

# **Sociological and Cultural Causes of Violence**

Violence in Turkey-  
Report of Findings  
November 2018

The field survey forming the basis of this report regarding the **sources of violence in Turkey** has been conducted by **KONDA** Research and Consulting Inc. for the **Küyerel Thought Institute** in partnership with the **Heinrich Böll Stiftung Turkey**.

**KÜYEREL**

Abide-i Hürriyet Cd. Hasat Sk. Hasat İş Mrk. No:2/4 Şişli, İstanbul

Web: [www.kuyレル.org](http://www.kuyレル.org)

Mail: [iletisim@kuyレル.org](mailto:iletisim@kuyレル.org)

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>2. SOURCES OF VIOLENCE .....</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>3. IDENTITIES.....</b>	<b>17</b>
3.1. Gender.....	18
3.2. Political view.....	19
3.3. Ethnicity .....	25
3.4. Religiousity, Religion and Sect .....	26
3.5. Class .....	32
3.6. The Most Important Identity .....	34
<b>4. WHO CAN USE VIOLENCE AND AGAINST WHOM? .....</b>	<b>39</b>
4.1. Can the State Use Violence? .....	39
4.2. Can People Use Violence Against Others?.....	42
4.3. Can a person use violence?.....	42
4.4. View of Different Identities on the Use of Violence.....	45
<b>5. SOCIAL FABRIC AND VIOLENCE BASED ON IDENTITIES.....</b>	<b>51</b>
5.1. Basic Patterns and Findings.....	57
<b>6. THE MOOD IN TURKEY.....</b>	<b>63</b>
6.1. More and more people are becoming introverted and are afraid of talking on the street .....	63
6.2. People react to each other much easier.....	66
6.3. People trust each other less. ....	67
<b>7. EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION .....</b>	<b>69</b>
<b>8. RESEARCH ID .....</b>	<b>77</b>
8.1. The General Description of the Survey .....	77
8.2. The Sample .....	77

<b>9. FREQUENCY TABLES .....</b>	<b>79</b>
9.1. Profile of Subjects .....	79
9.2. Possible Sources of Violence .....	85
9.3. Situations in which violence is accepted .....	92
9.4. Mood of the Society .....	94
<b>10. GLOSSARY of TERMS .....</b>	<b>95</b>
10.1 Questions and Response Options .....	96
<b>11. ANNEX 1: QUESTIONNAIRE FORM .....</b>	<b>99</b>

# 1.

---

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The field survey forming the basis for this report regarding the source of violence in Turkey has been conducted on November 3-4 by KONDA Research and Consulting Limited for the Küyerel Thought Institute.

This report presents trends in the adult population above the age of 18 in Turkey, as observed on the dates of the field survey. Within the scope of the survey, face-to-face interviews were carried out with 2,691 individuals in 154 neighborhoods and villages of 101 districts -including the central districts - of 32 provinces. Age and gender quotas were applied for 18 questionnaires conducted in each neighborhood.

### Sources of violence

In the first section, we discuss the sources of violence and realize people in Turkey mostly hold the view their identities are threatened and their identities are not at the place they deserve in society. Those who believe their identity is superior to others, and therefore think it is normal they have more rights, are at rather low rates. The rate of those who argue violence can be used towards others in order to protect their identity is very low. It is also important to note there is a considerable number of people, who say they have been discriminated against, were beaten up and have been subjected to violence because of their identity, although they are at relatively lower rates.

### Identities

In the study, we dealt with five types of identity: Gender, political opinion, ethnicity, religion/sect and financial situation. Half of the society states that religion/sect is the most important identity, while a quarter of the society believes financial status is the most important identity for them.

When we examine the degree to which those with different identities agree with the statements about the possible sources of violence, we observe that people who have weaker positions in society tend to agree more in general, with the exception of financial situation. For example, women who agreed with the statements that other women are not at a place they deserved in society, are threatened, and are more likely to be discriminated or be subjected to violence because they are women; also said they were more likely to see their gender as superior and to express that violence could be used towards others for their protection/coming to the place they deserve. The electorate of the opposition parties agree with the statements more than AK Party supporters; while Kurds agree more than Turks. On the other hand, Alevi Muslims agree more than Sunni Muslims that they are not at the place they deserve in society, that they are threatened and are discriminated, while they have similar views regarding statements that they are superior and can use violence towards others. In terms of religion, as the religious faith increases, the idea they are superior and that it is normal to have more rights based upon such thoughts increases especially among Sunni Muslims, while the view that they are discriminated decreases. The financial situation does not make any difference.


### **Who can use violence? Against whom can violence be used?**

Only when the views on the possible sources of violence are examined, is there an impression the identities in weaker positions may be more inclined to use violence. However, when we consider the phrase that the state, others or the person itself can use psychological violence or physical violence towards others or may be right to do so and can intervene, a different picture emerges. It is understood that those who are in the weakest positions are the groups most opposed to violence against certain identities and groups.

First, one out of the every three people in Turkey sees it as normal and acceptable that the state uses physical violence towards its own citizens in some cases. Almost half of the society sees it as normal that a police or civil servant, who is the visible face and embodiment of the state, mistreats some people if necessary. The only consolation in this pessimistic picture is that the group which sees the two situations as definitely not acceptable make up the biggest cluster with a rate of 40 percent.

Whom can a police officer or civil servant mistreat if necessary and do you consider it as normal?	Percent
Member of an illegal organization	44.5
Homosexual person	12.6
Unreligious person	7.1
Someone who is Syrian	6.5
Extremely religious-looking person	4.0
Someone opposed to the government	3.5
Someone who is Kurdish	2.8
Liberally-dressed woman	1.6
Someone who is Alevi	0.6
Someone who is rich	0.4
Someone who is poor	0.2
Woman covered with headscarf	0.1
No one should be mistreated; everyone should be treated equally within the legal limits.	46.4

### Views on psychological and/or physical violence by the state



The view that people, not the state, may be able to use violence towards other people has much less support. Only 10% of respondents stated that it would be just for a political suspect to be beaten by a crowd. The rate of those who see the violence of men towards women as just is at much lower rate: Only 3 percent consider it just when a husband beats his wife, and only 1 percent consider it just when a young man beats his girlfriend or his fiancé.

The situations in which people try to interfere and prevent actions provide clues about their tendencies to legitimize violence. Two out of three said they would take preventative measures in case ‘a terrorist takes shelter in her/his neighborhood. While the rate of those who would prevent the situation is higher among MHP, İyi Party and AK Party voters, even among the HDP supporters, who agreed with the statement at the lowest rate, were almost at one third (28 percent). Other situations that are considered for the interference are no more than 10 percent: Throughout the society, people interfere most in religious sect meetings and with a beggar/homeless person takes shelter in an apartment, while the lowest reaction is shown towards the couple who holds hands in public transport.

Which of the following situations would you interfere in and try to prevent?	Percent
A terrorist takes shelter in the neighborhood	68.7
Religious sect meeting	10.9
A beggar/homeless person takes shelter in your apartment	10.3
The members of the party that I do not approve distribute an election bulletin in my neighborhood	5.8
One does not fast and eats during Ramadan	4.9
Speaking Kurdish on the street	4.5
Celebrations of the New Year’s Eve on the street	4.4
A couple holds hands in public transport	1.6
None of them	25.6

People mostly do not want homosexuals and refugees where they live, and three of the four people believe that something should be done for these undesired groups. They expect the state to expel them at the highest rate.

### **Social Fabric with Identities and Violence**

The research findings indicate and contain clues that identities in Turkey are intertwined, and that it is not possible to imply some identities are the sources of violence. In order to make sense of this intertwined state, we have used the statistical analysis method called Multiple Correspondence Analysis to map the identities as seen below.





The findings of the research and the distances of these findings in this map point to a few basic patterns:

- ✓ Although the violence of persons or groups that are stronger is not approved, the use of psychological or physical violence of the state towards certain identities is more acceptable. This means the society sees the state as a means of exerting violence on behalf of the powerful.
- ✓ Although society is most polarized towards the ‘Other,’ which is reflected as an illegal organization member, terrorist or political suspect, it makes a clear distinction between these identities and the Kurdish identity. We can argue society in general has almost completely settled the Kurdish issue in its mind, noting there is no reaction to Kurds in the collective consciousness.
- ✓ Those who are in majority in the society and are in a powerful position are embodied in terms of the political party electorate in the MHP, the İyi Party and the AK Party supporters. These identities consider the view that it is normal to use violence at highest rates.

- ✓ The social distinction and the distance in the axis of religiosity seem very sharp. The religious people towards the atheists, atheists to the religious people are very reactive and prone to legitimizing violence. But the atheists are much less in number and generally more against violence. In this case, the more religious people, especially the Sunni Muslims and those who define themselves as religious or devout emerge as the embodiment of the majority.
- ✓ Although differences in terms of gender differences are more in the background compared other identities, the reaction towards homosexuals suggests that masculinity has a role among the intertwined identities, and that there must be other important debates on gender identity.
- ✓ Considering the positions in the identities map, the class issue is not based on the conflict between upper and lower classes, but is based on the conflict of the middle class with upper class/lower class and the intertwined conflict with other identities. It is possible to say that the middle class tends to consider violence against other classes as legitimate.

In the survey, we tried to understand the insecurity and introversion of Turkey's society regarding its psychological state and why people react to each other easily. The majority of the society agrees with the phrases 'People trust each other less'; 'People react to each other much more easily'; and 'More and more people are becoming introverted and are afraid of speaking on the street.'

## 2.

---

# SOURCES OF VIOLENCE

According to the literature, there are basically a number of reasons why people use or endorse use of violence towards others. They may feel their particular identity or characteristics are threatened, and they are not at the place they deserve in society or that their identities are superior to other identities and therefore should in any case not be equal with them. They may also be discriminated against or subjected to violence because of their identities. For these reasons, they may justify applying psychological or physical violence towards others.

In order to understand the sources of violence in Turkey and which grounds have the potential to trigger the tendency towards violence and endorsement of the use of violence, we selected five different identities and we have discussed the possible sources of violence individually according to these identities. We selected gender, political opinion, ethnicity, religion/sect and class as identities, as we often encounter them as identities in both politics and daily life in the context of hierarchical relations and cases of violence.

For each of these five identities, we read the following statements about the possible sources of violence and asked whether they agreed with these phrases using the five-point Likert scale moving from 'strongly disagree' to 'strongly agree':

- Those with this identity are not at the place they deserve in Turkey.
- My identity is threatened in Turkey.
- If necessary, violence may be used against others to protect my identity and ensure it reaches its rightful place.
- I have been discriminated against because of this identity.
- I got beaten up and subjected to violence because of this identity.
- My identity is superior and therefore it is normal for me to have more rights than others.


Among the identities, we did not use six statements for the financial situation, but three phrases that are meaningful when they were read and can be understood by all people with different financial status.

The graph below shows the answers to all questions grouped by possible sources of violence. When we look first at the graph without focusing on the details, regardless of their identities, the interviewees agree the most with the phrase that their identity is not at the place it deserves in Turkey. They agree with these phrases, ranging from 26 percent to 48 percent. Subsequently, they display high agreement with the phrase that their identity is threatened and that they are subjected to discrimination because of their identity. The rate of those who believe their identity is superior, and therefore consider it normal to have more rights than others, ranges from 11 percent to 19 percent. Interviewees displayed lowest rates of agreement with the phrases that they had been subjected to violence because of their identity and that if necessary; violence could be applied towards others to protect their identity.

Therefore, we first get the following impression based on the questions, which we discussed regarding the source of violence: We should search the source of violence in Turkey mainly therein that the people do not think their identity is at the place it deserves or they think their identity is threatened. Nevertheless, despite this victimhood they are against the use of violence towards others. Although this is the first impression, as we examine the findings of the research in depth throughout the report, we will reveal there are notably large groups of people who do not oppose the use of violence against another person, or even consider it normal that they themselves use violence against others. We will try to understand the reasons for this phenomenon.

To better understand each possible source of violence and its causes, let's first start by evaluating these sources in themselves. In order to do this, we examine whether there is a relationship between the answers given to the same phrases by different identities, in other words the correlation values. When the probability of agreement with one phrase increases, if the probability of agreement with another expression increases, this indicates a positive correlation and the correlation value approaches 1 (if one increases and other decreases, the value approaches to -1). For example, as the belief that their political opinion is threatened increases amongst the interviewees, the view their ethnicity is threatened increases, and there is a strong relationship between them at the value of 0.401.

### Possible Sources of the Violence



When we examine the correlations between the responses to the phrase “they are not in the place they deserve in Turkey” for different identities, first we see very high correlations between all identities. In other words, the more people think their identity is not where it deserves to be, the more likely they will think the same for other identities. The highest correlation was found between religion/sect and ethnicity (0.427).

<b>They are not at the place they deserve in Turkey</b>	Those with the same gender as me	My political opinion	My ethnicity	My religion/sect	Those in my class
Those with the same gender as me					
My political opinion	.251				
My ethnicity	.175	.326			
My religion/sect	.155	.241	.427		
Those in my class	.178	.319	.229	.201	

Similarly, in the phrase group on the perception of threat, there is a very close relationship between seeing one identity threatened and seeing another under threat and this relationship is the strongest among ethnicity and religion/sect (0.429).

<b>Threatened in Turkey</b>	Those with the same gender as me	My political opinion	My ethnicity	My religion/sect
Those with the same gender as me				
My political opinion	.212			
My ethnicity	.212	.401		
My religion/sect	.192	.305	.429	

While the view that violence can be applied towards others if necessary to protect their identities and that their identities take their rightful places has little support on average throughout the country, using this expression for one identity increases the likelihood of using it for another. Correlations between identities in phrases regarding the use of violence are much stronger than in the two previous groups of statements. Again, the strongest relationship is observed between religion/sect and ethnicity (0.532) followed by ethnicity and political view (0.456).

