and not tied to specific projects, is very flexible. This flexibility allows them to operate in areas where regulations may not allow them to do so and to carry out their work effectively. It should also be noted that some organisations have close links with religious communities. In the central areas of the city, migrants benefit considerably from aid activities such as “soup kitchens” set up by these associations. The statements made by the leaders of these associations are examples of their adaptable operational capacity on the ground:

We serve as a bridge. Residents of Konya who wish to donate their unwanted belongings can contact us. For example, if a citizen's parents have passed away and their house is furnished with belongings, they can donate these items to us. (...) Our approach is similar to a waiting list for an organ transplant, where we give the items to the next family in line. New families arrive here every day. (...) These people have no legal rights, but they have come. All the associations (...) operate legally. If they have Turkish citizenship, the process continues. We don't even ask for identification. (...) We just focus on whether what they're saying is true or not. Our team is excellent at this. We employ an Afghan translator and a Syrian translator who go out on a daily basis to inspect the houses, visiting each one individually. (Konya, 5, CSO)

It is important to recognise the link between these CSOs and public institutions, as well as project-based associations and foundations. The statement of the director of the association mentioned above is noteworthy as it highlights their willingness to take on certain tasks that are typically the responsibility of public institutions:

Citizens contact us and say, "Sir, I need five employees, skilled or unskilled. We search our database, considering their age and the type of work they need, and match them with qualified candidates. (...) We are currently working with the Chamber of Industry, the Chamber of Commerce, and the Chamber of Agriculture. I am sorry to say that our performance is much better than theirs. They also cooperate with us. For example, the Chamber of Trades and Crafts is going to do a project. At present, they are having difficulties in finding people for their three-month training course. Who can find them? (...) we can. (Konya, 5, CSO)

While the manager's statement may sound like self-praise, discussions with other organisations have confirmed that the association is indeed one of the most effective institutions in Konya when it comes to helping refugees.

All the institutions in Konya know me. Despite the presence of official institutions here, even MPs from Ankara contact me. (...) They call us because we are out in the field. We have a cooperative relationship with our municipality and the police. We work with the Red Crescent. We are currently working with the Migration Directorate. I am an official representative of the governor's office. We cooperate with official institutions to fulfil this mission. (Konya, 5, CSO)

According to the same interviewee, the financial strength of the association is due to the contributions and support provided by the people of Konya in accordance with their religious beliefs.

There is also an invisible form of giving that I would like to mention. Some people in Konya have a faith-based approach to helping others without seeking recognition. (...) They have their zakat, their alms, their zakat al-fitr, their father's promise [to donate something], or an inheritance, but they would leave [that donation] at the door and go away without revealing themselves. (...) This is why lower social segments of Syrians prefer Konya. (...) Because in Konya there is a network of aid based on belief. (Konya, 5, CSO)

In Gaziantep, too, an interviewee from a CSO shared his observation that the majority of civil society organisations working with refugees in the province are faith-based:

We, let's say, who work from a human rights perspective, or let's call it secular, represent no more than 25% of those working in this field. The other 75% are all civil society organisations set up with Islamic motivations. (...) All of them work in the field of migration. (Gaziantep, 1, CSO)

There are various local initiatives and associations in Izmir, but in terms of their resources they are different than the organisations we mentioned in the case of Konya. Because of their independence from rigid project guidelines, their flexibility in decision-making, and their proximity to the field, these voluntary initiatives and local groups are able to function well despite their minimal financial resources. It is easier for them to reach irregular migrants and Syrians with temporary protection status who are registered in other provinces. The manager of one initiative explained the situation as follows:

What is the problem here now? If an organisation is receiving funding from the EU or UNHCR, they are obligated to document it. So, can you please tell me to whom you are going to give it? Joe Anybody! I can give it. Why? I don't have an accountability obligation. (Izmir, 12, CSO)

Even before the arrival of refugees from Syria, Izmir had active associations and solidarity networks, thanks to its location on the transit migration route across the Aegean Sea. In the 2000s, a volunteer-based organisation was established in Izmir to provide assistance to refugees using Izmir as a transit point. Over time, this organisation extended its assistance to all refugee groups, including Syrians, by providing protection, legal assistance, and access to their rights. The momentum generated by this association led to the creation of other organisations by dedicated volunteers and activists. During our interviews, it became clear that these volunteer activities played a crucial role in the establishment of specialised units for refugees in the Konak district and the metropolitan municipality.

In Izmir, as in Konya, there are local associations that operate through religious donations and volunteer work, providing assistance not only to native residents in need, but also to refugees. This association distributes meals to hundreds of people every day in the Basmane neighbourhood, relying solely on donations such as offerings, alms, and charity from citizens. The association also participates in food banks and food aid activities, collecting food that is about to expire from supermarkets. According to the association's representative, about half of the people they helped were refugees. This participant specifically mentioned the distribution of meals to Afri-

cans and Afghans waiting in Izmir to cross to Europe by sea. He also mentioned that on previous occasions, when large groups of transit migrants arrived and stayed in parks, they were provided with food aid. However, on one occasion, municipal officials took away the food parcels, citing hygiene reasons:

We did our shopping at the food market. We divided the goods into sacks, assigning one sack to each family. We even did all the heavy lifting ourselves. We had tomato paste, pasta, biscuits, and halva for energy. Then the municipal authorities showed up, grabbing all the sacks right in front of us, and left. We said, "We'll do it again." And we did it again. (Izmir, 10, CSO)

Although local associations and initiatives working with refugees, especially irregular migrants, may have limited capacities, it is important to stress that they are often in solidarity with each other. For example, if an association comes into contact with a sick irregular migrant, its members can work with another association specialised in health care to facilitate the person's treatment. When addressing the daily challenges that refugees face, it is important to emphasise that their efforts are driven by volunteerism:

We do this voluntarily. The others work on projects; I have no idea what they do. But we made every effort for this group (association). We carried chairs on our backs. We painted them and I don't know what else we did. When someone secures a job, their spouse accompanies them, and we prepare meals for both. In ten years, we have helped about 90,000 of the 100,000 Syrians living in Izmir. We take care of all their needs in the house – their beds, blankets, notebooks, pens, bags, televisions, and more. (Izmir, 6, CSO)

Another organisation, also based on volunteering and not project-based, also had programmes to support refugees:

One of my refugee clients needed immediate medical care and housing. The association helped her find a house and furnished it with basic necessities. The association facilitates the formation of sibling families between refugee families. I was lucky enough to become a sibling of a Syrian family. I have been with them for three years. I have a sister from Syria. (Izmir, 17, CSO)

The same association also runs a programme to promote relations between refugee and native families. However, it is important to recognise that voluntary and solidarity-based activities have a limited scope and can only reach a certain number of people:

In the aftermath of the Izmir earthquake, we facilitated the matching of refugee families with native families. Establishing contact is crucial. We give priority to pairing families who are particularly vulnerable, such as those who are unable to work or who have newborn babies. We have identified a total of 18 families in this way. The families are supported by volunteers from both inside and outside the association. The key step is to initiate communication. Our aim is to avoid creating expectations or financial commitments. We do not provide cash directly. In addition, we offer A101 cards to help individuals buy food and pay their bills. The reason for not giving cash is that there is a possibility that the men in the family might use it for purposes other than those for which it was intended. (Izmir, 17, CSO)

In Izmir, the fieldwork revealed that project-based CSOs and local associations and initiatives may not always have affirmative perspectives about each other. The manager of the initiative targeting seasonal agricultural migrants and irregular migrants had the following to say about this:

They don't really like us. Because we are always out in the field. Our feet stay in the mud. Our hands are always dirty. We're always sweating. (Izmir, 12, CSO)

In summary, the capacity of associations and solidarity initiatives working with refugees and migrants is determined by their financial resources and the capabilities of their volunteers when they are not operating through funded projects. While it is important to note that the examples presented here may not be representative of the overall situation, it is worth mentioning that in Konya there were cases where religious solidarity fostered the growth and cooperation of certain associations with public institutions. In Izmir, however, many local associations and initiatives are forced to rely on their own resources, with limited external support.

Project-based CSOs

The project-based civil society organisations whose representatives were interviewed are involved in various activities. These activities include protection, legal aid, psychosocial support, counselling, social work, healthcare services, and Turkish language courses. In recent years, there has been an increase in social cohesion activities and livelihood training programmes. Some of these CSOs are local branches of national organisations, while others are independent local associations. Some of these activities are carried out on a project basis within the remit of public institutions. In cases where public institutions are limited by legal constraints, they often turn to local CSOs for support or establish partnerships with them.

In Turkey, there has been a noticeable increase in the number of CSOs focusing on migration projects, especially since 2016. In addition, various civil society organisations from different sectors have also initiated projects to support migrants. For example, the head of a refugee advocacy association in Izmir shared her observations in this regard. Similarly, a representative of a CSO in Mardin mentioned that they redirected their efforts to this area when refugees from Syria started arriving:

Prior to the Syrian crisis, there were three or four CSOs active in this area. Currently, there are numerous CSOs, possibly numbering in the hundreds or even thousands. (...) Many individuals in this field are actively involved in various activities and seek support from funding sources. (...) In terms of humanitarian aid distribution, courses, integration, Turkish language courses, vocational training, skills development courses, and psychosocial support, I believe these are crucial areas that need attention. (Izmir, 4, CSO)

We started working with refugees in 2015, coinciding with the start of the migration from Syria. Before then, we had no experience of working with refugees, and our knowledge of how to work effectively with them was limited. There was an international organisation in Mardin at the time, and they knew how to work with refugees, but they were not familiar with the local context. (...) Although we were familiar with the local context, we lacked the

knowledge and skills to effectively help refugees. We worked with them. We did not have any independent projects at the time. (...) In 2016, we developed a two-year project, which then became one of our first initiatives with refugees in 2017-2018. (...) In this way, we were able to meet refugees, observe their challenges, analyse them, and identify possible solutions. (Mardin, 11, CSO)

Like other cities, Konya has long-established local networks and civil society organisations that have begun to engage in migration-related activities as the influx of migrants and refugees into the city has increased. There has been an increase in the number of new organisations dedicated to providing humanitarian aid, and existing institutions have also broadened their focus to include assistance to refugees. Both the representative of a national CSO's branch in the city and a municipal employee expressed concern about the situation in Konya:

In Konya, the number of CSOs is astonishing. Many of them are established for foreigners. I don't know whether their activities are legitimate or criminal. But the enormous number of CSOs is the fundamental problem. (Konya, 12, CSO)

There are too many CSOs in Konya. When two or three people get together, they say: "Let's set up a CSO." It can happen quite easily. There is a CSO Directorate. We were expected to work with one place, so we asked for a list of CSOs. You will be surprised how many there are. I thought it was necessary to read the protocols, but I found it overwhelming to deal with all of them. (Konya, 7, Metropolitan Municipality)

Some CSOs focus on specific groups of migrants or refugees, while others specialise in different areas. Two CSOs in Gaziantep and Mardin are examples of organisations that have specialised in specific areas:

We provide advocacy and protection support to around 50,000 Syrian Dom and Abdal families in Gaziantep. We are dedicated to working with the most marginalised group within the Syrian population. (Gaziantep, 1, CSO)

Our approach is women-centred. Our work is built on this foundation and, as mentioned before, native women face significant disadvantages. Unfortunately, women from refugee communities are among the most disadvantaged. In addition to women, we also prioritise persons with disabilities and children. We are currently trying to reach the most vulnerable and fragile ones. (Mardin, 15, CSO)

We also met a foundation in Istanbul that specialises in programmes for Syrian women:

We offer Turkish language workshops. (...) We invite the women who have contacted us to our empowerment workshops, and we also offer a sewing workshop. (...) We teach interested women about sewing and design. Over time, as trust is built, the women approach us with their individual concerns, which can range from experiencing violence to issues relating to their children's education or even everyday problems. Our organisation has a dedicated team of staff who are available to provide personal and individual support to our clients. (...) When a woman reaches out to us, we make every effort to provide direct support or refer her to other organisations if necessary. (Istanbul, 1, CSO)

The organisations and foundations in this group have to work within the framework of funded projects. One interviewee, who had previously worked in civil society and was currently in a local government position in Izmir, expressed her belief that this area had been transformed into a sector:

Then it became a sector, so it's not really civil society anymore. It has evolved into a new labour market drawing many fresh graduates. (...) Initially, the salaries were quite high; it was a new condition, but then crises happened, and during Covid, the funds dwindled, many places closed, and chaos ensued. (...) In my view, they see Turkey as a huge cake and at the same time they drastically undervalue human labour. Things have changed a lot since those early days. In the current circumstances, it seems to me that people are not receiving fair compensation for their work. (Izmir, 3, Metropolitan Municipality)

The activities of CSOs have been negatively affected by the approach of international funding agencies and the decrease in funding. This was a recurring theme during the fieldwork. This situation has particularly affected human-rights-focused CSOs. Several participants noted that in this type of environment, CSOs often prioritise projects that are more likely to receive funding. These projects typically include humanitarian aid, education initiatives, psychosocial support programmes, and livelihood support efforts:

We are witnessing a shrinking space for CSO activities. (...) Two groups of CSOs are particularly affected by this situation: those working with a human-rights-based approach and those providing humanitarian aid. I'm talking about those engaged in humanitarian work focusing on migrants and refugees. (...) The majority of civil society organisations working in this field in Turkey are, in fact, humanitarian actors. Undoubtedly, their contribution to the field is undeniable. (Izmir, 4, CSO)

Concerns about the decline of rights advocacy were also expressed by other interviewees. A representative of a Syrian-led CSO in Istanbul made the following statement:

Civil society organisations have another weakness. They are generally hesitant when it comes to human rights issues. Let's imagine that today a civil servant discriminates against a refugee in a police station, a government building, or on the street. (...) Civil society organisations do not raise this issue. Why not? Because they believe that "even if we are right and defend their rights, we will be perceived as opposing the government." That should be the crux of the matter. You are a CSO. The duties of a CSO go beyond simply providing a food pack, as I have already explained. In 2022, the distribution of milk or food parcels will no longer be enough. I need them to defend me, to protect me, and ultimately to secure my legal rights. The civil society organisations are not doing this. (Istanbul, 4, CSO)

The working environment of civil society is partly shaped by competition for project funding and implementation (Akbaş Demirel et al., 2022). CSOs sometimes refrain from advocacy work because of the state's decisive role in approving project funding and establishing cooperation protocols with public institutions. In the scholarly literature on civil society in Turkey, this overwhelming presence of the state has been mentioned not only in the context of refugee issues (Danış and Nazlı, 2019), but also regarding CSOs working in different fields (e.g., Parker et al., 2013; Yabancı, 2019).

On the other hand, CSOs in their respective cities can cooperate with local governments and public institutions by establishing protocols that allow them to jointly apply for certain funds or work together to support migrants on the ground. It has been reported that a significant number of

associations and foundations in Konya cooperate with local municipalities and the metropolitan municipality to provide services to refugees.

In addition, municipalities can cooperate with employers' organisations and professional chambers. Several examples of work carried out under the cooperation protocols between the metropolitan municipality, district municipalities, associations, and professional organisations in Konya were described:

For instance, the (association X) registers persons [for social assistance]. We provide social assistance directly to persons who are registered. We receive files containing information about those who are eligible for assistance, and then we process their applications accordingly. (Konya, 7, Metropolitan Municipality)

We are working with the metropolitan municipality on a social card project. Although we do not personally carry out the assessments, we have a significant number of foreign national families in the Karatay district who receive social cards. Due to a lack of interpreters, the metropolitan municipality and (association Z) work together to carry out the evaluations. Once the eligibility of the beneficiaries has been established, the families come to us for the distribution of the cards specifically designed for foreigners. (Konya, 6, Karatay Municipality)

In Konya, vocational training and employment programmes for migrants are available through cooperation between İŞKUR (the Turkish Employment Agency), the Chamber of Industry, the Governorate, and the metropolitan municipality. In particular, İŞKUR has prioritised the implementation of initiatives aimed at addressing the need for middle-level workers in the industrial sector. In addition, the Konya Chamber of Tradesmen and Craftsmen is actively involved in the implementation of vocational training programmes in cooperation with the ILO. Although there is an age limit for native participants in this project, it does not apply to migrants. That is, there is no age limit for migrants who want to learn as apprentices (Konya, 11, Employers' Organisation).