<b>Violence can be applied towards others to protect them /so that they take their rightful places</b>	Those with the same gender as me	My political opinion	My ethnicity	My religion/sect	Those in my class
Those with the same gender as me					
My political view	.366				
My ethnicity	.316	.456			
My religion/sect	.298	.362	.532		
Those in my class	.309	.391	.381	.358	

In the three statement groups so far, namely that the identity is not where it deserves, that it is threatened and that violence can be applied towards others, the lowest correlation is observed between gender and religion/sect. The possible reasons why the relationship between the identities of gender and religion/sect is statistically significant but relatively weak will be discussed in the following sections, where we examine the identities separately.

There are strong relations between being discriminated against due to different identities and the strongest relations are observed between ethnicity and religion/sect (0.468) and ethnicity and political opinion (0.466).

<b>I was subject to discrimination.</b>	My gender	My political opinion	My ethnicity	My religion/sect	My financial status
My gender					
My political opinion	.230				
My ethnicity	.224	.466			
My religion/sect	.239	.401	.468		
My financial status	.210	.271	.276	.263	

Even though respondents generally stated they had been beaten up because of their identities and that they have been subjected to violence at very low rates, very high correlation values, in other words very strong relations are observed in this statement group. The strongest relationship is observed between ethnicity and religion/sect (0.529), followed by ethnicity and political opinion (0.512). The relationship between gender and these three identities is weaker.

<b>I got beaten up, I was subjected to violence</b>	My gender	My political opinion	My ethnicity	My religion/sect
My gender				
My political view	.221			
My ethnicity	.256	.512		
My religion/sect	.211	.424	.529	

We see the same pattern of correlations regarding the phrase stating it is normal to have more rights, as their identity is superior and to have been subjected to violence. The strongest relationship is between ethnicity and political opinion (0.516) followed by ethnicity and religion/sect (0.493), while the relationship between gender and these three identities is statistically significant and strong but weaker than others.

<b>Superior than others and therefore it is normal to have more rights than opposite gender.</b>	My gender	My political opinion	My ethnicity	My religion/sect
My gender				
My political opinion	.372			
My ethnicity	.319	.516		
My religion/sect	.337	.452	.493	


When examining the relationships between responses to statements about possible sources of violence through different identities, it becomes clear that it is not possible to differentiate one's identity from each other and to think that it is related to a single identity of a person when evaluating the sources of violence. Nevertheless, in the next section, we examine the different identities of the interviewees one by one and examine the differences between their views on the sources of violence.



### 3.

## IDENTITIES

Whether one person is at the bottom or at the top of a social hierarchy, will of course affect her/his exposure to violence, her/his opinion whether her/his identity is threatened or her/his opinion whether violence can be used against others. For example, even if women have fully internalized the patriarchal order, we can expect them to be at higher risk of being exposed to violence than men because of their gender. By examining such differences in this section, that is, the relationships between the identities of individuals and the possible sources of violence, we examine who has a more inclined profile to see violence as acceptable or even to apply violence.



In this section, in a summarized way, we examine the phrases about the possible sources of violence, the answers of which are part of the five-fold Likert scale based on the options 'absolutely agree' and 'absolutely disagree,' by taking their average values. Accordingly, the value of 1 means 'absolutely disagree' and the value of 5 means 'absolutely agree.' Based on this scale, it can be said the population of Turkey

is impartial to the phrase 'The people, who have the same gender as me are not at the place they deserve in Turkey' with the value of 3 that is 'neither agree nor disagree.'

### 3.1. Gender

When the statements regarding gender identity are arranged according to the ones with which the society agrees the most on average compared with the ones with which the society agrees the least on average, the two statements come to the foreground: that people having the same gender like them are not at the place they deserve (3.0) and that they are threatened (2.8). Men disagree with any statement regarding gender identity. Nevertheless, these were the two statements, which they agreed the most with. Women, on the other hand, think these two statements are correct on average with 3.6 and 3.5, that is at a point between 'neither agree nor disagree' and 'agree.' On the other hand, although they do not agree with other statements on average, they agree more than men. In summary, these data put forward two findings: Even though we know from different channels that women are subjected to discrimination and violence due to their gender more often, we heard it directly from women and confirmed it. The second finding is that women agree more with five of the five statements about possible sources of violence than men.

When the issues of violence against women are discussed, there are often those in public and social media who try to make this violence insignificant, stating that men are also subjected to violence. In fact, as shown by the two graphs below, 2 percent of males state that they are exposed to violence, while 5 percent state they are subjected to discrimination. These rates coincide with a remarkable population of 500 thousand to 1 million people. Therefore, it is not possible to say there is no such problem. However, when compared to women, of whom 15 percent say they have been subjected to violence and 30 percent say they have been discriminated against, the interviewees who came to their doors observed the problems have very different scopes.

It should be noted at this point when asking about the gender identity, that there is discrimination in Turkey on the sexual orientation and it was not possible to ask questions about people's sexual orientation.





<b>Which party would you vote for if there were a General Election today?</b>	<b>Percent</b>
AK Party	33.1
CHP	15.3
MHP	8.2
HDP	5.2
İyi Party	2.3
Other parties	.9
Swing voter	27.5
Non-voter	7.5
Total	100.0

As for gender identity, the respondents voting for the same political parties are most in agreement that their political views are not at the place they deserve in society and they are threatened.

When we examine the graph below showing how the expressions change according to political party preferences, we see AK Party voters are least in agreement with the statements and do not agree with any statements on average, and that the voters of all other parties and voters who remain undecided or do not think to cast a vote are more likely to agree with the phrases compared to the AK Party supporters. The HDP voters are the ones who agree with the statements about the sources of violence the most and they are in a position of agreement for three phrases.

HDP supporters also agree with the statement ‘I got beaten up because of my political opinion, I was subjected to violence’ with an average of 2.6 more than any other voters. Twenty eight percent of the HDP supporters, that is one out of every four HDP supporters, stated they were subjected to violence because of their political views. This rate is only 2 percent among AK Party supporters.

The electorate of the MHP, a part of the ruling People’s Alliance, are in a position between the electorate of the AK Party and other opposition parties regarding the sources of violence and agree especially with the first phrases (they are not in the place they deserve, they are threatened, they are subjected to violence) slightly below the average in Turkey.



When we compare CHP and İyi Party voters with each other, it is not possible to talk about a fundamental difference, but CHP supporters generally agree with the phrases more and feel a bit more subjected to violence.

In order to understand the relationship between political opinion and the sources of violence, we also examine people’s preference for news sources based on the television channel they watch. Our question regarding the TV channel used to follow news does not aim to reveal the rating of the news channels, but to reveal indirect information about the political affiliation of the interviewees. We often see in our monthly Barometer surveys that no other demographic feature or political preference other than the TV channel used to follow news, can reveal bigger differences regarding people’s views on daily politics, religious and moral references, their lifestyles and opinions.

The preferred channel used to follow the news can be considered as an important indicator in terms of giving an idea about the relationship between media and regarding violence as acceptable, while providing clues about the effect of media on opinions.


<b>Which TV channel do you prefer the most to follow the news?</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Fox TV	22.7
ATV	12.4
TRT	9.5
Show TV	6.1
A Haber	5.9
Kanal D	5.2
Star TV	3.1
CNN Türk	2.4
NTV	2.4
Haber Türk	1.6
Kanal 7	1.3
Halk TV	1.2
Ulusal Kanal	0.2
Other channels	3.4
I don't watch TV	13.6
I do not follow the news on TV	9.0
Total	100.0

Firstly, we examine which TV channel is preferred to watch the news. There are 5-6 TV channels that have dominance in news followers and Fox TV leads with the preference of one out of every 5 people. ATV, TRT, Show TV and A Haber follow Fox TV. In addition, about one in five people neither follow the news on TV nor watch TV, but prefer other sources. This group also tends to be less interested in politics in general.

When we look at the party preferences of the channel viewers, who follow by at least 2 percent TV channels and provided that their number among interviewees in the


research is sufficient for the analysis, a partially predictable picture emerges. Those who follow ATV, A Haber and TRT, which are the broadcasting organs of the government, are overwhelmingly AK Party voters, while those who watch Show TV and Star TV are predominantly AK Party voters. Seventy eight percent of A Haber viewers, 63 percent of ATV viewers and 55 percent of TRT viewers state they would vote for the AK Party if there were an election today. Among those who watch Fox TV, which has broadcasts critical of the government, the AK Party voters are far less and 39 percent of them are CHP supporters. Although not widely viewed, Kanal D and NTV have the audience, which are the closest to the general voter profile. Looking at this table, we can find out that roughly one quarter of the population prefers news channels close to the government, while one quarter prefers those close to the opposition, whereas one quarter prefers other channels, and one quarter does not have much contact with television news.

### Party preferences based on TV channel to follow news



If we look at the relationship between news channel preference and the possible sources of violence in the light of this information, we see that prioritizing expressions and ranking are almost the same regardless of channel preference. However, the more distant the audience of a channel is to the government, the more likely they agree with the phrases, and those who watch Fox TV, agree the most as the most opposite profile.

The three statements that her/his political views are not at the place they deserve, that they are threatened and that she/he was discriminated against because of their views were the ones that made the most difference among the news channel viewers. Those who prefer channels close to the government do not exceed the average value of 3, that is, the “neither agree nor disagree” point in any phrase, while it can exceed in opposition channels.





### 3.3. Ethnicity

Ethnicity in Turkey is one of the problems that remains unresolved and which causes the most social conflicts and violence. We do not need to consider the background, as we assume that those who read this report have a good command of the history of the Kurdish issue and its impacts on contemporary politics. Before examining the relationship between ethnicity and possible sources of violence, it is useful to recall the distribution of ethnic origins in Turkey. We asked the interviewees during the field-work of our research the following question: ‘We are all citizens of the Republic of Turkey, but we can be of different ethnic origin; how do you know or feel yourself, your identity?’ Seventy seven percent stated that they are Turks, 15.6 percent Kurds, 2.5 percent Arabs<sup>2</sup> and 1.1 percent Zaza<sup>3</sup>. Those who state they have a different ethnic origin than the most common answers and belong to other ethnic backgrounds totaled 3.7 percent.


<b>We are all citizens of the Turkish Republic, but we can be from different ethnicities; How do you know or feel yourself/your identity?</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Turkish	77.1
Kurdish	15.6
Zaza	1.1
Arab	2.5
Other	3.7
Total	100.0

On average, the public in general does not agree with the statements that link ethnicity and possible sources of violence. They are most likely to agree with the phrase that “my ethnic origin is not in the place it deserves” at 2.6 points, while they are least likely to agree with the phrase ‘I got beaten up because of my ethnic origin, I was subjected to violence’ at 1.7 points. The reaction of respondents whose ethnic origin is Turk, is not much different from the country in general but they agree slightly less.

2 Since the founding of the Republic in Turkey; in provinces such as Hatay, Mardin, Urfa there are predominantly citizens of Arab origin. According to Konda’s Barometer surveys, Arabs were between 1 and 1.5 percent of the population in 2010-2011. As of 2012, the rate of Arabs we interviewed increased to 2.5 percent with the effect of refugee migration from Syria. However, we do not know how many of them came with recent migration.

3 We did not include it in our analysis because the number of people who identified themselves as Zaza was not sufficient.

However, Kurds and Arabs tend to agree more with the phrases. They especially tend to agree with three phrases that their ethnic identity is not in the place it deserves in Turkey, that it is threatened and that they are subjected to discrimination because of their ethnic origins. On average, those most likely to say they are discriminated against because of their ethnicity are Arabs, while Kurds agree the most with the phrase that their ethnicity is not in the place it deserves in society. Kurds are also more likely to agree with the statement ‘I got beaten up, I was subjected to violence’ at the point of 2.1 more than other ethnic backgrounds. In other words, Kurds said they were most likely to be subjected to violence. It is worth noting those from “other” ethnic backgrounds agree with the statements that they are not at the place they deserve and that they are discriminated against at above the average rates.



### 3.4. Religiosity, Religion and Sect

Another axis of social conflict in Turkey is established on the basis of religion. Issues such as headscarf freedom, discrimination against Alevis, and attitude towards non-fasting people can constantly influence the public agenda and the daily lives of people. In order to understand the relationship between religion and violence, we asked the interviewees which religion and sect they belong to, and to what extent they described themselves as religious.

Ninety one percent point five of the population define themselves as Sunni Muslim, 5.7 percent as Alevi Muslim, 0.9 percent state say they belong to other religions and 2 percent state they do not have religious belief.



<b>What is the religion and sect to which you feel you belong to?</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Sunni Muslim	91.5
Alevi Muslim	5.7
Belonging to other religion	0.9
Does not have religious belief	2.0
Total	100.0

To find out how religious they are, we asked the question: ‘With which of the following would you describe yourself in terms of religiousness?’ and we offered 5 options.<sup>4</sup> In the table below, we have simplified the options and made them into text format. According to this, more than half of the society considers itself to be religious and, in addition, 10 percent consider themselves as devout. Four point five percent see themselves as non-believers or atheists.


<b>With which of the following would you describe yourself in terms of religiousness?</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Atheist: Someone who does not have religious belief	2.0
Non-believer: Someone who does not believe in the requirements of the religion	2.5
Believer: Someone who is faithful but does not fulfill the requirements of religion	29.1
Religious: A religious person trying to fulfill the requirements of religion	56.1
Devout: A religious person who fulfills all the requirements of religion	10.3
Total	100.0

Considering the sect and religiousness together, it is observed that Sunni Muslims consider themselves to be more religious than Alevi Muslims, and that 54 percent of the society, the majority, see themselves as both Sunni Muslim and religious.

<sup>4</sup> See. Glossary of Terms




When the statements about the possible sources of violence based on religious/sectarian identities are ranged with the agreements of the society on average, even though the perceptions that the identity is not at the place it deserves and that it is threatened are in the first two places, it is remarkable that at the third place we observe the phrase ‘My religion / sect is superior to other religions/sects and therefore It is normal for me to have more rights.’