Gaziantep's metropolitan municipality, on the other hand, works with CSOs to support refugee women who have been victims of violence and have taken refuge in shelters. The assistance provided includes helping women to find rental housing, offering rental support, providing household items, and facilitating job opportunities through women's cooperatives. The aim is to help these women rebuild their lives. Similar initiatives have also been reported in Konya:

Occasionally there is a need for assistance with medical equipment. Although we do not provide direct support, we can help individuals access the help they need by liaising with other agencies. For example, we identified a significant need for hearing aids during this project period and advised people to contact organisations in Gaziantep and the Kızılay Community Centre for assistance. (Konya, 9, CSO)

The organisation has several branches, one of which is in Selçuklu. When children need clothes, they go to the Selçuklu branch. This branch offers assistance by providing clothes to those in need. In addition, when there is a need for stationery, they immediately contact the branch and take quick action to meet urgent needs. (Konya, 12, CSO)

In addition to the national associations, which have branches in several cities, local associations can also help refugees with registration and legal assistance. In Mardin, there was an

association dedicated to assisting Yazidis who had migrated to the region. Its focus was to help these individuals register and access the basic services they needed:

Most of those arriving are Yazidis. They are using Turkey as a transit point. (...) However, many individuals in this group have not completed the registration process, and there are cases where provincial migration authorities are no longer accepting new registrations. As a result, they have no access to healthcare services. (...) In addition, new arrivals do not have identity documents, which prevents them from accessing services due to lack of proper identification. (...) Recently, we received reports indicating that there are around 600 families living in Midyat, and we will be meeting with them soon. A significant number of their children are unable to attend school because they do not have proper identification. (...) Our aim is to locate these children and accompany them in approaching the provincial migration authorities. This assistance is crucial to help them obtain the necessary identification documents. (Mardin, 7, CSO)

However, CSOs providing rights-based assistance may face difficulties due to legislation and legislative changes in many regions, which may render their efforts futile. This is particularly the case when Syrians seek temporary protection status or when other refugees apply for international protection:

The registration of refugee families was closed in certain neighbourhoods where a quota had been imposed. (...) Therefore, these families were unable to go to the Population Directorate and register their addresses. Consequently, they have not been able to obtain identity documents. Children without identity documents cannot register for school, so they cannot attend. (...) We experienced similar contingency plans last year. Every day we would wake up facing new regulations, such as the closure of neighbourhoods for registration and the implementation of address verification measures. (Mardin, 7, CSO)

However, when it comes to setting up and maintaining a system, I believe that CSOs, including ours, have a very limited impact. (...) We are currently unable to provide adequate counselling services during this period. There are many practices that are uncertain, arbitrary, and non-standard. (...) The law says, "You have these rights," but none of them are effectively enforced. (...) Take, for example, access to registration. This has always been a source of problems, but it has become even more difficult. Although we raise our concerns about these issues, it seems that our efforts have little impact because of the different policies in place. No matter what we say, it doesn't seem to have any effect. (Izmir, 4, CSO)

As discussed earlier in this study, there has been a noticeable spike in anti-migrant political rhetoric since 2022. This has subsequently led to an increase in deportations, expulsions, and administrative detention measures specifically targeting international protection claimants and Syrians with temporary protection status. CSOs and lawyers working on human rights in Izmir have stated that they are focusing on addressing these issues:

The problems in Izmir are more visible. For example, problems in detention centres are brought to the attention of the media. Although there are detention centres in different cities, there is little information about their operation and activities. (...) However, the Izmir removal centre is very active. There have been reports of torture, inadequate food, and overcrowding. The bar association's legal aid programme assists refugees in Izmir, including those who are not registered. Refugees who are sent to the detention centre are at risk of losing their identity documents. (Izmir, 17, CSO)

Deportations and administrative detention measures can pose challenges for CSOs and initiatives working on human rights advocacy and protection. These measures can limit the services that these organisations can provide to refugees. One example is the reduction of the appeal period for deportation orders from 15 to seven days:

At the removal centre, officials can offer referrals to the bar association for people who need legal representation and request assistance. But it's possible that the person is unaware or confused about this right. Alternatively, they may decide to apply through a group like ours in the hope that we can help them. In reality, however, we cannot intervene directly; we can only refer them to the bar association. The process of referral to the bar can take a few days, so the seven-day period is quite restrictive. I wouldn't necessarily call it a problem, but it has certain limitations. (Izmir, 13, CSO)

Education is another important area of activity for CSOs. In the previous section of the study, the issue of formal education for Syrians with temporary protection status and refugees who have applied for or received international protection status was addressed. In addition, CSOs provide a range of educational activities for adult refugees. These include Turkish language courses, extracurricular support for children, vocational training programmes, and classes specifically designed for migrants and refugees who do not have access to education. In Izmir, educational activities have been carried out by project-based associations and voluntary solidarity initiatives. There are several examples of initiatives aimed at supporting different communities. These include providing basic hygiene information to the families of agricultural workers, offering reproductive health education to young refugees living in urban areas, providing vocational training to facilitate labour market integration, and organising Turkish language courses for refugee and migrant children.

In Konya, the local branch of an international CSO set up a community centre as part of its project. The centre provided psychosocial support and organised educational programmes for children and students:

The community centre, as we call it, is an initiative that includes psychosocial support, protection, and social integration. We have a case management process where our team of professionals including psychologists, lawyers, interpreters, and social workers work together. Psychological sessions with the psychologist are conducted on an individual basis. (...) Occasionally we also provide psychosocial support to address the challenges we observe in schools. We have conducted training sessions on various topics such as peer bullying, communication skills, and other related issues. (Konya, 9, CSO)

Another association in Konya supported refugee families by helping them to enrol their children in schools:

Our main focus is the school enrolment support project, with the main aim of helping Syrian nationals. We provide support to individuals of various nationalities such as Afghan, Iranian, Ugandan, and many others. We try to provide the best possible assistance to people who have acquired Turkish citizenship. (Konya, 12, CSO)

During the summer of 2022, when the fieldwork was conducted in the city, the Izmir branch of a national CSO was organising online vocational training courses for a mix of native and Syrian youth. These courses are designed to train individuals who have the necessary skills and qualifications to become semi-skilled workers. Speaking about these courses, a representative of the CSO described the difficulties they had encountered:

Our language of instruction is Turkish. Our training courses cover a range of subjects such as e-business, social media management, graphic design, and web design. Because of this, we face challenges in Izmir. (...) Our requirement that participants have at least a high school diploma is another challenge for us. The level of education is a challenge for many refugees in Izmir, as a significant number have only completed primary or middle school. (Izmir, 18, CSO)

The previous section discussed the access of registered refugees and migrants to public health services and highlighted the fact that irregular migrants have extremely limited access to health-care. Several of the CSOs interviewed are actively involved in addressing the health problems of irregular migrants. One particular CSO, which has branches in two other cities, identified its priority as providing access to healthcare for migrants and refugees, and provided “secondary triage” services to migrants and refugees, including those who were not registered, in Izmir:

Our current projects focus on supporting the population that does not have access to health-care, with a particular focus on non-emergency situations. The Ministry provides emergency services through its emergency departments, regardless of a person’s legal status. We are currently developing a “secondary triage” system to support cases that we label as “not emergency but urgent.” (...) I mean these are the cases that do not require immediate intervention but cannot be referred to outpatient clinics. (...) We are talking about people living in Izmir who are in transit. (...) There is also a group of people who are registered in Izmir or another city but are not covered by the general health insurance system. (...) Another group consists of people who are registered in another city but currently live and work in Izmir. This group often includes seasonal agricultural workers. (Izmir, 20, CSO)

Although not providing direct healthcare services, another national organisation with branches in other cities, with the support of international organisations, organised education and awareness-raising activities on reproductive health for young and female refugees in Izmir.

One of their main focuses is to participate in programmes that provide young people with essential knowledge and skills. These programmes aim to train them as peer educators, with a particular focus on sexual and reproductive health and gender issues. This includes topics such as family planning, contraceptive methods, sexually transmitted infections, and HIV/AIDS. (Izmir, 14, CSO)

There are also associations that help the refugee seasonal agricultural workers and their families in agricultural regions where agricultural productivity is high. One example we came across in Mardin is a local association:

Our main aim is to extend our support to refugees living in rural areas, in addition to those residing in urban areas. In a specific area known as “Kuyubaşı” in Kızıltepe, there are well-established irrigation areas and a large population engaged in agriculture. As a result, a significant number of people live in this area. Many families, including children, currently live in makeshift shacks in extremely difficult conditions that fall far short of basic living standards. They include pregnant women, the disabled, and the elderly, all of whom face significant challenges in accessing water. In addition, their access to education is severely limited. (Mardin, 15, CSO)

The representative of this local association mentioned that they had successfully intervened and achieved results in certain cases of the unfulfilled rights of agricultural workers. However, she also acknowledged that there are still many people they have not been able to reach or assist in these difficult circumstances:

As a local association, we often intervene to address violations of agricultural workers' rights, and we have been successful in achieving positive results. But as a small local organisation, we are somewhat hesitant. Although we have a lawyer, there is no official agreement and there are obvious human rights violations. Intervention can lead to the resolution of certain issues. But the question remains: How many people can we sustainably help? How many people can come to us for help? There are many people we cannot reach. Therefore, there are significant problems in rural areas. (Mardin, 15, CSO)

In Izmir, the local solidarity initiative mentioned above carried out a series of activities aimed at the families of Syrian seasonal agricultural workers:

There are currently 700 families living in Torbalı. (...) During the summer this number increases to 1,500 families. In addition, there are families who move from nearby towns in search of employment opportunities. (...) Our aim is to provide them with education, which includes teaching reading and writing, Turkish language skills, and encouraging analytical thinking through mathematics lessons. We also provide hygiene classes, explaining the importance of proper hand washing and tooth brushing. However, we face challenges as a significant number of people in the area do not have access to clean water, while others do not have adequate housing, bathrooms, and toilets. (Izmir, 12, CSO)

We have already mentioned that there are CSOs that are carrying out activities that are targeted at women. A representative of a CSO in Konya stated that, whereas in previous years they had difficulties in accessing women, refugee women have become increasingly active:

Three to five years ago, women were much less involved. But now there has been a significant increase in participation. When we announce our upcoming events, we invite people to bring their children. In the past, people often used having a child as a reason for not attending, but now they bring their children. They are interested in learning new things together with their children. For example, people can get help with their children. They can see a psychologist. There is also a great demand for courses, especially in Turkish. (Konya, 9, CSO)

A representative of a prominent national association in Konya expressed their desire to showcase the achievements of successful Syrian and Afghan women who have excelled in small-scale entrepreneurship. Their aim is to present these women as positive role models:

There is a woman who works as a hairdresser from home. There is another woman who works as a graphic designer. They help us in many ways. I want to find a wide range of potential examples in Konya, including people from different ethnic backgrounds, such as Syrians, Afghans, and others, who can serve as pioneers. I want to show everyone: "Look, this person was like this, came from here and made it. You can do it too." I look forward to giving more examples like this. (Konya, 13, CSO)

As mentioned above, the provision of humanitarian assistance to refugees has been a major focus of civil society since the arrival of the Syrians. One method that has been developed in this area is to collect products that are about to expire from supermarkets and distribute them to refugees through food banks. In 2004, the Ministry of Finance issued Directive No. 251, which allows

companies to deduct from their tax base contributions made to associations and foundations for food banks. Food banking has gained popularity as a method used by charities in large cities to collect aid. In recent years, food banking has been extended to provide assistance to refugees. As mentioned above, there is a local association in Izmir that is actively involved in food banking. Food banking initiatives have also been set up in Mardin and Konya to assist refugees, providing similar examples:

For example, we sometimes receive 200-300 eggs. The other day we received a large quantity of yoghurt that had three days remaining on its expiry date. (...) We receive cakes, and the children are thrilled, especially when there are Migros cakes and fruit yoghurts. (...) We are the only food bank serving the south-east region. (...) The transport of goods to our site is organised by the municipality. (...) The municipality is responsible for the delivery of the goods sent from here. (...) Our network is now well established and has a solid foundation. (Mardin, 11, CSO)

As noted above, Konya has a long history of using civil society to provide in-kind and cash assistance and donations to those in need. Associations are working to improve communication and division of labour to identify those in need in the city and distribute aid more effectively:

For example, we will distribute food packages. (...) We will liaise with local authorities to identify the appropriate people or organisations to contact for this support. We work together to ensure that the aid reaches those who really need it. Similarly, we contacted schools to distribute boots and jackets to children. We asked the headmasters for instructions and distributed them accordingly. (Konya, 9, CSO)

However, the distribution of humanitarian aid can sometimes be ineffective. Due to the decentralised nature of aid distribution, some beneficiaries may face difficulties in accessing assistance, while others may be able to receive food or other resources from several organisations. Representatives of two CSOs in Konya have drawn attention to this situation:

They have a thorough understanding of the aid mechanisms. However, there is a problem that we have been hearing about. Certain individuals are receiving support from multiple sources. There is a group that receives support from me, from others, and from various available sources. However, there is a group that receives no help from any organisation. Unfortunately, this inequality exists. Our aim is to help individuals who are not currently receiving help from any organisation, to ensure that no one is left behind. However, we cannot prevent people who are already receiving help from others from receiving help from us. (Konya, 9, CSO)

A major challenge for CSOs in providing services to foreigners is the potential for individuals to become dependent on aid. There are also concerns about the appropriate distribution of aid. Yes, many of these organisations do provide genuine humanitarian assistance. They actively listen to the individual's situation and offer assistance based on their needs. (...) For example, they may receive a heater from organisation X, another from Y, and a third from Z. They may receive coal on several occasions and then sell it. (...) Individuals may develop a dependency on this assistance, which may lead to a lack of motivation to obtain a work permit or to pursue employment opportunities. (Konya, 12, CSO)

Under this heading, it would be appropriate to include initiatives funded by international organisations that promote social cohesion. Projects initiated after 2016 aim to foster social and cultural engagement between native communities and Syrian communities. Some projects aim to provide Syrians and other refugees with valuable insights into everyday life in Turkey. The projects in the second category are implemented with the cooperation and support of the Migration Management Presidency and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

Refugee-led associations

It is important to note that there are several associations formed by refugees and migrants to serve their communities. In Gaziantep, there are associations founded by Syrians who are actively involved in sending humanitarian aid to Syria through international organisations. In Istanbul, there are mutual aid organisations set up by Afghan refugees who migrated there in the 1980s (Karadağ and Sert, 2023). In addition, Nigerians have also formed solidarity communities based on their home states, while Southeast Asians have established mutual aid associations (Kurtuluş et al., 2022). This section provides information on the activities of two Syrian-founded organisations that serve and advocate for migrants and refugees, with representatives in Izmir and Istanbul.

There is an association in Izmir that was founded by Syrians and has been operating since 2013. This association is responsible for distributing donations from benefactors to Syrians. “Turkish businessmen know me,” said the founder of the association, adding: “They donate money, send food, BIM cards, and shoes.” The association is actively involved with the city council and organises social events that foster links between Turkish nationals and Syrian men and women:

We have a football team affiliated to the association. They won the cup for two years in a tournament held in Buca. Our women also took part in a cycling race in Izmir. They took part in a cycling competition in the city. There was a women’s football match in Izmir and our team took part. Every year on 8 March, for International Women’s Day, we have our stand at the metropolitan municipality, and we also have a separate stand. We have established strong links and relationships with both the city council and the Women’s Council. We actively participate with our children in the Children’s Council, and we are members of both the Disabled People’s Council and the Refugee Working Group. (Izmir, 11, CSO)

Located in an area with a high concentration of undocumented African migrants, this organisation also provides occasional assistance to Africans in need:

We accept donated clothes that are second-hand and have been worn before. African migrants who arrive here may have fled via the sea or the forests and end up in Izmir without proper clothing. Visitors come to our premises and choose from the clothes we have available. In addition, we sometimes offer them food and other forms of assistance. (Izmir, 11, CSO)

The manager of the Izmir-based association, which works well with regional CSOs, solidarity movements, and national associations, said:

All the seminars organised by the Turkish Red Crescent (Kızılay) are held in this place. When they organise a seminar, nobody goes to their centre. They come to our place and hold seminars here. (Izmir, 11, CSO)

On the other hand, the director of a Syrian-founded and led civil society organisation in Istanbul is actively involved in addressing issues related to children's education and is a vocal opponent of racism and discrimination against Syrians:

Even though everything in the case is legal, some administrative staff in some schools have a discriminatory attitude and refuse to register the child or tell the parents to come back later, saying that the registration process has not yet started. (...) When the father of the child returns after 15 days, they tell him that the quota has been reached. (Istanbul, 4, CSO)

The CSO manager mentioned that some headmasters are approaching Syrian families who are trying to enrol their children in schools. In some cases, these headmasters ask for a donation of a few thousand liras. In such situations, families need the support of CSOs to ensure that their children can be enrolled in schools.

Although the main beneficiaries of these CSOs are typically Syrians, they also receive applications from other refugee groups:

We have a significant number of Syrians and a small number of applications from our Afghan and Uyghur brothers. However, the applications from Uyghurs and Afghans are mainly related to education. (Istanbul, 4, CSO)

The same interlocutor stated that some of the civil society organisations working with refugees in Turkey are not fully able to adapt to the changing needs of Syrians and continue to focus primarily on humanitarian assistance rather than addressing other pressing issues:

Our CSOs are currently approaching people with a perspective and mindset still rooted in 2011. People have changed and so have their needs. Legal and regulatory issues such as social security rights and work permits are now at stake. Unfortunately, our CSOs are not addressing these issues. Instead, they prioritise activities such as distributing food during Ramadan, organising iftar events and working with organisations such as the Turkish Red Crescent to provide clothing to orphans. (...) But it has been a decade and our society has changed significantly. (Istanbul, 4, CSO)

During the previous discussion on project-based CSOs, a representative of a human rights organisation in Izmir made similar observations. In other words, some interviewees believe that many CSOs and foundations have limited themselves to providing humanitarian aid to refugees and have shifted their focus away from human rights advocacy.

To summarise the section of the study dealing with CSOs working in the field of migration and refugees: There are three main categories of CSOs. Some CSOs operate using their own resources as well as donations. Another group focuses on project management with the support of international funds. The third group is made up of CSOs founded by migrants and refugees themselves. All of these CSOs are involved in a wide range of activities, such as providing humanitarian aid, advocating for human rights, offering vocational training, providing Turkish language education, providing healthcare services, and facilitating social integration activities.

Services provided by municipalities

The services provided by public institutions to migrants and refugees were not examined in depth in this study. However, as part of the qualitative research, we conducted interviews with representatives of municipalities. In this section, we provide a brief overview of the different approaches that local governments have taken towards migrants and refugees.

According to Article 13 of the Municipal Law No. 5393, municipalities have the authority to provide a range of services and support to non-citizens, such as refugees and migrants. In addition, refugees with TP or IP status, as well as migrants with residence permits in Turkey, are entitled to certain services provided by municipalities. However, there are notable limitations in the provision of these services, particularly for irregular migrants and unregistered Syrians, who are unable to access them (Kurtuluş et al., 2022). In addition, as part of the integration strategy implemented by the Presidency for Migration Management, migrants can participate in city councils and establish migration councils or commissions within these councils. Studies on the role of municipalities in migration management show the important function that local governments can play in ensuring access to services and rights for refugees and migrants based on the principle of subsidiarity (for a summary, see Yüксеker, 2021).

In Izmir, the metropolitan municipality's approach to migrants has been praised in other studies on the role of local administrations in managing migration (e.g., Özçürümez and Hoxca, 2023; Yavçan and Memişoğlu, 2023). In 2020, the metropolitan municipality's strategic plan was amended to include a section on services for refugees and social integration. Previously, refugees were considered a disadvantaged group; however, the Izmir metropolitan municipality now recognises the refugee phenomenon in its official documents and established a Refugee Desk in September 2020 to ensure that refugees have equal access to civil rights. Through protocol-based collaboration, this desk works with local civil society organisations as well as global organisations such as UNFPA. The multilingual Fellow Citizen Communication Centre aims to provide refugees and migrants with the means to access municipal services. They have produced a "Welcome to Izmir" booklet in several languages (Turkish, Kurdish, Arabic, Persian, and French) with information on how everyone can access the services of the Izmir metropolitan municipality. In addition, Izmir metropolitan municipality has taken the initiative to organise training programmes to educate its staff on issues related to migration and refugees. The municipality's Justice and Equality Department is responsible for monitoring and implementing these activities:

We regularly organise training sessions for our colleagues on migration and refugee issues. These sessions focus on basic protection services. Our aim is to address and correct misconceptions, challenge prejudices, and highlight the importance of this issue as a fundamental right of the city. The principle of equality, municipal regulations, and fellowship are all our basis, as stated in Article 13 of the Municipal Law. We explain to our colleagues that this is not a charitable act, but something we must do when we visit neighbourhoods A and B. (Izmir, 3, Metropolitan Municipality)

During our fieldwork in Izmir, the Municipal Justice and Equality Department was running a project on hate speech. The aim of this project was to raise awareness of hate speech related to gender and gender identity, ethnic origin, language, and citizenship/migration issues. It also aimed to highlight the importance of inclusive policies in addressing these issues. According to the metropolitan municipality representative, the focus group meetings conducted as part of the project highlighted the intersectionality of discrimination in these four areas:

As a woman, there are times when you may face challenges in terms of your sense of security and belonging in the same neighbourhood. There may be similarities between being a refugee and being a Kurd, although they may vary depending on individual circumstances. We plan to document the results of these focus group studies and use them to develop a video project. (Izmir, 3, Metropolitan Municipality)

However, events organised with a rights-based approach can be disrupted because of growing poverty and the economic crisis. Therefore, the interviewee argued that both participatory social support programmes and human rights-based activities should be implemented simultaneously:

In times of severe economic crisis, the primary concern shifts to survival. At such times, basic needs seem to take precedence over everything else. As primary needs increase, rights receive less attention. People give up claiming their rights. (...) In such situations, institutions should allocate their efforts accordingly. For example, if I were to enter this household, it would be appropriate for the social services to enter first and offer all the help they can. There is no point in talking about human rights and equality in this neighbourhood. But there is also no point in waiting. The economic crisis triggered by Covid, and its subsequent escalation has had a profound impact on rights, leading to a significant setback. (Izmir, 3, Metropolitan Municipality)

On the other hand, the activities of the Izmir metropolitan municipality, which include migrants and refugees, are constrained by legislation and central government control. The Izmir metropolitan municipality is unable to provide services and support to irregular migrants. As the official we interviewed explained: "Currently, there are no legal regulations that allow us to provide services to undocumented migrants. Right now, there is migration from Central Africa to this region. The only services these people can benefit from are the lunchtime meals distributed by the Red Crescent." (Izmir, 3, Metropolitan Municipality). The official went on to explain that local governments face additional challenges due to pressure from central authorities:

We are under constant scrutiny by the Court of Accounts, which conducts a comprehensive and ongoing audit of our operations. For the past five years, this municipality has been under scrutiny. Many people have been questioned. As a result of the many problems that have arisen, the managers have become extremely strict in enforcing the rules. It is important for us to follow the law. (Izmir, 3, Metropolitan Municipality)

Izmir's metropolitan municipality was actively involved in working with UN agencies and various national CSOs to implement joint projects in support of migrants and refugees. According to the official we spoke to, the majority of EU funding is often given to "ready-made projects" and it is preferable for people who work directly with migrants to develop projects.

So maybe it makes more sense for us to create our own projects, at least that's how I see it in Turkey. Instead of imposing ready-made programmes on people without first determining their needs, we should consider their actual needs. Right now, we need to find out what

the needs of the target groups are and assess the situation together. As a local government representative, I suggest: "Let's create them together." Perhaps they see the public as a tool to achieve their goals, or they have a desire to implement these programmes in specific locations. In my opinion, most of the ready-made programmes are not very effective. (Izmir, 3, Metropolitan Municipality)

Gaziantep, one of the cities with the largest Syrian populations, is also actively engaged in substantial activities targeting migrants and refugees, led by the local government. Studies, such as the one by Özçürümez and Hoxca in 2023, have cited Gaziantep's metropolitan municipality as a model for migration governance at the local level.

In Gaziantep, we spoke with a senior official from the metropolitan municipality's Migration Department. He expressed their commitment to implementing an egalitarian approach that benefits both citizens and migrants and refugees. The official mentioned that their approach is based on Article 13 of the Municipal Law, which deals specifically with laws relating to fellow citizens. Although migration policy in Turkey is determined at the national level, it is important to note that migrants and refugees primarily interact with municipalities in their daily lives. This highlights the importance of local institutions in addressing the needs and concerns of these individuals:

When the Migration Management Department was established, Gaziantep's metropolitan municipality received significant backlash from those who believed that "managing migration is not the job of the municipality; it is a matter of national policy." (...) However, there is a need to have a proper management of this situation. This is because people arriving in the city may not be familiar with the details of Ankara, but they know the municipality and would seek help from it if they needed it. The municipality has become the main point of contact for migrants. Eventually, we realised that we were the most affected, although we lacked authority. (...) As a result, our basic philosophy, especially in social services, was established as follows: No municipal service should be segregated based on the distinction between host communities, Turkish citizens, migrants, or refugees. (Gaziantep, 11, Metropolitan Municipality)

Citing examples of how they have developed an egalitarian approach to municipal services, the same official said:

A person cannot get a concessionary card just because they are a migrant. However, a migrant over 65 has the same privileges as a Turkish citizen over 65. (...) Similarly, migrant students are entitled to the same discounts and rights as other students. (Gaziantep, 11, Metropolitan Municipality)

Our approach is to ensure that people who live in this city, regardless of their nationality (e.g., Syrian or Afghan), have access to the same discounts and benefits as Turkish citizens under the same conditions. (...) Migrants living here are not segregated from Turkish citizens. Women's services, children's services, and services for the disabled are available. (...) Therefore, individuals can access these services directly, without the need for an intermediary unit, and receive the service they need. (Gaziantep, 11, Metropolitan Municipality)

However, the services provided by local governments in the area of migration may be limited due to shortcomings in legislation and limited resources. The calculation of local government's share of general budget revenues takes into account the population within the municipal bound-

aries but does not include Syrians under temporary protection. In addition, many municipalities have mobile migrant populations (those registered in other cities or irregular migrants) residing within their borders, which are not accounted for in the calculations. When we inquired about this matter with an official at Gaziantep's metropolitan municipality, he provided the following explanation:

Municipalities involved in migration sometimes suffer significant backlashes. For example, during election seasons they may be criticised for "only working with Syrians." They say, "You do everything, and this municipality does nothing." But if individuals have clear responsibilities and duties, they can defend themselves by saying: "Political institutions give priority to votes. I must abide by the current legislation and work within that framework. Any other municipality would do the same, whether it's me or someone else." It would make our job a lot easier. (Gaziantep, 11, Metropolitan Municipality)

In situations where municipalities are reluctant to provide services due to the small population and there is a lack of services in this particular area, migrants have a valid argument when they express: "If I stay in Antep, I will have access to these services. If I go to Şanlıurfa, I will have access to different services. But when I visit Kırşehir, I find that there is nothing there." This creates a magnet effect in certain places. The people in charge of the municipality also have a valid argument for not wanting to get involved in this area. However, we argue that "if there is to be a reform or update of the Municipalities Law, basic tasks and responsibilities related to migration should also be assigned and funds from the central budget should be distributed based on the number of Turkish citizens and registered Syrians." This is a disadvantage. (...) At the end of the day, when we think about increasing the number of buses in transport, we take the entire population into account. When building new pavements, you cannot say: "Only Turks will use this pavement and not Syrians." (Gaziantep, 11, Metropolitan Municipality)

To overcome resource constraints, municipalities often work with CSOs or independently seek access to international funding. Interviews with local government representatives from Gaziantep, Konya, and Izmir provided examples of this.

In summary, this section has shown that some municipalities are increasingly adopting rights-based and egalitarian service practices within their local governments. However, limitations in legislation and insufficient resources can limit the scope of their services and activities. An additional concern that deserves attention following the conclusion of this fieldwork is the potential impact of increasing anti-migrant political rhetoric on municipalities in the run-up to the upcoming local elections.

Prejudice and Discrimination Against Migrants and Refugees

The qualitative fieldwork took place in the summer of 2022, a time when the economic crisis in Turkey was escalating. This period was approximately one year before the presidential and parliamentary elections in May 2023, in the runup to which political vows to restrict the rights of migrants and refugees became a mainstay of election campaigns. This context was reshaping the relationship between native and migrant and refugee communities.

In the previous sections of the qualitative research on employment, housing, education, and health, we identified specific instances of discrimination that migrants experienced both at an institutional level and in their daily lives. We also highlighted instances where migrants experienced a loss of rights. In contrast, this section focuses on the recent rise of anti-migrant sentiment and discourse, analysing its context, processes, and developments. This section is therefore structured around the key developments, relationships, and interactions highlighted in the interviewees' narratives.³⁴ Various conditions and developments have affected migrants and refugees, native communities, municipalities, civil society organisations, and other institutions. These include the sharing of urban space, the increasing impoverishment of broad sections of the population, the influence of anti-migrant attitudes in the political arena, and the inadequacy of current migration policies to meet the needs of these groups.

Rising discrimination as a result of the economic crisis and increased competition among the poor

In Turkey, the economic crisis initially triggered by the pandemic has put considerable pressure on living conditions. This crisis has led to an increase in unemployment, high inflation rates, increased cost of living, decline in real wages, and sudden and excessive rent hikes. Vulnerable groups, including pensioners, the unemployed, the working poor and students experience increasingly more economic troubles. Amid this economic hardship, there is a growing sentiment that migrants are to blame for economic problems such as joblessness. The fact that migrant labour is the cheapest segment of the labour market, and that labour-intensive industries rely on this cheap and informal labour, has led to a perception that migrant labour is a competitive factor for the unemployed. This situation exacerbates ethnic divisions in the labour force, leading to xenophobia towards migrants and refugees who share the same socio-economic status and living conditions as natives. During the qualitative research, anti-migrant perceptions and discourses especially towards were mentioned in many interviews:

"They should just go." "They are causing us harm." "They are damaging our country." "They are damaging our economy." Some people blame their (migrants') presence for the rising cost of living. (Konya, 12, CSO)

³⁴ The qualitative fieldwork involved interviews with a range of people, including experts, muhtars, local administrators, and CSO representatives. This approach allowed us to include the perspectives of these individuals and gain insights into the impact of discrimination. Regrettably, this study did not include the direct experiences and testimonies of the migrants themselves.