When we examine the results by separating people according to sect, we see a partially predictable picture. The views of Sunni Muslims, who make up the majority of the society, are very close to the average of Turkey and they agree with none of the phrases on average. However, Alevi Muslims agree with the phrases that their religion/sect in Turkey is not at the place it deserves, that it is threatened and, therefore, they are subjected to violence at an appreciably higher rate than the average of Turkey. As their average is above 3, they agree with these phrases.

Agreement with statements about possible sources of violence does not matter much compared to religiousness. Although there are differences between the averages, it is not possible to speak of significant differences between the atheists and the devout, as is the case between Sunnis and Alevis, or between Turks and Kurds.



But when we look at the statements one by one, there are some patterns. As the level of religiousness increases, the rate of seeing one’s own religion/sect as superior and therefore the perception of having more rights as being normal increases considerably. However, the state of being subjected to discrimination decreases. On one hand, atheists and non-believers, on the other hand, the religious and devout, those on both ends of the scale of religiosity tend to agree more with the statements that their religion/sect is not at the place it deserves and is threatened. Meanwhile, the beliefs of the believers, who are in the middle in the religiousness scale, are not as sharp as others.





As can be predicted, contrasts in the way Sunnis and Alevis evaluate their religious devotion have different effects regarding their views on the violence. As Alevis become more religious, they are more likely to agree with some statements, but the relations between them are not statistically significant. However, as Sunni Muslims become more religious, the probability of agreeing with the four statements, whose correlation values are in bold in the table below, increases. In other words, as religiousness increases among Sunni Muslims, they are more likely to think their religion/sect is superior to others and, therefore, it is normal to have more rights than other religions/sects; that violence can be used against others to protect these identities; that their identity is not in the place it deserves in Turkey and that it is threatened.

<b>Correlation</b>	<b>Religiousness of Sunni Muslims</b>	<b>Religiousness of Alevi Muslims</b>
My religion/sect is in Turkey is not at the place it deserves.	<b>.078</b>	-.043
My religion/sect is threatened in Turkey.	<b>.041</b>	-.042
If necessary, violence can be applied against others to protect my religion/sect and that it takes its rightful place	<b>.104</b>	-.011
I was subjected to discrimination because of my religion/sect.	.024	-.107
I got beaten up, was subjected to violence because of my religion/sect.	.036	.016
My religion/sect is superior to other religions/sects and therefore it is normal that I have more rights than others.	<b>.167</b>	.106

### 3.5. Class

The economic situation, that is, being richer or poorer than others, can also create a perception of victimization and threat and become one of the triggers for violence. The economic situation can of course be defined and measured in many different ways. Different indicators can be used, such as salary or income, house, land or car ownership. In this study, we measured the economic situation on the basis of total income entering the household in a month. The first table below shows the total monthly household income, which we asked in an open-ended manner and divided results into 5 groups.


<b>What is the total monthly income of the people living in this house? How much money enters your house on average every month, including everyone's earnings?</b>	<b>Percent</b>
1200 TL and below	6.8
1201 - 2000 TL	33.6
2001 - 3000 TL	26.3
3001 - 5000 TL	24.2
5001 TL and above	9.1
Total	100.0




Although monthly household income is a good indicator of the economic situation, of course, there is a difference between two people sharing the same amount of income and six people sharing that amount. In other words, a difference can be found in terms of income per capita. Therefore, we also examine the findings in on our economic class grouping based on per capita household income.

Economic classes	Percent
Low income	15.5
Low middle class	33.5
New middle class	31.1
Upper income	20.0
Total	100.0

When we examine the three statements about the relationship between financial situation and violence on the basis of monthly household income and economic classes, we see that the economic situation does not make a difference.





### 5.6. The Most Important Identity

So far we have dealt with five different identities, and we have read phrases to the interviewees for these five identities and asked if they agree or disagree. However, we do not know whether people attach importance to this identity, for example, whether they internalize being in the lowest income quintile or being female and develop their attitudes accordingly. To study this notion, we asked them to choose between identities and choose which one was most important to them. Fifty three percent stated their religion/sect is their most important identity, while 23 percent said they regard their material status and their class as their most important identity.

Which identity is THE MOST IMPORTANT to you?	Percent
My religion / sect	53.4
My ethnicity	7.8
My gender	7.5
My political view	8.6
My financial status, class	22.7
Total	100.0

When we examine which groups attach importance to which identities in the graph below, we reach quite striking findings, both regarding each of the identity groups and regarding Turkey in general.

First, 14 percent of women, in other words, almost twice of the average rate in Turkey consider their gender as their most important identity. Men do not attach importance to their gender at all and only 1 percent of them point to the gender. Among men, financial status replaces gender.


With increasing income and decreasing religiousness, gender becomes a more important identity. In addition, Arabs, Alevis and CHP voters consider gender as their most important identity twice as much as the average rate in Turkey.

Among the voters, the differences in the rate of considering political opinion as the most important identity are quite striking: Twenty two percent of CHP supporters, 17 percent of MHP supporters and 12 percent of the HDP supporters regard their political view as their most important identity. However, this rate is only 5 percent among the AK Party supporters. In addition to party preference, the political view is becoming more important with the increase in income and the decrease in religiousness.

Kurds point to ethnicity as their most important identity more than Turks and partially more than Arabs. However, it is not Kurds who most attach importance to ethnicity. One-quarter of both HDP supporters and İyi Party supporters say their ethnicity is their most important identity. Ethnicity is the most important identity for 15 percent of MHP voters who identified with nationalism. According to our findings, 15 percent of Alevis, of whom 56 percent are of Turkish, 16 percent Arab and 14 percent Kurdish, ethnicity is important. Apart from this, the effect of increasing income and decreasing religiousness can be seen for ethnicity, too.

Whether religion/sect is seen as the most important identity makes a big difference compared to religiousness and sect. While 78 percent of those who consider themselves as devout point to religion/sect as the most important identity, this rate decreases gradually with the decrease in religiousness and falls to 12 percent for non-believers and 6 percent for atheists. In addition, similar to Turkey in general, 56 percent of Sunni Muslims regard religion/sect as the most important identity, while this rate is 27 percent among Alevi Muslims. We are able to identify significant differences according to financial status and as income increases the rate those who attach importance to religion/sect gradually decreases. In Turkey, as demographic characteristics such as religiousness and education move together, and create nested dynamics, this situation is actually not surprising.

Which of the following identities is THE MOST IMPORTANT to you?



Again, not surprising, but striking in numerical terms is the relationship between the importance attached to religion/sect and political preference. Seventy five percent of AK Party supporters and 17 percent of CHP supporters view religion/sect as the most important identity, and in this respect they have opposing priorities. Considering the secular-religious debate that has taken place in Turkey for year, these rates are quite self-explanatory. What is quite surprising regarding the political preference is that religion/sect reflects the average rate in Turkey for the electorate of other parties and does not make much difference.

Finally, when we examine the material situation as the most important identity, there is of course an effect of income and class, and this effect is most noticeable for the top and bottom segments. Those in the upper classes care more about their economic situation than those in the lower classes. The lower income group, on the other hand, tends to attach more importance to religion/sect. Indeed, demographic groups such as CHP supporters, non-voters, Alevis, atheists and non-believers, whose income is above average in Turkey tend to see their financial status as their most important identity.

In our analysis so far, we got the impression that those who are minorities in society or those who are weaker are more prone to situations that trigger violence. In addition, the gender, political opinion, ethnic origin and sect or religiousness of the people make up some opinion differences about the possible sources of violence, while the material situation does not seem to make much difference. However, in the following sections of the report, when we examine how acceptable it is for the state, those in power, or the interviewees themselves to use violence against others, a very different picture emerges, and those with identities in stronger positions are more likely to normalize violence.



## 4.

---

### WHO CAN USE VIOLENCE AND AGAINST WHOM?

In order to find out whether the use of violence against others was acceptable, whether the interviewees approved of violence, we considered three possible actors as the perpetrators of violence: the state, people in a powerful position, and the interviewees themselves. In this section, we examine whether Turkish society considers it acceptable for these actors to use violence against others, and which social clusters are more inclined to see it as acceptable. At the same time, we will examine against whom these actors accept the use of violence according to the views of the interviewees.

#### 4.1. Can the State Use Violence?

In the survey, we asked two questions regarding the use of violence by the state. One was about psychological violence; the other was about physical violence.

We asked the question, ‘Who can a police officer or civil servant treat badly and you would consider it as normal?’ and we listed the 12 options in the table below. Fifty three percent of the society stated that they considered maltreatment in at least one of these options as normal. Forty seven percent opted for the option, ‘Nobody should be treated badly; everybody should be treated equally according to the law.’ Accordingly, half of the society thinks that people who are the visible face of the state can treat a citizen badly if necessary.

<b>Whom can a police officer or civil servant treat badly and you would consider it as normal?</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Member of an illegal organization	44.5
Homosexual person	12.6
Unreligious person	7.1
Someone who is Syrian	6.5
Extremely religious-looking person	4.0
Someone opposed to the government	3.5
Someone who is Kurdish	2.8
A woman who wear revealing clothes	1.6
Someone who is Alevi	.6
Someone who is rich	.4
Someone who is poor	.2
Someone who is covered with headscarf	.1
Nobody should be treated badly; everybody should be treated equally according to the law	46.4

Forty four point five percent of the society said it is normal for a police officer or civil servant to treat a member of an illegal organization badly. This is followed by a homosexual with 12.6 percent, an atheist with 7.1 percent and a Syrian with 6.5 percent. Other options have been selected at lower rates. Maltreatment of an atheist has been chosen at a higher rate than maltreatment of an overly religious person. The answer 'someone who is rich and poor' is chosen at very low rates, and the impression arises that maltreatment based on class is not considered as normal. 'A woman who wears revealing clothes' is chosen to be relatively low at 1.6 percent, while a woman wearing a headscarf was chosen almost zero times. It can be said the headscarf discussions in the last 15 years have affected the society and it has ceased to be an issue.

<b>Against whom would you consider the maltreatment of a police official or civil servant as normal, if necessary?</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Maltreatment is normal at least in one of them	54.6
Nobody should be maltreated; everyone should be treated equally according to law.	46.4




Regarding physical violence we asked the following question: ‘Do you consider it as normal and acceptable that Republic of Turkey uses physical violence against its own citizens?’ Thirty two point seven percent said ‘it is normal in some cases and can be considered as normal.’ Sixty seven point three percent of the society, in other words two-thirds of the society states ‘It is not normal nor acceptable in any case.’

<b>Do you consider it as normal and acceptable that Republic of Turkey uses physical violence against its own citizens?</b>	<b>Percent</b>
It is normal and acceptable in some cases.	32.7
In not normal nor acceptable in any case.	67.3
Total	100.0

When we look at the two issues together, 27 percent of the society stated they consider both the use of psychological violence and physical violence by the state as normal. Again, 27 percent consider the use of psychological violence normal, but do not accept physical violence, whereas 40 percent accept neither of the two options.

### Views on psychological and/or physical violence by the state



## 4.2. Can People Use Violence Against Others?

Is there any possibility of rightfulness in any of the following phrases?	Percent
Police beating people in an unauthorized demonstration group	17.6
Police beating someone who is considered politically suspicious	14.9
The crowd beating someone who is considered politically suspicious	9.5
Teacher beating her/his student	6.7
Husband beating his wife	2.8
Young boy beating his girlfriend/fiancé	1.0
There is no rightfulness in any of them.	69.9

We asked the question regarding the hierarchically stronger people among the perpetrators of possible violence in the following way: ‘Is there any possibility of rightfulness in any of the following phrases?’ and the results are shown in the table above. Seventy percent state the people do not have rightfulness in any of the cases stated above. Seventeen point six percent state there is a possibility of rightfulness when police beats people in an unauthorized demonstration group, while 14.9 percent state there is a possibility of rightfulness when the police beat someone who is politically suspicious.

Those, who think that a person can use violence against another person and there is the possibility of rightfulness, respond at lower rates, but certainly not negligible: Nine point five percent state there is a possibility of rightfulness, when a crowd beats a politically suspicious person, while 6.7 percent state there is a possibility of rightfulness when a teacher beats a student. Two point eight percent state there is a possibility of rightfulness when a husband beats his wife, while 1 percent said so when the young man beats his girlfriend or fiancé.

In this case, we can claim the following: The society thinks it may be more rightful that a police beats a politically suspicious person rather than a crowd and that, similarly, it may be more rightful when a man beats a woman he is married to rather than when a man beats a woman he is not married to.

### 4.3. Can a person use violence?

The third actors as possible perpetrators of violence were the interviewees themselves. During the design of the study, we set out with a presumption that it would not be possible to directly ask the interviewees whether they used violence or not, and that it would not be the correct method for accessing healthy data. Nevertheless, we have dealt with which situations or with which groups they may intervene or obstruct. Of course, intervening and obstructing actions may not necessarily be violent and can also lead to a solution through speaking and dialogue. However, it will provide important findings regarding which situations or which groups and individuals they wish to prevent, and which ones they see as a threat to their identity.

In which of the following situations would you interfere and try to obstruct?	Percent
A terrorist takes shelter in the neighborhood	68.7
Religious sect meeting	10.9
A beggar/homeless takes shelter in your apartment	10.3
The members of the party I do not approve of distribute election bulletins in my neighborhood	5.8
One does not fast and eats during Ramadan	4.9
Speaking Kurdish on the street	4.5
Celebrations of New Year's Eve on the street	4.4
A couple holds hands in public transport	1.6
None of them	25.6

Seventy four point four percent of the interviewees said they would try to obstruct and intervene in at least one of the situations, while 25.6 percent said they would not intervene in any of them. Sixty eight point seven percent of the respondents would intervene and prevent a terrorist from taking shelter in their neighborhood. Other answers are stated at the rate of 10 percent and below. On one hand, 10.9 percent said they would prevent a religious sect meeting, while on the other hand 4.9 percent said that they would intervene if someone does not fast during Ramadan and eats food. Four point four percent stated they would prevent a New Year's Eve celebration on the street. Discrimination based on the class does not arise in the question regarding the state's ill treatment, while by this question 10.3 per cent say they would prevent an orphan or beggar from taking shelter in their apartment. A couple's holding hands in public transport emerged as a condition that only a small minority of the society would try to prevent.