There used to be a labour market here in the morning. Kurds worked for 50 liras, Syrians for 20 liras and then Africans came and started working for 5 liras. The capitalists and the real estate agents are reaping the benefits of this situation, while some people express their frustration by saying: "Our jobs have been taken away from us." There's huge exploitation in this area. Rents are skyrocketing. There are three families living in a house that was never intended for that kind of occupancy, but the estate agent raises the rent so much that even Turks can no longer afford to rent it. (Izmir, 3, Metropolitan Municipality)

It's all about the economy, mainly the economy. Our people are complaining: "They buy too many tomatoes and that's why I'm getting poorer," because costs are rising and they're getting poorer. (...) "I cannot afford it," they say, adding "We have production (...) but they deplete it. They are preventing me from making a living," they say. (...) "They get the same coal aid as me, but they receive it with the taxes I pay," they say. (Gaziantep, 2, Muhtar)

During the pandemic, the increase in in-kind and cash assistance to the poor has led to various tensions between institutions and the native poor as they compare their welfare conditions with those of migrants. Inadequate public knowledge of the financial resources allocated to humanitarian assistance and support for migrants and refugees, coupled with a lack of transparency or the deliberate dissemination of false information by various parties, has led to scepticism and misconceptions about the sources of funding for these institutions and aid initiatives. In times of economic crisis, there is often a tendency to direct reactions against international organisations, civil society organisations, humanitarian aid agencies, and relevant government institutions:

Who funds us as civil society organisations is not widely known to the public. What is the source of funding for the provision of aid? Is the aid provided by Kızılay funded by the government, the state, or the EU? These facts are not widely known, and because they are not spelled out on social media or elsewhere, it is unclear what will happen to the refugees and how the situation will develop. Uncertainty reigns and there is a lack of clarity about certain policies, which makes them controversial. When things are unclear, everyone has a lot of questions and concerns. (Konya, 12, CSO)

There is a common perception that Syrian refugees with temporary protection status receive services and support funded by public resources, leading to a perception of privilege. This research also revealed that the misconception that Syrians are exempt from certain financial or bureaucratic obligations and that they are given privilege over the native poor population is shared by various segments of society, including some participants. This perception is particularly acute with regard to financial aid and economic support, with some interviewees going as far as to claim that "Syrians are privileged and prioritised, and the country's resources are directed towards migrants":

There is what I call a misconception. For example, they think that migrants receive services without queuing. There is also something like "she arrives after me, but she is in the queue before me." But the fact is that this person makes an appointment, and the others join the queue. So, the one with the appointment already has an hour set aside. The person making this statement is not thinking this way. (Konya, 12, CSO)

During the pandemic, Syrians were often seen roaming the streets. They were not fined, but Turks were. Arabs, including Syrians, were exempt from fines. It all started from there, you know (...) I have many files here. Fines were imposed on Turkish citizens, including road fines and administrative fines, but no fines were imposed on Syrians. (Gaziantep, 12, Muhtar)

There is a considerable amount of misinformation and allegations circulating in the public sphere. These include that the state provides services to migrants using taxes collected from citizens, that in-kind services and materials distributed by civil society organisations are paid for by public funds and institutions, that assistance to migrants is provided without conditions, that the state provides rent subsidies to migrants, that social integration assistance (SIA) provided to migrants is actually a salary, and that unemployment benefits are provided to migrants. Participants reported that although this situation is not new, it has become more acute in the wake of the pandemic and the economic crisis, leading to a new form of reaction, particularly towards Syrian refugees:

One thing persists. "They get their medicine for free, we pay for it." Everyone believes it. (Mardin, 15, CSO)

Natives are particularly outraged that migrants receive free medication from health centres. Even baby formula is free for them. What do you think a citizen would say after witnessing such a sight? (These are paid for with EU funds, right?) Yes, but the public doesn't know about it. (...) They see them getting ten boxes of baby food from a pharmacy and ask: "Why are you giving them this?" When the pharmacist replies, "They're free," what would you think? (...) When you cannot afford baby food for your own child, they get it for free. (Gaziantep, 2, Muhtar)

The notion that "the state is using taxpayers' money to help migrants" is often presented in a way that goes beyond this, comparing the two groups and suggesting that migrants enjoy certain privileges or advantages. The idea that migrant households enjoy a higher level of economic welfare than native households has gained considerable popularity. Some claim that migrant households receive unrestricted support from a wide range of institutions and that both in-kind and cash assistance end up being a source of income for these households. Furthermore, migrant households are often associated with higher household incomes due to the large number of people living and working in these households. Consequently, they are perceived as having fewer financial obligations to the state, such as taxes, fines, or debts, than the native population. Some participants went so far as to give specific examples of individuals or families they had met to illustrate how wealthy Syrians had allegedly become by acquiring properties over the years, despite not being able to legally buy property in Turkey:

The migrants have better living conditions because they receive a lot of support. The governorate provides them with SIA. They receive monthly per capita aid from the EU, and if they send their children to school, they also receive per child aid. Almost everyone in their household is employed and earns a salary. The combined household income is higher than any other household, including mine, in the neighbourhood. (Konya, 1, Muhtar)

"The government gives them a monthly salary, still takes care of them even when they are not working or provides them with accommodation and pay their rent." Many people think like that. They believe that the government does not take care of its own citizens, but it seems to take care of Syrians. (Konya, 12, CSO)

Aid is given to both the native and the migrant population. But if someone doesn't get it, it's possible that they didn't meet the requirements for distribution or they weren't qualified according to the process, but they still claim: "They gave it to them but not to me." They say, "Whether the Syrian meets the requirements or not, they gave it to them." They claim: "They have so many employees, while I have only one employee and I am retired." They claim: "Because I am retired, they don't give it to me, but to this Syrian." (Gaziantep, 2, Muhtar)

Institutional representatives also feel that the economic resourcing of activities and support for migrants have not been adequately communicated to the public and that there is a lack of information on this issue:

We had a children's celebration in the community centre on 23 April. The children do not differ in language, race, or colour. We cannot treat Turkish children, Afghan children, or Syrian children differently. We are not individuals who have grown up with that perspective. Nevertheless, there was a direct perception that "you are doing it again for the Syrians." Even elderly uncles would say that. We couldn't quite get across that "these funds come from completely different sources and are not made with the taxes you pay." I do not know if we have missed something or if they just do not want to understand. Unfortunately, something remains missing. (Konya, 13, CSO)

It is true that the perceptions and arguments surrounding different forms of support and humanitarian aid for migrants are often based on a lack of knowledge, misinformation, and manipulative influences. However, alongside these factors, there are also contradictions and problems arising from the fact that the aid system operates on a funds-based basis. These contradictions have the potential to create new divisions, particularly in settings where there is close proximity in terms of social class, such as neighbourhoods, schools, and workplaces, where individuals have similar levels of welfare:

They live either side by side or on different floors of the same building. They're both destitute, although they help each other out when they don't have bread and share their own. Then we, as civil society organisations, step in and say: "You are Syrian, and we will help you." The other woman, however, asks, "Why do you only help them? We are poor too. Why don't you help us?" In fact, our protection programme is the source of this discord. So, we say that this temporary protection status is actually creating ongoing problems. It wouldn't disturb the peace if you carry out a needs assessment and provide aid based on the needs of the underprivileged in both groups, and they will say: "They came and thanks to the Syrians I also get support." (Gaziantep, 1, CSO)

During the interviews conducted in Gaziantep, a representative of a civil society organisation with extensive experience of working with disadvantaged groups and a senior official of the metropolitan municipality, also with considerable experience, expressed their concerns about the ongoing system of assistance under temporary protection status. They emphasised that this system has created problems and divisions in the field. The aid in-kind and in cash, which is allocated by international organisations exclusively to migrants, to public institutions and civil society organisations, creates opposing positions between two groups that often share the same social class and inhabit the same space.

In an interview in Gaziantep, a CSO representative mentioned that after the initial arrival of migrants, there was a harmonious and cooperative atmosphere between the migrant population,

who settled in impoverished neighbourhoods, and the native population. However, the way in which the funding system has operated during the pandemic and the economic crisis have created an invisible divide between these two disadvantaged groups. Another interviewee explained the Jordanian government's approach, a country where a significant number of Syrian refugees have sought refuge, as follows:

Take the example of Jordan. The Jordanian government has a policy that whatever you do there, 50% of it has to be for Jordanian citizens. Otherwise, you must support those who need it. 50% of it must be for Jordanians or Palestinians living in Jordan. They say because my native population is also poor. (...) So the current system must move in that direction. Because, as I said, the system creates problems that keep accumulating. (Gaziantep, 1, CSO)

The previous paragraph highlights that the budget allocated to institutions, aid material, or any form of support that is not transferred to the native impoverished population due to the lack of a recording/inventory system is a problem for both organisations and individuals on the ground. Stakeholders who maintain regular contact with native communities, including community leaders and local government officials, try to avoid negative public reactions or duplication. They try to do this by distributing aid through CSOs or by using "discreet alternative methods" such as covert distribution.

Gaziantep's metropolitan municipality has developed a formula to address the problems and contradictions in impoverished neighbourhoods. They have presented this formula to the institutions with which they have established cooperation. According to the description given by the Gaziantep municipality official, these "well-intentioned efforts" could potentially pose a risk by creating "tension or even hostility" between the two communities living in the same neighbourhood, once these institutions leave the area. According to the official, the funding agencies initially rejected the municipality's proposal. Over time, however, efforts to establish project management that did not segregate different groups based on their needs and social class proved successful. As a result, the relevant institutions were convinced by the proposal. A model based on equality and rights has been developed for the distribution of aid and support, which prioritises fundamental rights and needs without relying on a native-migrant division, depending on the nature of the project:

We have made it very clear to the institutions that have approached us that our position is as follows: "If there is a person in need in this city, their nationality could be Turkish, Syrian, Afghan, or even Myanmar. That is not the point. Our primary criterion is not based on race, but on whether individuals are in need or not. That should be the focus." For example, certain institutions declined to work with us when we insisted on implementing this approach. They said, "We can't do that because we are also accountable to our donors, and the donors don't accept that." To which we said: "We think this is a valid argument. I suggest that you explain this to the donor at your next meeting. Maybe the split won't be exactly equal, like 50-50, but it could be 40-60 or even 30-70. At the very least we're not going to create conflict between those people." We come from there. Those people will continue to live there and face each other. (Gaziantep, 11, Metropolitan Municipality)

Izmir's metropolitan municipality reportedly also adopted a similar approach. One official explained their approach as follows:

Now, if it is written in the project that "(...) it will only be given to Syrians," (...) if you go to a school, the school can explain that (but) we didn't do that, and we never do that. In the municipality, any project, whether for natives or migrants, is always shared equally when it comes to providing aid. To upset this internal balance would have serious consequences, especially in the face of the alarming increase in poverty. (Izmir, 3, Metropolitan Municipality)

The economic crisis, ethnic disparities in employment opportunities and wages, and the international funding system for migrant assistance, which creates hidden and overt tensions between natives and migrants, are among the factors that exacerbate competition and discrimination between poor migrants and poor natives. Tensions are also exacerbated by a lack of awareness or manipulation of humanitarian aid and refugee assistance processes. In the next section, we will examine how the state of competition is intensified by the uncertainty surrounding temporary protection status and the implementation of populist measures in response to political pressure and influence.

Political construction of an anti-migrant discourse

At the time of the fieldwork, Turkey's critical 2023 presidential and parliamentary elections were less than a year away. The country was immersed in an electoral atmosphere due to the importance of these upcoming elections. In this context, migration became more prominent on the political agenda and politicians used populism to exploit the public reaction to migrants, thereby reshaping public sentiment towards m.

In the first years after Syrians arrived in Turkey, the official narrative portrayed them as "guests." Migration policies and discourses at the time focused on the idea that their stay was temporary and emphasised the importance of hospitality. The concept of temporariness was further emphasised by the "temporary protection" status granted to Syrians in 2014. In recent years, however, the rapid increase in the number of migrants residing in Turkey with short-term residence permits, the continued arrival of irregular migrants, and the realisation that Syrians' stay is not temporary have prompted a reaction. Interviewees often referred to the "high political, economic, and cultural [social] tensions in Turkey," and the combination of these factors soon pushed the migrant issue to the top of populist politicians' agendas. In the last year or two, the number of deportations and so-called "voluntary" returns of irregular migrants and Syrians have increased in this context:

Statements such as: "We have deported this number of people; we will not register anymore; everyone will return to their home country" are often made. There are also internal tensions in Turkey, both economic and cultural. Various factions see migrant communities as a threat. In addition, the large number of migrants in Turkey adds to the complexity of managing the process. (...) I also think that this discrimination and social tension is part of the reason why new registrations are not accepted and the procedure is so drawn out. (Izmir, 19, CSO)

Problems created by policies based on temporariness

In the first few years of Syrians' arrival, that is between 2011 and 2015, when they were fewer in numbers, native communities to some extent formed friendly relationships and showed solidarity and support towards them, according to interviewees. In Gaziantep, natives and migrants come together in poor neighbourhoods due to shared experiences of poverty. In Konya, relations between natives and migrants were based on notions of brotherhood and religious ties, with natives acting as hosts to newcomers. In Mardin, commonalities based on cultural proximity and kinship, fostered a sense of belonging. In Izmir, solidarity among Turkish and Syrian Kurds living in impoverished neighbourhoods was built on a shared language. These local interactions helped create some tenuous links between communities. Over time, however, these tenuous links have frayed:

In the beginning there was indeed that feeling. They were regarded as our guests. And there was a lot of that. But later, on a national level, the situation changed. Today there seems to be a certain prejudice or weariness. They used to be welcomed as our religious brethren, but now this sense of hospitality and religious brotherhood has been thrown aside. (Konya, 12, CSO)

It has not developed into a neighbourly relationship. When we have had the opportunity to visit other cities in the past, people have responded to our questions about their relationships with their neighbours by saying things like "We exchange greetings, they are good people, and we have no problems." When we asked about their relationships in more detail, we got answers like, "When we greet them, they respond with a hello." That's as far as it went. So, it's always been quite limited, always on an as-needed basis. It's almost like a regular shopping arrangement with a local grocer. (...) I think the prevailing view now is negative. While it may not be entirely accurate to make a blanket statement about every neighbourhood, we have knowledge of past events that occurred in Altındağ, Ankara. Later we heard similar things in different neighbourhoods here in Torbalı. (...) The overall outlook has taken a turn for the worse, with previously neutral sentiments now leaning heavily towards the negative. This is particularly evident in the political sphere, where the language used has become increasingly negative. This could also be caused by the current economic crisis, as refugees are among the most vulnerable people and are targeted in times of crisis. In my opinion, political discourse has played a significant role in intensifying, spreading, and perpetuating this hateful rhetoric, both as a foreign policy tool and as a means of influencing domestic politics. (Izmir, 4, CSO)

In deprived neighbourhoods there is still a sense of solidarity among residents, largely due to shared language and other commonalities. Currently, the level of solidarity has decreased significantly due to the sharp increase in poverty and soaring rents. (Izmir, 3, Metropolitan Municipality)

Yes, it is over. It was there at the beginning, but it is no longer there. In the beginning, when Syrians arrived, Turks would visit them and ask kindly, "Is there anything you need?" They would give them anything, including carpets and blankets. The Syrians ended up throwing away their blankets and sheets when they were worn out. Turkish women who witnessed this expressed their disapproval, saying, "They are ungrateful." They said, "I gave my best blankets to the Syrians, but they threw them away." (...) Now all eyes are on them with disapproval. (Gaziantep, 2, Muhtar)

Programmes designed to address the immediate and essential humanitarian needs of refugee groups arriving from Syria were initially based on the assumption that these groups would return to their home countries in the short term. This assumption also delayed the development of durable and long-term migration policies. As noted earlier in this study, the 2016 agreement between the EU and Turkey implicitly acknowledged that Syrians would not be able to return to their country in the near future. Nevertheless, the concept and discourse of temporariness continued. With technical and financial support from the EU, programmes were established, mainly in the areas of social assistance, education, and health. However, as discussed earlier in the study, it is important to note that a comprehensive set of policies for the integration of migrants and refugees has not been developed. This situation is also highlighted by civil society representatives.

A civil society representative in Konya stated that state policies aimed at inclusive social integration have recently been introduced, but it is too late to achieve social integration at this point. According to the interviewee, the necessary measures for the social integration of migrants, including many who have become citizens, have not been implemented in a reasonable time. The increasing density of the migrant population has made it more difficult to implement these efforts effectively due to limited capacity. A representative of Gaziantep's metropolitan municipality also mentioned that programmes for Syrians were originally developed with the assumption that their stay would be temporary. However, it was only later realised that this approach was inadequate when it became clear that they would not return:

As a municipality, we faced significant challenges at that time. Since 2012 – when we first felt it – our basic strategy has been to try to provide services on an equal basis. During that time, there was a short-term humanitarian objective. That was our goal because we believed that “people will return.” What were these efforts? Large numbers of people were crossing the border. We made immediate efforts to find suitable accommodation and to ensure that everyone had three hot meals a day. We also arranged for baby food and nappies for the children. Those were the kinds of services. At the end of 2012, a school was set up specifically for Syrian children. In 2013, a second one was opened to accommodate the children who stayed here when the need arose. “They will be gone in six months,” we predicted. We had planned for that, but six months is a very long time for a child to be out of school. Two temporary education centres were established. They followed the Syrian curriculum. These activities may not be equivalent, as Turkish citizens did not need this. At that time, we were working according to identified needs. However, during the 2014-2015 period, we realised that people would not be able to return, even if they wanted to, because the environment they once knew does not exist. They currently have no desire to return. Ten years have passed since the beginning of the crisis. A Syrian who arrived in this city ten years ago has become more of a resident of Antep than someone who was born here eight or seven years ago. They have spent a lot more time here. (Gaziantep, 11, Metropolitan Municipality)

The representative of the CSO in Gaziantep highlighted that the narrative of temporariness is contradictory for both the natives and migrants and refugees. The main drawback of humanitarian aid and protection policies, as implemented by CSOs and international institutions under temporary protection policies, is the lack of focus on addressing and empowering the current and future needs of vulnerable groups. He argued that the uncertainty and lack of a clear future perspective within the temporary protection status hinders migrants' attachment to the “place where they live” as well as the attachment between the natives and migrants:

The issue of temporariness, in particular temporary protection, contributes to the limited interaction between these two communities. I have always said this. Yes, the refugee community lives here and has established its own order, but they do not feel rooted. Every day there is someone on television who says: "We will send them back." As a result, within their own community, people are more reluctant to interact with their neighbours because they have grown self-sufficient. There is also a lot of anti-refugee sentiment in society. People are genuinely scared, and we see this a lot. (Gaziantep, 1, CSO)

Politics breeds discrimination ahead of the 2023 elections

The discussion about Syrian refugees being referred to as "guests" and "temporary" re-emerged in the public and political sphere, especially as the presidential and parliamentary elections drew near. Some opposition political parties have stressed the importance of putting an end to hospitality and have called for refugees to be repatriated to their respective countries. This renewed debate has again entered the public and political sphere. Several participants spoke about an increase in hate speech and exclusion and the "division between communities." In particular, the statements of anti-migrant political actors, the manipulative influence of social media, and the increasing prevalence of anti-migrant sentiments in the public sphere have all played a role. During this period, the possibility of a change in political power or a shift in the government's stance on migration intensified reactions towards migrants, affecting their daily lives in different cities:

It would have been easier if we had done it at time when we said, "They are our guests." The idea was that they were our guests, our fellow believers. Now the guest mentality no longer exists. Everybody says: "Hospitality is over." (...) They are saying, "Hospitality has ended, they must leave." There is also the question: "Why aren't they being returned? The war is over, so they should go." I don't often see that kind of language directed at Afghans when we look at Afghanistan. I think that the continued influence of the Taliban is an important factor that contributes to the lower visibility of Afghans compared to Syrians. (Konya, 12, CSO)

Regrettably, recent statements by politicians have caused a significant rift between these two communities. The words of those in positions of authority. A single statement has the power to be a catalyst for unrest in Turkey. Social media plays an important role in misleading people. It constantly spreads provocative messages and attempts to generalise isolated incidents. Currently, it seems highly unlikely that these two communities will find a way to reconcile their differences. Let's be realistic, despite what others may say. (Konya, 5, CSO)

I feel that discrimination, ostracism, and exclusion have increased dramatically in Izmir over the past two years. (...) With the upcoming elections, I see a widespread spread of hate speech through the rhetoric of the media and political parties. I feel it when I use the metro, when I take the ferry, and when I observe how reluctant our visitors are to go out. (Izmir, 14, CSO).

The statements made by public institutions in charge of migration issues, such as "no new registrations are being accepted at the moment," "migrants will be returned to their countries in certain conditions or stages," "preparations and plans for deportation are underway," "migrants will be deported," and "statistics of deported persons will be shared with the public," have heightened fear and pressure among migrants.

These declarations have triggered a series of new confrontations. The native population is now increasing the pressure on the Syrians. They say: "We will report you and you will be sent back to Syria." (Mardin, 15, CSO)

They said: "You will leave. We will send you back." (...) Whenever they were told: "You will leave," a sense of unease would arise among them [Syrians]. When [President] Tayyip Erdoğan said, "We are preparing to send back a million people and we will do it," a sense of tension filled the air, and everyone fell silent. Three days later, however, he said: "I will not send them back. These are Ansar and Muhajir [Islamic terms denoting the Madina inhabitants who accepted Islam and those Muslims who migrated from Mecca]" all of them took off [havalandı] again. (Gaziantep, 2, Muhtar)

Families are disturbed. Also, for some reason, they [Syrians] hardly sleep at night. They get very little sleep. Even the neighbours are complaining. (...) The police station is in touch with us. The police also issue warnings. The Syrians are afraid of the police. They are not as relaxed as they were in the beginning. (...) They are obliged to inform the immigration authorities of their place of residence and to provide proof of it. There was no such obligation before, but now there is. (...) They know that under the new laws, if they make a mistake or commit a crime, they could be deported to another country. So, they are not as relaxed as they used to be. (Izmir, 8, Muhtar)

The simultaneity of government initiatives and programmes aimed at integrating migrants and refugees and discourses about "sending migrants back" can cause migrants and refugees to feel insecure and reduce the impact of other integration initiatives:

The state's policy seems somewhat hypocritical. How so? The Presidency for Migration Management implements social integration projects because it receives funding and support for this purpose. On the other hand, the government has said: "We will send the Syrian refugees back." If you plan to send me back, please do not implement the social integration project on my behalf. But if I'm staying, then go ahead and put it into practice. (Istanbul, 4, CSO)

The representative of a CSO from Mardin explained that the atmosphere surrounding the 2023 elections had affected the perception of coexistence in Mardin. Before the pandemic, migrants and natives had made significant progress in living together, thanks to their shared language and cultural ties. However, with the pandemic and the upcoming 2023 elections, the political discussions about "voluntary or forced repatriation," "the so-called security of Syria," and "temporary visits of migrants to Syria during holidays" have had an impact on the residents of Mardin. As a result, there has been a shift away from the concept of long-term coexistence with migrants. Instead, they tend to believe that migrants are not permanent residents of Mardin.

During this period of escalating anti-migrant discourse, institutions that interact with migrants, especially municipalities, have faced pressures such as the "fear of losing votes and citizens' reactions." There are reports that political cadres, in particular, have chosen to distance themselves from the field or stay in the background because of these concerns. The increase in discriminatory practices can be attributed to the rise in anti-migrant attitudes and hate speech observed over the past two to three years. According to a representative of a CSO in Izmir, local companies are reluctant to hire Syrians, especially for white-collar positions,

in their vocational training and employment initiatives. Similarly, a representative of a civil society organisation in Konya mentioned that landlords in the area are refusing to rent their properties to migrants. They are also putting more pressure on existing tenants to leave, even if there are ongoing contracts. Even Arabic signs aimed at migrants in Izmir are met with resistance, according to one interviewee, because of rising Islamist and conservative political concerns. On the other hand, in Konya, which initially provided support and assistance to the migrant groups, there are conservative segments that prefer to redirect religious donations or assistance to natives instead. The situation is similar in Izmir:

Someone comes to us and says, "Don't give it to these people!" We can't do that. We ignore the identity of people, wherever they are. But we cannot argue against that person either. Prejudices exist. We can't break them. For example, someone makes a donation and says: "Give it to the Turks" and adds: "I don't want it to go to the Syrians." (...) The soup kitchen uses these donations. At least they give it to a Turkish person. (Izmir, 10, CSO)

The result of the rise in discriminatory language and hate speech has been an increase in anti-migrant street violence, an escalation of tensions between the native population and migrants at the local level, and, perhaps more "disturbingly," a perception that violence against migrants is becoming more socially acceptable or justifiable:

Fights can break out in Çayırbaşı. Last year, several clients came and reported the matter. There was a situation in Karatay recently that caused tension. (Konya, 12, CSO)

There have been reports of raids on the homes of young, single, or cohabiting men, resulting in fatalities. It almost seems okay! As if it were not a crime, it seems acceptable to attack them, even if it means killing or injuring them. It's as if someone who values their country and nation would do this. (...) They do not want them. Why don't they want them? What are the true reasons? "I don't want them, and I don't want to see them!" But have they affected you personally? Have you ever had any contact with them? Absolutely not! They are just repeating this narrative mindlessly. We are heading in a very dangerous direction. (...) It creates an atmosphere as if these discourses are harmless and permissible. I think it is extremely dangerous. (Izmir, 4, CSO)

The observations highlight how attempts by public authorities to relocate migrants from troubled neighbourhoods, and in some cases send them to removal centres to "appease natives," inadvertently contribute to legitimising street violence. This approach also becomes a means of repressing migrants, as mentioned above:

In Gaziantep, Izmir and various other cities and neighbourhoods, the authorities always take immediate action when incidents occur. Refugees are moved out of these districts and this action is presented as a publicly announced solution. This gives the impression that "we have the freedom to do what we want." "They will be ousted whether we attack, murder, or expel them." I think we are currently moving towards a very dangerous situation. (Izmir, 4, CSO)

We remember the incident at the Somali restaurant in Ankara. The discrimination was clear for everyone to see. (...) The man is a victim. He was a victim of racism. But a deportation order was issued against him. He faces racism, becomes a victim, and is ultimately

deported. This is a bad thing. The government should be supporting the victim and the refugee, but unfortunately, they are choosing to deport him instead. These decisions effectively give power to those who perpetrate racism and discrimination. It further empowers them. There are extremely dangerous situations. (Istanbul, 4, CSO)

In Turkey, framing the presence of Syrian refugees as temporary creates numerous problems for the natives, institutions, and the migrants themselves. Political actors who promote anti-migrant sentiments and narratives contribute to discrimination and negative reactions against migrants. This in turn puts considerable pressure on various institutions, including civil society and local governments. Another form of exclusionary language and behaviour towards migrants is manifested in urban spatial encounters and daily interactions, resulting in the marginalisation and stigmatisation of migrants in urban space.

The marginalisation of migrants in urban and shared public spaces

Research conducted in predominantly poor, working-class neighbourhoods where encounters between migrants and natives take place has revealed practices of urban marginalisation and labelling. Neighbourhoods with high concentrations of migrants face stigmatisation from various sources, including the media, bureaucracy, politics, and even in everyday interactions (see: Wacquant, 2012). Migrants are seen as factors that make their communities “dangerous,” “dirty,” and “lawless.” The discourses and imageries that have emerged from urban transformation and transformation policies since the mid-2000s, particularly those targeting gecekondu settlements and old city centres slated for transformation, are also manifest in migrant neighbourhoods. These spatial images and labelling languages (Kaya, 2013) position these areas as epicentres of physical and social pollution, underdevelopment, urban threats, and crime, referring to them as “urban sores,” “slums,” and “dangerous places.” This discourse is used in relation to neighbourhoods with high concentrations of migrants.

In all the cities where the research was carried out, it was found that spaces such as parks, which are conceived as places of encounter and sharing, especially for women and children, can become spaces of segregation between natives and migrants. Syrian refugees living in cramped, small, and substandard dwellings rely heavily on open spaces such as parks. They adapt their use of these spaces according to their living conditions and daily needs. On the other hand, the native population tends to distance itself from these spaces or avoid interacting with them. The participants emphasised that urban public spaces such as parks, which are intended to facilitate voluntary interaction and socialisation, can unfortunately become spaces that promote segregation rather than connections and interactions:

There are certain parks, such as Alaaddin Hill and Gedavet Park, which everyone visits. However, when there is a large presence of migrants, especially Syrian refugees, the local Turkish population tends to avoid these areas. (Konya, 1, Muhtar)

In Konya there is a place called Kültürpark. It is often used by migrants. Alaaddin Hill is also used. Turkish people go there too, but from what I've seen and what they've said, they feel uncomfortable when there are too many migrants and don't want to be there.

Unfortunately, they do not meet in common spaces because of this problem. But, as I said, there must be close contact. They should either be neighbours in the same neighbourhood, classmates in school, or in the same class in a course. Otherwise, they are not willing to have close contact. (Konya, 9, CSO)

Syrians are also frequent users of these spaces. If you visit this place in the evening, you will see people enjoying their meals and making tea. Hookahs were once available, but they have been banned. There is a tradition of using public spaces, but unfortunately it does not encourage voluntary interaction. Turkish people, for example, find it very disturbing. They claim that Syrians have taken over the parks. (Gaziantep, 1, CSO)

In cities such as Gaziantep and Konya, interactions in public spaces often involve natives actively avoiding areas with high concentrations of migrants, or migrants encountering efforts to prevent them from entering these spaces. Municipal authorities have received feedback from citizens expressing concern about migrants' use of parks. A representative of Gaziantep's metropolitan municipality responded to these complaints by stating that they are actively working to address the issue by developing new park areas:

When I first assumed office, the most common migration-related complaint we received was about the use of parks. People used to complain that "they use the parks too much. We can't sleep." Today, we have largely solved this problem. Firstly, we have created brand new parks, which have been crucial in providing this service to the community. Another factor is that people started working. If someone starts work at eight in the morning, they cannot stay in the park until two or three in the afternoon. Nevertheless, we often hear about this problem in the summer. We haven't felt it yet, but many families have got together because of the economic crisis. (...) In Gaziantep, rents have skyrocketed in recent years. For example, there are three families somehow living in one apartment. The summers in Gaziantep are known for their intense heat. Using air conditioning in the summer poses its own challenges, especially when there is an electricity problem. In such situations, people use the parks. (Gaziantep, 11, Metropolitan Municipality)

A similar issue arises in the sharing of streets between native and migrant populations living in the same neighbourhood. While neighbourhoods can be places where children come together and share based on "play," there are also neighbourhoods where parents do not want their children to interact with migrant children. As noted in the education section of this report, the segregation between the native and migrant populations in schools is also evident in neighbourhoods:

The children no longer play together. Instead, they are each immersed in their own world. Syrian migrants have stopped interacting, and Turks curse all the way to the top (Gaziantep, 2, Muhtar).