While the response ‘a terrorist takes shelter in your neighborhood’ was stated at very high rate, speaking Kurdish on the street was stated at the rate of 4.5 percent, which points to the fact that the majority of the society does not see all Kurds as terrorists, although it is sometimes expressed in public. As a matter of fact, in the question of the state’s maltreatment, only 2.8 percent would consider the state’s maltreatment towards a Kurdish person as normal.


<b>Which of the following do you least want to see in the place you live?</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Homosexuals	23.6
Refugees	22.6
Nonreligious people	19.1
Extremely religious groups	13.6
Nationalist people	3.0
Kurds	2.6
Leftists	1.7
Roma people	1.2
No answer	12.7
Total	100.0

The most preferred two options in the answers for ‘Which of the following do you least want to see in the place you live?’ were homosexuals and refugees. As a matter of fact, the maltreatment of the state towards homosexuals and Syrians are regarded as the most normal among the groups. These two options are followed by the answers of atheists and extremely religious groups, which are opposites, followed by the nationalists and Kurds. Groups, with which people have the least problems are Leftists and Roma people.

It is an attitude that people do not want certain groups to be present in their places of residence, and although they feel this distance, they may or may not turn these attitudes into a behavior based on a wish or necessity to live together. We asked another question, in order to understand if they want to turn these attitudes into a behavior: ‘What should be done so that these groups do not live where you live?’ Twenty four percent said, ‘Nothing, I don’t want any intervention.’ Those who want something to be done think the state should expel them, and inhabitants of a neighborhood should expel them. Those who state they will expel themselves are the smallest group, with 6 percent.

What should be done so that these groups do not live where you live?	Percent
I will expel them myself.	6.0
Inhabitants of the neighborhood should expel them.	11.8
The state should expel them.	58.3
Nothing, I don't want any intervention.	23.9
Total	100.0


Those who least want Kurds, homosexuals, unreligious people and refugees, argue the state should expel the groups they do not want. More than half of those who do not want nationalists and one-third of those who do not want extremist religious groups argue there should be no intervention.



#### 4.4. View of Different Identities on the Use of Violence

In our questions regarding the acceptability of the use of violence by the state, by others or by the people themselves, we have addressed individuals and groups with different identities as the object of violence. We examined which identities supported more than the average and which ones were less supportive regarding the use of violence towards these people and groups. This would provide important information regarding the distance between identities, perception of threats and about how they view themselves as people in strong positions. However, before considering which identities/groups are in weaker positions one by one, we consider the tendency of

Views on the use of violence of the state against its citizens



groups with different identities to see violence as acceptable. To this end, the first graph below shows the proportions of those who find it normal that a civil servant or police officer mistreats someone else, and the rates of those that regard the physical violence of the state acceptable in some cases. In the second graph, we show the rate of those who will intervene and try to prevent any group/person, and the rate of those who regard it as rightful, when a person uses violence in any given situation.

The first graph regarding the violence of the state highlights the following points:

- ✓ Men affirm the violence of the state slightly more than women.
- ✓ Among voters, it is understood MHP, İyi Party and AK Party supporters tend to normalize the violence of the state at higher levels. Seventy one percent of MHP supporters, 69 percent of İyi Party supporters and 64 percent of AK Party supporters stated they consider it as acceptable for any officer or police official representing the state to mistreat someone. Predictably, they consider the mistreatment of an illegal organization member as the most normal. MHP and AK Party supporters consider the use of physical violence by the state as acceptable at above average rates in Turkey, while İyi Party supporters consider the use of physical violence by the state as acceptable at below the average rates in Turkey.
- ✓ CHP and HDP supporters consider state violence as normal at below average rates in Turkey. The rate is lower especially among HDP supporters: Twelve percent considered physical violence as acceptable and 26 percent said mistreatment was acceptable.
- ✓ Alevi Muslims find state violence less acceptable compared to the average of Turkey and compared to Sunnis.
- ✓ The view of those who see themselves as believer, religious or devout are very close to the average, while those who are unbelievers and atheists consider psychological or physical state violence as less acceptable.
- ✓ The rates of the lowest and highest income groups finding state violence as acceptable are below average, while the rate of the middle-income groups is slightly higher.

Since both the most striking differences and the highest rates are among party voters, it is useful to examine one by one which voters of different parties deem it normal for the state to mistreat people through its civil servants and police officers. As can be seen in the graph below, the three voter groups who consider the maltreatment as the most normal are MHP voters, İyi Party and AK Party voters, at 59 percent, 64


percent and 53 percent, respectively. They considered it normal to mistreat a member of the illegal organization at the highest rate. These three groups also consider the mistreatment of homosexuals as normal at above the average rates. MHP and İyi Party supporters tend to consider the maltreatment of a Syrian and liberally-dressed people as normal at above average rates, while the AK Party supporters tend to consider the maltreatment of an atheist and a person who opposes the government more normal than the other two voter groups and the country in general.

	MHP	İyi Parti	Ak Parti	CHP	HDP
Maltreatment at least in one of them is normal	71	69	64	43	26
Member of an illegal organization	59	64	53	40	13
Homosexual person	19	15	21	3	9
Unreligious person	8	8	13	2	4
Someone who is Syrian	11	10	6	9	5
Extremely religious looking person	3	7	3	11	4
Someone opposed to the government	4	2	7	1	1
Someone who is Kurdish	10	7	3	3	1
A woman who wear revealing clothes	2		3		1
Someone who is Alevi		2	1	1	
Rich person			1		
Poor person					
Someone who is covered with headscarf				1	
Nobody should be treated badly, everybody should be treated equally according to the law	29	29	35	57	75

Among CHP supporters, the rate of those who consider it normal for the state to mistreat a member of an illegal organization is not low: 40 percent. This group is followed by extremely religious looking people and Syrian people among CHP supporters.

HDP supporters stated all the options, including the option of a member of an illegal organization, at much lower rates, and 75 percent preferred the option ‘No one should be mistreated; everyone should be treated equally within the legal limits.’ That HDP supporters point out to the answer ‘member of an illegal organization’ at lower rates, and the other voters at higher rates indicates that the interviewees understood the phrase as ‘PKK member.’





In summary, when we examine the tendency of the interviewees to see rightfulness in any of the individuals who use violence in certain cases and to try to prevent and intervene in any situation as in the above graph in a summarized way, we see a pattern similar to that of the state violence: men compared to women; MHP, İyi Party and AK Party supporters compared to CHP supporters and especially HDP supporters; Turks and Arabs compared to Kurds; Sunni Muslims compared to Alevis; and those with middle level income compared to those with upper or lower level income, seem more inclined to see someone else's practice of violence as normal and to use violence themselves.

Seeing others' rightfulness in the practice of violence varies most often with the police or the crowd beating political suspects or people in a group of unauthorized demonstrators. AK Party supporters, MHP and İyi Party supporters; Sunni Muslims, more religious people and males think the police or the crowd can be rightful in all three cases at above average rates.

In other cases, which have already been pointed out at lower rates, groups that tend to consider violence more normal tend to consider it as rightful. For example, even if rates are low among men who think there may be rightfulness in a husband or boyfriend using violence, it is twice as high as that of women.

The vast majority of interventions have been expressed for the option of 'a terrorist taking shelter in your neighborhood.' This answer, which is at the rate of sixty nine percent in Turkey, is 86 percent among İyi Party supporters, 83 percent among AK Party supporters, 79 percent among MHP supporters and above the average; while the rate is 68 percent among CHP supporters and 28 percent among HDP supporters and remained below the average. Among HDP supporters, we can guess that one quarter of those who oppose a terrorist taking shelter in the neighborhood are comprised of those who took distance from the PKK.

Nine percent of the MHP and AK Party supporters stated they would intervene and prevent members of a political party they oppose from distributing election materials in their neighborhood, while this rate is 8 percent among İyi Party, 5 percent among CHP and 2 percent among HDP supporters. It is noteworthy that MHP members are not the most reactive group regarding the option of a terrorist taking shelter in the neighborhood, even though they make up the group of voters who see the use of state violence as the most normal and are the most opposed to the distribution of election materials by other parties.

As can be expected, as religiousness increases, those who will try to prevent a non-fasting person and Christmas celebrations on the street increase and as religiousness increases, the number of people who try to prevent a religious sect meeting increases. Those who will try to prevent the religious sect meeting are above the average rate among the CHP, İyi Party supporters and Alevis. MHP, CHP supporters and those who have an income between 3000 -5000 TL are opposed to an orphan or a beggar taking shelter in their apartment.

MHP supporters are the group that most opposes the speaking of Kurdish on the street. With the increase of income, the rate of those who will oppose and intervene, increases. As expected, it is very low among Kurds and also among Alevis.



## 5.

---

# SOCIAL FABRIC AND VIOLENCE BASED ON IDENTITIES

In the sections of the report covered so far, we addressed 29 different identities based on five identity types and whether the use of violence was acceptable, as well as, 38 different identities/groups based on these five identity types. However, because the identities in Turkey are so interwoven, the problem of isolating which identities people hold and believe are threatened and towards which groups they legitimize the use of violence cannot be solved easily. For example, we cannot claim that only ethnic origins play a role in the Kurdish issue. Today, the issue has a political and ideological dimension as well as a class dimension. Similarly, in Turkey, income, political preferences and religiousness are interwoven. The social conflict has become apparent in the antagonism between the AK Party and CHP in the political arena is based on ideology as well as class and religiousness.

In this section of the report, to understand both how identities are interwoven with each other in Turkey and how they are related to the tendency towards violence as the purpose of our research, we use a statistical analysis method, which is called multiple correspondence analysis and analyze the findings we revealed so far regarding violence.

Multiple correspondence analysis is a data analysis technique used to demonstrate the relationships between nominal-categorical data and the possible patterns between them on a two-dimensional plane. It is used on large data sets with more than two variables.

Multiple correspondence analyses was shaped by the work of mathematician and linguist Jean-Paul Benzécri in the 1960s, and the studies and publications in this field increased rapidly with the introduction of research in English in the 1980s and through French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu's use of this method in his articles.

To put it more simply, this analysis method examines the relationships between the selected variables, in other words how close or distant they are to each other, which of them pull each other and which of them push each other. After performing this analysis between all the variables, it reduces all relationships to two dimensions.

In our research, we selected the five identities we identified at the beginning and analyzed the relationships between these identities with the Multiple Correspondence Analysis, in other words how close or distant they are to each other and which of them pull each other and which of them push each other. After analyzing each of the five different types of identities, the two-dimensional reduction of all relationships can be seen in the graph below. As in a sense a map of identities in Turkey emerged, we call the graph the “identity map.”



In the background of the analysis, each interviewee appears as a point, and the majority of them are located at the bottom left of the map. For example, the AK Party point is the closest focal point, which is the closest to those, who casted a vote for the AK Party. The identities in this lower left make up a section, where identities, which are in majority in the society, prevail mostly: being an AK Party supporter, being a Turk, being a Sunni Muslim and middle income segments prevail here.


As we move towards the right in the graph, we see lower income points, the Kurd and HDP points. Being an HDP supporter is one of the most distant one to other identities: while pushing all other identities, the one that attracts the most is being Kurdish. It is not a coincidence that the Kurdish point and the low-income points have attracted each other: the incomes of the Kurds are well below the average. On the far right is being an HDP supporter, while on the far left is being a MHP and İyi Party supporter and then being Turk. Therefore, we can call the horizontal axis of this map as the axis of nationalism / ethnicity.

As we go up from the crowded left bottom, we move away again from the majority identities. At the top we see the points of not having religious belief, being Alevi and being a member of other religions. At the same time, being a CHP supporter, those with high income and ethnic identities other than Turkish and Kurdish are located in the upper part of the map. The vertical axis can be called as the axis of socio-economic development along with religiosity.


The map outlines a political picture in Turkey only based on five identities. The distance on the horizontal axis leads to the Kurdish issue and nationalism. Although the MHP and the İyi Party supporters are in the lead in Turkish nationalism, the AK Party and the CHP supporters are in a similar position. The distance on the vertical axis demonstrates both the class distance and the social conflict that we can call secularism-religiosity or center-periphery, and the Kurds are as far apart as the other identities in the class issue towards the upper classes. Those on top of the map and those on the right side of the map are out of the majority and can occasionally share their demands.

In order to understand the relationship between violence and these identities, which is the purpose of the research, we place the answers (focal points) on the map given to the questions regarding the most important identity and the perspectives on the use of violence by the state, others and the individual himself/herself.

First, when we examine the most important identities, the religion/sect stands close to the bottom to being AK Party supporter and a Sunni Muslim, the ethnicity is the answer that is the closest to being Kurdish, and the political view is closer to the upper side, where socio-economic situation is better and the distance towards religion is higher. Although financial status and gender are also slightly closer to the upper side, they make up identities that are closest to the average rate in Turkey.








Responses to the answer regarding to which people the maltreatment of a state official or police officer can be considered as normal, are gathered generally in the lower left corner where the majority is located. However, the distribution is quite explanatory:

- ✓ The most widely stated answer 'member of an illegal organization' is in the middle of the answers.
- ✓ 'Someone who is homosexual' is also located in the middle.
- ✓ 'Extremely religious-looking person' is located on the most upper side; 'Someone who is atheist' is located at the bottom and close to the answer 'a woman who wears revealing clothes.'
- ✓ The answer 'Someone who is Kurd' is very close to Turk, MHP supporter and İyi Party supporter points. However, someone who is an opponent to the government is positioned further to the left.
- ✓ The answer 'No one should be mistreated' is both more to the right than of the lower-left corner of the majority and above: We noted in the earlier sections of the report that CHP supporters, non-religious people, and HDP supporters are more likely to give this answer.