Children do not learn Turkish; they speak their mother tongue. There is a lack of interaction between Turkish children and migrant children, and even between migrant children themselves when it comes to playing together. There is also a lack of neighbourly interaction between women. People tend to form neighbourly relationships with people from their own country. (Konya, 4, Muhtar)

The marginalisation of migrants in everyday urban life is perpetuated by a discourse of labelling, generalisation, and discrimination. This discourse primarily targets Syrians, who make up the largest group within the migrant population, followed closely by Afghan migrant men. The increased visibility and larger population of Syrians, as well as their concentration in certain areas, has led to discriminatory language being directed at them. This discrimination is based on the belief or fear that Syrians are more likely to settle and stay permanently than other migrant groups. In addition, discrimination is primarily directed at Syrians with lower levels of education and economic disadvantage, often perpetuated through cultural and physical stereotypes. It is important to note that individuals living in middle-class neighbourhoods, who have greater social and cultural capital, may not match the characteristics associated with discrimination as described here. Furthermore, foreign students and groups from Ukraine in higher education experience less urban marginalisation because they are perceived as more civilised in the sense of being “urban, western, and modern”:

Indeed, the profile of the migrant is important. If they are highly educated and well-dressed, you might run into them in a café without anyone being bothered. Otherwise, we don't usually meet these people. I rarely see them in cafés, but I see them more often on the street. (Konya, 9, CSO)

But perhaps this is what society expects. In Istanbul, Ukrainians arrived and started picking up litter. This news was reported, and it became a phenomenon like: “Look, the Ukrainians have arrived, their level of civilisation is obvious, at least they're picking up litter as a sign of gratitude.” What have we seen from Syrians in the last ten years? This is their perspective. (Konya, 12, CSO)

In several of the accounts given by the interviewees, it was observed that a biased vocabulary had been created on everyday urban life. The narrative that the native population was initially welcoming, but that recent waves of migration have shattered the notion of the “reasonable migrant” was also emphasised in such accounts. Thus, according to this narrative, while the earlier, smaller migrant communities or groups with residence permits, such as students, were often described as “quiet” and “docile,” later arrivals, particularly Syrian refugees, do not meet the criteria for acceptance as “reasonable migrants”:

As I mentioned earlier, Sahibiata was a place where people of different races and nations used to live together. But there were only three or five of them, so they didn't attract much attention. But now they have suddenly started to appear in groups. We noticed a change in the way people dressed in the streets, a change in the way they talked in the parks, and a noticeable difference in their behaviour. I think there was a significant reaction to the Syrians because their population was significantly larger. It was a significant migration. (Konya, 13, CSO)

Somalis, for example, are well-behaved people. They follow the rules and regulations. They do not get into fights or conflicts with others. They are individuals who mind their own business and abide by the law. (Konya, 4, Muhtar)

For example, natives often ask: “Did we ever react when they (previous migrants) arrived? Did they cause any problems?” We often hear this. “They never caused any problems,” they

claim. "They lived with us for years." But they were a small group. Years ago, there were Somalis living in Sahibiata. They didn't attract much attention. We saw them and went on with our lives. I don't think anyone attracts attention because it's a separate issue, but society has this idea and unfortunately people do. They say, "They came too, and we didn't mind." But now we are talking about a large group. Migrants are now a significant part of the population. How many Somalis were there, a few or thousands? (Konya, 9, CSO)

In neighbourhoods or urban areas where Syrians make up the majority of the population, migrants often become the focus of urban tensions. This is mainly due to the perception that they have not fully adapted to "urban life" in these areas. In the context of everyday urban life, certain cultural behaviours are often unfairly stigmatised as criminal or problematic. In addition, migrants are often singled out as the cause of insecurity and unease in urban areas. This perception includes generalisations, such as of large Syrian families and overcrowded houses, young men in groups on the streets (smoking hookah, walking together, sitting together), being perceived as dirty and untidy (throwing rubbish on the street or littering), making noise and staying up late, lacking proper eating and hygiene habits, enjoying public spaces without respecting the rules, and driving without a licence. These generalisations suggest that migrants, especially those living in the same neighbourhood, do not respect the norms and regulations of urban life:

They have no food or hygiene culture. They do not follow the rules. They leave rubbish on the streets late at night. They do not keep to the rubbish collection schedule. Although it was difficult, I managed to teach the natives. The migrants show no respect. The natives are very unhappy with the current situation. They continue to make noise until late at night. Nobody used to put their rubbish on the street late in my street. In some other streets, people dispose of their rubbish by throwing it in the backyards of the rear alleys. They do not keep their homes clean, which causes unpleasant odours and other problems. The neighbourhood is currently experiencing an infestation of woodlice. The number of woodlice has increased, and residents complain about them daily. (Konya, 1, Muhtar)

They pass through here; these people are rude. They do not fit in well with our cultural norms. They have lived comfortably. (...) There is a cultural difference. They sit here and casually smoke a hookah in front of the door. And a Turkish man who walks by with his daughter or his wife would not take it. They speak first in Turkish and then switch to Arabic, which might upset him because of the language change. He might ask, "Why are you drinking in the middle of the street?" You see, we are a bit shy. Even if we drink alcohol, we hide it so that no one sees. But I have noticed that these people often have energy drinks with them. (Gaziantep, 2, Muhtar)

It's nothing new, it's been going on for about a year, so it's not something new. I'm sure you've noticed the Syrians on the beaches (...). Everything they do becomes a crime. If they mourn, mourning becomes a crime; if they do not mourn, or if they end their mourning, that becomes a crime. However, I think that the issue of sharing public spaces has been around for a long time. It is not something new. (Izmir, 4, CSO)

"You talk too loud," "you have too many children," or something like that. No matter what kind of theft happens in the neighbourhood, Syrians are always implicated. (...) They don't even tolerate them listening to music. (Mardin, 15, CSO)

In neighbourhoods where there are significant numbers of Syrian residents, the rise of Syrian shopkeepers and migrants who rely on these businesses for their daily needs has been met with disapproval from natives. According to some interviewees, this situation is perceived as contributing to the ghettoization of Syrians and further isolating them within their community:

They don't buy from Turkish businesses. They tend to prefer businesses run by their own citizens. We don't have that. For example, if they need to buy something or dry food, they wouldn't buy it from a Turk, they would go to a Syrian shop, even if it is far away. (Gaziantep, 4, Muhtar)

They do not want to support Turkish businesses. They send the money they earn back to their families in Syria. They prefer to shop in shops owned by Syrians. They run all kinds of shops selling different things. (Konya, 4, Muhtar)

For example, if they go to a supermarket, it's a Syrian-owned supermarket. They can speak Arabic there when they buy something. There is no need to speak Turkish. They go to hairdressers. These Syrian-owned salons and shops are everywhere. (Konya, 8, Healthcare Worker)

This discourse on everyday practices has become increasingly harsh and has even evolved into a narrative that identifies migrants as a threat to public and national security and contributes to the production of an image of potential urban criminality. According to some interviewees, migrants are accused of harassing women, and even activities that are considered normal forms of enjoyment, such as listening to music or having a picnic, are considered luxuries for a community that has fled war. In addition, the ability of migrants to visit their home countries during the Eid period has raised the question of why they could not return, and specifically, the departure of young migrant men from their home countries is often questioned in terms of their "masculinity" and "patriotism." Finally, there have been claims that if the Syrians were to become permanent residents, this would potentially disrupt Turkey's demographics. It is also worthy of note that some of the muhtars have expressed these views in interviews:

At a meeting attended by Syrian opinion leaders, CSOs, and local representatives, it was openly discussed that there had been incidents of theft and sexual assault involving Syrians. They also claimed that Syrians disturb the peace by talking loudly in parks and that they don't know how to sleep properly, staying awake until one in the morning, which disturbs the natives who are used to sleeping at a reasonable hour. These statements have been made by the local authorities. (Mardin, 15, CSO)

There is much to be said about the Syrians. I mean, we are a nation of warriors. We are the descendants of the Ottomans, our ancestors. I have always said that if war broke out in my homeland, I would choose to stay rather than leave and come to this place. However, circumstances led them to leave their homeland and seek refuge here. That is why there is a reaction. Why did you decide to leave your country and come here? You left everything behind and now you live comfortably in your new place. I think there is a reaction because of that. (...) People say "we remained steadfast during the coup attempt on 15 July. Let them be steadfast too. Let them fight there, protect their nation, and take their families with them." There is an intense reaction to this situation here. (Konya, 12, CSO)

I just came in. There was a mother who had five children and was expecting her sixth.

There was a child in the car when a Turkish man noticed and asked, "What's going on here? Are they reproducing at such a high rate?" In the future, this will be a problem for us. Currently, no one is afraid of those who have already arrived. They fear the offspring that will come later. In the evening, around 7:30 or 8, you can see a lot of young people on the streets. (Gaziantep, 2, Muhtar)

They also have a strong penchant for enjoyment. For example, we are natives of Gaziantep. This is not a place for a picnic, but rather a place where I've never been before. I ask: "When did you discover this place? When did you come here? You came from the war." They quickly developed a love of exploring new places and having a good time. For example, they sit and socialise until the early hours of the morning, usually around two or three in the morning. (Gaziantep, 4, Muhtar)

As attitudes towards migrants and refugees become harsher and prejudices increase, some argued that they are an "uneducable, ignorant community" and that only strict disciplinary systems should be implemented. It was the muhtars who expressed this view:

There is no neighbourliness. It cannot exist. They are very ignorant. They lack understanding and choose to feign ignorance. They do things, but they know how to avoid responsibility. I think they are extremely dishonest. We welcomed them wholeheartedly when they arrived. Everyone contributed and we offered our help. But now they are no longer guests. We are completely alienated from them. We have tried to help them buy goods and find a place to live. But their behaviour has become demanding and confrontational. In the past, people would often come and ask for coal by asking, "Do you have any coal?" Now they ask, "Where is my coal?" (Konya, 1, Muhtar)

If they gave me the authority, I would discipline every one of them. Have you seen the young people here in the evening, for example? If I had the support of the police, I would strongly advise them not to stay here at this late hour. This is the entrance to the neighbourhood, open to everyone. You have to leave, there are benches on the other side of the street, sit there instead of sitting on the street. Don't leave your drinks here, throw them in the rubbish. Get organised because the public are getting more and more annoyed with them for throwing things on the ground. I would put them all in order. Don't leave rubbish outside, I send the rubbish truck out at nine o'clock. I make sure the neighbourhood is tidy. But everyone is in the habit of littering the streets. They even throw their rags from high up. (...) The people of Gaziantep are getting irritated. "I..." they say, "I take responsibility for sweeping in front of my own door," they say. "A child comes, eats sunflower seeds and throws shells on the ground, and the mother doesn't say anything," they say. (Gaziantep, 2, Muhtar)

This study has documented various discriminatory practices faced by migrants and refugees, which are discussed in different sections. The focus in this section was on the growing discrimination and exclusion faced by migrants and refugees, particularly in relation to the social, political, and economic conditions experienced in recent years. Economic crisis and competition among the impoverished, coupled with uncertainties surrounding migration policies and practices, have now become integral parts of the domestic political agenda. Furthermore, the marginalisation of migrants in urban areas not only perpetuates existing discrimination, but also changes the dynamics between the native population and migrants.

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

Through the Migration and Social Participation in Turkey project we collected a comprehensive dataset using quantitative and qualitative research methods between June and October 2022. The study looked specifically at the social participation of migrants, refugees, and Turkish citizens in both work and everyday life. The research findings from the analysis of quantitative and qualitative data have been reported separately in the previous two sections.

This final section summarises and discusses the quantitative and qualitative findings together and offers a series of policy recommendations based on these findings.

In the first phase of the research, extensive quantitative data was collected in 38 neighbourhoods in 17 provinces of Turkey that have experienced significant migration, where Syrians have settled, and where working-class populations reside. Data was collected through a fully structured questionnaire administered to a sample of 3,866 individuals aged 18-49, including 1,933 Turkish nationals, 1,427 Syrians, and 506 other migrants. Respondents were also asked about the people living in their households, resulting in a dataset comprising 12,164 individuals, including 5,514 Syrians, 1,179 other migrants, and 5,471 Turkish nationals living in 3,866 households.

In the second phase of the study, qualitative research was conducted in four selected cities (Gaziantep, Izmir, Konya, and Mardin) out of the 17 provinces where the quantitative research was conducted. In these four cities, extensive data was collected using qualitative techniques. In addition, to contribute to the thematic structure of the qualitative report, a series of interviews were conducted in Istanbul with specialists from institutions in the fields of working life, health, and education. As per the research design, the interviews were not conducted with migrant or native individuals, but rather with representatives of institutions and civil society organisations (CSO) with knowledge of the working life, housing, health, education, social rights, and social support services for migrants and refugees in these cities.

When the quantitative and qualitative data from the research are combined, what is the picture that emerges? The main finding of this study is this: migrants and refugees have become a part of Turkish society. They actively participate in the labour force; if they are legal residents, they can benefit from health services to a certain extent; and their children have the right to basic education. Despite challenges such as low wages, limited access to education, and inadequate housing, migrants continue to participate actively in society to varying degrees. Many of the problems faced by migrants and refugees are also faced by native living in the same neighbourhoods. Both native residents and migrants often expressed concerns about the challenges they face in finding employment, securing housing, and accessing healthcare services. Moreover, according to the quantitative findings of this study, native respondents are even more dissatisfied than Syrians with certain aspects of their current situation.

However, there are two major factors that delimit the social integration of Syrians, as well as other migrants and refugees, and which also differentiate them from the native working classes living in the same neighbourhoods. One of the main challenges is the presence of structural

problems in various sectors, including education, the labour market, and healthcare. Some systems discriminate against and marginalise individuals and groups based on their migration status, while in other cases there are structural issues affecting the delivery of services. Yet, one of the most worrying factors is the prejudice and sometimes institutionalised discrimination that migrants face. While it is true that certain groups are included or integrated into these systems, discrimination can still hinder their progress and marginalise or exclude them from these structures. Escalating anti-migrant political rhetoric and administrative practices have impacted on various aspects of migrants' lives, from obtaining residence permits, securing access to temporary and international protection, access to education and healthcare, housing, and employment, to increased administrative detention orders and deportations.

With the support and financial contributions of the EU, structures aimed at the integration of migrants (such as education and healthcare projects, social integration activities, social assistance projects, vocational training, etc.) have led to the perception among many members of Turkish society that migrants are granted special privileges. Considering the conceptual discussion in the introduction to the report, this situation highlights the need to re-conceptualise social participation, harmonisation, cohesion or integration (whatever we call it) by viewing society as a whole, and to develop policies accordingly. The key findings of the study are analysed below, based on the quantitative and qualitative data derived from the research, together with some policy recommendations.

Key findings

Of the quantitative research respondents aged 18-49, two-thirds are actively engaged in income-generating activities. However, a comparison of the gender distribution of the three groups shows that only a small proportion of female participants are in the labour market, with the highest proportion among native women and the lowest proportion among Syrian women. Although the vast majority of individuals in the three samples are in paid employment, the proportion of self-employed individuals is relatively low in each group. However, it is lowest among non-Syrian migrants and highest among the native Turkish citizens.

When analysing the employment status of household members by age group, Syrian households with individuals aged 7-17 have a working rate of 4%. This compares with 3% for other migrants and 1.7% for the Turkish citizens. Analysing employment data by age group not only raises concerns about child labour, but also highlights the fact that migrants make up a significant proportion of the younger labour force.