- ✓ Their location on the map confirms those in the upper socio-economic groups are distanced towards Syrians at most.



The locations of answers given to the question ‘Which of the following don’t you want in your neighborhood?’ have some parallels to the locations of the answers given to the previous questions:

- ✓ The state of the rejection of Kurds is at the same point as the maltreatment of a Kurdish person and is very close to the identities of being a Turk, MHP supporter, İyi Party supporter and AK Party supporter. The answer ‘leftists’ is also located very close. The ‘ülküçü’ answer is very close to the point of having a Kurdish identity.
- ✓ The answer ‘refugee’ is located at a point closer to the top, similar to the maltreatment of someone who is Syrian. The Roma people, who are at quite lower rates, are located a bit above the refugees.
- ✓ The point of not wanting homosexuals in the neighborhood is located in the middle.

## **5.1. Basic Patterns and Findings**

When the findings of the identity map, which are formed from the relationship of identities, are examined together, several basic findings come forward in the research.

### **Society sees the state as a means for using violence**

There is an important “vein” in the society that considers state violence as normal. There are notable groups who consider the state’s practice of psychological and/or physical violence as normal, and there is an important section waiting for the “expulsion” of unwanted groups by the state rather than by themselves. Even if they do not consider the practice of violence by themselves or another person as legitimate, they can legitimize the practice of violence by police or civil servants on behalf of the state. Nevertheless, it is possible to talk about a difference between staying distant from violence, not wanting it and normalizing the violence enough to think that even the state can behave badly.

### **Society internalized the distinction between an illegal organization member and the Kurd**

The society is most distant from the “other,” who is expressed as the member of the illegal organization, terrorist and political suspect. Sixty nine percent of respondents said they would prevent a terrorist from taking refuge in their neighborhood, 45 percent said it would be normal for police or civil servant to treat a member of an illegal organization badly, if necessary, and 15 percent said it can be justified for the police to beat a politically suspicious person. Although this “other” is not fully defined, especially the difference between the views of MHP voters, İyi Party voters and HDP voters gives an important clue that the term ‘organization’ is interpreted as the PKK, and the term ‘terrorist’ is overwhelmingly interpreted as a member of the PKK. In fact, one of the most important findings in the research is that the society was able to make the distinction between Kurds and members of illegal organizations very clearly. The maltreatment of a member of an illegal organization is seen as normal by 45 percent of the interviewees, and only 3 percent consider it as normal for a Kurdish person. While 69 percent try to prevent the terrorist from taking refuge in their neighborhood, only 5 percent react to Kurdish being spoken on the street. Only 3 percent do not want Kurds in the place where they live. We can argue, the findings indicate Turkish society, in general, has solved the Kurdish issue almost completely in its mind and there is no reaction against Kurds in the collective consciousness. Contrary to what is sometimes discussed in public opinion, it is understood that identifying the PKK with the Kurdish identity is not an issue for society as a whole.

### **The majority is embodied in the voters of the MHP, İyi Party, AK Party and in religious people**

The majority in the society and those in strong positions are embodied in MHP, İyi Party and AK Party supporters in terms of political party voters. In particular, they react against the “others,” who are expressed in the statements as the members of an illegal organization, terrorist, or political suspects. They are the ones who generally find violence against other identities normal.

### **Social distinction and distance on the axis of religiosity is very sharp**

Another sharp distinction in society is seen on the axis of religiosity. Devout people say non-religious people can be mistreated (15 percent), that they do not want them in their neighborhood (40 percent), and that they will intervene in New Year celebrations (40 percent) more than the rest of the society. In contrast, atheists, non-believers say that an overly religious person can be mistreated (11 percent), that they do not want them in their neighborhood (49 percent), and they would intervene in a religious sect meeting (19 percent). But it should be noted that atheist-non-believers are far fewer in number and are generally more against the violence. In this case, the more religious ones, especially those who are Sunni Muslims and those who define themselves as religious or ascetic, emerge as another embodiment of the majority. Alevis also do not want extremist religious groups in their neighborhoods (41 percent), but they oppose the maltreatment of the state.

### **Patriarchal views dominate gender identity and manifest themselves in reaction to homosexuals**

Male violence against women remains a secondary issue compared to the relationships between other identities. It is not possible to mention remarkable differences between men and women. Men find the mistreatment of an illegal organization member, a Syrian and a homosexual more legitimate and normal by a few points, compared to the violence of a teacher, a husband, and a boyfriend, and they are more likely to intervene in the case of a terrorist taking shelter in their neighborhood. In other words, if we look at the sources of violence, we see that women tend to be more inclined to violence, but they are not more pro-violence. But it is not possible to argue the contradictions that can be seen in other identities are at the same sharpness between women and men. This may be partly due to the fact that there is not much difference in opinion between women and men and that women have internalized the patriarchy as much as men. It can be evaluated over the women’s existence in the more traditional part of the society for reasons such as education and income.

However, the response to homosexuals denotes the need for other important debates about gender identity. After being a member of a terrorist / illegal organization, the most unwanted group seems to be homosexuals, and there is a strong tendency among men to think that violence can be applied to someone else to protect their identity.

**We can speak of the domination of the middle class and it is intertwined with other dominant identities**

The class itself does not matter in terms of the source of violence. Neither the rich nor the poor supported state violence in above average rates. However, it is possible to talk about interconnection with other identities due to the fact the Kurds are the lowest income groups and the higher income groups are at the same time more educated and more distant from religion. In addition, the fact that the middle classes are more likely to intervene with a beggar in their apartments hints at the existence of a class problem. Specifically, when reading through the positions on the identities map, it is not possible to talk about the clash of the class issue between the upper and lower classes. Yet it is possible to speak of clashes between the middle class and both the upper and lower classes, intertwined with other identities, and their tendency to justify violence against other classes.




## 6.

### THE MOOD IN TURKEY

We also want to ask questions about the mood of the society in Turkey in preparing this study. In this context, we tried to understand the states of distrust, introversion, and swift reactions that are frequently expressed in society.


Nine out of ten people agree with the phrase ‘people trust each other less.’ Eighty four percent agree with the phrase, ‘people react to each other more easily,’ while three-quarter of the society agree with the phrase ‘more and more people are becoming introverted and are afraid of talking on the street.’



#### 6.1. More and more people are becoming introverted and are afraid of talking on the street

Three-fourths of the society agree with the phrase “More and more people are becoming introverted and afraid of talking on the street.’ Eighteen out of 100 people do not agree with this phrase.


**More and more people become introverted and are afraid of speaking on the street.**



When we take the average of the answers and look at the distribution of these averages in different demographic clusters, we see the average of each cluster is close to or above 4, which means that almost all clusters agree with this phrase to a great extent.

As age decreases and education increases, those who agree with the phrase increase. Those who define their lifestyles as modern think ‘more and more people are becoming introverted and refrain from talking on the street’ at a higher rate than other lifestyle clusters. This rate decreases as the level of religiousness decreases. Moreover, Alevis are more likely to agree with these phrases than the Sunnis.

**More and more people become introverted and are afraid of speaking on the street.**




When we conduct an analysis based on the answers in the section regarding sources of violence, we observe the state of agreement or disagreement with the phrase ‘My political view is not at the place it deserves in Turkey’ and ‘My political view is



threatened in Turkey’ are related to each other. In other words, those who think their political view is not at the place it deserves in Turkey, say that more and more people are becoming introverted and are afraid of talking on the street.


Therefore, we can say political preference is related to introversion and fear of speaking on the street.

**More and more people become introverted and are afraid of speaking on the street.**




At this point, when we analyze according to the party preferences, we see that all party voters agree with this phrase. AK Party and MHP voters agree the least with this phrase, whereas CHP and İyi Party voters agree the most. This finding is another important sign that the political preference is related to introversion and fear of speaking on the street.

**More and more people become introverted and are afraid of speaking on the street.**




## 6.2. People react to each other much easier

The second phrase we questioned in order to understand the social mood was reactions in society, which got easier or less inhibited. Eighty four percent of the society agrees with the phrase ‘People react to each other much more easily,’ while 10 percent disagree with it.




The rates of agreement with this phrase do not produce large differences within demographic clusters. While gender and age produce no difference, education and lifestyle work in a similar way to the previous question.

When we re-evaluate the findings on the basis of the average we see that on the average in Turkey is 4.1. The most notable differences are observed in the section regarding the sources of the violence in the context of the answers given to the phrase ‘Those in my class are not at the place they deserve in Turkey.’ ‘The higher the degree of agreement with this phrase, the more people think people react easily towards each other. Still, those who ‘definitely disagree’ with the phrase ‘those in my class are not at the place they deserve in Turkey.’ are slightly below Turkey’s average with the average of 3.9.




### 6.3. People trust each other less.


Our final phrase in this section was regarding people’s trust in each other. Nine out of 10 people agreed with the phrase ‘people trust each other less.’




Yet when we look on the basis of the averages, the average of Turkey is 4.3, which is between ‘I agree’ and ‘strongly agree.’ The phrase that people trust each other less is more widely accepted in society than our other phrases.



The interviewees agree with this phrase at higher rates, and those who think that their political opinion is threatened in Turkey agree with this phrase at much higher rates.



When we analyze according to party preferences, there are no big differences according to voter preferences, but we see those who vote for the AK Party and MHP have a little less agreement than the other voter clusters and that the CHP and İyi Party voters agree more.



## 7.

---

# EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION

*Prof. Dr. Ferhat Kentel*

### **Fear, congregation, and violence**

Research conducted with the public takes a photograph of a certain period of time, even of the moment. Theoretically, it does not mean the data reflected in the research was valid one day before or will be valid one day after, as an event that happened or will happen in these short periods of time can radically alter all the proportions and balances reflected in the research.

However, the data in our research confirm some of the trends that have been taking place for a long time. Turkey has long been a society moving from one tension to another and distrust between social sectors is continuous, except for some incidental improvements.

There is no doubt this distrust is due to political, cultural and economic conjunctures that have spread over long historical periods or that have recently been encountered. While we can never cover the entire historical trajectory, although it is known that the Anatolian territories inhabited by citizens in Turkey have a rich heritage and diversity, we can understand there have been intense fears and insecurities among different people, religions, sects, ethnic groups and cultures in the territory due to war, migration, exile, and massacre. In the face of domination, oppression, and cruelty of the strongest with highest numbers of people, armies and weapons, we can easily imagine the individuals of the weaker communities who did not escape or got slaughtered were subjected to the stronger ones. We can assume that this is also true for the segments that had appeared stronger in a given period of time and became weaker afterward.

In other words, we can think that those who change religion, sect, language or territory due to oppression and cruelty, carry a constant fear and anxiety or trauma of survival, in their memory, in their cultural capital with them.

However, this “chained trauma,” which has spread over long historical periods, is not only a wounded state in the depths of history that occasionally manifests itself from our social genes. Trauma has persisted in recent history. Undoubtedly due to our traumas, we have a troubled recent history starting from the “1915 Armenian issue” that we cannot even discuss, that we are afraid to name, or that fuels polarizations the moment we name it ...

Or, we live in a country where capital, goods, and property were unjustly shifted from one segment to another without being “halal” according to the values of the large masses, which was implemented under the name of the “Wealth Tax.”

Aside from the mood of dark organizations and events such as the Committee of Union and Progress, Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa, or the March 31 case, we have a tradition that hanged a prime minister elected by the majority of the people, along with two of his ministers on May 27, 1960, as the opening events of a coup. This tradition was settled with another coup that hanged Deniz Gezmiş and his friends with the slogans of “Three to three!” in the Assembly session on March 12, 1971. With the September 12 coup, we acquired another layer of trauma that was very difficult to heal in our tradition of coups. Accompanied by the words of coup d’état general Kenan Evren, who was waiting for the conditions of a coup in Maraş and the May 1<sup>st</sup> massacres, saying “We should hang them instead of feeding them,” we were terrorized by the hanging of 50 young people “equal number from both left and right side.” Even though there was no blood in the persecution, the coup of 28 February was added to the previous ones when we think about the traumatic effect it has had on the faithful part of the society, especially young women wearing headscarves. Last but not least, even though it was “unsuccessful,” the July 15 coup attempt did not leave people unaffected in the society due to its massacre and its political consequences.

These coups from past to present, or those events that created an impact upon people’s lives which we quickly scanned, left deep traces of mistrust in the lives of all people, classes, political and cultural groups living in Turkey. Insecurity has permeated the memory of these social segments and their genes. The most natural consequence of this distrust, which has been reproduced in their own future, and hence the distrust to others, was to create protection against all kinds of others and risks coming from others by building “congregations.”

This research carries different photos that reflect this insecurity. Accordingly, the congregation that we are talking about has consequences such as “people having less

confidence in each other,” “people reacting more easily to each other”, and “more and more people are withdrawing to themselves and fear to talk in public,” which are among the findings of the research.

### **Politics of congregations**

We could easily give examples of tensions and violent events that could potentially take place and the flare-ups that arise occasionally among very different sections –“congregations”- in Turkey. However, the situations in which these tensions that existed among those sections were embodied in the field of politics in a most concrete way. Since Turkey had passed to a multi-party democratic regime, all elections – with some exceptions - were marked by deep cleavages. Certainly, these tensions are not tensions produced by politics; it was the tensions in the depths of society solidifying in politics, the “reification” of tensions. In other words, the DP-CHP tensions in the 1950s, the AP and CHP tensions in the 1960s and 1970s, or the current AKP-CHP tensions are not produced by these parties themselves but they are the embodiment of deep cultural community identities and the cleavages between them, in the relations between these parties.