During the survey, all respondents were asked to provide information on their income. Although many individuals opted not to answer this question, the responses received highlight a notable difference between migrants and natives during the period June-August 2022, when the quantitative research was conducted. The three groups are ranked according to their average monthly household income as follows: 7,586 Turkish Liras for Turks, 4,329 Turkish Liras for Syrians and 4,994 Turkish Liras for non-Syrian migrants. About half of the Syrian population in Turkey has a household income below 4,000 Turkish Liras. A significant finding is that around two-thirds of native households with an income below 4,000 Turkish Liras have only basic literacy or have not completed school. However, the proportion of Syrian households

earning less than 4,000 Turkish Liras per month is less than a third for all levels of education. In other words, while the income of natives increases with their level of education, the income of Syrians doesn't follow this trend. That is, even Syrians with professional qualifications are found in low-paid jobs.

Looking at the different sources of household income, wages are the largest source of income for all three groups. Almost 25% of Syrians rely on social assistance as part of their income, while the rate of social assistance receipts is significantly lower for both Turkish nationals and other migrants. The significant rate of Syrians receiving social assistance is likely due to the EU-funded social integration assistance (SIA) programme. Among Turkish nationals, the proportion of people who include a pension as a source of household income is particularly noteworthy. In summary, although Syrians receive social assistance, wages remain the main source of income for all three sample groups.

The qualitative research, which sought the views of employers' organisations, trade unions, and CSOs, shows that in terms of labour force participation of migrants and refugees – largely excluding women due to gender barriers – working age-men are highly integrated into the labour force, and even male children below working age are significantly more involved in work than children of the native population.

Various factors have been identified as determinants of the labour force participation of different migrant and refugee groups. The reasons for migration and displacement, as well as the mode of arrival and residency status in destination areas, are all important factors to consider. The residency status of migrants and refugees plays a crucial role in determining their level of participation in the labour force, as well as the wages and working conditions they experience. As a result, there is an inequality in terms of access to the labour market between different groups of migrants and refugees.

Irregular migrants are the most disadvantaged group in this inequality. Above them are those with international protection applications or status, who do not have work permits and are expected to remain in the provinces of registration. Syrians with temporary protection status are the most advantaged group in terms of livelihoods. However, Syrians without temporary protection status and those living outside their registered provinces are more disadvantaged than those working within their registered provinces. This leads to the following conclusion: Residency status plays a crucial role in both the participation of migrants and refugees in the labour force and their bargaining power in the labour market. Those who are disadvantaged by their residence status take lower paid jobs in vulnerable positions. At the same time, employers exploit the vulnerability of these groups.

Another finding of the research is that the opportunities and forms of participation in the labour market available to migrants and refugees are influenced by their economic, cultural, and social capital. Contrary to common perceptions, a significant number of migrants and refugees are not dependent on social assistance. Rather, they are self-sufficient through the use of different types of capital, provided that they are able to overcome the barriers that prevent them from entering the labour market. Therefore, migrants and refugees are not a homogeneous group in terms of social class. In Turkey, migrants and refugees can participate in the labour force to the extent that their resources allow, taking into account labour regulations, the type of labour

needed, and the socio-political environment. However, regardless of their capital, migrants and refugees face unequal opportunities to participate in the labour market due to the vulnerability of their residency status. While Syrians with temporary protection status may have certain advantages, it is important to note that even having this status does not guarantee access to certain occupations.

The research findings show that unskilled and semi-skilled workers, despite the various forms of exploitation and difficult working conditions they encounter in the labour market among different migrant groups, are still able to find employment opportunities. This is made possible by the extensive informal sector in Turkey. On the other hand, among the migrants who possess various material and professional capital, those who are able to use these resources effectively and enter the labour market are mainly Syrians with secure residence status compared to other groups. Representatives of local employers' organisations have highlighted the significant contribution of Syrian business owners, foreign trade experts, and traders with supply chains among Syrians, particularly in relation to the increase in exports to regions beyond the control of the Syrian regime and the Middle Eastern market. Unfortunately, individuals from Syria with professional skills face significant challenges in finding opportunities to apply their expertise and enter the workforce. Healthcare workers, educators, legal professionals, and experts in public bureaucracy face barriers to practising their professions if they do not obtain citizenship and the necessary professional equivalency documents. As a result, even when migrants in these professions have residency status, they find themselves either working in positions below their qualifications or resorting to informal methods to practise their professions, all because they are unable to work legally in their respective fields.

While informal employment is common, it also leads to the phenomenon of "working in fear" due to the potential risk of deportation if detected. However, another finding of this study is that despite having access to legal employment through their temporary protection status, Syrians often choose to work informally as a means of subsistence to maintain their SIA benefits.

One of the findings of the research suggests that migrants and refugees can participate in the labour force to a significant extent due to the shortage of unskilled and semi-skilled or middle-level workers in the Turkish economy, although they face certain barriers within the labour regime. Representatives of employers' organisations, trade unions, and professional chambers interviewed for this study, particularly in industrial production and agriculture (such as seasonal labour and livestock husbandry), noted that Syrians and Afghans have become a structural component of the labour force in these sectors, based on their experiences in their respective industries. It can therefore be concluded that migrants and refugees play an important role in capital accumulation by meeting a wide range of labour needs at both local and national levels, often at a lowest cost.

Another important finding of the study is that employers' organisations and professional chambers recognise that migrant labour, especially Syrians with temporary protection status, is an essential part of Turkey's production structure. However, there is a lack of proposed solutions to address the potential labour shortage that would arise if these Syrians were to be repatriated. It is interesting to note that employers in the Turkish economy do not seem to be concerned about the political opposition's call to "send migrants back to their countries." This suggests that while this demand may resonate in society as a populist political discourse, it is seen by employers as an unrealistic possibility.

Another notable finding of the research is the significantly low participation of Syrian women in the labour force, particularly those not engaged in seasonal agricultural work. According to employers' organisations and CSO representatives, working women are more likely to participate in home-based activities, such as freelance work or providing services like hairdressing and tailoring, to earn an income. The quantitative research has provided evidence to support the notion that migrant and refugee women have low levels of labour force participation.

Child labour is another striking finding, indicating that it is more prevalent among Syrians who arrived in Turkey with their family members than among other migrant groups. This conclusion is based on testimonies from CSOs specialising in children's rights, as well as input from community leaders in neighbourhoods.

During the qualitative research conducted in the four cities and in Istanbul, the research team observed, and interviewees mentioned, that in neighbourhoods with a high Syrian population there is a noticeable increase in the presence of small to medium-sized businesses run by Syrians. These businesses include grocery stores, fruit shops, hairdressers, repair shops, mobile phone shops, confectioners, restaurants, and clothing shops. Contrary to common belief, CSO representatives have indicated that a significant number of these shops are indeed licensed. However, according to CSO representatives, these licences are usually obtained either by a Syrian individual who has acquired Turkish citizenship or by a native Turkish citizen.

Household structure, housing, and settlement

An analysis of the results of the quantitative research shows that Turkish households typically consist of around four persons, while Syrian households tend to have an average of five persons. On the other hand, households of other migrants typically consist of around 3.5 persons. Looking at the composition of household members, about one third of individuals in Syrian households are aged between 0 and 17. In comparison, this proportion is around one fifth for both native and other migrant households.

It is common for both native and migrant respondents to occupy 2+1 or 3+1 housing configurations. It can therefore be concluded that many Syrians live in flats that do not have an adequate number of rooms for the size of their households. Another important aspect of housing conditions is the availability of basic amenities within the dwelling. Among the respondents, it was found that around 20% of Turkish citizens do not have access to natural gas in their homes. However, this percentage rises to around 33 per cent for Syrians and over 40 per cent for other migrants. When analysing the correlation between housing conditions and household income, it was found that about half of the Syrian respondents whose household income is below 4,000 Turkish liras have six or more members living in their households. The rate for native and other migrant households is around one tenth.

The urban history of Turkey is shaped by the geography of migration. It revolves around what newcomers bring with them, what they leave behind, the memories they carry, and the narrative of their "existence" in this space. The process by which individuals adapt and establish themselves in a new environment, after having deviated from their usual habitus, is closely linked to the contingent factors that enable them to adapt and thrive in this new place. The qualitative data collected from the five cities provide valuable insights into how migrants from specific regions establish themselves in the new places to which they have migrated.

A key finding from the qualitative research in this study is that the dynamics and processes of housing and spatial integration for migrants and refugees who arrived in Turkey after 2011 are significantly influenced by spatial contingencies. Prior to modern urbanisation, the cities under study had strong historical foundations in terms of their social, economic, and spatial structures. The population shift to newly developing neighbourhoods of apartment blocks due to modern urbanisation has led to the abandonment of traditional neighbourhood structures and housing fabric in the historical centres of these cities. The people who remained in these neighbourhoods were low-income families who did not have the resources to relocate. Initially, rural migrants who moved to these cities through internal migration settled in these neighbourhoods and subsequently built their own makeshift houses. Over time, the housing in these areas gradually deteriorated and transformed into zones of urban decay. However, they ended up providing affordable housing for newly arrived migrants. Since 2011, these spaces, which previously housed impoverished Kurdish migrants as a result of forced migrations in the 1990s and irregular migrants such as Afghans, Turkmen, Uzbeks, Georgians, and Africans since the 2000s, have also begun to house Syrians. The research carried out in the four cities revealed that migrants have been able to settle in the urban space thanks to the housing available in these decaying areas.

Another important finding related to housing is that migrants and refugees often adopt the strategy of living in these modest, neglected dwellings with larger households as a way of surviving and fitting into a community. Migrants and refugees often find themselves living in overcrowded households in run-down old city centres or impoverished former shantytowns, which are typically organised around factors such as ethnicity, kinship, and nationality networks. In these areas there are bachelor apartments where many workers live, as well as a few family-sized homes. Over time, both bachelor flats and family houses become concentrated in certain streets. This research shows that these areas serve as safe zones within the neighbourhood, where social control is minimal, particularly for migrant groups involved in informal work. Although migrants' income levels have risen, they tend to avoid relocating to middle-low or middle-upper class neighbourhoods where there is greater social control and pressure to integrate. The concentration of migrants in certain neighbourhoods leads to the perception of these areas as "deep poverty zones," "unsafe areas," and "decaying regions," often referred to as "migrant neighbourhoods."

Another important finding of research on the spatial integration and housing of migrants and refugees is the sense of social empowerment that comes along with the emergence of migrant neighbourhoods. The development of elements that meet both housing needs and daily life needs, such as shopping, socialising, and solidarity, is observed to contribute to the development of spatial identity and empowerment. In May 2022, the Presidency of Migration Management decided to forbid new migrant settlements in neighbourhoods where the migrant population exceeds 20%. While the purpose of this decision is to confine migrants to certain areas and reduce spatial mobility, it may also reinforce the phenomenon of "migrant neighbourhoods" by encouraging further spatial consolidation.

Another finding of the study is that neighbourhoods with dilapidated housing stock and decaying structures have begun to witness social activity and transformation in tandem with the arrival of migrants. However, the central location of these areas makes them highly desirable for both global and local property investment companies, as land values are significantly higher. The research also draws attention to another phenomenon, namely that a significant proportion of these neighbourhoods are under significant pressure for urban transformation. Migrants, unlike the native population, often lack the capacity to resist urban transformation due to their highly

vulnerable residency status. The ease with which migrants can be evicted from areas of urban decay, compared to the eviction of impoverished native residents, suggests that migrants may soon be forced to leave these enclaves.

Interviews with muhtars indicated that migrants, including short-term residents, those who have acquired citizenship, and middle-class individuals with stable employment and regular income, tend to express a preference for living in middle-class neighbourhoods within the city. However, it is important to note that this preference is relatively low among migrants, as highlighted in the interviews.

Participation in the education system

According to the quantitative research findings, the Turkish respondents have a higher level of education than the other two groups. The majority of Syrians, more than two thirds, have completed primary or secondary school. In contrast, less than a third of the native respondents and almost half of the other migrants have a similar level of education. Migrants tend to have higher rates of illiteracy or basic literacy problems. Looking at the educational level of individuals within households, migrant households tend to have lower levels of education, especially below high school level. On the other hand, native households tend to have higher proportions of individuals with a high school diploma and higher levels of education.

The qualitative research revealed the following regarding the access/participation of migrants and refugees in education. First, a significant proportion of refugee and migrant children in Turkey do not have access to education, and even if they do, they often drop out. Although there is a programme called PIKTES, which is specifically designed for Syrian children under temporary protection status and children from families with international protection applications, there is still a group of Syrian children who are either excluded from education or end up dropping out. Refugee and migrant children face several challenges within the education system, which can be attributed to structural issues emanating from the Turkish education system. These challenges include the limitations of PIKTES, insufficient support mechanisms for children whose family language is not Turkish, and a lack of adequate training for teachers in the education of foreign students. However, certain issues also arise from children's everyday circumstances. In particular, economic hardship, which forces male children to work at a young age because of their family's situation, and the early marriage of some female children are significant factors that contribute to school dropouts. One of the additional challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic is that children who have lost touch with school during this period do not return to school. In addition, in a climate of escalating anti-migrant political discourse, Syrian children are experiencing alarming levels of peer bullying in schools. This mistreatment, sometimes even by teachers and school administrators, has become a worrying issue. Absenteeism and dropping out of school are significant consequences of these issues.

The intersection of structural problems in the education system with the everyday experiences of refugee and migrant pupils (problems such as overcrowded classrooms in underprivileged areas, which sometimes make school administrators reluctant to enrol Syrians; teachers in overcrowded classrooms not paying enough attention to pupils who do not speak Turkish; irregular attendance monitoring) contributes to children dropping out of school. The language barrier not only hampers communication between students and teachers, but also between refugee parents and teachers. Another problem arises when families registered for temporary protection in one

city are unable to enrol their children in schools in their current city. Families working as seasonal agricultural workers are particularly affected by this situation. Placing children who have experienced a prolonged absence from education in classes with peers of different age groups can potentially lead to challenges with social integration and an increased risk of peer bullying. An interesting finding from the field study is that in two neighbourhoods in Konya with a significant concentration of Syrians, the number of Syrian and other refugee children in primary and middle schools is higher than the number of Turkish children. Another interesting observation is that when Syrian pupils lack sufficient Turkish language skills, teachers who speak Arabic or Kurdish make an effort to provide support.

Access to healthcare services

Although the quantitative research did not include specific questions about access to healthcare, we can still analyse responses to questions about language skills and unjust treatment in relation to healthcare services. Based on their self-assessment, almost half of refugees and migrants have a “manageable level” of Turkish language proficiency, as indicated by the responses related to language skills. As a result, individuals may face challenges when trying to access services in hospitals or health centres. In addition, responses to questions about unjust treatment indicate that Syrians have expressed concerns about experiencing unjust treatment when accessing healthcare services.

The qualitative research has revealed the following about migrant and refugee access to health services: Access to primary healthcare facilities is available for people with temporary protection status and those with an international protection identity card (valid for one year), while access to secondary and tertiary healthcare facilities requires a referral. Persons with temporary protection status registered in another province have limited access to the public healthcare system, while irregular migrants are completely excluded from it, with the exception of emergency services.

The findings related to accessing healthcare can be divided into two main categories. The first concerns the challenges within the healthcare system itself, particularly in relation to migrants’ access to healthcare services. The second concerns the health risks that migrants and refugees face.

As with access to other systems, lack of knowledge of the Turkish language poses significant challenges in the healthcare system. These challenges include difficulties in making appointments, communicating with doctors, and effectively conveying diagnoses and treatment information to patients. The SIHHAT initiative has established a number of migrant health centres to address these access issues and provide a platform for migrants and refugees. Although these centres are helpful in addressing language issues, there are still challenges in accessing secondary and tertiary healthcare services. Another difficulty is that these centres are not sufficiently integrated with the primary healthcare system, which consists of family health centres, thereby resulting in a systemic dichotomy. There has been criticism of the effective use of funds and materials received from the EU through the SIHHAT project. Civil society organisations play a crucial role in facilitating access to healthcare for irregular migrants and Syrians with temporary protection status who are registered in another province. These organisations intervene to ensure that these vulnerable populations receive the necessary healthcare assistance in urgent situations.