If we see the glass half full, this situation can be defined as the attempt to solve the deep cultural cracks in society by politics, with democracy, instead of taking the approach of blood feuds. However, the other half of the glass is empty, and this distrust among these communities and congregation is reflected in the politics as the dichotomy of “defeating or being defeated.” In other words, already existing communities are also turning into political communities; the field of politics, in its deepest and broadest sense, is transforming into an area where “a matter of life and death” plays out.

In the research, among the reactions of people to different issues, the most significant manifestation of differences was between political identities and this shows how political party preferences have an “objectifying” effect on the worlds of cultural meaning. The superior-subordinate relationships that people “feel” in their daily lives, turn into “words” when it comes to their political preferences.

Therefore, the most fundamental elements of democracy, political parties are becoming the embodiments of the communities. In fact, in all the complexity of life, for example, a person who is “both religious and secular,” but who suffers from piety or secularity, when it comes to politics in which tension becomes the most concrete, puts one of their two traits in the background and becomes an insecure and sharp identity in one dimension. The state of existence of very large social segments, in fact consisting

of the intersection of multi-layered, different identity traits, can fall to one dimension and people look at any matter from their congregations, where they are attached only in that one dimension.

The weak and vulnerable groups in terms of their economic, social and cultural capital are insecure in every way. However, as the research data shows, those who are relatively strong and sovereign are also deeply afraid of losing what they have. So even those who are behind relatively secure walls in society actually feel insecure. Whether they have these security walls, the protection shield of the political party to which they belong, or the security sites with gatekeepers and the digital camera systems at the gates, every community sees others as a risk. Because they are worried that their situation may change at any time, they feel constantly vigilant against the possibility that the people to whom they are superior now, can one day displace them.

### **Class and cultural identity**

In Turkey, generally, it is expressed that class belonging, class expression, and class struggle are not strong and it can be said that this is largely true. Apart from the relatively successful performance of the trade union movement in Turkey, especially in the 1960s and 1970s, a process paralleling the crisis of modern societies around the world, the neoliberal wave and the rising cultural identity struggle against this wave, took place in our country. The center of the social and political movement in Turkey also has shifted towards the struggle for cultural identity and lifestyle mobility.

However, although “cultural identities” rather than “class” dominate in appearance, we cannot say that these cultural identity movements are independent of class distress and feelings. Because class never manifests itself only as class; class also produces its own culture, and in a discursive environment in which an “economist” speaking with concepts such as “economic rationality”, “free market”, “free trade”, “labor market” and the “human factor” imposes itself in a neutral manner, it is never easy to question the ideological contents of these concepts and to take a position as a class. However, not being able to speak in a discursive level of “illegitimate class language” does not mean there is no class domination, unfair work and working conditions, and sharp hierarchical divergences. In this context and in the face of the difficulty of speaking as a class, people’s demands for justice, equality, freedom, and objections can only be expressed with cultural references that are at their fingertips and have become part of their identities.



The conditions for the expression of class identity in its own language or the emergence of it through cultural reflexes also vary according to where a person is located in the class hierarchy of society itself. As we understand from the research data, those in the upper classes care more about their economic situation than those in the lower classes. Lower income groups are more concerned with their religion/sect. Because, in these groups, where economic mentality and rationality are not very sophisticated, religion actually functions as a class identity; as such, we see there is a kind of communitarian identity in the society for the protection of group interests. In other words, their desires to rise and their class anger can be expressed in the cultural field.

In fact, whether people define themselves according to their religion or not, religion is, in any case, one of the most distinctive divisions in the attitudes and positions taken against other segments of society. Religion, which is one of the expressions of cultural identity, emerges as the most important identity issue compared to other types of expression. For example, a person who speaks of religion with a strong emphasis both wants to have more rights and is more likely to believe violence is acceptable.

When the interviewees were asked to choose the identity characteristics that were most important to them, 53 percent stated that religion/sect was the most important, and 23 percent said that material status was the most important identity. On this basis, as the religiousness increases among Sunni Muslims, they are more likely to think that they are superior to other religions and thus have more rights; that violence may be inflicted on others to protect their identity; they are not where they deserve in Turkey and they are threatened.

However, another trend related to the class-culture issue, but different from the previous one, is mostly perceived by the reactions of MHP voters towards people speaking Kurdish on the street. With the increase in income, those who are opposed to people speaking Kurdish on the street increases. It is possible to talk about the existence of a class hatred that feeds the seemingly cultural/political cultural tension.

### **Dangerous others**

It is understood from the research data that among the categories seen as the most dangerous among the wider social groups, people who can “disrupt mental peace” (comfort is more accurate) and “foreigners” attract attention. Homosexuals and Syrians are among the groups where state maltreatment is most likely to be seen as normal.

On average, we can say that both categories are very meaningful for a society that sees itself as a “community” or consists of “communities.” It is understood that among the different social groups, the first one of these categories carries the danger of eroding the settled binary gender roles and the second carries the danger of eroding the dichotomy of “inside and outside,” taught and established by the nation-state. Predictably, the interviewees mostly consider the maltreatment towards “the members of an illegal organizations, homosexuals, atheists, refugees, and someone who is dressed openly” as normal. AK Party and MHP voters see physical violence of the state as normal, more than the average rates in Turkey.

In fact, building communities with the fear of the erosion of such dichotomies and the potential for alternative renewal and transformation can be seen in many societies. Nowadays, more and more, every society presents tendencies to divide in the face of risk perceptions. This division is actually the division of human beings rather than the division of society. Or every human being actually carries many desires and emotions (at least such as regeneration and preservation) that exist in society. However, while in some people, fear and related reactions come to the forefront, others take a stand for change despite the risk perception.

### **Power and violence**

The sense of class oppression or the lack of it is present in all categories that express themselves by referring to cultural/political categories. The exception of this is the AK party or people with more religious references. It seems the AK Party base feels to a large extent as “in power”; it is the group with the lowest level of complaints of discrimination or violence. In a way, this segment thinks that it is located “where it deserves.”

However, the fear of change among these segments, which often represents a more conservative identity of power and order; and their fear of the stranger and the unknown is higher than others... But this is not a total fear; it is not possible to speak of fear about interests, techniques, or money. In fact, in a society where materialism is very prominent, there is a mass that has grown accustomed to capitalism and is satisfied with the populist discourses (which pleases the culture) against the crisis...

In contrast, minorities (such as Alevis) are far from being able to speak such a conservative language. However, those who say “they trust each other less, they do not speak with each other,” who feel “uneasy” in other words, are more distant to the issue of religion (to extreme religious appearances, headscarves) ... In terms of the current conjuncture, this corresponds to an “oppositional” attitude and a higher level of fear.

When we look at the biaxial analysis, it is clear those who are at the edges and away from the main power centers (Alevites, HDP voters, upper-income groups, veiled women, well-educated, uncovered, Kurds) are completely separated from each other. In addition, while on the one hand, the average mass has anger towards them; these minority groups have anger towards each other. In particular, the modern, uncovered and Alevites have a clear position against more religious looking people; on the other hand, ascetic people and veiled women have a clear position against those who wear revealing clothing. Obviously, these contrasting attitudes feed the possibility of “maltreatment” against the others.

In Turkey, both pre-AKP middle classes and those formed during the AKP era, in other words, those who are closer to power and government, display a similar attitude towards those who are outside the mainstream. For example, the toleration level of almost all of them towards people speaking Kurdish on the street; extreme religious views towards people holding hands, eating during Ramadan, against New Year celebrations, is very low. They do not jointly want Roma, Kurds or Syrian refugees in their immediate neighborhood. Extremely religious people and those with a weak relationship with religion do not want to be near each other; religious people do not want to be near homosexuals and leftists.

### **Other and violence**

Based on data from the research, the tendency of building communities among those we have interpreted above is certainly not shaped by a matter of existence. While congregation emerges as a fear and a defense reflex against fear, as a “zero-sum game” or with the logic of “either me or them,” it also includes ill treatment against others, punishment, or even the desire of others to become invisible/disappear. Half of Turkish society expresses this desire to punish; they express the idea that the security forces could abuse a citizen, if necessary. The interviewees stated it might be right to beat people in a group performing unauthorized demonstrations or to beat someone suspicious, if necessary; the proportions of those who say they themselves will intervene and try to prevent events or people in some cases that are not accepted ideologically can reach remarkable dimensions. Likewise, we can emphasize that there are similarly significant proportions of people seeing abuse of state towards homosexuals and Syrians as normal. Moreover, we can often find examples of this kind of maltreatment in our society. It would be enough to point out the lynching events against Syrians or Roma in different cities. However, this “ill treatment” is not only about the attitude and behavior of the ordinary citizen. These violent attitudes and behaviors

feed the common expectations of both the citizens and the state and its security forces. An elite wedding at the Çırağan Palace in April and the violence of the protection police against a lawyer who reacted loudly to a road closure for political protocol clearly illustrate the common mood of violence in society. Both the police and a significant part of the public adopt the idea that state police can use violence. In a way, the police know that they can use violence as the police of a community, not the state.

### **Conclusion**

As a result, we can go back to the comment that we first mentioned. The fact that “more and more people are self-contained and afraid to talk on the street” is being confirmed. The normalization of violence on the street brings silence and fear, fear brings closing into itself, into the congregation, and the congregation brings about the normalization of maltreatment towards others.

Finally, KONDA’s research has taken a picture of insecurity and congregation and points out how violence in this photo carries a potential threat to daily life. However, the research also shows us there is an important group that stands at a distance from violence and rejects violence. In addition, the research shows there is a significant mass of people who say that violence can be applied by the state rather than people themselves. Therefore, even if violence is normalized, at least it refers to a theoretical knowledge contained in the state; “violence belongs to the state monopoly.” In other words, at least a basic assumption that violence can be within the state monopoly seems to be largely accepted. If we see the glass half empty again, we can emphasize that the effect created by a few people who do not consider the violence of the state sufficient, is not at all exaggerated.

## 8.

---

# RESEARCH ID

### 8.1. The General Description of the Survey

The survey that this report is based on was conducted by KONDA Research and Consultancy Limited (KONDA Arařtırma ve Danıřmanlık Ltd. Őti.) for Global and Local Thought Institution (Küyerel Düşünce Enstitüsü).

The field survey was conducted on 3–4 November 2018. This report presents the political trends, preferences and profiles of the adult population above the age of 18 in Turkey, as observed on the dates of the field survey.

The survey is designed and conducted with the purpose to determine and to monitor trends and changes in the preferences of respondents who represent the adult population above the age of 18 in Turkey. The margin of error of the survey is +/- 1.7 at 95 percent confidence level and +/- 2.3 at 99 percent confidence level.

### 8.2. The Sample

The sample was prepared by stratification of the data on population and educational level of neighborhoods and villages derived from the Address-Based Population Registration System with the neighborhood and village results of the general elections dated November 1, 2015. Residential areas were first graded as rural/urban/metropolitan and then the sample was determined based on 12 regions.

Within the scope of the survey, face-to-face interviews were carried out with 2,691 individuals in 154 neighborhoods and villages of 101 districts -including central districts- of 32 provinces. Age and gender quotas were applied for 18 questionnaires conducted in each neighborhood.

Provinces visited	32	Ages	Female	Male
Districts visited	101	Ages 18 - -32	3 subjects	3 subjects
Neighborhoods/villages visited	154	Ages 33-48	3 subjects	3 subjects
Subjects interviewed	2691	Ages 48 and above	3 subjects	3 subjects

	Level 1 (12 regions)	Provinces visited
1	Istanbul	İstanbul
2	West Marmara	Balıkesir, Çanakkale, Edirne, Tekirdağ
3	Aegean	Denizli, İzmir, Kütahya, Manisa
4	East Marmara	Bolu, Bursa, Eskişehir, Kocaeli
5	West Anatolia	Ankara, Konya
6	Mediterranean	Adana, Antalya, Hatay, Mersin
7	Central Anatolia	Kayseri, Sivas
8	West Black Sea	Samsun, Tokat
9	East Black Sea	Trabzon
10	Northeast Anatolia	Erzurum, Kars
11	Middle East Anatolia	Elazığ, Malatya, Van
12	Southeast Anatolia	Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa

	Area of survey	Rural	Urban	Metropol	Total
1	İstanbul			19,8%	19,8%
2	West Marmara		3,3%	1,3%	4,7%
3	Aegean	2,0%	6,8%	4,6%	13,4%
4	East Marmara	1,3%	2,7%	5,4%	9,4%
5	West Anatolia	,7%	1,9%	6,9%	9,5%
6	Mediterranean	1,9%	5,4%	5,2%	12,6%
7	Central Anatolia	,7%	2,7%	1,3%	4,7%
8	West Black Sea	2,0%	3,4%	,6%	6,0%
9	East Black Sea	1,2%	2,0%		3,2%
10	Northeast Anatolia	1,3%	1,3%		2,7%
11	Middle East Anatolia	1,3%	2,7%	,7%	4,6%
12	Southeast Anatolia	2,0%	3,3%	4,1%	9,4%
	Total	14,4%	35,5%	50,1%	100,0%

## 9.

### FREQUENCY TABLES

#### 9.1. Profile of Subjects

<b>Gender</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Female	51.2
Male	48.8
Total	100.0

<b>Age</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Ages 18 - 32	33.8
Ages 33 - 48	34.8
Ages 49+	31.5
Total	100.0

<b>Educational Status</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Illiterate	6.0
Literate without degree	2.2
Primary school graduate	30.2
Primary education / Middle school graduate	14.3
High school graduate	30.1
University graduate	15.8
Postgraduate / Doctorate	1.5
Total	100.0

<b>How many people live in this household (including children) ?</b>	<b>Percent</b>
1 - 2 person (s)	21.2
3 - 5 people	66.1
6 - 8 people	10.6
9 people or more	2.1
Total	100.0

<b>Marital status</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Single	23.4
Engaged	2.0
Married	68.5
Widow	4.8
Divorced	1.3
Total	100.0

<b>Lifestyle cluster</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Modern	27.5
Traditional Conservative	44.9
Religious Conservative	27.6
Total	100.0

<b>Did you work on a job to make money last week? If so, what is your profession?</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Public officer	5.2
Private sector	6.2
Worker	9.3
Small retailer	8.6
Merchant / businessman	1.2
Self-employed	1.9
Farmer, agriculture, stock breeder	2.5
Employed, other	5.8
Retired	12.8
Housewife	30.6



Student	9.7
Unemployed	4.7
Unemployable	1.6
Total	100.0

<b>Which party would you vote for, if there were a GENERAL ELECTION today?</b>	<b>Percent</b>
AK Party	33.1
CHP	15.3
MHP	8.2
HDP	5.2
İyi Party	2.3
Other parties	.9
Swing voter	27.5
Non-voter	7.5
Total	100.0

<b>Place of residence</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Rural	14.4
Urban	35.5
Metropolitan area	50.1
Total	100.0

<b>Area of survey</b>	<b>Percent</b>
İstanbul	19.8
West Marmara	4.7
Aegean	13.4
East Marmara	9.4
West Anatolia	9.5
Mediterranean	12.6
Central Anatolia	4.7
West Black Sea	6.0
East Black Sea	3.2
Northeast Anatolia	2.7

Middle East Anatolia	4.6
Southeast Anatolia	9.4
Total	100.0

<b>TV channel used to follow the news</b>	<b>Percent</b>
I do not watch TV.	13.6
I do not follow news on TV.	9.0
A Haber	5.9
ATV	12.4
CNN Türk	2.4
Fox TV	22.7
Haber Türk	1.6
Halk TV	1.2
Kanal 7	1.3
Kanal D	5.2
NTV	2.4
Show TV	6.1
Star TV	3.1
TRT	9.5
Ulusal Kanal	.2
Other channels	3.4
Total	100.0

<b>Do you have an automobile owned by this household?</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Yes	50.0
No	50.0
Total	100.0

Coverage status	Percent
Not covered	28,4
Headscarf	47,4
Turban	7,2
Chador, niqab	,8
Interviewee is single man	16,1
Total	100,0

Ethnicity	Percent
Turkish	77,1
Kurdish	15,6
Zaza	1,1
Arab	2,5
Other	3,7
Total	100,0

Religion/sect	Percent
Sunni Muslim	91,5
Alevi Muslim	5,7
Other religions	,9
Not religious	2,0
Total	100,0

Religiousness	Percent
Atheist	2,0
Non-believer	2,5
Believer	29,1
Religious	56,1
Devout	10,3
Total	100,0

<b>Monthly household income</b>	<b>Percent</b>
1200 TL or less	6,8
1201 - 2000 TL	33,6
2001 - 3000 TL	26,3
3001 - 5000 TL	24,2
5001 TL and above	9,1
Total	100,0

<b>Economic classes</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Lower income	15,5
Lower middle class	33,5
New middle class	31,1
Upper income	20,0
Total	100,0

<b>Type of residence</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Slums/apartment without external plastering	4,5
Single, traditional house	28,9
Apartment building	61,5
Housing estate	4,9
Luxury building, villa	,2
Total	100,0

## 9.2. Possible Sources of Violence

<b>Those with the same gender as me are not at the place they deserve in Turkey.</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Absolutely disagree	14,3
Disagree	28,0
Neither agree nor disagree	12,6
Agree	29,7
Absolutely agree	15,4
Total	100,0

<b>Those with the same gender as me are threatened.</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Absolutely disagree	19,9
Disagree	32,3
Neither agree nor disagree	11,2
Agree	25,3
Absolutely agree	11,3
Total	100,0

<b>In order to protect my fellows and ensure they take their rightful places, violence can be applied against others.</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Absolutely disagree	42,6
Disagree	39,9
Neither agree nor disagree	7,1
Agree	7,1
Absolutely agree	3,2
Total	100,0

<b>I was subjected to discrimination because of my gender.</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Absolutely disagree	32,8
Disagree	42,2
Neither agree nor disagree	7,5
Agree	12,4
Absolutely agree	5,1
Total	100,0

<b>I got beaten up/subjected to violence because of my gender.</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Absolutely disagree	41,4
Disagree	44,9
Neither agree nor disagree	4,9
Agree	5,7
Absolutely agree	3,1
Total	100,0

<b>My gender is superior and it is normal to have more rights than the opposite gender.</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Absolutely disagree	37,2
Disagree	39,9
Neither agree nor disagree	9,3
Agree	9,0
Absolutely agree	4,5
Total	100,0

<b>My political opinion is not at the place it deserves in Turkey</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Absolutely disagree	11,1
Disagree	26,4
Neither agree nor disagree	14,8
Agree	30,3
Absolutely agree	17,3
Total	100,0

<b>My political view is threatened in Turkey.</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Absolutely disagree	14,4
Disagree	35,5
Neither agree nor disagree	18,4
Agree	20,9
Absolutely agree	10,8
Total	100,0

<b>To protect my political view/so that it takes its rightful place, violence can be applied against others</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Absolutely disagree	42,6
Disagree	42,1
Neither agree nor disagree	9,7
Agree	4,3
Absolutely agree	1,4
Total	100,0

<b>I was subjected to discrimination because of my political opinion.</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Absolutely disagree	24,7
Disagree	39,6
Neither agree nor disagree	12,4
Agree	17,1
Absolutely agree	6,2
Total	100,0

<b>I got beaten up/was subject to violence because of my political opinion</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Absolutely disagree	40,7
Disagree	46,9
Neither agree nor disagree	7,1
Agree	3,3
Absolutely agree	2,0
Total	100,0

<b>My political opinion is superior and therefore it is normal to have more rights than others.</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Absolutely disagree	34,4
Disagree	40,5
Neither agree nor disagree	11,7
Agree	9,4
Absolutely agree	3,9
Total	100,0

<b>My ethnicity is not at the place that it deserves in Turkey</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Absolutely disagree	18,6
Disagree	39,7
Neither agree nor disagree	13,1
Agree	20,1
Absolutely agree	8,5
Total	100,0

<b>My ethnicity is threatened in Turkey.</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Absolutely disagree	23,0
Disagree	45,7
Neither agree nor disagree	11,5
Agree	14,2
Absolutely agree	5,7
Total	100,0

<b>To protect my ethnicity/so that it takes it rightful place, violence can be applied against others.</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Absolutely disagree	43,9
Disagree	41,8
Neither agree nor disagree	7,2
Agree	5,1
Absolutely agree	1,9
Total	100,0

<b>I was subjected to violence because of my ethnic origin.</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Absolutely disagree	33,5
Disagree	46,5
Neither agree nor disagree	7,0
Agree	8,8
Absolutely agree	4,2
Total	100,0



<b>I got beaten up because of my ethnicity, was subjected to violence.</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Absolutely disagree	42,6
Disagree	49,0
Neither agree nor disagree	4,7
Agree	2,3
Absolutely agree	1,3
Total	100,0

<b>My ethnicity is superior to others and therefore it is normal that I have more rights than others.</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Absolutely disagree	38,5
Disagree	42,6
Neither agree nor disagree	7,5
Agree	7,3
Absolutely agree	4,2
Total	100,0

<b>My religion/sect is not at the place it deserves in Turkey.</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Absolutely disagree	20,9
Disagree	41,7
Neither agree nor disagree	11,1
Agree	18,5
Absolutely agree	7,8
Total	100,0

<b>My religion/sect is threatened in Turkey</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Absolutely disagree	25,8
Disagree	46,5
Neither agree nor disagree	10,4
Agree	12,7
Absolutely agree	4,7
Total	100,0

<b>Violence can be applied against others to protect my religion/sect and to ensure they take their rightful place.</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Absolutely disagree	44,8
Disagree	42,1
Neither agree nor disagree	5,6
Agree	5,4
Absolutely agree	2,0
Total	100,0

<b>I was subjected to discrimination because of my religion/sect.</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Absolutely disagree	37,5
Disagree	47,8
Neither agree nor disagree	6,1
Agree	6,3
Absolutely agree	2,3
Total	100,0

<b>I got beaten up/was subjected to violence because of my religion/sect.</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Absolutely disagree	45,3
Disagree	49,5
Neither agree nor disagree	3,3
Agree	1,1
Absolutely agree	,8
Total	100,0

<b>My religion/sect is superior to others and therefore it is normal that I have more rights than others.</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Absolutely disagree	36,0
Disagree	37,9
Neither agree nor disagree	7,0
Agree	10,7
Absolutely agree	8,3
Total	100,0

<b>Those in my class are not at the place they deserve in Turkey.</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Absolutely disagree	7,1
Disagree	20,1
Neither agree nor disagree	14,9
Agree	37,5
Absolutely agree	20,4
Total	100,0

<b>To protect those in my class/so that they take their rightful place, violence can be applied against others.</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Absolutely disagree	42,3
Disagree	43,2
Neither agree nor disagree	7,1
Agree	5,4
Absolutely agree	2,1
Total	100,0

<b>I was subjected to discrimination because of my financial status, class.</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Absolutely disagree	24,1
Disagree	38,6
Neither agree nor disagree	11,9
Agree	17,9
Absolutely agree	7,4
Total	100,0

<b>Which of the following identities is THE MOST IMPORTANT for you?</b>	<b>Percent</b>
My religion / sect	53,4
My ethnicity	7,8
My gender	7,5
My political opinion	8,6
My financial status, class	22,7
Total	100,0

### 9.3. Situations in which violence is accepted

<b>Whom can a police officer or civil servant mistreat and you consider it as normal?</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Someone who is member of an illegal organization	44,5
Homosexual person	12,6
Unreligious person	7,1
Someone who is Syrian	6,5
Extremely religious-looking person	4,0
Someone who is opposite to the government	3,5
Kurdish person	2,8
A woman who wear revealing clothes	1,6
Alevi person	,6
Rich person	,4
Poor person	,2
Woman who wears headscarf	,1
Nobody should be mistreated; everyone should be treated equally within legal limits.	46,4

<b>In your opinion, is it acceptable and normal that the Republic of Turkey applies physical violence to its own citizens?</b>	<b>Percent</b>
In some cases it is normal and acceptable.	32,7
It is not normal and acceptable in any situation.	67,3
Total	100,0

<b>Is there a possibility of rightfulness in any of the following?</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Teacher beats up her/his student	6,7
Husband beats up his wife	2,8
Young man beats up his girlfriend/fiancé	1,0
Police officer beating up someone who seems politically suspicious	14,9
Police officer beating up people in an illegal demonstration group	17,6
Crowd beating up someone who seems politically suspicious	9,5
There is no rightfulness in any of them	69,9

<b>In which of the following situations do you interfere and try to prevent?</b>	<b>Percent</b>
A terrorist shelters in your neighborhood	68,7
Religious community meeting	10,9
A beggar/orphan shelters in your apartment	10,3
Members of a party, which I do not approve, distributes election manifestos in my neighborhood	5,8
Someone does not fast in Ramadan and eats	4,9
Speaking Kurdish on the street	4,5
New Year celebrations on the street	4,4
A couple joining hands in public transport	1,6
None of them	25,6

<b>Which of the following do you least want where you live?</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Extremely religious groups	15,6
Unreligious persons	21,9
Homosexuals	27,1
Kurds	2,9
Refugees	25,9
Roman people	1,3
Leftists	1,9
Nationalists	3,4
Total	100,0

<b>What do you want to be done so that these groups do not live in your place of residence?</b>	<b>Percent</b>
I expel them.	6,0
Neighborhood residents should expel them.	11,8
State should expel them.	58,3
Nothing, I don't want to be intervened.	23,9
Total	100,0

### 9.4. Mood of the Society

<b>More and more people are becoming introverted and are afraid of speaking on the street.</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Absolutely disagree	5,2
Disagree	12,6
Neither agree nor disagree	7,6
Agree	44,5
Absolutely agree	30,2
Total	100,0

<b>People react to each other very easily.</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Absolutely disagree	3,4
Disagree	6,3
Neither agree nor disagree	5,6
Agree	49,2
Absolutely agree	35,5
Total	100,0

<b>People trust to each other less.</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Absolutely disagree	2,0
Disagree	2,8
Neither agree nor disagree	4,2
Agree	44,7
Absolutely agree	46,2
Total	100,0

## 10.

### GLOSSARY of TERMS

All findings in Barometer reports are based on answers to the questions directed to respondents who were interviewed face-to-face in field surveys. Some questions and response options are then used in the rest of the report in short or simplified form. For example, the respondents who respond to the question on how religious they see themselves as “a person who is a believer, but does not fulfill religious requirements” are shortly identified as “believers” in the report. This glossary is prepared for both the readers who receive the report for the first time and the readers who need further clarification on the terms. The first table provides a list of the terms and their explanations, and the following tables list the questions and response options which establish the basis for these terms..