In examining migrant health issues, it has been observed that irregular migrants and seasonal agricultural workers may experience chronic health problems due to their lack of access to the healthcare system. In addition to reproductive health issues, gender-based violence against refugee and migrant women and trauma experienced during migration can lead to a range of health problems. Children have also been described as having health problems as a result of the trauma and suffering they have experienced during migration and displacement.

CSOs and municipalities

The qualitative research also explored the contribution of CSOs to the social integration of migrants and refugees, as well as the support mechanisms of local governments in providing migrants with access to urban services. A comprehensive analysis of civil society organisations was not the focus of the study. Nevertheless, significant patterns emerged regarding the distinct and similar roles of CSOs and local grassroots organisations and institutions, and their effectiveness in the cities where the qualitative research was conducted.

First, it is evident that, following the large influx of Syrians, the number of associations and foundations working with refugees has increased. Initially, these organisations focused on providing humanitarian aid. However, due to the increase in projects funded by the EU and other international institutions, many CSOs have shifted their focus since 2016 to project implementation. There are also other groups that rely on donations and volunteers to carry out their activities. Yet these volunteer groups often operate on a small scale or leverage their effectiveness by partnering with municipalities and other public institutions through political or faith-based connections. It has also been observed that project-based working principles are not effective in reaching irregular migrants. In addition, associations motivated by religious beliefs or local civic initiatives have the potential to have a greater impact in reaching irregular migrants.

In such a climate, it has been observed that human rights work and advocacy on behalf of refugees has waned, with many organisations shifting their focus to humanitarian aid or social integration projects, vocational training, and language courses. The presence of many CSOs in the humanitarian sector can sometimes hinder the efficient distribution of aid. Interviewees pointed out that some refugees receive comparable forms of assistance from different organisations, while others have no access to assistance at all due to the lack of city-based social databases. In addition, CSOs involved in education or activity-based projects stressed the need to actively seek out and identify beneficiaries to meet the performance criteria set by funding bodies.

Perceptions of unjust treatment and discrimination

In the quantitative research, respondents were asked “whether they had experienced any instances of unjust treatment during their time in Turkey” to ascertain whether they had experienced discrimination in different areas of social life. Eighty-five percent of all respondents answered “no” to this question. This rate among native respondents was slightly higher at 88%, for non-Syrian migrants it was 84% and for Syrian migrants it was just under 80%. Syrians were the most likely to report experiencing unjust treatment, with one in five saying they had. When asked about their experiences of unfair treatment, natives cited economic status, gender, and ethnic identity as the main reasons. Syrians, on the other hand, were more likely to high-

light language, nationality, and economic status as factors that explain their treatment. Other migrants often referred to their foreign status, nationality, ethnic identity, and language as factors contributing to their experience of unjust treatment.

In response to a second question about specific instances of unfair treatment, the majority of native respondents cited incidents in public spaces/transport, schools, and workplaces. For Syrians, the top three places where they reported experiencing unjust treatment were healthcare services, housing, and the workplace. Finally, other migrants reported incidents which took place at workplaces, job applications, and in public spaces/transport, respectively. The most reported situation across all three groups, however, was unjust treatment at work.

Some studies on intergroup relations suggest that intergroup contact can have a positive effect on reducing prejudice (e.g., Morgül et al., 2021). In the quantitative research, respondents were asked a series of questions about social interactions between natives and migrants. There is a noticeable lack of social interaction between natives, Syrians, and other migrants. Both native and migrant respondents showed a significantly low frequency of visiting the homes of neighbours or acquaintances of a different nationality. Looking at participation in different social activities, it becomes clear that both natives and migrants primarily participate in communal activities such as attending places of worship and gathering in public spaces such as parks or coffee houses. However, the quantitative field data has shown that there is a low level of participation by members of one group in activities that involve people from other groups in shared spaces and social environments.

This research was conducted at a time of rising inflation and unemployment in Turkey. In this context, it was found that the native residents and migrants who participated in the quantitative study reported facing similar challenges in their daily lives. Natives, Syrians, and other migrants identified job searching, finding rental accommodation, and dealing with government institutions as the three most difficult problems they faced. The responses of all three groups were clearly influenced by the growing economic crisis.

In this context, it is important to consider the prevalence of anti-migrant sentiment, prejudice, and discrimination. The qualitative research sections on education, housing, employment, and health highlight the various forms of institutional discrimination experienced by migrants and refugees. It is clear that officials and administrators within these institutions sometimes contribute to discrimination through arbitrary practices. A deeply disturbing finding of the qualitative research is the extent to which discrimination and exclusion practices are widespread, with the ambiguity of migration policies affecting all actors and mechanisms in the field.

One significant issue is that natives, who are often experiencing economic difficulties as a result of the crisis, sometimes perceive migrants and refugees as being responsible for their struggles and problems. In the qualitative research, some respondents shared the view that natives perceive migrants as privileged and with a higher level of welfare when comparing their own economic situation with that of migrants. This perception is partly influenced by prejudice against migrants, as well as the spread of misinformation and manipulation. To some extent, however, these tensions may also be caused by the contradictions and conflicts generated by EU-funded programmes for migrants and refugees, particularly in regions where socio-economic disparities are pronounced and class divisions are crystallised. The targeting of humanitarian and refugee assistance to funded projects that mainly target Syrians exacerbates tensions and divisions between impoverished native communities and disadvantaged refugee communities.

Another critical concern is that many policies targeting Syrians have been formulated with a temporary approach. As a result, refugees and migrants are trapped in a state of uncertainty and with no clear future, which hinders their ability to develop a sense of belonging in the host country. The perspective of natives is affected by the institutional uncertainty surrounding the potential permanence of the 'guest population', which in turn disrupts their relationship with migrants. Moreover, these policies hamper the ability of institutions directly or indirectly involved in migration to engage effectively in policymaking. In this context, as the electoral climate of 2023 has shown, the main argument of anti-migrant political attitudes is the implementation of "voluntary or forced return" as the end of the period of hospitality. This argument increases the burden on migrants and leads to increased reactions; discriminatory practices and actions have been observed in several cities. The actions and arguments developed by public institutions in response to these reactions or political pressure, with the intention of quelling public anger, contribute to legitimising discrimination against migrants, including street violence.

The third area of concern is the marginalisation and labelling of the migrant and refugee population, the majority of whom settle in the city's poor neighbourhoods and often cohabit with other residents. These labels construct migrants discursively as potential criminals of the city or neighbourhood. Spatially, especially among Syrians concentrated in the city's poor neighbourhoods, there is a growing tendency to establish and maintain relationships within their own community, while the initial "hospitality" and "welcoming" attitudes of the native population have almost disappeared. Migrants and refugees are now subjected to the same language of exclusion and othering that has long been directed at the urban poor.

Policy Recommendations

Legal status

Turkey should reconsider the geographical limitation on the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees from a human rights perspective.

The ambiguity created by temporary protection status has a negative impact on the social participation and integration of Syrians. This status should be restructured in a manner that allows for the social integration of Syrians.

Transparency of data on refugees and migrants

As repeatedly noted in this study, data on the number and location of migrants and refugees in Turkey is not readily available to the public or to researchers. There is also a lack of data on issues such as naturalisation, deportation, administrative detention, etc.

Public institutions should transparently share data on migrants and refugees with the public to inform effective integration policies, allow researchers to contribute data-driven insights to policy-making, and facilitate a healthy, fact-based public discourse.

Participation in labour market and employment

Recognising that the right to work is a fundamental right within the first generation of human rights, legislation should be introduced to provide migrants and refugees with a direct work permit tied to their residence permit.

In particular, such a framework should be developed in such a way that work permits are automatically granted to working-age Syrians under temporary protection.

Applicants and beneficiaries of international protection should also be granted work permits.

The authorities should take effective measures to prevent pressures which lead people to work below the minimum wage in the informal economy, which impacts on the most vulnerable groups in the labour market. The right to work should therefore be considered in conjunction with the right to residence. In addition, relevant public authorities should step up inspections of workplaces and take legal action in cases of employment below the minimum wage or forced labour.

Trade unions in Turkey should focus on developing legislation that promotes the active participation of migrants and refugees in the class struggle. They should also engage in advocacy and lobbying to achieve this goal. Interviews with trade union representatives revealed that although trade unions have started to address this issue, it is not yet perceived as an urgent matter. Migrants and refugees are an integral part of the Turkish working class and trade unions should act accordingly.

The working conditions for women and children in seasonal work are particularly inhumane and exceptionally harsh. These conditions should be improved. In addition, the process of setting wages for seasonal agricultural workers is typically carried out by a local coalition, but these wages are often significantly lower than the minimum wage. It is imperative that the wages of seasonal workers be brought into line with the minimum wage as a labour necessity, based on the principle of justice.

The problem of child labour among migrants requires a concerted approach involving the Ministry of the Family, Labour and Social Affairs, the Ministry of National Education and the Ministry of Labour and Social Security. It is key to implement measures to prevent the exploitation and abuse of children, while at the same time establishing appropriate regulations to address these issues.

The right to housing and housing conditions

The practice of suspending new registrations in some districts, thereby confining migrants and refugees to certain neighbourhoods and effectively restricting their freedom of movement, warrants re-evaluation.

Not only does this practice infringe upon the fundamental human right to freedom of movement, but it also hinders the social participation and integration of migrants into their new communities.

Efforts should be made to involve migrants in urban transformation projects and to ensure their inclusion alongside other residents who are to be displaced. In this context, we would like to reiterate that a work permit should be granted together with a residence permit. The right to residency should be treated as a right to housing, and migrants should be involved in the negotiation process and support mechanisms for housing rights during urban transformation.

The right to education

Despite the development of mechanisms to facilitate the participation and access to education of migrant and refugee children and youth, these policies often exclude those who are not registered, especially irregular migrants. Children who are forced to migrate with their families due to circumstances over which they have no control should not be denied a fundamental right. It is therefore important to ensure that children have access to education, regardless of the residence permits and legal status of adults.

While some migrant and refugee children in Turkey do not have access to basic education, the same is true for some Syrian children with temporary protection status and children of applicants for international protection. Due to the various factors discussed in this study, a number of Syrian children face barriers that prevent them from attending school. While making policy recommendations in basic education requires expertise, we urge consideration of the following recommendations based on the findings of this study.

A systematic school attendance monitoring system should be introduced for both native and migrant/refugee pupils. Factors leading to student absenteeism should be assessed by experts, and families and students should be supported to improve attendance.

Educational programmes and materials for teaching Turkish as a second language, especially within the framework of the PIKTES programme, should be developed for migrant pupils.

The number of school counsellors should be increased in schools with a significant number of migrant and refugee pupils. Awareness-raising and preventive training on peer bullying, discrimination, and violence prevention should be provided to education professionals, especially guidance counsellors.

Regulations preventing the enrolment of children from families with temporary protection status or international protection applications/status in schools outside their provinces of registration should be repealed.

In schools with a high concentration of native or migrant populations, class sizes should be reduced, and the number of classrooms and teachers increased.

The allocation of cash and in-kind support under the PIKTES programme should be organised to cover all schools and students in the project areas, avoiding practices that reinforce perceptions of favouritism towards refugee students.

The allocation of resources within the PIKTES programme should follow principles of transparency and accountability and be subject to oversight by professional organisations.

The right to healthcare

This research identified a number of challenges that migrants and refugees face when trying to access the healthcare system. As in other areas, the main challenge in accessing healthcare services is often bound up with one's legal status. Despite the lack of healthcare experts in the research team, the findings of this study have led to the formulation of the following policy recommendations:

All migrants, regardless of their legal status, should be granted access to the public health system for both emergency and public health matters. Access to primary healthcare should be guaranteed for women and children migrants and refugees, regardless of their legal status. Access to primary healthcare is not only a basic human right, but also essential for the overall well-being of the public.

Healthcare institutions should give priority to providing services in different languages to meet the diverse needs of the local community. It is essential to take the necessary steps to ensure that language barriers do not impede access to healthcare services.

Planning for primary health care facilities and health workers should be based on the total population, including native, migrant, and refugee populations, at the provincial, district, and neighbourhood levels.

Rather than having separate systems for migrants and nationals, a single inclusive system of primary healthcare provision should be established, based on the needs and characteristics of different local groups.

The financial and equipment support provided to health facilities under the SIHHAT project should be allocated on the basis of clear and transparent criteria, while adhering to principles of accountability.

Professional organisations should have oversight of resource allocation within this project.

Activities of CSOs

The EU-Turkey Agreement plays an important role in funding services for refugees and migrants in Turkey, with both public institutions and CSOs playing a crucial role in managing these funds. Despite the increase in projects funded by the EU and other international organisations since 2016, the services provided by CSOs to refugees and migrants are not satisfactory in terms of effectiveness.

Ensuring that irregular migrants have access to the services provided by CSOs is of paramount importance. Programmes developed by CSOs to address social services and promote social integration should be inclusive of both citizens and migrants.

At the provincial level, mechanisms should be established for the distribution of humanitarian and social assistance provided by CSOs to migrants and refugees, using a joint database and transparent criteria.

Programmes receiving funding for social services and social integration should move from a project-based to a more sustainable approach. This requires promoting transparent co-operation between local governments and local CSOs, paving the way for developing joint programmes.

Some CSOs use cash or in-kind incentives to recruit participants for livelihood projects, vocational training, or social integration activities, and they may also re-invite persons who have participated in the past. The reasons for the lack of interest in such projects should be investigated, and more effective methods of identifying those who can effectively benefit from these programmes should be developed.

Activities such as vocational training or livelihood programmes should be based on a local needs assessment.

Municipalities

Metropolitan and district municipalities have a crucial role in ensuring that migrants have access to urban services, supporting their participation in urban social life, and working towards reducing spatial and social segregation between the native population and migrants and refugees. Local authorities have robust public instruments at their disposal to address and prevent discrimination, recognising the importance of spatial interaction in this context. In the four cities where the qualitative research was conducted, however, it was found that although municipalities have migration departments, they seem reluctant to formulate or articulate policies that specifically target migrants at the local level.

Local governments should, first, “acknowledge” the presence of new residents in the cities they are responsible for.

The local government should provide municipal and social services without discrimination to all fellow residents, both migrants and natives.

Legislation governing municipalities and municipal revenues should be crafted to accommodate the presence of migrants and provide local authorities with the authority and resources to do so.

Prevention of discrimination

To prevent discrimination against migrants and refugees, political parties and institutions should renounce discriminatory and biased rhetoric.

Public authorities should abandon discourses that emphasise ambiguity and temporariness towards refugees and migrants and fully implement the principle of non-refoulement.

Arbitrary administrative detention, expulsion, and deportation practices that increase and align with anti-migrant rhetoric should be abandoned.

Refugees and migrants should have effective access to legal aid in their appeals against administrative detention and deportation orders.

The promotion of communication campaigns aimed at increasing social acceptance of migrants and combating prejudice, as outlined in the Integration Strategy Paper and the National Action Plan, should be widespread.

The prohibition of discrimination and the principle of equality in the current legal framework need to be extended to cover migrants, as outlined in the Integration Strategy Paper and the NAP.

Measures should be taken to ensure that the prohibition of discrimination in education, healthcare, local government, and other public institutions is not merely a written document, but is effectively put into practice to protect migrants and refugees.

Public officials, including teachers, healthcare professionals, and law enforcement officials, should receive awareness-raising trainings to prevent institutional discrimination and monitoring mechanisms should be developed for this purpose.

Given the potential role of intergroup contact in reducing prejudice, methods should be developed and implemented to promote quality social interaction between natives and migrants.

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