#### DEFINITION

<b>Alevi Muslim:</b>	A person who identifies his/her religion/sect as Alevi Muslim
<b>Arab:</b>	A person who identifies his/her ethnic origin as Arab
<b>Atheist:</b>	A person with no religious belief
<b>Believer:</b>	A person who believes in the requirements of the religion, but does not fulfill them completely
<b>Chador:</b>	A woman who wears a chador or a man whose spouse wears a chador
<b>Headscarf:</b>	A woman who covers her head or a man with a headscarf or whose spouse covers her head with a headscarf
<b>Kurdish:</b>	A person who identifies his/her ethnic origin as Kurdish
<b>Lower class:</b>	Households whose income per capita is in the lowest 20 percent segment
<b>Lower middle class:</b>	Households with an income per capita in the 60 percent segment but which do not own a car
<b>Metropolitan:</b>	Settlements which are located within the integrated boundaries of the most crowded 15 cities (differs from the official definition)
<b>Modern:</b>	A person who identifies his/her lifestyle as modern

<b>Multiple correspondence analysis</b>	A data analysis technique for nominal categorical data, used to detect and represent underlying structures in a data set. It is used for applying Correspondence Analysis (CA) to large data sets with more than two variables.
<b>New middle class:</b>	Households whose income per capita is in the 60 percent segment and which own a car
<b>No cover:</b>	A woman who does not cover her head or a man whose spouse does not cover her head
<b>Non-believer:</b>	A person who does not believe in the requirements of the religion
<b>Pious:</b>	A person who fulfills the requirements of the religion completely
<b>Religious:</b>	A person who tries to fulfill the requirements of the religion
<b>Religious conservative:</b>	A person who identifies his/her lifestyle as religious conservative
<b>Rural area:</b>	Settlements with a population of less than 4,000 (differs from the official definition)
<b>Sunni Muslim:</b>	A person who identifies his/her religion/sect as Sunni Muslim
<b>Turban:</b>	A woman who wears a turban or a man whose spouse wears a turban
<b>Turkish:</b>	A person who identifies his/her ethnic origin as Turkish
<b>Traditional conservative:</b>	A person who identifies his/her lifestyle as traditional conservative
<b>Urban area:</b>	Settlements with a population of more than 4,000 (differs from the official definition)
<b>Upper class:</b>	Households whose income per capita is in the highest 20 percent segment
<b>Zaza:</b>	A person who identifies his/her ethnic origin as Zaza

### 10.1. Questions and Response Options

<b>Which of the three lifestyle clusters below do you feel yourself belonging to?</b>
Modern
Traditional Conservative
Religious Conservative
<b>Which religion or sect do you feel you belong to?</b>
Sunni Muslim
Alevi Muslim
Other



**Settlement Code (Data obtained from the sample)**

Rural

Urban

Metropolitan

**We are all citizens of the Turkish Republic, but we may have different ethnic origins; which identity do you know/feel that you belong to?**

Turkish

Kurdish

Zaza

Arab

Other

**Do you cover your head or does your spouse cover her head when going out of your home? How do you cover your head?**

No head cover

Headscarf

Turban

Chador

Bachelor male

**Which of the following describe you in terms of piety?**

A person who does not believe in the requirements of the religion

A person who believes in the requirements of the religion, but does not fulfill them completely

A person who tries to fulfill the requirements of the religion

A person who fulfills the requirements of the religion completely

**Economic classes (determined by using household size, household income and car ownership)**

Lower class

Lower middle class

New middle class

Upper class



## ANNEX 1: QUESTIONNAIRE FORM

VG Nr: \_\_\_\_\_



### GOOD DAY MADAM/SIR,

*Let me ask you a few short questions. Our survey will take approximately 7-8 minutes to complete. Our research aims to determine what the public in general thinks, not what individuals think one by one. We ask for your sincere ideas with regards to our questions. Thank you very much for your interest and help.*

<b>MK Code (Written on the envelope):</b> .....					
<b>1.</b>	<b>Gender of the Interviewee</b> ( ) Female     ( ) Male				
<b>2.</b>	<b>How old are you?</b> .....				
<b>3.</b>	<b>What is your educational status, the last school you graduated from?</b> ( ) Illiterate   ( ) Literate without degree   ( ) Primary school graduate ( ) Primary education/Middle school graduate   ( ) High school graduate ( ) University graduate   ( ) Postgraduate / Doctorate				
<b>4.</b>	<b>What is your marital status?</b> ( ) Single   ( ) Engaged   ( ) Married   ( ) Widowed   ( ) Divorced				
<b>5.</b>	<b>How many people (including children) live in this house/household?</b> .....				
<b>6.</b>	<b>In which of the following three groups do you consider yourself in terms of LIFESTYLE? (TO THE INTERVIEWER: Mark ONE option that the interviewee says.)</b> ( ) Modern                      ( ) Traditional Conservative                      ( ) Religious Conservative				
<b>7.</b>	<b>Did you work on a job to earn money last week? If so, what is your profession?</b>				
	<i><b>If Employed:</b></i> ( ) Public officer, head, director etc. ( ) Officer, manager in private sector ( ) Worker ( ) Small retailer / driver vb. ( ) Merchant/industrialist/business	<i><b>If Unemployed</b></i> ( ) Doctor, architect, lawyer vs. (Self-employed) ( ) Farmer, agriculture, Stock breeder ( ) Employed, other: .....	( ) Retired	( ) Housewife	( ) Student
	( ) Unemployed	( ) Unemployable			
<b>8.</b>	<b>If there were a GENERAL ELECTION today, which party would you vote for?</b> <i>(TO THE INTERVIEWEE: Try to receive answers from those who say 'No answer' as much as possible.)</i> Party name: .....                      ( ) Swing voter                      ( ) Non-voter				
<b>9.</b>	<i>Now I'm going to read you a series of sentences about your different identities.</i> <b>Do you agree with the sentences regarding your gender, which I will read now?</b>	Absolutely disagree	Disagree	Neither agree Nor disagree	Agree
	Absolutely agree				
<b>9.1.</b>	<b>Those with the same gender as me are not at the place that they deserve in Turkey.</b>	( )	( )	( )	( )
<b>9.2.</b>	<b>Those with the same gender as me are threatened in Turkey.</b>	( )	( )	( )	( )
<b>9.3.</b>	<b>Violence can be used against others to protect those having the same gender as me so that they take their rightful places.</b>	( )	( )	( )	( )
<b>9.4.</b>	<b>I was subjected to discrimination because of my gender.</b>	( )	( )	( )	( )
<b>9.5.</b>	<b>I got beaten up because of my gender, I was subjected to violence.</b>	( )	( )	( )	( )
<b>9.6.</b>	<b>My gender is superior and therefore it is normal that I have more rights than the opposite gender.</b>	( )	( )	( )	( )

VG Nr: 

10.	<i>Do you agree with the sentences regarding your political opinion, which I will read now?</i>	Absolutely disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Absolutely agree
10.1.	<b>My political opinion is not at the place that it deserves in Turkey.</b>	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
10.2.	<b>My political opinion is threatened in Turkey.</b>	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
10.3.	<b>Violence can be used against others to protect my political opinion/ to ensure it takes its rightful place.</b>	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
10.4.	<b>I was subjected to discrimination because of my political opinion.</b>	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
10.5.	<b>I got beaten up because of my political opinion, I was subject to violence.</b>	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
10.6.	<b>My political opinion is superior and therefore it is normal that I have more rights than others.</b>	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
11.	<i>Do you agree with the sentences regarding your ethnicity, which I will read now?</i>	Absolutely disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Absolutely agree
11.1.	<b>My ethnicity is not at the place it deserves in Turkey.</b>	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
11.2.	<b>My ethnicity is threatened in Turkey.</b>	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
11.3.	<b>Violence can be used against others to protect my ethnicity/to ensure my ethnicity takes its rightful place.</b>	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
11.4.	<b>I was subjected to discrimination because of my ethnicity.</b>	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
11.5.	<b>I got beaten up/was subjected to violence because of my ethnicity.</b>	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
11.6.	<b>My ethnicity is superior to other ethnicities and therefore it is normal to have more rights than others.</b>	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
12.	<i>Do you agree with the sentences regarding your religion/sect, which I will read now?</i>	Absolutely disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Absolutely agree
12.1.	<b>My religion/sect is not at the place it deserves in Turkey.</b>	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
12.2.	<b>My religion/sect is threatened in Turkey.</b>	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
12.3.	<b>Violence can be used against others to protect my religion/sect and to ensure that it takes its rightful place.</b>	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
12.4.	<b>I was subjected to discrimination because of my religion/sect.</b>	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
12.5.	<b>I got beaten up/was subjected to violence because of my religion/sect.</b>	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
12.6.	<b>My religion/sect is superior to other religion/sects and therefore it is normal to have more rights than others.</b>	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )

VG Nr: 

<p>Do you agree with the sentences I will read about your financial situation, your economic class, in other words that you are poorer or richer than the rest of society?</p>	Absolutely disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Absolutely agree
<p>13.1. Those in my class are not at the place they deserve in Turkey.</p>	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
<p>13.2. Violence can be used against others to protect those, who belong to my class/so that they take their rightful places.</p>	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
<p>13.3. I was subjected to violence because of my financial status, my class.</p>	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
<p>14. Which of the identities that we read before is the MOST IMPORTANT to you? (TO THE INTERVIEWEE: Mark only ONE option) ( ) My religion / sect      ( ) My ethnicity      ( ) My gender      ( ) My political opinion ( ) My financial status, class</p>					
<p>15. Whom can a police officer or civil servant mistreat and you would consider it as normal? (TO THE INTERVIEWEE: Mark ALL of the said options.) [ ] Extremely religious-looking person      [ ] An Unreligious person [ ] A woman wearing revealing clothes      [ ] Homosexual person [ ] A poor person      [ ] Rich person [ ] Member of an illegal organization      [ ] Someone who is opposite to the government [ ] A Syrian      [ ] A Kurdish person [ ] A Woman who wears headscarf      [ ] An Alevi ( ) Nobody should be mistreated; everyone should be treated equally within legal limits.</p>					
<p>16. In your opinion, is it acceptable and normal that the Republic of Turkey applies physical violence to its own citizens? ( ) In some cases it is normal and acceptable. ( ) It is not normal and acceptable in any situation.</p>					
<p>17. Is there a possibility of rightfulness in any of the following? (TO THE INTERVIEWER: Mark ALL of the mentioned options.) [ ] Teacher beats up her/his student [ ] Husband beats up his wife [ ] Young man beats up his girlfriend/fiancé [ ] Police officer beats up someone who seems politically suspicious [ ] Police officer beats up people in an illegal demonstration group [ ] Crowd beats up someone who seems politically suspicious ( ) There is no rightfulness in any of them</p>					
<p>18. In which of the following situations do you interfere and try to prevent?? (TO THE INTERVIEWER: Mark ALL of the said options.) [ ] A terrorist shelters in your neighborhood [ ] Someone does not fast in Ramadan and eats [ ] New Year celebrations on the street [ ] Religious community meeting [ ] A beggar/orphan shelters in your apartment [ ] Speaking Kurdish on the street [ ] A couple joining hands in public transport [ ] Members of a party, which I do not approve, distribute election manifestos in my neighborhood ( ) None of them</p>					

VG Nr: 

<b>19. Which of the following do you least want where you live?</b>						
<input type="checkbox"/> Extremely religious groups <input type="checkbox"/> Unreligious persons <input type="checkbox"/> Homosexuals <input type="checkbox"/> Kurds <input type="checkbox"/> Refugees <input type="checkbox"/> Roman people <input type="checkbox"/> Leftists <input type="checkbox"/> Nationalists						
<b>20. What do you want to be done so that these groups do not live in your place of residence?</b>						
<input type="checkbox"/> I expel them. <input type="checkbox"/> Neighborhood residents should expel them. <input type="checkbox"/> State should expel them.. <input type="checkbox"/> Nothing, I don't want to be intervened.						
<b>21.</b>	<i>Could you tell me if you agree with the sentences I will read about the mood of society recently?</i>	Absolutely disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Absolutely agree
<b>21.1.</b>	<b>More and more people are becoming introverted and are afraid of speaking on the street.</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>21.2.</b>	<b>People react to each other very easily.</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>21.3.</b>	<b>People trust each other less.</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>22. Which TV channel do you prefer the most to watch the news?</b>						
Channel name: ..... <input type="checkbox"/> I do not follow the news on TV. <input type="checkbox"/> I do not follow the news.						
<b>23.</b>	<b>Does this household own an automobile?</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes		<input type="checkbox"/> No		
<b>24.</b>	<b>(If a man) Your wife (If a woman) You, do you wear headscarf when you go out? How do you cover up? (TO THE INTERVIEWER: Read the options to the interviewee and mark the interviewee's own response.)</b>					
<input type="checkbox"/> No head cover <input type="checkbox"/> Headscarf <input type="checkbox"/> Hijab <input type="checkbox"/> Chador, purdah <input type="checkbox"/> Interviewee is single male						
<b>25.</b>	<b>We are all citizens of the Republic of Turkey, but we can be of different ethnic origin; how do you understand or feel your identity?</b>					
<input type="checkbox"/> Turkish <input type="checkbox"/> Kurdish <input type="checkbox"/> Zaza <input type="checkbox"/> Arab <input type="checkbox"/> Other (Write): .....						
<b>26.</b>	<b>What religion or sect do you feel that you belong to?</b>					
<input type="checkbox"/> Sunni Muslim <input type="checkbox"/> Alevi Muslim <input type="checkbox"/> Other religions <input type="checkbox"/> No religious belief						
<b>27.</b>	<b>In terms of religiousness, with which of the following would you describe yourself?</b>					
<i>(TO THE INTERVIEWER: Read the answers below, mark the first one the interviewee says)</i>						
<input type="checkbox"/> Someone who does not have religious belief						
<input type="checkbox"/> Someone who does not believe in the requirements of the religion						
<input type="checkbox"/> Someone who is faithful but does not fulfill the requirements of the religion						
<input type="checkbox"/> A religious person trying to fulfill the requirements of the religion						
<input type="checkbox"/> A religious person who fulfills all the requirements of the religion						
<b>28.</b>	<b>What is the total monthly income of the people living in this house? How much money enters your house on average every month, including everyone's every type of earning? ..... Turkish lira</b>					
<b>29.</b>	<b>COMPLETION TIME OF THE SURVEY ... : .... (Don't leave it blank, but don't fill it up later if you've forgotten.)</b>					
<b>30.</b>	<b>Type of residence: (TO THE INTERVIEWER: Mark one of the following options without asking the interviewee.)</b>					
<input type="checkbox"/> Slums/apartment without external plastering <input type="checkbox"/> Single, traditional house						
<input type="checkbox"/> Apartment building <input type="checkbox"/> Housing estate <input type="checkbox"/> Very luxury building, villa						

Name Surname of the Interviewer : .....